United States v. Joseph F. Frank, Joseph C. Stead, Jr., & Agnes Toomer, Agnes Toomer, 290 F.2d 195 (3rd Cir. 1961). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Joseph F. Frank, Joseph C. Stead, Jr., & Agnes Toomer, Agnes Toomer, 290 F.2d 195 (3rd Cir. 1961). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Levy (njd, 1988-08-23)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Levy
D.N.J. · 1988 · confidence medium
United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir.1961); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 853 (7th Cir.1985) (“because an agreement is difficult to prove with direct evidence, circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom ... may serve as proof.”) This point was aptly explained by the Second Circuit in United States v. Cassino, 467 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 , 93 S.Ct. 957 , 34 L.Ed.2d 276 (1973): To establish a conspiracy the government is not required to show that two or more persons sat around a table and then entered into a solemn pact…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Frederick Ines Gordon, United States of America v. Edward Loeswick
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See United States v. Mosley, 786 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S.Ct. 2919 , 91 L.Ed.2d 548 (1986); United States v. Price, 763 F.2d 640, 643 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 821 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995 , 101 S.Ct. 534 , 66 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980); United States v. Sheehy, 541 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir.1976); United States v. Untiedt, 493 F.2d 1056 , 1059 n. 3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 862 , 95 S.Ct. 115 , 42 L.Ed.2d 98 (1974); United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. William Mosley
7th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
United States v. Price, 763 F.2d 640, 643 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 821 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Berardi, 629 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995 , 101 S.Ct. 234 , 66 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980); United States v. Sheehy, 541 F.2d 123, 130 (1st Cir.1976); Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 , 91 S.Ct. 1636 , 29 L.Ed.2d 115 (1971); United States v. Costner, 359 F.2d 969, 974 (6th Cir.1966); Franklin v. United States, 330 F.2d 205, 207 (D.C.Cir.1964); United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir.19…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Machi
E.D. Wis. · 1971 · confidence medium
In United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3rd Cir. 1961), the court stated: ‘An express agreement is not necessary to prove conspiracy * * * “[It] is an axiomatic principle of law that a conspiracy charge may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone”. ’ ” Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 , 47 S.Ct. 300 , 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); Brown v. United States, 403 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1968); Medrano v. United States, 285 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Nomura Trading Company, 213 F.Supp. 704, 706 (S.D.N.Y.1963); United States v. Bitz, 179 F.Supp. 80, 86 (S.D.N…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cullen
E.D. Wis. · 1969 · confidence medium
In United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3rd Cir. 1961), the court stated: ‘An express agreement is not necessary to prove conspiracy * * * “ [I] t is an axiomatic principle of law that a conspiracy charge may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone”.’ ” Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 , 47 S.Ct. 300 , 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927); Brown v. United States, 403 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1968); Medrano v. United States, 285 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Nomura Trading Company, 213 F.Supp. 704, 706 (D.C.N.Y.1963); United States v. Bitz, 179 F.Supp. 80, 86 (D.C.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Brandom
E.D. Wis. · 1967 · confidence medium
In United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3rd Cir. 1961), the court stated: “An express agreement is not necessary to prove conspiracy * * * ‘[I]t is an axiomatic principle of law that a conspiracy charge may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone’.” Does count 18 allege two or more distinct conspiracies involving different groupings of defendants?
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ward Baking Company
E.D. Pa. · 1963 · confidence medium
“The gist of the offense of conspiracy * * * is agreement 2 among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy,” United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 , 61 S.Ct. 204, 207 , 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940), but “An express agreement is not necessary to prove con *69 spiracy.” United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195, 196 (3rd Cir. 1961), cert. den.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Walter Rex Johnston, Iii, United States of America v. Harry Balk
6th Cir. · 1963 · confidence medium
United *292 States v. Frank, 3 Cir., 290 F.2d 195, 196 (1961); Cwach v. United States, 8 Cir., 212 F.2d 520, 525 (1954); Andrews v. United States, 10 Cir., 78 F.2d 274 , 105 A.L.R. 322 (1935).
cited Cited "see" cadc 1966
D.C. Cir. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
cited Cited "see" Cupo v. United States
D.C. Cir. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Frank, 290 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
UNITED STATES of America
v.
Joseph F. FRANK, Joseph C. Stead, Jr., and Agnes Toomer, Agnes Toomer, Appellant
13499_1.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
May 8, 1961.
290 F.2d 195
Gilbert S. Bachmann, Wheeling, W.Va. (Owen B. McManus, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., Andrew J. Goodwin, Wheeling, W. Va., on the brief), for appellant., W. Wendell Stanton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Hubert I. Teitelbaum, U. S. Atty., W. Wendall Stanton, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Goodrich, Kalodner, Staley.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant under the so-called “Mann Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 2422. The indictment upon which the present defendant and others were indicted contained two counts. One was for the substantive offense; the other was for conspiracy. The defendant was prosecuted and convicted upon the conspiracy count only.

