Dunbar, Paul & Dunbar, Nancy, His Wife v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., a Pennsylvania Corp. & Frank A. D'Lauro Co., a Pennsylvania Corp. & Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia, & Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. v. Tankle Constr. Co. v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. Appeal of Nancy Dunbar, 816 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Dunbar, Paul & Dunbar, Nancy, His Wife v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., a Pennsylvania Corp. & Frank A. D'Lauro Co., a Pennsylvania Corp. & Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia, & Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. v. Tankle Constr. Co. v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc. Appeal of Nancy Dunbar, 816 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we have cautioned that dismissal in is a drastic tool and may be appropriately invoked only after careful analysis of several factors, including .”
115 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Berry v. Halliday (vid, 2008-08-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Berry v. Halliday
D.V.I. · 2008 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we have cautioned that dismissal in is a drastic tool and may be appropriately invoked only after careful analysis of several factors, including .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CMC FOOD, INC. v. MITLITSKY EGGS, LLC
D.N.J. · 2025 · confidence medium
R. 72.1(c)(2) (district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge,” and “may consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record.”); and WHEREAS, plaintiffs were noticed directly by the only contact means made available to the Court that dismissal of their claims was being contemplated, see Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987); and WHEREAS, no party has filed objections to the report and recommendation, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ADAMS v. HOME DEPOT INC., THE
D.N.J. · 2025 · confidence medium
R. 72.1(c)(2) (district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge,” and “may consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record.”); and WHEREAS, plaintiff was noticed directly that the Court was contemplating dismissal for failure to prosecute (D.E. 44, at 9 (directing service to be made to plaintiff herself)), see Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987); and WHEREAS, no party has filed objections to the r…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adlife Marketing & Communicati v. Karns Prime and Fancy Food Ltd
3rd Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
As to the first Poulis factor, Adlife argues on appeal that they were entitled to notice and a hearing to show that they were ignorant of Liebowitz’s misconduct, under Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (remanding for notice and hearing, as district court made no finding with record support that party facing dismissal bore some responsibility for actions of her counsel).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CALLE v. JOHNNY'S BRICK OVEN PIZZA LLC.
D.N.J. · 2021 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Raymont Wright
3rd Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (announcing a new rule for the composition of federal juries); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (prescribing procedures for motions to dismiss based on the conduct of a litigant’s counsel); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring district courts to state reasons for a criminal sentence). 38 See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2007). 10 prohibit certain jury instructions in the district courts39 and to review attorney-client fee arrangements.40 Second, Courts— both …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Raymont Wright
3rd Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (announcing a new rule for the composition of federal juries); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (prescribing procedures for motions to dismiss based on the conduct of a litigant’s counsel); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring district courts to state reasons for a criminal sentence). 38 See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2007). 10 prohibit certain jury instructions in the district courts 39 and to review attorney-client fee arrangements. 40 Second, Courts— bot…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Raymont Wright
3rd Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (announcing a new rule for the composition of federal juries); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (prescribing procedures for motions to dismiss based on the conduct of a litigant’s counsel); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring district courts to state reasons for a criminal sentence). 38 See United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2007). 10 prohibit certain jury instructions in the district courts 39 and to review attorney-client fee arrangements. 40 Second, Courts— bot…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. Lalone (In re Moore) (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. W.D. Pa. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, in contrast to the standard by which the Court decides Rule 60(b)(6) motions premised on gross negligence, applying the Poulis analysis to Rule 41(b) motions requires the Court to identify specific record evidence supporting the client’s “awareness of her attorney’s derelictions.” Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987) (remanding to district court given, inter alia, “the absence of a finding with record support that [the client] bore some responsibility for the flagrant actions of her counsel”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tera Knoll v. City of Allentown
3rd Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
We have required consideration of the Poulis factors when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to Rule 37(b) for failure to respond to discovery, e.g., United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141 , 145, 161-62 (3d Cir.2003); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155-56 (3d Cir.1988), when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, e.g., Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir.1987), and when a district court enters a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b) as a sanction for failure to plead or otherwise defen…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tip-Top Construction, Inc. v. Gonzalez
