Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
125 citation events (61 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ryan v. Bell (nynd, 2025-03-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ryan v. Bell
N.D.N.Y. · 2025 · confidence medium
Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Attorneys’ affidavits not based upon personal knowledge have been held not to comply with Rule 56(e) at least since Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 , 831, 70 S.Ct. 894, 896 , 94 L.Ed. 1312 (1950), a position this court has frequently reiterated . . . .”); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The first flaw in the granting of summary judgment to defendants in the present case was the court’s reliance on the materials submitted by defendants as having established the contents of the s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bell v. Hamilton County Tennessee
E.D. Tenn. · 2025 · confidence medium
P. 56(e); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting an attorney affidavit was improper because it was not based on a personal knowledge of the events giving rise to the underlying litigation))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Socci v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
E.D.N.Y · 2024 · confidence medium
Moore Federal Practice par. 56.22[1] at 56–752 to 56–755 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted), Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. Correction
D. Conn. · 2024 · confidence medium
"This result flows logically from the more generalized proposition that 'an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed.'" Abrams, 2018 WL 1469057 , at *6 (quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) SE v. Peter Herzig
S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
Because of this admissibility requirement, “‘[h]earsay testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in [an] affidavit.’” Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. Delmar
W.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
However, “it is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramos v. Guaba Deli Grocery Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986) and citing Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tolliver v. Jordan
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Jan. 11, 2012) (citing Cty. of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010); Muhammad v. City of New York Dep’t of Corr., 126 F.3d 119 , 122-23 (2d Cir. 1997); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Touchette
D. Vt. · 2020 · confidence medium
(Doc. 16 at 4–5.) The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual controversy . . . be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed.” Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grant v. Department of Corrections
E.D.N.Y · 2019 · confidence medium
“It is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Jd. (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Stanford
S.D.N.Y. · 2019 · confidence medium
Jd. atn.1 (citing Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tayler Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir. 2006); Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2004); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. Martin
D. Conn. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986))). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greene v. Brentwood Union Free School District
E.D.N.Y · 2013 · confidence medium
Apr. 23, 2013), and therefore “hearsay testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at trial may not properly be set forth in the Rule 56(e) affidavit,” Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir.1985) (“[The non-moving party] cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for summary judgment, absent a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial.”) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Panayoty v. Annucci
N.D.N.Y. · 2012 · confidence medium
This result is consistent with the general proposition that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed.” Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986) (cited in Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir.2002)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, LLC v. Arden
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
In order to be admissible, a letter must either be sworn and based on personal knowledge, see Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir.1986), or declared under penalty of perjury.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Salazar v. City of Albuquerque
D.N.M. · 2011 · confidence medium
Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d at 1272 (citing Bernhardt v. County of L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir.2002) (“[W]e must conclude that [plaintiffs] claims for prospective relief are moot, although we hold that her possible entitlement to nominal damages creates a continuing live controversy.”); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 (3d Cir.2001) (holding that where claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot, and claim for compensatory damages was prohibited, “[t]he availability of damages or other monetary relief almost always avoids mootness”); Van Wi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Northeast Research, LLC v. One Shipwrecked Vessel
W.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Randell v. United States, 64 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir.1995); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Advanced Fiber Technologies Trust v. J & L Fiber Services, Inc.
N.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
AFT correctly notes that the correspondence J & L cites in support of its argument is inadmissible hearsay, which may not be considered on motion for summary judgment. 22 See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986); Spadaro v. McKeon, 693 F.Supp.2d 183, 188-89 (N.D.N.Y.2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dean v. Blumenthal (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638 , 651 (2d Cir.1998) ("[W]e have not precluded the award of nominal damages in the past if the complaint explicitly sought compensatory damages.”); Beyah, 789 F.2d at 989 (holding that plaintiff's potential entitlement to nominal damages prevented his claim from being moot, even where defendant contended that plaintiff would not be able to establish requested compensatory and punitive damages). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dean v. City of Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 2008 · confidence medium
Corp., 722 F.Supp. 17, 21 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (“arguments or statements by counsel unsupported by the record cannot raise a genuine issue of fact requiring a trial”) (citing Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. (2×)
2d Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Facts, Personal Knowledge, and Expert Opinions Where a summary judgment motion is supported or opposed by affidavits, those “affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). ‘“[H]earsay testimony ... that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in [the Rule 56(e) ] affidavit.’ ” Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal P…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wahhab v. City of New York
S.D.N.Y. · 2005 · confidence medium
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, n. 17 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp. (2×)
10th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
L.REV. 197, 255 (1976) ("If this republic is remembered in the distant history of law, it is likely to be for its enduring adherence to legitimate institutions and processes, not for its perfection of unique principles of justice and certainly not for the rationality of its laws."). 2 See Bernhardt v. County of L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir.2002) ("[W]e must conclude that [plaintiff's] claims for prospective relief are moot, although we hold that her possible entitlement to nominal damages creates a continuing live controversy."); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 (3d Cir.2001) (holding that …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barlow v. Connecticut
D. Conn. · 2004 · confidence medium
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, n. 17 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). (“Unsworn statements are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-990 (2d Cir.1986)(reversing summary judgment which relied on sworn testimony that was not based on personal knowledge).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beierle v. Colorado Department of Corrections
10th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See id. at 1217 (concluding that the hypothetical possibility that an inmate on supervised release will violate the terms of his parole and be returned to *376 the same prison cannot “save an otherwise moot claim for prospective injunctive relief relating to prison conditions”); see also Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that a prisoner’s transfer moots his request for injunctive relief for denial of access to courts in the facility from which he was transferred); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986) (holding similarly in the context of alleged depr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Calhoun, Tyrone v. DeTella, George
