D.C. Code

D.C. Code § 23-1331 (2026)

Definitions.

✓ current as of July 2026
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As used in this subchapter:

(1) The term “judicial officer” means, unless otherwise indicated, any person or court in the District of Columbia authorized pursuant to section 3041 of Title 18, United States Code, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bail or otherwise release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court.

(2) The term “offense” means any criminal offense committed in the District of Columbia, other than an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal, which is in violation of an Act of Congress.

(3) The term “dangerous crime” means:

(A) Any felony offense under Chapter 45 of Title 22 (Weapons) or Unit A of Chapter 25 of Title 7 (Firearms Control);

(B) Any felony offense under Chapter 27 of Title 22 (Prostitution, Pandering);

(C) Any felony offense under Unit A of Chapter 9 of Title 48 (Controlled Substances);

(D) Arson or attempted arson of any premises adaptable for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business;

(E) Burglary or attempted burglary;

(F) Cruelty to children;

(G) Robbery or attempted robbery;

(H) Sexual abuse in the first degree, or assault with intent to commit first degree sexual abuse;

(I) Any felony offense established by the Prohibition Against Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2010 [D.C. Law 18-239; § 22-1831 et seq.] or any conspiracy to commit such an offense; or

(J) Fleeing from an officer in a motor vehicle (felony).

(4) The term “crime of violence” means aggravated assault; act of terrorism; arson; assault on a police officer (felony); assault with a dangerous weapon; assault with intent to kill, commit first degree sexual abuse, commit second degree sexual abuse, or commit child sexual abuse; assault with significant bodily injury; assault with intent to commit any other offense; burglary; carjacking; armed carjacking; child sexual abuse; cruelty to children in the first degree; extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence; gang recruitment, participation, or retention by the use or threatened use of force, coercion, or intimidation; kidnapping; malicious disfigurement; manslaughter; manufacture or possession of a weapon of mass destruction; mayhem; murder; robbery; sexual abuse in the first, second, or third degrees; use, dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.

(5) The term “addict” means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug as defined by section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare.

(6) The term “physical injury” means bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: James J. Dorsey v. United States, 154 A.3d 106 (D.C. 2017).
James J. Dorsey v. United States, 154 A.3d 106 (D.C. 2017). · cites it 2× “In turn, D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) defines “crime of violence” to include, inter alia, “aggravated assault,” “assault with a dangerous weapon,” and “an attempt .”
In re: K.G., 178 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2018). · cites it 4× “A term of art, “dangerous crimes” is defined in D.C. Code § 23-1331 (3) to include a range of offenses — some that may cause direct physical harm to others (e.”
Jackson v. Gov't of the Dist. of Columbia, 975 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2013). · cites it 5× “Jackson pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-1331 (1) [sic] and D.C. Code § 23-1331 (1) *57 [sic] is unconstitutional because it criminalizes speech protected by the First Amendment.”
Luis Vargas-Sarmiento v. United States Dep't of Just., Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 448 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006). “(quoting D.C.Code § 23-1331(4) (1981)) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.”
Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1989). · cites it 2× “It is inconceivable to me that this evidence — containing no adult criminal record of a "dangerous crime," D.C.Code § 23-1331(3) (1981) — could be deemed clear and convincing evidence of future dangerousness within the meaning of the pretrial detention statute.”
United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). “D.C.Code § 23-1331(4) (1981) (most recently amended 2002).”
United States v. Singleton, Carlos T., 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “statute, the Senate Report cited D.C.Code §§ 23-1331(3) (defining "dangerous crime”) & (4) (defining "crime of violence”), neither of which listed a purely possessory offense of any kind.”
United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007). “(citing D.C.Code § 23-1331(3), (4) (1981)). UUMT and similar offenses are not listed.”
Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1974). · cites it 2× “Code § 23-1322(a)(2) and as defined in D.C.Code § 23-1331(4). 2. The defendant has been convicted of a crime of violence within a ten year period immediately preceding the alleged crime of violence for which he is presently charged; to wit, a March 31, 1967 robbery conviction in…”
Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F. Supp. 1292 (D.D.C. 1972). · cites it 2× “D.C.Code § 23-1331(3) (Supp. IV, 1971): The term “dangerous crime” means (A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying…”
Darius Briscoe v. United States, 181 A.3d 651 (D.C. 2018). “) (incorporating the definition set forth in D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) (2012 Repl.) ). The mandatory-minimum provisions of § 22-4502 were enacted through a voter initiative effective June 7, 1983.”
Bland v. United States, 153 A.3d 78 (D.C. 2016). · cites it 2× “See D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) (2012 Repl). . That the statements were not made by appellant personally does not mean they cannot be treated as his admissions.”
— D.C. Code § 23-1331(3) — 5 cases
Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1989). “It is inconceivable to me that this evidence — containing no adult criminal record of a "dangerous crime," D.C.Code § 23-1331(3) (1981) — could be deemed clear and convincing evidence of future dangerousness within the meaning of the pretrial detention statute.”
United States v. Singleton, Carlos T., 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “statute, the Senate Report cited D.C.Code §§ 23-1331(3) (defining "dangerous crime”) & (4) (defining "crime of violence”), neither of which listed a purely possessory offense of any kind.”
United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007). “(citing D.C.Code § 23-1331(3), (4) (1981)). UUMT and similar offenses are not listed.”
Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F. Supp. 1292 (D.D.C. 1972). “D.C.Code § 23-1331(3) (Supp. IV, 1971): The term “dangerous crime” means (A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying…”
— D.C. Code § 23-1331(4) — 6 cases
Luis Vargas-Sarmiento v. United States Dep't of Just., Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 448 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006). “(quoting D.C.Code § 23-1331(4) (1981)) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.”
United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). “D.C.Code § 23-1331(4) (1981) (most recently amended 2002).”
Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1974). “Code § 23-1322(a)(2) and as defined in D.C.Code § 23-1331(4). 2. The defendant has been convicted of a crime of violence within a ten year period immediately preceding the alleged crime of violence for which he is presently charged; to wit, a March 31, 1967 robbery conviction in…”
Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F. Supp. 1292 (D.D.C. 1972). “D.C.Code § 23-1331(3) (Supp. IV, 1971): The term “dangerous crime” means (A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying…”
United States v. Mathis, 739 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1990).
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