D.V.I. · 2011 · confidence medium
P. 41(b); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Co.
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Jackson’s litany of arguments to the contrary are simply not convincing. 3 Finally, Jackson argues that he was entitled to notice and a hearing pursuant to Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Co.
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Jackson’s litany of arguments to the contrary are simply not convincing. 3 Finally, Jackson argues that he was entitled to notice and a hearing pursuant to Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Ryobi Techtronics (5×)
E.D. Pa. · 2008 · confidence medium
In Dunbar, a 41(b) dismissal was vacated because there was no evidence the plaintiff knew “of her counsel’s defaults or otherwise bore some personal responsibility for his professional irresponsibility.” 816 F.2d at 129.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wecht (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Billing, Inc., 230 F.3d 600, 607-12 (3d Cir.2000) (discussing our invocation of supervisory power to prohibit certain jury instructions); Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir.1999) (exercising supervisory power over attorney-client fee arrangements); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987) (invoking supervisory authority and mandating certain pleading and notice requirements when parties seek dismissal based on counsel's apparent default). 42 Accordingly, we now exercise our supervisory authority to require that district courts ap…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wecht
3rd Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Billing, Inc., 230 F.3d 600, 607-12 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing our invocation of supervisory power to prohibit certain jury instructions); Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1999) (exercising supervisory power over attorney-client fee arrangements); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (invoking supervisory authority and mandating certain pleading and notice requirements when parties seek dismissal based on counsel’s 8 The government asserts the Second Circuit upheld a reasonable likelihood standard in United States v. Cu…
cited Cited as authority (rule) DiFrancesco v. Aramark Corp.
3rd Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baxter v. Lancaster County
E.D. Pa. · 2002 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit has stated “on numerous occasions! ] that dismissals with prejudice ... are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court ... and are to be reserved for comparable cases.” Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir.1984) (citation omitted); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Technology, Inc.
D. Del. · 2000 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir.1987) (placing great emphasis on “the extent of the party’s personal responsibility”) (relying on Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. St. Thomas Gas Co. (2×)
virginislands · 1997 · confidence medium
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "any motion by the Court or counsel seeking an effective dismissal based on an apparent default on the part of a litigants' counsel must be pleaded with supporting material." Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3rd.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Derzack v. County of Allegheny
W.D. Pa. · 1996 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) The Republic Of The Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation
3rd Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Center, 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir.1986); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
3rd Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Center, 804 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir.1986); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burns v. Glick
E.D. Pa. · 1994 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir.1987); Curtis T.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. Trustees of the New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund
3rd Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Notwithstanding, the PBGC argues that we should extend it the right to notice and a hearing before dismissal under Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca3 1994
3rd Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Like the plaintiff in Link, the PBGC did not avail itself of this escape hatch. 4 Having foregone this opportunity, the PBGC cannot claim it was denied due process or that the court abused its discretion because of a lack of notice and hearing. 38 Notwithstanding, the PBGC argues that we should extend it the right to notice and a hearing before dismissal under Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Golden Elevator, Incorporated (2×)
7th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Ball considers the dismissal law in other circuits, for instance in the Third Circuit where “before dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute the district judge must notify plaintiffs directly.” Id. at 754 , citing Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spain v. Gallegos
3rd Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1987). 38 the evidence she was not permitted to introduce.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ellen v. Spain v. Tony E. Gallegos, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission United States of America
3rd Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir.1987). 18 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mark A. Ball v. City of Chicago and Alfred S. Schultz, Individually and as Agent of the City of Chicago
7th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987); Curtis T.
cited Cited as authority (rule) VanHaaren v. State Farm
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Dunbar, 816 F.2d at 128 (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennis Vanhaaren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (2×)
