United States v. Ralph M. Crow, 824 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1987). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Ralph M. Crow, 824 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Joshua Meech (ca9, 2022-01-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#6 40 U.S.C. § 318 cited 2× in this case · 63 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joshua Meech (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
A “bare bones” indictment—“one employing the statutory language alone”—is “entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.” United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Matthews, 572 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ellis
N.D. Cal. · 2015 · confidence medium
“In the Ninth Circuit ‘[t]he use of a “bare bones” information—that is one employing the statutory language alone—is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.’ ” Woodruff, 50 F.3d at 676 (quoting United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987)). 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Williams
D. Haw. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir.2009) (upholding indictment that tracked the statutory language of the money laundering statute, and reasoning that “the government need not [also] allege all the elements” of the underlying offense, where the indictment provided detailed factual allegations describing the basis for the charges); Echavarria-Olarte v. Reno, 35 F.3d 395, 398 (9th Cir.1994) (rejecting the argument that a conspiracy indictment was insufficient for failure to allege the “substantive offense statute which was the object of the alleged conspira…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Renzi
D. Ariz. · 2012 · confidence medium
“In the Ninth Circuit, ‘[t]he use of a ‘bare bones’ information — that is one employing the statutory language alone- — is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.’ ” United States v. Woodruff 50 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Kevin Woodruff
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987) (noting that while the information lacked particulars it did put defendant on notice that the conduct was of the kind made penal).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Betty Salisbury (2×)
6th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 117 , 94 S.Ct. at 2907 ; Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 , 82 S.Ct. 1038 , 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 750 (6th Cir.1991), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 883 , 116 L.Ed.2d 787 (1992); United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1411 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Goodner Brothers Aircraft, Incorporated and Albert S. Goodner, Jr., Also Known as Junior Goodner
8th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kjorsvik (2×)
Wash. · 1991 · confidence medium
App. 840, 841 , 615 P.2d 511 (1980). [7] A number of cases indicate that all elements must be contained in the charging document: United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Opsta, 659 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir.1976); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 804 (5th Cir.1965); Lott v. United States, 309 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950 , 9 L.Ed.2d 498 , 83 S.Ct. 504 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" ca9 2004
9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Woodruff, 50 F.3d at 676 ("In the Ninth Circuit, `[t]he use of a `bare bones' information — that is one employing the statutory language alone — is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.'") (quoting United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Fernandez
9th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Woodruff, 50 F.3d at 676 (“In the Ninth Circuit, ‘[t]he use of a ‘bare bones’ information. — that is one employing the statutory language alone. — is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Richard Donald Chambers, United States of America v. Richard Donald Chambers
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Woodruff, 50 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended) ("In the Ninth Circuit, '[t]he use of a 'bare bones' information--that is one employing the statutory language alone--is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished.' " (quoting United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir.1987))). 14 In the 1991 indictment, the Government made only one modification to the language of § 2252(a)(2) by adding the words "of minors" following the phrase "knowingly received visua…
cited Cited "see, e.g." American Samoa Government v. Luki
amsamoa · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761 (1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Government of American Samoa v. Afamasaga
amsamoa · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761 (1987). 2 After reviewing the information in this matter, we conclude sufficiency.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ralph M. CROW, Defendant-Appellant
86-1234.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 11, 1987.
824 F.2d 761
L. Anthony White and Robert Bork, Reno, Nev., for plaintiff-appellee., Ralph M. Crow, Carson City, Nev., for defendant-appellant.
Koelsch, Noonan, Bryan.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

L. Anthony White and Robert Bork, Reno, Nev., for plaintiff-appellee.

Ralph M. Crow, Carson City, Nev., for defendant-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.

Before KOELSCH and NOONAN, Circuit Judges, and BRYAN,* District Judge.

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge:

Lead Opinion

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge:

Crow urges but two grounds for reversal of his conviction:

[*762] 1. That the information does not charge a crime,[1]
2. That the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt.

Neither has merit.

1. The use of a “bare bones” information — that is one employing the statutory language alone — is quite common and entirely permissible so long as the statute sets forth fully, directly and clearly all essential elements of the crime to be punished. United States v. Matthews, 572 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.1978).