7th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 672 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986); Lancaster v. Rodriguez, 701 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir. 1983); Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1122-23 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyrone Calhoun v. George E. Detella
7th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir.1994); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 672 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir.1986); Lancaster v. Rodriguez, 701 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir.1983); Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1122-23 (D.C.Cir.1983); see also Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 , 1231 (11th Cir.2000) (approving of nominal damage award in excessive force case).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Carter
2d Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
This result flows logically from the more generalized proposition that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed.” Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Carter
2d Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
This result flows logically from the more generalized proposition that "an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed." Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Lara
Tex. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-10 , 103 S.Ct. 1660 (it is presumed that plaintiff will follow the law); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 , 632-33 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 1322 , 71 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (plaintiffs required by law to prevent their own recidivism); Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149 , 96 S.Ct. 347 (once permanently paroled, there is no demonstrated probability that plaintiff will be subjected to the parole procedure again); O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 497 , 94 S.Ct. 669 (it is presumed that plaintiffs will follow the law); McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir.l999)(prisoner’s claim for …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo
D. Mass. · 2001 · confidence medium
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 , 95 S.Ct. 2330 , 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (action brought by a state prisoner for injunctive reliefideclara-tory judgment rendered moot because the challenged actions were no longer in effect when the case reached the district court); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir.1996) (transfer to another prison moots a prisoner’s request for injunctive relief); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ian Dawes v. Hans Walker
2d Cir. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1986) (prisoner entitled to nominal damages for Eighth Amendment prison conditions claim even if he is not "able to establish actual damages"). 40 If Congress wishes to curtail unnecessary, burdensome prisoner litigation, it should consider amending § 1997e(e) to require actual damages as a component of prisoners' § 1983 prima facie case.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dawes v. Walker
2d Cir. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986) (prisoner entitled to nominal damages for Eighth Amendment prison conditions claim even if he is not “able to establish actual damages”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marrie v. Nickels
D. Kan. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., id. (prisoner’s claim for mandamus relief moot once he was placed on supervised release); Smith v. Younger, 1999 WL 623355 , at *2 (6th Cir. Aug.9, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (“A transfer to another prison moots a prisoner’s request for declaratory or injunctive relief.”); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir.1987) (prisoner’s transfer moots his request for injunctive relief against conditions of confinement in facility from which he was transferred); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986) (prisoner’s transfer from prison where he complained of the co…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. New York Division of State Police
N.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
Sand & Co. v. Airtemp Corp., *201 934 F.2d 450, 454-55 (2d Cir.1991); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mroz v. City of Tonawanda (2×)
W.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
“This requirement means that ‘hearsay testimony ... that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in [the Rule 56(e) ] affidavit.’ ” Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.22[1], at 56-1312 to 56-1316 (2d ed.1985) (footnote omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frooks v. Town of Cortlandt
S.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
See United States v. 143-147 East 23rd Street, 77 F.3d 648, 657 (2d Cir.1996) (submission of unsworn letter was “inappropriate response to ... motion for summary judgment”); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-990 (2d Cir.1986) (trial court erred in considering unsworn letters by third parties on motion for summary judgment).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Symbol Technologies Class Action Litigation
E.D.N.Y · 1997 · confidence medium
Floor Crafters, 842 F.2d 639 , 643 (2d Cir.1988); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-990 (2d Cir.1986), in order to proceed to trial.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L.
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
See also, e.g., Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir.1987); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Prins v. Coughlin
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 3224 , 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Prins v. Coughlin
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 3224 , 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Likewise, in Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988-89 (2d Cir.1986), the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s complaint directed at allegedly unconstitutional practices at a particular institution was moot to the extent it sought declaratory and injunctive relief once the plaintiff was transferred to a different institution.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Torres v. CBS News
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Moreover, although unsupported allegations in a memorandum of law are insufficient under Rule 56(e) to raise an issue of fact (see, e.g., Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir.1986); Prudential Publishing Co. v. Myron Mfg.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schaurer v. Fogg
N.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-04 , 95 S.Ct. 2330, 2334-35 , 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fox v. Board Of Trustees Of The State University Of New York (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
As Plaintiffs point out, there was such a final judgment in Fox III on remand from our decision in Fox II, but that judgment was stayed and is effectively inoperative in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Fox IV. 28 Plaintiffs invoke our ruling in Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986), that a claim for nominal damages can suffice to avoid mootness when claims for injunctive and declaratory relief have become moot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fox v. Board of Trustees of the State University of New York (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs invoke our ruling in Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986), that a claim for nominal damages can suffice to avoid mootness when claims for injunctive and declaratory relief have become moot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klos v. Haskell
W.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 , 373-74 (7th Cir.1991); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 339 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2805 , 115 L.Ed.2d 978 (1991); Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567 , 568 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909 , 109 S.Ct. 3224 , 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986); Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1137 (2d Cir.1986); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986). 15 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jaret International, Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 1993 · confidence medium
Sand & Co. v. Airtemp Corp., 934 F.2d 450, 454-55 (2d Cir.1991), quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotations omitted).
Abdul Beyah, K. McDonald H. Benitez, A. Robles, D. Boswell, K. Dukes, K. Richardson, M. Payne, J. Duffy, S. Dukes, and
v.
Baez, Abdul Beyah v. Thomas A. Coughlin, Commissioner of Docs Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility and J. Cochrane, Attica Correctional Facility
782.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 2, 1986.
789 F.2d 986
Cited by 51 opinions  |  Published