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Dunbar, 816 F.2d at 128 (emphasis in original).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp. (9×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wis. · 1991 · confidence medium
One procedure that circuit courts may wish to consider utilizing in the earlier stages of litigation to inform the litigant that his attorney's noncompliance may be jeopardizing his case is suggested in Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Andrews v. Government of the Virgin Islands
D.V.I. · 1990 · confidence medium
Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin (3×)
3rd Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
In Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987), this court, invoking its supervisory power over district courts within the circuit, established the following rule: “While it is true that Poulis affords some judicial protection to innocent litigants from the consequences of professional defaults, it is evident that such litigants are often in extremis, legally speaking.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (2×)
Wis. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Dismissal is warranted only where the plaintiff bears some degree of responsibility for counsel's misconduct, Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3rd Cir. 1987), or is personally culpable, Snead v. Automation Industries, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 823 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca3 1988
3rd Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See Poulis (dismissal not an abuse of discretion after plaintiffs' failure to file answers to interrogatories and late filing of pre-trial statement); Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 36 (3d Cir.1979) (dismissal not an abuse of discretion after plaintiffs' failure to appear at depositions and failure to obey court orders to answer interrogatories) 18 The court made a specific finding that Donaldson's testimony as to his refusal to attend the deposition without the notebooks was credible 19 In Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance
3rd Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
In Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir.1987), we set forth the need to notify the client of his counsel’s misconduct in order to enable the client to protect himself from the attorney’s discovery abuses.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Engstrom v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.
E.D. Pa. · 1987 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764-65 (3d Cir.1982); cf. Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Company, 816 F.2d 126, 127 (3d Cir.1987) (attorney’s derelictions are not sufficient evidence of a party’s responsibility or culpability when determining whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of prosecution).
discussed Cited "see" YOUNG v. SOUTH BEACH BAR AND GRILL CORPORATION (2×)
D.N.J. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Forrest
M.D. Penn. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding “that any motion, whether by court or counsel, seeking an effective dismissal or default judgment based on an apparent default on the part of a litigant’s counsel be pleaded with particularity and with supporting material and that where the papers demonstrate reasonable grounds for dismissal on that basis the court shall direct the clerk of the court to mail notice directly to the litigant of the time and place of a hearing on any such motion, reasonably in advance of the hearing date”).
discussed Cited "see" Anthony Hildebrand v. County of Allegheny
3rd Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co. , 816 F.2d 126 , 128-29 (3d Cir. 1987) (vacating and remanding after Rule 41 dismissal because, although attorney's conduct rose to "the level of willfulness and contumaciousness necessary to support the sanction of dismissal," there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aware of "her counsel's defaults or otherwise bore some personal responsibility for his professional irresponsibility"); Briscoe , 538 F.3d at 258-59 (vacating and remanding after Rule 41 dismissal because, even though plaintiff represented himself, there was insufficient evidence …
cited Cited "see" Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
D.V.I. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1987); Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Government of the Virgin Islands ex rel. Woods v. Davis
D.V.I. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1987); Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Sebrell v. Philadelphia Police Department
3rd Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir.1987).
cited Cited "see" Mosaid Technologies Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
D.N.J. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber and Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126 , 129 (3d Cir.1987). 2 .
cited Cited "see" Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation v. Texaco, Inc.
D.V.I. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." MARASEK v. 206 COURTHOUSE LANE LLC
D.N.J. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original); see also Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Thomas Dodson v. Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General for the U.S. Postal Service
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987); Shea, 795 F.2d at 1078 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hagans v. Henry Weber Aircraft Distributors, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128-29 (3d Cir.1987) (citing Poulis factors); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982) (discussing factors similar to those presented in Poulis).
Dunbar, Paul and Dunbar, Nancy, His Wife
v.
Triangle Lumber and Supply Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation and Frank A. D'Lauro Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation and Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia, and Alpine Engineered Products, Inc. v. Tankle Construction Company v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc. Appeal of Nancy Dunbar
86-1268.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Apr 14, 1987.
816 F.2d 126
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published

