Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Heller, 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Heller, 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
130 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 28 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: ComSpec International, Inc.v. Uniface B.V. (mied, 2021-09-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) ComSpec International, Inc.v. Uniface B.V.
E.D. Mich. · 2021 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gamboa v. Ford Motor Company
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FARHANGUI v. GROSSINGER
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir. 1987) (“The fact that the parties take different positions under the contract as to the appropriate prime rate, or the fact that the defendant charged too high a ‘prime rate’ and thereby . . . refused to disclose what the plaintiff considers the true prime rate called for under the contract, does not give rise to a valid claim for fraud.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joseph v. Jahwary
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sivak v. United Parcel Service Co.
E.D. Mich. · 2014 · confidence medium
Rather, the reason for dismissal in Blount was that the plaintiff failed to make sufficient allegations of “misrepresentations or omissions which were ‘reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’ ” 819 F.2d at 153 (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Llewellyn-Jones v. Metro Property Group, LLC
E.D. Mich. · 2014 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hayes v. Shelby County Trustee
W.D. Tenn. · 2013 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987); Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 416 F.Supp.2d 885, 911 (E.D.Cal.2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Port Firefighters' Pension-Local Option Plan v. Fushi Copperweld, Inc.
M.D. Tenn. · 2013 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151 (6th Cir.1987), the Court explained that “Rule 9(b) requiring ‘averments of fraud ... with particularity’ is designed to allow the District Court to distinguish valid from invalid claims in just such cases as this one and to terminate needless litigation early in the proceedings.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kevelighan v. Trott & Trott, P.C.
E.D. Mich. · 2010 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987) (“Sending a financial statement which misconstrues the prime rate provided by the terms of *778 the contract may breach the contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of action.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Investments, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (dismissing RICO act in part because “[t]he fact that the parties take different positions under the contract as to the appropriate prime rate, or the fact that the defendant charged too high a ‘prime rate’ and thereby concealed or refused to disclose what the plaintiff considers the true prime rate called for under the contract, does not give rise to a valid claim for fraud.”); United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.1980) (“[T]he [mail fraud] statute does not reject all business practices that do not fulfill expectations…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kolar v. Preferred Real Estate Investments, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (dismissing RICO act in part because “[t]he fact that the parties take different positions under the contract as to the appropriate prime rate, or the fact that the defendant charged too high a ‘prime rate’ and thereby concealed or refused to disclose what the plaintiff considers the true prime rate called for under the contract, does not give rise to a valid claim for fraud.”); United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.1980) (“[T]he [mail fraud] statute does not reject all business practices that do not fulfill expectations…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Wells Fargo & Co.
S.D. Iowa · 2009 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987) (affirming dismissal on the grounds that the complaint failed to identify with particularity a false statement that was "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension” or to allege that plaintiffs relied on any false statement).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hagen v. U-Haul Co. of Tennessee
W.D. Tenn. · 2009 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (“Fraud alleged in a RICO civil complaint for mail fraud must state with particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on and the facts showing the plaintiffs reliance on defendant’s false statement of fact.”); see also Evans v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 434 F.3d 839 , 852-53 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming dismissal of fraud action where plaintiff failed to plead reliance with particularity as required by Rule 9(b)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Meier v. Musburger
N.D. Ill. · 2008 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987)(holding there is no RICO claim when alleged misrepresentation could have been checked against public information).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Cassens Transport Co.
6th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Cassens Transport Co. (4×)
6th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bates v. Northwestern Human Services, Inc.
D.D.C. · 2006 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that “[f]raud alleged in a RICO civil complaint for mail fraud must state with particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on and the facts showing the plaintiffs reliance on [the] defendant’s false statement of fact”); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 405 (stating that “[t]here can be little doubt that [Rule 9(b) ] *89 ... applies to fraud allegations in civil RICO complaints”) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Cassens Transport Co.
E.D. Mich. · 2005 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a civil RICO complaint involving a predicate act of mail fraud must allege “with particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on and the facts showing the plaintiffs reliance on defendant’s false statement of fact” to establish the “scheme to defraud” element of mail fraud.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply
E.D. Mich. · 2005 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a civil RICO complaint involving a predicate act of mail fraud must allege “with particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on *597 and the facts showing the plaintiffs reliance on defendant’s false statement of fact” to establish the “scheme to defraud” element of mail fraud. 12 Accord Bender v. Southland Corporation, 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir.1984); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Ci…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Lum v. Bank of America (3×) also: Cited "see"
1st Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987) ("The fact that the parties take different positions under the contract as to the appropriate prime rate, or the fact that the defendant charged too high a `prime rate' and thereby concealed or refused to disclose what the plaintiff considers the true prime rate called for under the contract, does not give rise to a valid claim for fraud."); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522 , 527-28 (9th Cir.1987) (opining that prime rate indicates the average cost of a loan because most loans are negotiated at interest rates above or b…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deasy v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District
6th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle
1st Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Falkowitz
S.D.N.Y. · 2002 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987), Caraluzzi v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 824 F.Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (N.D.Ill.1993) and Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 785 F.Supp. 411, 425 (S.D.N.Y.1992), as well as the contrasting precedents of U.S. v. Parker, 839 F.2d 1473, 1480-81 (11th Cir.1988) and U.S. v. Goodman, 984 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armbruster v. KH CORPORATION
E.D. Mich. · 2002 · confidence medium