789 F.2d 986

Abdul BEYAH, K. McDonald, H. Benitez, A. Robles, D. Boswell,
K. Dukes, K. Richardson, M. Payne, J. Duffy, S.
Dukes, and V. Baez, Plaintiffs,
Abdul Beyah, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Thomas A. COUGHLIN, Commissioner of DOCS; Harold J. Smith,
Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility; and
J. Cochrane, Attica Correctional
Facility, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 782, Docket 84-2371.

United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

Argued Feb. 20, 1986.
Decided May 2, 1986.

Mitchell A. Lowenthal, New York City (Jonathan I. Blackman, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, New York, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Martin A. Hotvet, Asst. Atty. Gen. of State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Robert Hermann, Sol. Gen., William J. Kogan, Asst. Sol. Gen. of State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before OAKES, KEARSE, and PRATT, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

[*~986]1

Plaintiff Abdul Beyah, a New York State prisoner whose religion requires his abstention from contact with pork or pork products, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, John T. Curtin, Chief Judge, dismissing his complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), alleging that the refusal of the defendant prison officials to allow him to use soap containing no pork products violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the soap currently provided to inmates did not contain pork products. On appeal, Beyah contends that the court improperly granted summary judgment on the basis of the affidavit of defendants' attorney, who lacked personal knowledge of the facts alleged, and unsworn letters from third parties, and that the court ignored a genuine issue of material fact demonstrated by the affirmation of another inmate who was one of the original plaintiffs in the action. Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment principally on the ground that, since Beyah is no longer incarcerated at the correctional facility where the alleged constitutional violations occurred, the action is moot. Finding insufficient merit in defendants' claim of mootness, and finding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment, we vacate the judgment dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

2

Beyah and several other inmates of New York State's (the "State") Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"), who were from time to time housed in Attica's Special Housing Unit ("SHU"), commenced this action in April 1983 under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against defendants Thomas A. Coughlin, Commissioner of the State's Department of Correctional Services, Harold J. Smith, Superintendent of Attica, and J. Cochrane, Deputy Superintendent of Attica. In their complaint and in various pretrial affidavits, plaintiffs alleged that they were practitioners of religions that require abstention from contact with pork products, and that during their incarceration in SHU in the 1982-1983 period, defendants confiscated plaintiffs' personal soap "without reason or cause," in violation of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and allowed plaintiffs to use only soap made with pork products, depriving them of their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religious beliefs. Plaintiffs also contended that their inability to use the soap provided by defendants effectively denied them adequate hygiene and health care, thereby subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The complaint demanded declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants admitted that inmates in SHU are not permitted to use other than State-issued soap, but denied that pork-based soap was issued.