816 F.2d 126

7 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1315

DUNBAR, Paul and Dunbar, Nancy, his wife
v.
TRIANGLE LUMBER AND SUPPLY COMPANY, a Pennsylvania
Corporation and Frank A. D'Lauro Company, a Pennsylvania
Corporation and Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, and Alpine Engineered Products, Inc.
v.
TANKLE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
v.
ALPINE ENGINEERED PRODUCTS, INC.
Appeal of Nancy DUNBAR

No. 86-1268.

United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.

Argued on Jan. 22, 1987.
Decided April 14, 1987.

Isaac Green (argued), Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Allan Greenberg, Stephen B. Slick, Troy Cloud, Esquire (argued), Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee Triangle Lumber & Supply Co.

Before SEITZ, BECKER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SEITZ, Circuit Judge.

[*~126]1

This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to prosecute. We are required to address the recurring problem confronting a district judge when counsel fails to discharge properly his or her professional obligation to the court and to the client.

I.

2

Paul and Nancy Dunbar, husband and wife, through the law firm of Ballen, Keiser, Denker, Bor & Gertel (Ballen, Keiser) commenced this diversity action against Triangle Lumber & Supply Company. Mr. Dunbar sought to recover damages for a work-related injury. Ms. Dunbar's claim was based on loss of consortium. The plaintiffs were later divorced.

3

Ballen, Keiser wrote to Ms. Dunbar and advised her that Mr. Dunbar's case would be tried in the spring and that she should get another lawyer because of the divorce. Thereafter, the law firm filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel for Ms. Dunbar.

4

On April 18, 1985, the district court received a letter from Isaac Green stating that he would be representing Ms. Dunbar, and requesting a thirty-day continuance of the final pre-trial conference. On April 30, the court held a conference at which Mr. Green stated that he would be entering an appearance for Ms. Dunbar, and alleged that Ms. Dunbar had been prejudiced by Ballen, Keiser's representation. Ballen, Keiser informed the judge that Mr. Dunbar's case was close to settling. The court stated that Ballen, Keiser's motion to withdraw would be granted once Mr. Green entered his appearance for Ms. Dunbar.

5

Mr. Green had not entered an appearance as of May 14. The court therefore scheduled a hearing for May 23, 1985 on Ballen, Keiser's motion to withdraw. On May 20, Mr. Green entered an appearance on behalf of Ms. Dunbar and filed a motion to disqualify the Ballen, Keiser firm, alleging violations of the code of professional responsibility.

6

On May 22, 1985, the court entered an order granting Ballen, Keiser's motion to withdraw. On May 31, Mr. Green filed a motion seeking to vacate the court's order permitting Ballen, Keiser to withdraw for reasons that are not apparent. On July 8, Mr. Dunbar's claim was settled. On July 30, the court denied Ms. Dunbar's motion to vacate its order. It also dismissed as moot the motion to disqualify Ballen, Keiser, extended discovery until September 16 and scheduled a pretrial conference for September 30. The case was listed for an October trial.

7

Mr. Green, on behalf of Ms. Dunbar, filed an appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate the order permitting withdrawal.[1] On September 20, Mr. Green filed a motion to stay the district court's May 22 order which stay was promptly denied.

[*~127]8

Mr. Green did not appear at the September 30 pretrial conference. On October 28, the district court scheduled a pretrial conference for November 18 and further ordered that "in the event Plaintiff's counsel fails to appear on November 18th, 1985, this case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute." At 4:58 on Friday, November 15, the court received a hand delivered letter stating that Mr. Green would not be able to attend the conference because of a kidney infection.

9

On November 18, 1985, the court scheduled a pretrial conference for December 24, 1985 and listed the case for trial in January. The order further stated that:

10

In the event Plaintiff's counsel does not appear at the conference on December 24, 1985, this case will be dismissed unless this court receives from Plaintiff's counsel on or before December 15, 1985 a report from his physician certifying that counsel is unable to attend said conference because of illness.

11

The deputy clerk was advised by telephone that Mr. Green would not attend the conference, and that a letter from the doctor would be forthcoming. No such letter was ever received.

12

On March 17, the district court ordered a hearing to be held on April 4 at 2:00 to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. According to the district court's Memorandum Opinion, Mr. Green called the clerk's office at 9:45 on April 4 and stated that he was going to be late to the hearing "this morning due to a SEPTA strike." When he was told the hearing was at 2:00, he stated that his client, Ms. Dunbar, was probably in the courtroom at that time. This probability is not confirmed in the record. Around 1:40 p.m., Mr. Green called to say he would be a half hour late for the hearing. The court announced that it was dismissing the action for failure to prosecute. Mr. Green apparently entered the courtroom at 2:31 p.m., but did not address the court.

13

By order dated April 18, 1986, the district court formally dismissed Ms. Dunbar's action pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The dismissal was based on various unchallenged defaults and derelictions of duty by Ms. Dunbar's counsel, Isaac Green. The record fully justified the district court's statement that the administration of justice was thwarted and abused insofar as Mr. Green was concerned. This appeal followed.

