Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Robert F. Swantz v. Am. Inst. of Architects Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers Virginia Soc'y of the Aia, Amici Curiae, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988). · Go Syfert
Search
Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Robert F. Swantz v. Am. Inst. of Architects Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers Virginia Soc'y of the Aia, Amici Curiae, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“f a court finds that an express contract exists between the parties, either by determination of the court or stipulation of the parties, the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment is unavailable.”
112 citation events (77 in the last 25 years) across 35 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu v. Kaya (vawd, 2023-10-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu v. Kaya
W.D. Va. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
f a court finds that an express contract exists between the parties, either by determination of the court or stipulation of the parties, the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment is unavailable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PPI/TimeZero, Inc. v. Zenith Firearms, Inc.
W.D. Va. · 2024 · confidence medium
However, “[a]n action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature and may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Serious Business PR, LLC v. Ancient Drinks, LLC
W.D. Va. · 2024 · confidence medium
Just like Virginia law’s rule concerning quantum meruit, “[a]n action for unjust enrichment is quasi- contractual in nature and may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Recon Group LLP v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC
W.D.N.C. · 2024 · confidence medium
Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 541 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988)) (“[T]his express promise to pay creates an extra element which prevents preemption by the Copyright Act.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.
E.D. Va. · 2024 · confidence medium
“An action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature and may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sport Of Business, LLC v. Sarah Beth Yoga, LLC
W.D. Va. · 2022 · confidence medium
Counterclaim-defendants argue that these claims are barred because a party cannot bring equitable claims “in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TruLogic, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co. (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Internatl., Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.1993), Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990), and Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States of America v. NDUTIME Youth & Family Services, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2020 · confidence medium
Equitable claims “may not be brought in the face of an express contract.”24 Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (evaluating unjust enrichment clam); Butts, 2013 WL 6039040 at *3 (“A condition precedent to the assertion of such a claim is that no express contract exists between the parties.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) XAPT Corporation v. Deere & Company, Inc.
D. Del. · 2020 · confidence medium
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (Sth Cir. 1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coleman v. Bank of America NA
D.S.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
WRH Mortg., 214 F.3d at 534 (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988)) (finding in regard to a promissory note between parties, “where a contract governs the relationship of the parties, the equitable remedy of restitution grounded in quasi-contract or unjust enrichment does not lie.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ENVOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. NORTHRUP GRUMMAN CORPORATION
D.N.J. · 2020 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he contractual restriction on use of the programs constitutes an additional element making this cause of action not equivalent to a copyright action”); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his action for breach of contract involves an element in addition to mere reproduction, distribution or display: the contract promise made by Taquino, therefore, it is not preempted”.); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (reversing the lower court’s finding of preemption…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae
N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
However, since “[a]n action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature,” it “may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing In re Virginia Block Co., 16 B.R. 771, 774 (W.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae
N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
However, since “[a]n action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature,” it “may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing In re Virginia Block Co., 16 B.R. 771, 774 (W.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sparrow Sys., Inc. v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, Pllc â (2×)
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 541 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for excessive use of its software was “more appropriately a breach of contract claim than a copyright infringement claim because [plaintiff’s software agreement with defendant] contained an express promise to pay for excess use” and that “this express promise to pay create[d] an extra element which prevent[ed] preemption by the Copyright Act”) (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988), where the “plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was not preempted becaus…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2013 · confidence medium
Aug. 12, 2009) (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988)) (dismissing an unjust enrichment claim because an express contract governed the dispute).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir.1993) (express licensing agreement); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1490, 1501 (5th Cir.1990) (express contract); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (express contract); see also 4 *432 Nimmer § 19D.03[C][2] (“As a general rule, contract claims require proof of a significant ‘extra element’: the existence of an actual agreement between plaintiff and defendant involving a promise to pay for use of disclosed ideas.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir.1993) ("We conclude that the alleged contractual restriction on National’s use of the licensed programs constitutes an extra element in addition to the copyright rights making this cause of action qualitatively different from an action for copyright.”) (emphasis supplied); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) ("Implicit in the contract between Acorn and Swantz was an agreement that while Swantz did not have to use Acorn’s plans, if he did use Acorn’s plans then he was obligated either to purchase the plans from Acorn…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Northwest Home Designing Inc. v. Sound Built Homes Inc.
W.D. Wash. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, National Car Rental System, Inc. v. *1216 Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 438 (8th Cir.1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); and Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MDY INDUSTRIES, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment
9th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
MDY INDUSTRIES v. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT 2707 433 (8th Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988). [25] This action concerns the anti-bot provisions of ToU § 4(b)(ii) and (iii), which we have held are contract- enforceable covenants rather than copyright-enforceable con- ditions.
cited Cited as authority (rule) MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, Inc.
D. Colo. · 2009 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Nat’l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 432 (examining contract provision at issue to determine whether it protected rights equivalent to exclusive federal copyright rights); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990) (finding no preemption because contract promise at issue, the plaintiffs promise not to represent a competing company, was not within the general scope of copyright law); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) (finding breach of contract claim not preempted based on fact-specific analysis *1245 of contract); Selby v.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc.
D. Maryland · 2008 · confidence medium
A breach of contract claim will survive preemption only when the cause of action is based upon provisions of the contract outside the subject matter of copyright. 6 Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Sivantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chalfant v. Tubb
N.D. Okla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir.2001); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988); Hustlers Inc., 253 F.Supp.2d at 1293 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Madison River Management Co. v. Business Management Software Corp.
M.D.N.C. · 2005 · confidence medium
