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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 959a — Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41a (2025)

Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1976–2007 20citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 20 opinions since 1976. The most litigated part is subsection (4) (2 cases).

The following words and phrases, as used in this chapter, have the following meanings, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) “Wire communication” means any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of telephone or telegraph between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate or foreign communications;

(2) “Intercept” means the intentional overhearing or recording of a wire communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device or a cell site simulator device;

(3) “Electronic, mechanical or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire communication other than (A) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof (i) furnished to the subscriber or used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business, or (ii) being used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business, or (B) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal;

(4) “Cell site simulator device” means a device that transmits or receives radio waves for the purpose of conducting one or more of the following operations: (A) Identifying, locating or tracking the movements of a communications device, (B) intercepting, obtaining, accessing or forwarding the communications, stored data or metadata of a communications device, (C) affecting the hardware or software operations or functions of a communications device, (D) forcing transmissions from, or connections to, a communications device, (E) denying a communications device access to other communications devices, communications protocols or services, or (F) spoofing or simulating a communications device, cell tower, cell site or service. “Cell site simulator device” includes, but is not limited to, an international mobile subscriber identity catcher or other invasive cell phone or telephone surveillance or eavesdropping device that mimics a cell phone tower and sends out signals to cause cell phones in the area to transmit their locations, identifying information and communications content, or a passive interception device or digital analyzer that does not send signals to a communications device under surveillance. “Cell site simulator device” does not include any device used or installed by an electric distribution company, as defined in section 16-1, solely to the extent that such device is used by the electric distribution company to measure electrical usage, to provide services to customers or to operate the electric grid;

(5) “Person” means any officer, agent or employee of the state of Connecticut or any political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, limited liability company or corporation;

(6) “Investigative officer” means (A) any officer of the Connecticut state police, (B) the chief inspector or any inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, (C) any municipal police officer who has been duly sworn as a special state police officer under the provisions of section 29-177 and who is currently assigned to the state-wide narcotics task force or the state-wide organized crime investigative task force and is acting under the direct authority of the Connecticut state police, and (D) any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of offenses enumerated in this chapter;

(7) “Law enforcement officer” means any officer of any organized police department of this state or of the state police of any other state, an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration or United States Customs Service, or the United States attorney for the district of Connecticut or a person designated by him in writing to receive the contents of any wire communication or evidence derived therefrom;

(8) “Contents”, when used with respect to any wire communication, means and includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport or meaning of that communication;

(9) “Panel of judges” or “panel” means any panel or panels of three Superior Court judges specifically designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from time to time to receive applications for, and to enter orders authorizing, interceptions of wire communications in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;

(10) “Communication common carrier” means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire in the transmission of communications by wire or radio;

(11) “Aggrieved person” means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire communication, a person against whom the interception was directed, a person named in any order authorizing an interception, or a person having a property interest in any premises involved in any interception.

(1971, P.A. 68, S. 1; P.A. 79-179, S. 1; P.A. 82-368, S. 1; P.A. 83-543, S. 1; P.A. 87-229; P.A. 95-79, S. 184, 189; P.A. 17-221, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-179 replaced single definition for “investigative or law enforcement officer” with a separate definition for each, applying existing definition to investigative officers and adding chief inspectors and inspectors of criminal justice division; P.A. 82-368 expanded the definitions of “investigative office” to include municipal police officers as specified and “law enforcement officer” to include state police of other states and FBI or Drug Enforcement Administration officials; P.A. 83-543 expanded the definition of “law enforcement officer” to include the U.S. attorney for Connecticut or his designee; P.A. 87-229 expanded the definition of “law enforcement officer” to include an official of the United States Customs Service; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 17-221 redefined “intercept” in Subdiv. (2) to include reference to cell site simulator device, added new Subdiv. (4) to define “cell site simulator device”, redesignated existing Subdivs. (4) to (10) as Subdivs. (5) to (11), and made technical changes.

Cited. 171 C. 524; 191 C. 360; 194 C. 447. “Wire communication” as defined in section includes the radio wave portion of a cordless telephone conversation. 224 C. 593. Cited. 238 C. 253; Id., 692.

