(a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
(1) The person recklessly or intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or
(2) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(3) The person intentionally causes physical injury to a law-enforcement officer, a volunteer firefighter, a full-time firefighter, emergency medical technician, paramedic, fire police officer, fire marshal, correctional officer, a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, public transit operator, hospital security officer or constable, code enforcement constable, or a code enforcement officer who is acting in the lawful performance of duty. For purposes of this subsection, if a law-enforcement officer is off duty and the nature of the assault is related to that law-enforcement officer’s official position, then it shall fall within the meaning of “official duties” of a law-enforcement officer; or
(4) The person intentionally causes physical injury to the operator of an ambulance, a rescue squad member, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, paramedic, licensed medical doctor, or any person providing health-care treatment or employed by a health-care provider while such person is performing a work-related duty; or
(5) The person intentionally causes physical injury to any other person while such person is rendering emergency care; or
(6) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to another person who is 62 years of age or older; or
(7) The person intentionally assaults a law-enforcement officer while in the performance of the officer’s duties, with any disabling chemical spray, or with any aerosol or hand sprayed liquid or gas with the intent to incapacitate such officer and prevent the officer from performing such duties; or
(8) The person intentionally, while engaged in commission of any crime enumerated in this chapter, assaults any other person with any disabling chemical spray, or with any aerosol or hand sprayed liquid or gas with the intent to incapacitate the victim; or
(9) The person intentionally causes physical injury to any state employee or officer when that employee or officer is discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of employment or office; or
(10) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to a pregnant female. It is no defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the person was unaware that the victim was pregnant; or
(11) A person who is 18 years of age or older and who recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to another person who has not yet reached the age of 6 years. In any prosecution of a parent, guardian, foster parent, legal custodian or other person similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of a child victim pursuant to this paragraph, the State shall be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any justification offered by § 468(1) of this title. In any prosecution of a teacher or school administrator pursuant to this paragraph, the State shall be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any justification offered by § 468(2) of this title; or
(12) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to a law-enforcement officer, security officer, fire police officer, fire fighter, paramedic, or emergency medical technician in the lawful performance of their duties by means of an electronic control device shall be a class C felony.
(b) It is no defense, for an offense under paragraph (a)(6) of this section, that the accused did not know the person’s age or that the accused reasonably believed the person to be under the age of 62.
(c) It is no defense, for an offense under paragraph (a)(11) of this section, that the accused did not know the person’s age or that the accused reasonably believed the person to be 6 years of age or older.
(d) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony, unless the offense is a class C felony as described in paragraph (a)(12) of this section.
11 Del. C. 1953,
§
612;
58 Del. Laws, c. 497,
§
1;
63 Del. Laws, c. 50,
§
1;
63 Del. Laws, c. 237,
§
1;
67 Del. Laws, c. 130,
§
8;
68 Del. Laws, c. 129,
§§
1, 3;
69 Del. Laws, c. 24,
§§
3, 4;
69 Del. Laws, c. 189,
§
1;
69 Del. Laws, c. 367,
§
1;
70 Del. Laws, c. 128,
§§
1-5;
70 Del. Laws, c. 186,
§
1;
71 Del. Laws, c. 307,
§
1;
71 Del. Laws, c. 374,
§§
4, 5;
72 Del. Laws, c. 34,
§
10;
72 Del. Laws, c. 43,
§
5;
72 Del. Laws, c. 173,
§§
1, 2;
73 Del. Laws, c. 126,
§§
3, 16;
74 Del. Laws, c. 199;
76 Del. Laws, c. 270,
§
3;
77 Del. Laws, c. 119,
§
1;
77 Del. Laws, c. 265,
§
1;
78 Del. Laws, c. 325,
§
1;
80 Del. Laws, c. 287,
§
1;
83 Del. Laws, c. 334,
§
1;
84 Del. Laws, c. 514,
§
15;
Notes of Decisions
Royce Brown v. John F. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013).