3

Plaintiffs asserted that the allegedly pork-based soap provided them had been manufactured by the State at its Great Meadow Correctional Facility ("Great Meadow"), and they served on defendants interrogatories and requests for admissions seeking confirmation of those facts. Responding in January 1984, Cochrane stated that in 1982, "State soap and soap provided by an outside source were provided to SHU inmates," and that "[f]rom May 1982 until now we have purchased soap for SHU inmates from a commercial supplier." Thus it was conceded that prior to May 1982, defendants had provided plaintiffs only with soap manufactured by the State, and it is clear from various submissions of the defendants that the State-made soap was manufactured at Great Meadow. Defendants disclaimed personal knowledge, however, of the content of the soaps provided to plaintiffs. In his November 1983 answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories, Cochrane stated that he had "no knowledge that soap made at Great Meadow Correctional Facility for department use is made with swine by-products." He added that information had been requested from the commercial suppliers as to the contents of their soaps.

[*~987]4

In February 1984, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that there were "no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the composition of the soap presently issued to inmates in [SHU] or previously issued to inmates in [SHU] prior to May of 1982." In support of their motion, defendants relied on Cochrane's answers to plaintiffs' discovery requests and submitted the affidavit of their attorney, Assistant Attorney General Douglas S. Cream, which attached, inter alia, letters from the State's current commercial suppliers of soap, stating that there were no pork products in their soaps. Cream's affidavit stated that prior to May 1982, soap manufactured at Great Meadow had been provided to SHU inmates and that the soap manufactured at Great Meadow "does not contain pork fat or pork derivatives." In support of this statement, the affidavit attached a December 1983 letter from a quality control analyst employed by the State, stating that "to the best of [his] knowledge," the soap products manufactured by the State Department of Correctional Services "do not contain pork fats or pork fat derivatives."

5

In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiff Milton Payne filed an affirmation in which he stated, inter alia, that

6

plaintiff Milton Payne, as well as other prisoners ... were once held at Great Meadow Corr. Fac. ... where all N.Y.S. Dept. of Corr. Services "State" soap is manufactured has seen or been to Soap-Factor [sic] at that facility to view the barrels of swine (pig) produces [sic] that are used in making that soap.

7

In light of Payne's affirmation, defendants requested that the court hold their summary judgment motion in abeyance until Payne's deposition could be taken.

8

The district court declined to postpone its decision on the summary judgment motion, concluding that the taking of Payne's deposition was unnecessary in light of all the circumstances. The court stated that "[t]here is no evidence whatever that the soap now provided contains any pork products." Decision and Order dated October 24, 1984, at 2. Without reaching the question of whether the denial to plaintiffs of pork-free soap, if proven, would violate their constitutional rights, the court granted summary judgment on the basis of the materials submitted by defendants stating that the soaps provided by current suppliers contained no pork products:

9

According to the affidavits supplied, neither "Cashmere Bouquet," which is manufactured by the Colgate Palmolive Company, nor "Sweetheart" soap, which is manufactured by Purex, contains pork fats or pork derivatives. Beyond plaintiffs' suspicion that this is so, there is no information in the file to support plaintiffs' contention.

10

Id. The complaint was dismissed, and this appeal by Beyah followed.

II. DISCUSSION

11

On appeal, Beyah contends that the granting of summary judgment was error principally because the court (1) relied on inadmissible hearsay and unsworn statements, and (2) disregarded Payne's affirmation which showed that a material fact was in dispute. Defendants seek to sustain the judgment on the ground that the action is moot, principally because Beyah is no longer incarcerated at Attica, where the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred. Finding insufficient merit in the claim of mootness, and finding that the district court erred in granting defendants summary judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A. Mootness

12

Defendants' mootness contentions need not detain us long. Defendants argue, first, that since plaintiffs' complaint attributed the allegedly unconstitutional practice only to officials at Attica, the fact that Beyah is no longer incarcerated at Attica renders the action moot as to Beyah. Although this fact may well moot Beyah's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, see Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-02, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 2334-35, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is filed); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459-60, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215-16, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Geraci v. Treuchtlinger, 487 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir.1973) (per curiam), the complaint also sought compensatory and punitive damages for the period in which the alleged deprivation occurred. These requests were not mooted by Beyah's transfer from Attica.

[*~988]13

Nor are we impressed by defendants' suggestion, relying on pre-1978 authorities, that Beyah's claims are moot because he would not be able to establish actual damages. Even if defendants' factual premise were accurate, Beyah's claim for damages would not be moot since it is now well established that if he can prove that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected right, and if defendants are not able to establish a defense to that claim, Beyah will be entitled to recover at least nominal damages. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).