Therefore, it fails to establish that FTC was acting as K-H’s. agent when it informed Plaintiffs that increased costs of medical *898 insurance required that retirees pay a portion of the insurance premiums and provided them with an allegedly inaccurate formula pursuant to which it calculated the amount that retirees would be required to pay. 27 As the Sixth Circuit observed in Blount Financial Service v. Walter F. Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987), “fraud alleged in a RICO civil complaint for mail fraud must state with particularity the false statement of fact made by the def…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor Group v. ANR Storage Co.
6th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Envoy Corp. Securities Litigation
M.D. Tenn. · 2001 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987), the Court explained that “Rule 9(b) requiring ‘aver-ments of fraud ... with particularity’ is designed to allow the District Court to distinguish valid from invalid claims in just such cases as this one and to terminate needless litigation early in the proceedings.” Rule 9(b) is also intended “to provide a defendant fair notice of the substance of a plaintiffs claim in order that the defendant may prepare a responsive *659 pleading.” American Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Assoc., 912 F.2d at 104, 109 (6th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Mexico Money Transfer Litigation
N.D. Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987) (no RICO claim based upon scheme to defraud where alleged misrepresentation could have been checked against public information).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morse v. McWhorter
M.D. Tenn. · 2000 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987), the Court explained that “Rule 9(b) requiring ‘aver-ments of fraud ... with particularity’ is designed to allow the District Court to distinguish valid from invalid claims in just such cases as this one and to terminate needless litigation early in the proceedings.” Rule 9(b) is also intended “to provide a defendant fair notice of the substance of a plaintiffs claim in order that the defendant may prepare a responsive pleading.” American Town Center v. Hall 83 Associates, 912 F.2d at 104, 109 (6th Cir.1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) SYSTEM MANAGEMENT, INC. v. Loiselle
D. Mass. · 2000 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); B.V.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Livingston v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc.
D.N.J. · 2000 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that absent specific allegations of intentional fraud, “[sjending a financial statement which misconstrues the prime rate provided by the terms of the contract may breach the contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of. action.”); United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126 , *600 128 (5th Cir.1980) (“[T]he [mail fraud] statute does not reject all business practices that do not fulfill expectations, nor does it taint every breach of a business contract.”)- Plaintiffs do allege that the individual defendants “co…
cited Cited as authority (rule) System Management, Inc. v. Loiselle
D. Mass. · 2000 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); B.V.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Annulli v. Panikkar
3rd Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that absent specific allegations of intentional fraud, ”[s]ending a financial statement which misconstrues the prime rate provided by the terms of the contract may breach the contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of action.”). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dominick Annulli v. Ananda K. Panikkar
3rd Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that absent specific allegations of intentional fraud, "[s]ending a financial statement which misconstrues the prime rate provided by the terms of the contract may breach the contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of action."). 8 See, e.g., United States v. Napoli, 54 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that "despite the broad range of criminal offenses designated by the money laundering statute, the crime of theft, standing alone, is not a specified unlawful activity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca9 1999 (2×)
9th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding, in a RICO action, that there was no scheme to defraud when the plaintiff could have "verified . . . independently" the alleged misrepresentations).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hanley
9th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Adolescent Psychiatry, 941 F.2d at 570 (stating that rule); Blount, 819 F.2d at 153 (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Federal Express Corp. v. United States Postal Service
W.D. Tenn. · 1999 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffin v. NBD Bank (2×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Mich. · 1999 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.1979)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGee v. City of Warrensville Heights (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ohio · 1998 · confidence medium
Blount Financial Servs., 819 F.2d at 152-53; Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., Ltd., 750 F.Supp. 838, 842-43 (N.D.Ohio 1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc.
D. Mass. · 1998 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); B.V.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Line v. Astro Manufacturing Co.
E.D. Ky. · 1998 · confidence medium
Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barbara Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., and Transamerica Premier Insurance Company (2×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Heden v. Hill
S.D. Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); Prouer v. Nathan’s Famous Sys., Inc., 904 F.Supp. 101, 108 (E.D.N.Y.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barbara Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A. (2×)
6th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CMI, Inc. v. Intoximeters, Inc.
W.D. Ky. · 1995 · confidence medium
Heller & Company, 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Scott v. Scott
M.D. Ala. · 1995 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shuttlesworth v. Housing Opportunities Made Equal
S.D. Ohio · 1994 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987); Central Distribs. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181 , 184 (6th Cir.1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Everson v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio
N.D. Ohio · 1994 · confidence medium
Services, Inc., 819 F.2d at 152; Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Central Distributors Of Beer, Inc. v. Donald Conn
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the plaintiff must plead with particularity the false statements of fact made by the defendants to the plaintiffs and the facts showing that the plaintiff relied on those statements to its detriment); Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400 (noting that the plaintiff properly pleaded that the defendants had made misrepresentations to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had detrimentally relied on those statements).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn
6th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the plaintiff must plead with particularity the false statements of fact made by the defendants to the plaintiffs and the facts showing that the plaintiff relied on those statements to its detriment); Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1400 (noting that the plaintiff properly pleaded that the defendants had made misrepresentations to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had detrimentally relied on those statements).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United Liberty Life Insurance v. Pinnacle West Capital Corp.
S.D. Ohio · 1993 · confidence medium
Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1987).
Blount Financial Services, Inc., a Corporation Bfs Finance, Inc., a Corporation David Aultom and Jean Aultom
v.
Walter E. Heller and Company, a Foreign Corporation and Lowell Crabtree
86-5342.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
May 27, 1987.
819 F.2d 151
Cited by 74 opinions  |  Published