“1, characterizing his two prior felony convictions — one for second-degree assault in violation of 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3); the other for Arson in the Third Degree in violation of 11 Del.”
Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774 (Del. 2007).
“11 Del. C. § 612(a)(2). 14 . 11 Del. C. § 222(4).”
McLaughlin v. Carroll, 270 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Del. 2003).
· cites it 3× “According to 11 Del.Code Ann. § 612, a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) the person recklessly or intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or (2) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to another person by…”
Mills v. State, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).
“[25] See 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3) (defining assault in the second degree).”
Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009).
“CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the assault second degree conviction is reversed and all remaining convictions are affirmed.”
State v. Keis (Del. Super. Ct. 2021).
· cites it 2× “§ 826A; and one count of Assault of a Person over 62 years old, 11 Del. C. § 612. The Court found him not guilty on the remaining charge of Tampering with Physical Evidence.”
Wilson v. May (D. Del. 2022).
· cites it 2× “” 11 Del. Code § 612(a)(2). The Delaware Code defines “physical injury” as an “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”
Hale v. State (Del. 2024).
· cites it 2× “33 (18) Hale argues that a specific-unanimity instruction was required because the alternative theories were “conceptually different” for the second-degree assault charge.34 As mentioned above, the charge alleges the elements of 11 Del.”
Boyer v. Redman, 553 F. Supp. 219 (D. Del. 1982).
“See 11 Del.C. § 612(4). Accordingly, under Delaware evidence law in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial, the assault and battery conviction would have been admissible to impeach Scott’s credibility.”
State v. Anderson (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
“Anderson Was indicted on June 23, 2014 on a charge of Assault Second Degree under 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(6), Which provides: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree When: .”
State v. Harris (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
“§ 1257. In exchange for Harris’ plea, the State entered nolle prosequis on the remaining charges.”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(1) — 1 case
— 11 Del. C. § 612(2) — 1 case
McLaughlin v. Carroll, 270 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Del. 2003).
“According to 11 Del.Code Ann. § 612, a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) the person recklessly or intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or (2) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to another person by…”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(3)(2) — 1 case
— 11 Del. C. § 612(4) — 1 case
Boyer v. Redman, 553 F. Supp. 219 (D. Del. 1982).
“See 11 Del.C. § 612(4). Accordingly, under Delaware evidence law in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial, the assault and battery conviction would have been admissible to impeach Scott’s credibility.”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a) — 1 case
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(1) — 2 cases
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(11) — 1 case
Hale v. State (Del. 2024).
“33 (18) Hale argues that a specific-unanimity instruction was required because the alternative theories were “conceptually different” for the second-degree assault charge.34 As mentioned above, the charge alleges the elements of 11 Del.”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(2) — 3 cases
Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774 (Del. 2007).
“11 Del. C. § 612(a)(2). 14 . 11 Del. C. § 222(4).”
Wilson v. May (D. Del. 2022).
“” 11 Del. Code § 612(a)(2). The Delaware Code defines “physical injury” as an “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”
Hale v. State (Del. 2024).
“33 (18) Hale argues that a specific-unanimity instruction was required because the alternative theories were “conceptually different” for the second-degree assault charge.34 As mentioned above, the charge alleges the elements of 11 Del.”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3) — 4 cases
Royce Brown v. John F. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013).
“1, characterizing his two prior felony convictions — one for second-degree assault in violation of 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3); the other for Arson in the Third Degree in violation of 11 Del.”
Mills v. State, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007).
“[25] See 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(3) (defining assault in the second degree).”
Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009).
“CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the assault second degree conviction is reversed and all remaining convictions are affirmed.”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(6) — 3 cases
State v. Anderson (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
“Anderson Was indicted on June 23, 2014 on a charge of Assault Second Degree under 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(6), Which provides: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree When: .”
— 11 Del. C. § 612(d) — 3 cases
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