B. The Granting of Summary Judgment

14

We have several difficulties with the district court's granting of summary judgment dismissing the complaint: The court did not enforce the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) as to the manner in which motions for summary judgment are to be supported; it appears to have misallocated the burden with respect to the establishment of the absence or existence of a genuine issue of material fact; it may well have drawn inferences in favor of the moving, instead of the nonmoving, party; and it appears to have ignored the temporal scope of plaintiffs' claim and the nature of the relief requested.

15

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) allows summary judgment to be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) provides that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." This requirement means that "[h]earsay testimony ... that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in [the Rule 56(e) ] affidavit." 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.22, at 56-1312 to 56-1316 (2d ed. 1985) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 105 n. 11 (2d Cir.1981). Rule 56(e) states that if a summary judgment motion "is made and supported as provided in this rule," the nonmoving party may not rest upon his pleading but must show the existence of a genuine issue to be tried by setting forth facts in "affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added).

16

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine dispute as to a material fact exists, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and the evidence proffered and the inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, id.; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). " 'Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.' " Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-10 (quoting Advisory Committee Note on 1963 Amendment to subdivision (e) of Rule 56) (emphasis in opinion).

[*~989]17

The first flaw in the granting of summary judgment to defendants in the present case was the court's reliance on the materials submitted by defendants as having established the contents of the soaps provided to plaintiffs. The only affidavit submitted was that of Cream, defendants' attorney. Cream, however, did not suggest that he had personal knowledge of any of the facts he asserted. The letters attached to the Cream affidavit, although signed by persons who may have had personal knowledge of the matters asserted therein, were not sworn to as is required by Rule 56(e). The answers of Cochrane to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for admissions, though sworn to, did not purport to state, on the basis of Cochrane's personal knowledge, the contents of the soaps provided. In short, insofar as the contents of the soaps were concerned, defendants proffered no statements sworn to by anyone who had knowledge of the facts asserted. Their factual presentation thus did not carry their burden under Rule 56(e) of establishing that there was no genuine issue as to the contents of the soaps provided to plaintiffs. Given the shortcomings of defendants' motion, plaintiffs had no burden to come forward with affidavits of their own to show that there was an issue for trial.

18

In addition to suffering these procedural defects, defendants' factual presentation was substantively inadequate to warrant the summary dismissal of plaintiffs' entire claim. Although the submission of affidavits from the commercial suppliers setting forth the information they provided might have sufficed to shift to plaintiffs the burden of setting forth in affidavit or other sworn form facts sufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue as to the contents of the soaps provided plaintiffs after May 1982, the same cannot be said with respect to the State-made soap from Great Meadow provided them prior to May 1982. The December 1983 letter submitted by defendants with respect to whether pork products were used in the Great Meadow soap spoke only in the present tense. Even had these statements been made under oath, it would have been improper for the court to grant summary judgment on the basis of an inference, unfavorable to plaintiffs, the nonmoving parties, that the manufacturing process there described had also been in existence during the pre-May 1982 period.

19

Finally, it appears that in dismissing the complaint, the court was unaware of that part of plaintiffs' claim that sought damages for the alleged deprivation of their rights during their entire period of incarceration at Attica in the years 1982-1983. The court ignored the fact, evidenced by defendants' admissions, that prior to May 1982, the State had provided SHU inmates with soap manufactured by the State at Great Meadow, not with soap purchased from commercial suppliers. The court's observation that there was "no information in the file to support plaintiffs' contention" that the soap provided them contained pork was stated with reference to, and was applicable only to, the soaps provided by the commercial suppliers. As to the pre-May 1982, State-made soap, Payne's affirmation stated that while he was incarcerated at Great Meadow he had seen vats of swine fat being used in the manufacture of soap. The court's disregard of Payne's affirmation and its rejection of defendants' request for a delay in the decision of their summary judgment motion to permit them to depose Payne, opining that a Payne deposition was "unnecessary in view of all the circumstances [because] [t]here is no evidence whatever that the soap now provided contains any pork products" (emphasis added), suggests that the court simply failed to focus on plaintiffs' claims for damages with respect to the pre-May 1982 soap manufactured by the State.

20

In sum, the form of defendants' presentation with respect to the commercially manufactured soaps did not comply with Rule 56(e) and hence did not permit the entry of summary judgment dismissing the part of plaintiffs' claim which dealt with soaps supplied to them after May 1982. Flaws in both the form and the substance of defendants' presentation with respect to the soap manufactured by the State at Great Meadow should have prevented entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs with respect to so much of their claim as dealt with the soap provided them prior to May 1982.

CONCLUSION

[*~990]21

The judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.