Cited. 8 CA 673; 10 CA 347.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41a most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 54-41a 48×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“The dispositive issue in these consolidated appeals is whether a communication over the radio wave portion of a cordless telephone is a “[w]ire communi *595 cation” as defined in General Statutes § 54-41a (1), 1 which is part of our judicially supervised wiretap act (wiretap…”
The case’s holding
Cordless telephone conversations are covered by Connecticut's wiretap statutes, so the radio-wave portion of such a conversation is a wire communication whose unauthorized interception requires suppression.
Later courts cite it for
“we do not believe that the legislative intent behind the wiretap act was to leave such unknowing third parties unprotected simply because the telephonic technology in such widespread use today was not available in 1971” · 1 citing court
2
GREENWashington v. Meachum, 680 A.2d 262 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 54-41a 7×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“The plaintiffs appeal, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the department regulations permitting the monitoring and recording of nonprivileged inmate telephone calls (a) do not violate either the “eavesdropping statutes”; General Statutes §§ 53a-187…”
The case’s holding
Monitoring of nonprivileged inmate mail and telephone calls is permissible to further substantial governmental interests in security, order, and rehabilitation.
Later courts cite it for
“it is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts . . . and that such access must be adequate, effective and meaningful.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Tomasko, 681 A.2d 922 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 54-41a 6×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
““In general terms, our wiretap act [General Statutes § 54-41a et seq.] provides that, based upon certain specified findings, a panel of three Superior Court judges may issue an order authorizing ‘the interception of wire communications within the state of Connecticut.”
The case’s holding
A defendant has no fundamental constitutional right to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense because the right is purely a matter of common law.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no fundamental constitutional right to a jury instruction on every lesser included offense . . . rather, the right to such an instruction is purely a matter of our common law.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENIn re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1995).
cites § 54-41a 7×subsections: (2) 2× (3) 2× (1)cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“(Title III), 28 and the Connecticut Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-41a et seq. (State Wiretap Act).”
The case’s holding
Government officials lack qualified immunity for the unauthorized recording of private telephone calls when the right to privacy is clearly established and the conduct is objectively unreasonable.
Later courts cite it for
“applies not only to evidence which would support a conviction, but to 'information which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution, as well as evidence which an individual reasonably believes could be used against him in a criminal prosecution.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Ross, 481 A.2d 730 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 54-41a 8×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“, erred in concluding that there was no probable cause to support the state’s application for an order authorizing interception of certain telephonic communications under General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. On May 1,1981, the state’s attorney for the judicial district of Waterbury…”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must apply a more penetrating standard of review to wiretap applications than to search warrants to ensure the affidavit establishes probable cause.
Later courts cite it for
“examination of the plain language of general statutes 54-41a et seq. quickly makes it abundantly clear that the legislature sought to limit carefully such intrusions” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENState v. DeMartin, 370 A.2d 1038 (Conn. 1976).
cites § 54-41a 8×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“The defendant also moved to suppress the transcripts of these conversations.”
7
GREENState v. John G., 918 A.2d 986 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 54-41a 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“[5] The defendant makes no claim that the state violated Connecticut's wiretapping statutes, General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. [6] We note that although the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress on the basis of State v.”
Later courts cite it for
“furthermore, striking similarities between the charged and uncharged misconduct, such as the nature of the crimes and the identity of the victims, make the evidence of prior misconduct highly probative” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 54-41a 8×subsections: (10) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“These appeals concern the extent to which the state police are required to minimize electronic *362 surveillance when conducting telephone wiretaps pursuant to General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. (wiretap statute), in the course of a narcotics investigation.”
9
GREENState v. Chiarizio, 514 A.2d 370 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 54-41a 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“We do not believe that General Statutes § 54-41a requires more from the three-judge wiretap panel.”
10
GREENState v. Grullon, 562 A.2d 481 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 54-41a 3×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“II The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the transcripts of his telephone conversations with the brother, which he had moved to suppress prior to trial, because (a) the wiretap constituted an unreasonable search, and (b) there is no…”
The case’s holding