Op. & Order Jan. 5, 2005, at 10-13), this express promise to pay creates an extra element which prevents preemption by the Copyright Act and brings this claim within the purview of Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was not preempted because the corresponding promise to pay for any use by the defendant constituted an extra element). 14 Ac- *542 eordingly, Madison’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as to this claim. b.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harold L. Bowers (Doing Business as Hlb Technology), Plaintiff-Cross v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 , 26 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir.1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 , 926, 6 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (4th Cir.1988); but see Lipscher v. LRP Publs., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1312 , 60 USPQ2d 1468, 1473 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kabehie v. Zoland (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
(National Car Rental v. Computer Associates, supra, 991 F.2d at pp. 429-430 [breach of promise not to use computer program to process third party’s data]; Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz (4th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 923, 926 [promise to buy architectural plans or building materials from plaintiff if defendant used plaintiff’s plans]; Lennon v. Seaman, supra, 63 F.Supp. at p. 438 [right under employee confidentiality agreement to prevent disclosure of information]; Chesler/Perlmutter Prods. v. Fireworks Entertain.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harold L. Bowers (Doing Business as Hlb Technology), Plaintiff-Cross v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
Fed. Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 , 26 USPQ2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir.1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 , 926, 6 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (4th Cir.1988); but see Lipscher v. LRP Pubis., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1312 , 60 USPQ2d 1468, 1473 (11th Cir.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc.
Ind. · 2002 · confidence medium
Likewise, in Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988), the contract at issue contained an "implicit provision" that if a prospective homeowner used Acorn's home design plans, he was obligated either to purchase the plans from Acorn or to purchase his building materials from Acorn, a provision that "does not arise out of the subject matter of copyright and is therefore a separate and distinct cause of action." 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County Commissioners v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc.
Md. · 2000 · confidence medium
Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 388 , 521 N.Y.S.2d 653 , 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1987))); Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971 F.2d 401, 408-09 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a party cannot recover on a claim of unjust enrichment where the parties’ relationship was governed by a valid express contract); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) ("An action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature and may not be brought in the face of an express contract.”); Bloomgarden, 479 F.2d at 210 ("The quasi-contract ... is not really a contract, but a legal o…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Federal Deposit Insurance v. S.A.S. Associates
E.D. Va. · 1999 · confidence medium
Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir.1994) (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988)); Occidental Life Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ballas v. Tedesco
D.N.J. · 1999 · confidence medium
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 , 114 S.Ct. 176 , 126 L.Ed.2d 136 (1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that because breach of contract action involves a promise that is in addition to mere reproduction, distribution or display, it is not preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that breach of contract action was not preempted by federal copyright law); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc., 935 F.Supp. 425, 441 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frontline Test Equipment, Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc.
W.D. Va. · 1998 · confidence medium
In Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, the defendant signed an agreement with Acorn Structures, Inc., according to which agreement Acorn would design a home and the defendant could either purchase the home as designed or return the drawings to Acorn. 846 F.2d 923, 925 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. (2×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Va. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Vicars v. First Virginia Bank-Mountain Empire, 250 Va. 103, 109 , 458 S.E.2d 293 (1995); Kavanaugh v. Donovan, 186 Va. 85, 91 , 41 S.E.2d 489 (1947) (waste); Acorn Structures, 846 F.2d at 926 (conversion).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
However, the Seventh Circuit reversed that decision, agreeing instead with the only three other courts of appeals that have decided the question that § 301 does not preempt breach of contract claims. 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir.1996) (citing National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 , 114 S.Ct. 176 , 126 L.Ed.2d 136 (1993), Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990), and Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
7th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Three courts of appeals have answered “no.” National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
W.D. Wis. · 1996 · confidence medium
National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Associates Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 176 , 126 L.Ed.2d 136 (1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988); Trenton v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 865 F.Supp. 1416, 1429 (C.D.Cal.1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holland v. Cline Bros. Min. Co., Inc.
S.D.W. Va · 1995 · confidence medium
Because ‘an action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature[, it] may not be brought in the face of an express contract.’ Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).” Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 202 , 130 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca4 1994
4th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Because an "action for unjust enrichment is quasicontractual in nature[, it] may not be brought in the face of an express contract." Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bright v. QSP, Inc.
4th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Because an “action for unjust enrichment is quasicontractual in nature[, it] may not be brought in the face of an express contract.” Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Siderpali, S.P.A. v. Judal Industries, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Trucking Corporation v. Westmoreland Coal Company
4th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (parties' right and duties growing out of contractual relationship wholly defined by express contract).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nobel v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.
Me. · 1990 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988); Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, 65 N.Y.2d 75 , 78, 479 N.E.2d 236 , 237-38, 489 N.Y.S.2d 891 , 893 (1985).
discussed Cited "see" USI Insurance Services, LLC v. Ellis (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Va. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Fitzpatrick v. Capital One Financial Corp.
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
Corp., 96 F.3d 1151 , 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) 21 (California law); see Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) 22 (Virginia law) (“An action for unjust enrichment . . . may not be brought in the face of an 23 24 5 Plaintiff’s claim would fare no better under California law.
cited Cited "see" Brainchild Surgical Devices, LLC v. CPA Global Limited
E.D. Va. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited "see" Sitelink Software, LLC v. Red Nova Labs, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Acorn Structures, 846 F.2d, at 926; cf. Sparrow Sys. v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, PLLC, No 14 CVS 1025, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 70 , at *28 (N.C.
cited Cited "see" Out of the Box Developers, LLC v. Logicbit Corp.
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
discussed Cited "see" Internet Archive v. Shell
D. Colo. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456-458 (6th Cir.2001), ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir.1996), National Car Rental System, Inc., v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir.1993), Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir.1990) and Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
cited Cited "see" WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. S.A.S. Associates
4th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir.1988).
cited Cited "see" Wrh Mortgage, Incorporated v. S.A.S. Associates
4th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
Acorn Structures, Inc.
v.
Robert F. Swantz v. American Institute of Architects National Society of Professional Engineers Virginia Society of the Aia, Amici Curiae
87-1039.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Mar 11, 1988.
846 F.2d 923
Published