819 F.2d 151

55 USLW 2704, 1987-1 Trade Cases 67,580,
RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6633

BLOUNT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., a corporation; BFS
Finance, Inc., a corporation; David Aultom and
Jean Aultom, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WALTER E. HELLER AND COMPANY, a foreign corporation and
Lowell Crabtree, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-5342.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 16, 1987.
Decided May 27, 1987.

Philip R. Russ, argued, Amarillo, Tex., James D. Fox, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs-appellants.

L. Caesar Stair III, Knoxville, Tenn., Rene A. Torrado, argued, Chicago, Ill., W. Morris Kizer, argued, L. Crabtree, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants-appellees.

Before MERRITT and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

[*~151]1

Plaintiffs sue the two defendants for violation of the Sherman Act and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, "RICO," in an action arising from a financing contract in which the defendant, Heller, loaned money to plaintiffs for their industrial thrift operations. The contract provided for interest based on adjusting upward the rate that the Continental Illinois Bank charged its most credit worthy customers. The gravamen of the case is that plaintiff was forced out of business because Heller charged a rate of interest which was illegal under the contract between the parties.

2

We agree with the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) decision that the complaint fails to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act and RICO, 632 F.Supp. 240. Stripped to the essential facts found in the allegations of the antitrust claim, the complaint alleges simply that Heller breached its contract with plaintiff by withdrawing from the financing arrangement and doing business with another financial institution in the same area. Under the controlling antitrust principles concerning refusal to deal stated in Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. New-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.1982), the antitrust complaint in the instant case is defective and fails to state a claim. The antitrust complaint states no facts constituting an injury to competition but states only that the defendant Heller replaced one thrift institution with another as its business associate in the area.

3

The complaint likewise fails to state a valid civil RICO claim for the predicate offenses of "unlawful debt" under Sec. 1961(6)(B), Title 18, and mail fraud under Sec. 1961(1). Section 1961(6) does not criminalize interest rates based on the prime rate unless the rate is twice the usurious rate under state or federal law. There are no facts alleged in the instant complaint which would bring the case in question within the requirement of twice the usurious rate under the last clause of Sec. 1961(6)(B).

4

On the mail fraud RICO allegation, the complaint fails to state the nature of the fraud which gives rise to the predicate offense of mail fraud. The fact that the parties take different positions under the contract as to the appropriate prime rate, or the fact that the defendant charged too high a "prime rate" and thereby concealed or refused to disclose what the plaintiff considers the true prime rate called for under the contract, does not give rise to a valid claim for fraud. Fraud alleged in a RICO civil complaint for mail fraud must state with particularity the false statement of fact made by the defendant which the plaintiff relied on and the facts showing the plaintiff's reliance on defendant's false statement of fact. The plaintiff has not alleged with particularity any such false statement of fact and therefore the District Court was correct in dismissing the complaint. Sending a financial statement which misconstrues the prime rate provided by the terms of the contract may breach the contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of action. Rule 9(b) requiring "averments of fraud ... with particularity" is designed to allow the District Court to distinguish valid from invalid claims in just such cases as this one and to terminate needless litigation early in the proceedings.

5

Even assuming that Heller knew that Continental Illinois Bank was charging a lower than advertised prime rate to some of its best borrowers, and that it concealed that fact from plaintiffs, that would not state a cause of action for RICO mail fraud. In United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994, 100 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed.2d 425 (1979), this Court recognized that in order to establish a scheme to defraud, which is an essential element of mail fraud, there must be proof of misrepresentations or omissions which were "reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension."

6

Heller's decision to charge a rate of interest based on Continental's advertised prime rate could not have been reasonably calculated to deceive a business entity such as Blount Financial "of ordinary prudence and comprehension." Heller is a separate and distinct entity from Continental Illinois and is therefore in no better position than Blount to obtain information about Continental Illinois' prime rate. Put another way, Blount was in as good a position as Heller to discover the "true" prime rate. An ordinary and prudent business person in the financial field would not have merely accepted Heller's quotation of the prime rate, but would have verified the rate independently. Blount's reliance and inaction were unreasonable and therefore prevent it from establishing that Heller's conduct was "reasonably calculated" to deceive the ordinary business person. In this business setting, Blount at most has a breach of contract action.

[*~152]7

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.