The conspiracy statute is bilateral in nature and requires proof that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in criminal conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“held in states v. grullon, 212 conn. 195, 199 , 562 a.2d 481 (1989), that our conspiracy statute is bilateral in nature: 'our examination of the definition of the crime of conspiracy in 53a-48 convinces us that the legislature has determined that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Ross, 454 A.2d 266 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 54-41a 2×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“See General Statutes §§ 54-41a *45 through 54-41s.”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of appellant-induced error does not bar an appeal when the state seeks dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of a dispositive suppression order.
Later courts cite it for
“an appellant cannot ordinarily claim error in the action of the trial court which he has induced.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. McLoughlin, 723 A.2d 827 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
cites § 54-41a 15×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“2d 133 (1993) (holding that cordless telephones are covered by General Statutes §§ 54-41a through 54-41t, Connecticut’s wiretap statutes).”
13
GREENState v. Formica, 489 A.2d 1060 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-41a 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“2d 730 (1984) (“examination of the plain language of General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. quickly makes it abundantly clear that the legislature sought to limit carefully such intrusions”); State v.”
14
GREENState v. Brown, 543 A.2d 750 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 54-41a 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“The affidavit of Solomon and Lengyel supporting their application was based in part on the results of certain telephone wiretaps authorized by a panel of Superior Court judges pursuant to chapter 959a of the General Statutes; General Statutes §§ 54-41a through 54-41t; our…”
The case’s holding
Evidence obtained through objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is admissible under the Connecticut constitution.
Later courts cite it for
“in dechamplain , the court found a lack of probable cause to believe that drugs were located in the defendant's apartment, because the only fact establishing a nexus to the apartment was a single telephone call to the defendant at his apartment in which he received an order for the purchase of drugs.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Scott, 522 A.2d 1245 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 54-41a 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“” General Statutes § 54-41a (10), in turn, defines the term “aggrieved person” to mean “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire communication, a person against whom the interception was directed, a person named in any order authorizing an interception, or a person…”
16
GREENCrooker v. U. S. Dep't of Just., 497 F. Supp. 500 (D. Conn. 1980).
cites § 54-41a 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“1978), and the question of whether the statute is meant to apply to agents of the federal government as distinguished from those of the state, see Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-41a(4), the Court concludes, in view of the fact that the Connecticut statute was patterned after, and, indeed,…”
17
GREENState v. Vallas, 547 A.2d 903 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 54-41a 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“On January 28, 1986, the state’s attorney-for the judicial district of New Haven applied to the state wiretap panel, pursuant to Chapter 959a of the General Statutes; General Statutes §§ 54-41a through 54-41t; for *249 authorization to intercept calls to and from telephone…”
18
GREENSchmidt v. Devino, 206 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D. Conn. 2001).
cites § 54-41a 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 6 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
19
GREENState v. Vincente, 688 A.2d 359 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
cites § 54-41a 4×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 54-41a
“On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress* 2 certain evi *252 dence that he claimed resulted from telephone conversations intercepted in violation of the Connecticut wiretapping statutes, General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. We…”
20
NEUTRALState v. Mastrianni, 501 A.2d 772 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-41a 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 54-41a
“The pertinent evidence was derived from court ordered electronic surveillance obtained, under General Statutes § 54-41a et seq., at the request of the state’s attorney for the Hartford Judicial District.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197619912007

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1983. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.8Conn. App. Ct.8D. Conn.3Conn. Super. Ct.1
By subsection
(1)1 case
In re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1995).“(Title III), 28 and the Connecticut Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-41a et seq. (State Wiretap Act).”
(2)1 case
In re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1995).
(3)1 case
In re State Police Litig., 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1995).
(4)2 cases
Crooker v. U. S. Dep't of Just., 497 F. Supp. 500 (D. Conn. 1980).“1978), and the question of whether the statute is meant to apply to agents of the federal government as distinguished from those of the state, see Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-41a(4), the Court concludes, in view of the fact that the Connecticut statute was patterned after, and, indeed,…”
Schmidt v. Devino, 206 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D. Conn. 2001).
(10)1 case
State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799 (Conn. 1983).“These appeals concern the extent to which the state police are required to minimize electronic *362 surveillance when conducting telephone wiretaps pursuant to General Statutes § 54-41a et seq. (wiretap statute), in the course of a narcotics investigation.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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