846 F.2d 923

1988 Copr.L.Dec. P 26,251, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1810

ACORN STRUCTURES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Robert F. SWANTZ, Defendant-Appellee,
v.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS; National Society of
Professional Engineers; Virginia Society of the
AIA, Amici Curiae.

No. 87-1039.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 4, 1987.
Decided March 11, 1988.

John A.D. Gilmore (Nilda M. Navarro, Hill & Barlow, Boston, Mass., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Craig Thomas Merritt (Robert Alfred Gouldin, Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, Richmond, Va., on brief), for defendant-appellee.

Before RUSSELL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

[*~923]1

This action is brought by Acorn Structures, Inc., plaintiff/appellant, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment for the unauthorized use of its architectural plans which had been sold, subject to certain conditions, to the defendant/appellee, Robert F. Swantz. Subject matter jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332, plaintiff Acorn being a Massachusetts corporation, while defendant Swantz is a resident of Virginia. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted by the district court on each of plaintiff's three causes of action. The court found that the claims for conversion and unjust enrichment failed to state a claim on which relief could be based. We agree. However, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim finding that it had been preempted by federal law, specifically, the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 301. The principal issue before us is whether the district court erred in its judgment that plaintiff's claim for breach of contract is preempted by federal copyright law. We reverse the judgment of the district court on this issue.

I.

2

The pertinent facts are not subject to dispute. Acorn Structures, Inc. (Acorn), designs homes and sells the building materials for those homes. On October 28, 1983, Swantz entered into a "design agreement" with Acorn which provided for the performance of architectural services by Acorn in consideration of $750.00 paid by Swantz. The design agreement did not commit Swantz to purchase building materials from Acorn but it did provide an incentive to do so by offering to credit the $750.00 paid for the architectural services toward the purchase of the building materials. If Swantz were to choose not to purchase the materials from Acorn, the agreement provided that he would be entitled to a $100.00 refund for returning the drawings to Acorn. The design agreement provides in relevant part:

3

Signing this agreement does not commit you to purchase an Acorn house package, but does authorize Acorn to prepare for you at the costs indicated below ... [design drawings, etc.]