[*196] Various objections are made to the conviction. It is argued that the indictment is defective since it does not set out an agreement on defendant’s part. There is no merit to this point. An express agreement is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Judge Staley, in a recent case in this Court, pointed out that criminal plottings are spawned in secrecy. “[I]t is an axiomatic principle of law that a conspiracy charge may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone.” United States v. Migliorino, 3 Cir., 1956, 238 F.2d 7, 9.

Defendant’s counsel makes a very strong argument to the effect that the indictment is duplicitous. The first count charges a substantive offense only and the present defendant is not involved. Count two charges conspiracy and then adds some language which certainly is open to the construction that it charges the substantive offense of transportation in interstate commerce. We have a very strong statement on the duplicity point in United States v. Richie, 3 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 436. The court points out that the objection is waived unless there is a motion prior to trial to dismiss the indictment. Appellant endeavors to meet that decision by saying that the trial court here did not give any consideration to the motion to dismiss because it was not filed before arraignment and did not see fit to exercise its discretion to permit the motion to be argued within a reasonable time after arraignment. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) (3), 18 U.S.C.A. But the force of the argument is completely lost because the motion to dismiss did not include any objection on the basis of duplicity. In this ease the trial judge pointed out to the jury the difference between the two counts in the indictment, and further told them clearly that in considering the conspiracy count they should consider each defendant’s case separately. There was no confusion.

In its list of overt acts the Government includes one very remarkable charge that “On or about March 25, 1959, at Pittsburgh, in the County of Allegheny, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, said Patricia Ann Kister practiced prostitution at the 26th Street Hotel, Wheeling, West Virginia.” We may disregard the allegation of this extraordinary feat because there are five overt acts charged and only one has to be proved. Hall v. United States, 10 Cir., 1940, 109 F.2d 976. This was done.

The chief point in the case concerns a telephone call made from the defendant Stead from his apartment in Pittsburgh to one “Agnes, 26th Street Hotel, Wheeling, West Virginia.” Kister was the chief Government witness and she was the one who was concerned in the transaction. But such a person is not a coconspirator even though a willing object of interstate transportation for purposes of prostitution. Gebardi v. United States, 1932, 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206.

Kister testified that in her presence and hearing in Stead’s apartment in Pittsburgh a person-to-person call was made by Stead to “Agnes,” 26th Street Hotel, Wheeling, West Virginia. This “Agnes” is the defendant here. Kister could not hear what was said at the other end of the line in Wheeling but could hear and did testify to what Stead himself said. As a result of the conversation, according to the witness, arrangements were made for her to travel to Wheeling, West Virginia, and there serve as a prostitute in the defendant’s “hotel.” This arrangement was carried out; she did take the trip and did so serve.

The case presents on its facts a situation very similar to Cwach v. United States, 8 Cir., 1954, 212 F.2d 520. In that case the report of the telephone conversation was corroborated by the supporting evidence from the telephone company that the call was made at the time and place that it was supposed to have been made to the person who was claimed to have received it. Such corroboration would have made the Government’s case easier here. But the jury was satisfied with what was submitted to it. There[*197] were corroborative facts and evidence supporting Kister’s testimony. The judge submitted the case fairly to the jury. There was no error.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.