II.

14

Incredibly, Mr. Green's appellate brief does not contend that the district court committed error in dismissing Ms. Dunbar's case for failure to prosecute. It was this court which required Mr. Green to address the only proper issue on appeal, whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the action under F.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) provides, in part, "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of any action or of any claim against him."

[*~128]15

We have cautioned that dismissal in this context is a drastic tool and may be appropriately invoked only after careful analysis of several factors, including,

16

(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet the scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

17

Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984); see Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.1984).

18

In this case, the district court specifically determined that Mr. Green acted in bad faith to avoid bringing this case to trial. We believe the record fully supports this finding and that Mr. Green's conduct rises to the level of willfulness and contumaciousness necessary to support the sanction of dismissal. See Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.1982). The district court further found that defendant was prejudiced by the pattern of dilatoriousness but no specific evidence is noted and we find none other than delay. The court also stated that it had considered the imposition of alternative sanctions but it had "determined that such sanctions would have little or no effect in bringing this case to trial."

19

The district court evaluated certain of the factors mentioned in Poulis. It cannot be said that its appraisal amounted to an abuse of discretion. This is particularly so given the extraordinary patience of the court in dealing with Mr. Green. However, one of the factors to be considered under Poulis is the party's personal responsibility. Yet, the district court did not point to any record evidence of Ms. Dunbar's possible awareness of her attorney's derelictions. The only relevant references in the court's Memorandum were to (1) a telephonic statement, presumably by Mr. Green, at 9:45 a.m. on the show cause date, that Ms. Dunbar was probably present in the courtroom; (2) Ms. Dunbar's absence from the show cause hearing; and (3) the absence of communication from Ms. Dunbar to the district court after April 4, 1986, the show cause date. None of the three matters mentioned could support a finding that Ms. Dunbar knew of her counsel's defaults or otherwise bore some personal responsibility for his professional irresponsibility.

20

Given the absence of a finding with record support that Ms. Dunbar bore some responsibility for the flagrant actions of her counsel and the lack of a determination of the facial merits of Ms. Dunbar's claim, we conclude that the interests of justice dictate that the matter be remanded to permit a hearing and determination based on all of the Poulis factors, after notice to Ms. Dunbar and her counsel. See also Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir.1986).

III.

21

This court takes judicial notice of the increasing trend toward the dismissal of legal actions based on dereliction of duty by members of the bar. See Poulis v. State Farm, 747 F.2d at 867 (citing cases); see also Carter v. Albert Eisenstein Medical Center, supra. Additionally, we are confident that there are many such dismissals that do not appear in the reported cases.

22

While it is true that Poulis affords some judicial protection to innocent litigants from the consequences of professional defaults, it is evident that such litigants are often in extremis, legally speaking. Yet, they are, nevertheless, dependent on their attorneys to protect their interests. A conflict in interest is almost inherent in such a situation.[2]

23

Defaults in professional obligations are a blight on the legal system and a betrayal of the privilege accorded the legal profession. We have therefore concluded that the growing scope of the problem and the responsibility of the courts to the general public require us to invoke our supervisory power in this area with respect to the district courts within this circuit.

24

We conclude that any motion, whether by court or counsel, seeking an effective dismissal or default judgment based on an apparent default on the part of a litigant's counsel be pleaded with particularity and with supporting material and that where the papers demonstrate reasonable grounds for dismissal on that basis the court shall direct the clerk of the court to mail notice directly to the litigant of the time and place of a hearing on any such motion, reasonably in advance of the hearing date. We are confident the district judges have the necessary remedies to prevent any abuse of this procedure.

25

We think such a procedure will put the client on notice of possible jeopardy to his or her legal interests by counsel's conduct at a time when the client can take appropriate action and when the Poulis balance has not been irretrievably struck in favor of the moving party.

IV.

26

The order of the district court will be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk of this Court shall cause a copy of this opinion to be mailed to Ms. Dunbar.

[*~129]27

Costs will be assessed personally against Ms. Dunbar's counsel.

1

On October 7, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

2

The district court may wish to consider this factor on remand