4

... Acorn will prepare these design drawings for you as a prospective customer of an Acorn house package. All Acorn drawings are copyrighted and are its property, and may not be used or copied in any way, in whole or in part, without the written consent of Acorn. The design fee is not a license fee and does not authorize you to use or copy any drawings provided by Acorn.

5

All design fees may be applied to the price of an Acorn house package. If you do not purchase the house package, a refund of $100 of the design fee will be made upon return of all drawings to Acorn.

6

Swantz neither purchased building materials from Acorn nor did he return the drawings. Rather, Swantz notified Acorn that there would be a delay in his purchase of building materials because of financial difficulties but then delivered the drawings to another architect who filed a copy of the drawings under his own seal with the Building Permits and Inspections Office which issued a building permit for the house and adjacent garage. The construction of the house and garage has now been completed.

II.

7

Acorn contends that Swantz breached the contractual provisions of the design agreement by using Acorn's plans without the consent of Acorn and without buying from Acorn any building materials for use in constructing the house and garage.

8

Swantz responds by arguing that this breach of contract claim has been preempted by federal law. Specifically, Swantz asserts that Section 301 of The Copyright Act of 1976 preempts Acorn's claim. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 301 provides in relevant part:

[*~924]9

(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.

10

(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to--

11

(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or

12

(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978; or

13

(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.

14

The district court found that Acorn's claim for breach of contract was within the subject matter of copyright and therefore was preempted by Section 301. The district court properly noted that "federal copyright law protects an author's expression, but does not protect the ideas underlying that expression." Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 657 F.Supp. 70, 75 (W.D.Va.1987) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1879). Thus, in the judgment of the district court, while Acorn's design agreement itself would be protected by copyright law, the ideas underlying that agreement would not be protected. The district court found on this basis that "a state law claim which would enforce a breach of contract action for the use of an idea would conflict with the implicit goals of the Copyright Act." Acorn, supra, at 75. We find that the district court erred in its analysis of plaintiff's complaint.

III.

[*~925]15

Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract entails a distinct cause of action which is clearly not within the subject matter of copyright but arises out of the implicit contractual provisions of the design agreement. Swantz was not committed to purchase a house package from Acorn. However, Acorn prepared the plans for Swantz, only "as a prospective customer of an Acorn house package." Implicit in the contract between Acorn and Swantz was an agreement that while Swantz did not have to use Acorn's plans, if he did use Acorn's plans then he was obligated either to purchase the plans from Acorn or to purchase his building materials from Acorn. This agreement is clearly implied by the contract. Acorn's cause of action is based upon this implicit provision of the contract which does not arise out of the subject matter of copyright and is therefore a separate and distinct cause of action.

16

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in its judgment that plaintiff's claim for breach of contract is preempted by federal copyright law.

IV.

17

Acorn further argues that the district court erred in dismissing the claims for conversion and unjust enrichment.

18

In Virginia, the tort of conversion consists of "[a]ny distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over the property of another, and in denial of his rights or inconsistent therewith." Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 76, 92 S.E.2d 359, 365 (1956). As noted by the district court, "Swantz had an absolute right to possession of the plans." 657 F.Supp. at 74. Although Acorn offered an inducement of one hundred dollars if the plans were returned, Swantz was under no obligation to return them. But Swantz did use the plans in the construction of his home, which the contract prohibited. Despite this the district court found that Swantz did not wrongfully exercise dominion over the property and dismissed the claim for conversion on that ground. It could be said under Restatement of Torts, Second, Sec. 228 that such use, which was unauthorized under the contract, constituted an actionable conversion.[1] Whether this would be true under Virginia law is a matter not considered below. We, however, find no occasion to resolve this matter here because at best conversion is only an alternative ground of action to that of breach of contract which we have sustained. A judgment on that claim would be dispositive of the conversion claim. We, therefore, find no error in the district court's disposition of this claim for these reasons. We may add that there does not appear any facts for an award of punitive damages in the breach of contract action under Virginia law. Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 224 Va. 699, 299 S.E.2d 514 (1983).

19

Likewise, the district court committed no error in dismissing Acorn's claim for unjust enrichment. An action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual in nature and may not be brought in the face of an express contract. In re Virginia Block Co., 16 B.R. 771, 774 (W.D.Va.1982). It is undisputed that here there is an express contract between Acorn and Swantz which has not been set aside by the courts. Because there is an express contract in this case, the district court acted properly in dismissing Acorn's claim for unjust enrichment.

20

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court on the ground that plaintiff's claim for breach of contract was preempted by federal law, and remand to the district court for disposition of plaintiff's breach of contract suit on its merits.

[*~926]21

REVERSED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

1

The pertinent language of the section is:

One who is authorized to make a particular use of a chattel, and uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to liability for conversion to another whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby seriously violated.