Here, the information tracked the language of the pertinent regulation CFR 101-20.305; that regulation makes penal “Any conduct ... which impedes or disrupts the performance of official duties by Government employeesThe essential element of that offense is thus conduct producing the prohibited result and it does appear that this information does charge Crow with such conduct. True, the information lacks particulars but it did put him on notice that the conduct was of the kind made penal; the details of the conduct was not a matter of substance and their inclusion would have added nothing save unnecessary evidentiary matter going to the proof of that conduct. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 731-32 (9th Cir.1963).

2. The basic facts adduced at trial were essentially uncontradicted. The district judge — the case was tried to the court— carefully and we think, fairly, summed up the evidence; his ensuing findings, giving them due deference (see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1941)) fully support the judgment of guilt.[2]

AFFIRMED.

1

Crow did not raise this objection in district court but it nonetheless is now available to him Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2).

2

At no time either in the district court or here, did Crow, a practicing attorney, raise any issue regarding 40 U.S.C. § 318(a). We see no compelling reason to gratuitously do so now. None of the three cases cited in the dissent is germane, save perhaps Strakoff and that decision only serves to support the view that posting is not material; there the Fifth Circuit at least hinted that the matter was evidentiary: "Because of this inconformity and absent any showing that Strakoff did not in fact have notice of the proscription of CFR 101-20.313 the conviction cannot stand.”

Dissent

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

The General Services Administration possesses a delegated authority to issue rules whose violation will constitute a crime. A GSA regulation promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 318a sets a standard whose violation may be punished by a $50 fine or imprisonment for up to 30 days. 40 U.S.C. § 318c. Classified under the general criminal law as “a petty offense,” such violations are criminal. 18 U.S.C. § 1.

In the exercise of this awesome and delegated responsibility, GSA is strictly limited by 40 U.S.C. § 318a. The rules and regulations of GSA are effective and enforceable upon a condition: “that such rules and regulations shall be posted and kept posted in a conspicuous place” on the relevant federal property. 40 U.S.C. § 318a.

The posting of the regulations and their continued posting in a conspicuous place constitute an essential element that the United States must prove in order to prove crime in the violation of the regulation. See, e.g., United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 870-71 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1024, 90 S.Ct. 1364, 25 L.Ed.2d 83 (1970) (rules enforced against Jerry Rubin and other Vietnam War demonstrators at the Pentagon when the rules were posted in all main entrances of the Pentagon and in the lots throughout the Pentagon grounds including the parking areas); United States v. Murray, 352 F.2d 397, 398-399 (4th Cir.1965) (parking regulations of GSA enforced when court deemed that the marking of a parking space was the equivalent of posting a sign under § 318a). Failure to show that GSA regulations were conspicuously posted means that the government has not proved its case. United States v. Strakoff, 719 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir.1983) (Two signs on the first floor and one on each of the upper[*763] floors in the Federal Courthouse Building in Brownsville, Texas, forbidding the carrying of firearms into the courthouse were insufficient evidence of conspicuous posting giving notice to a person entering the building; a conviction for violating the regulation was reversed).

The opinion of the court discusses the adequacy of the information. The opinion of the court does not address Crow’s second ground for reversal, “that the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt.” The district court did carefully and fairly sum up the evidence: there is not the slightest suggestion in the court’s findings that the regulation was posted.

The district court did offer a hypothetical that illuminates the extent of the problem here. Suppose, the district court said, that a government employee is vacuuming a rug in a court house and a passerby deliberately stood in his way. Would the passerby be guilty of the crime with which Crow is charged? Yes, the district court concluded. By the same token, a law clerk intent on his or her research who did not move when requested to do so by a GSA employee cleaning the room would be guilty of violating the law. The opinion of this court apparently accepts the criminality of such conduct even though the passerby or law clerk was not shown to have had any notice that a federal regulation empowered the carper-sweeper with authority to make his requests peremptory and disobedience to them subject to penal sanction.

This case is small by virtue of the offense charged and the punishment threatened. The case is large in its implications. A federal bureaucracy is given power to create crimes. No notice need be given of the bureaucracy’s criminalizing regulation. A person is guilty if intentionally he performs the act forbidden by the secret regulation.

The instant case in no relevant particular differs from Strakoff. There was no evidence whatsoever at the trial that the regulation applied to Crow was posted. An essential element of the crime was not proved. His conviction was contrary to law.