Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). · Go Syfert
Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
690 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 51 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Thomas Wesley Alexander & Sylvia Alexander v. Commissioner (tax, 2014-02-26) · Strongest negative: Messer v. Commissioner (tax, 1953-04-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1925 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1925 1975 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Messer v. Commissioner (2×)
Tax Ct. · 1953 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Weiss v. Stern , 265 U.S. 242 ↩ . 7.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Wesley Alexander & Sylvia Alexander v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2014 · confidence medium
Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eaton Corp. v. Comm'r
Tax Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Proc. 2004-40, sec. 2.04(1), 2004-2 C.B. at 51.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eaton Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Proc. 2004-40, sec. 2.04(1), 2004-2 C.B. at 51.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eaton Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Proc. 2004-40, sec. 2.04(1), 2004-2 C.B. at 51.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner (4×)
SCOTUS · 1991 · confidence medium
See United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 173 (1921); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, 253-254 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 540-542 (1925); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207-212 (1920) (recognizing realization requirement).
examined Cited as authority (rule) San Antonio Savings Association and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Weiss, 265 U.S. at 254 , 44 S.Ct. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Centennial Savings Bank FSB v. United States
N.D. Tex. · 1988 · confidence medium
Weiss, 265 U.S. at 254 , 44 S.Ct. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H. K. Porter Co. v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
In Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924), the Supreme Court stated: Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants; and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws enacted thereunder we must regard matters of substance and not mere form.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thatcher v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1973 · confidence medium
Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924); Paula Construction Co., 58 T.C. 1055 (1972), affirmed per curiam 474 F. 2d 1345 (C.A. 5, 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paula Constr. Co. v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1972 · confidence medium
Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924); Lansing Broadcasting Co., 52 T.C. 299 , 308 fn. 7 (1969), affd. 427 F. 2d 1014 (C.A. 6, 1970), certiorari denied 400 U.S. 941 (1970); Temple N. Joyce, 42 T.C. 628, 636 (1964).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Klausner
2d Cir. · 1928 · confidence medium
In Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, 254 , 44 S. Ct. 490, 492 ( 68 L.
cited Cited "see" Nolte v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See T.D. 7698 , 1984- 2 C.B. 51 .
cited Cited "see" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bonnie A. Miller
4th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rev.Rul. 85-98, 1985- 2 C.B. 51 .
cited Cited "see" Young v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 , 254 (1924) ; Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 , 136 (1965) , affd. per curiam 377 F. 2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967) .
discussed Cited "see" Behrens v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1985 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 , 254 (1924) ; Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 , 136 (1965) , affd. per curiam 377 F. 2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967) . *465 More importantly, petitioner apparently fails to realize that the distinguishing factor between his two hypothetical alternatives and what actually took place is the particular transaction in which the $22,080.37 cash is received.
examined Cited "see" Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington (6×)
Minn. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 , 44 S.Ct. 490, 491 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 (1924); Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 Pepperdine L.Rev. 313, 352 (1980).
cited Cited "see" Gada v. United States
D. Conn. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rev.Rul. 69-460, 1969- 2 C.B. 51 .
examined Cited "see" Affiliated Government Employees' Distributing Company, a Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×)
9th Cir. · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 (1924). 4 .
examined Cited "see" Arnold Namrow and Lillian Namrow, and Jay C. Maxwell and Dorothy N. Maxwell v. Commissioner of Internal Revnue (3×)
4th Cir. · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 ; Rollman v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 244 F.2d 634 .
examined Cited "see" Schwerin v. Commissioner (4×)
D.D.C. · 1944 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 , 33 A.L.R. 520 ; Clemmons v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 54 F.2d 209 ; Bruce v. Helvering, 64 App. D.C. 192 , 76 F.2d 442 .
cited Cited "see" Wellman v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation
Mass. · 1935 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242, 254 .
examined Cited "see" C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×)
4th Cir. · 1934 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 , 44 S. Ct. 490 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" Garden Homes Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×)
7th Cir. · 1933 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 , 44 S. Ct. 490 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" Industrial Cotton Mills Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev. (3×)
4th Cir. · 1932 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 , 44 S. Ct. 490 , 68 L.
cited Cited "see" Maytag Co. v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1929 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 ; Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Commissioner, - Fed. (2d) -.
examined Cited "see" Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Com'r of Internal Revenue (6×)
4th Cir. · 1929 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 , 44 S. Ct. 490 , 68 L.
examined Cited "see" White v. Weiss (3×)
N.D. Ohio · 1925 · signal: see · confidence high
See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 , 44 S. Ct. 490 , 68 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." TBL Licensing LLC F.K.A. the Timberland Company, and Subsidiaries (A Consolidated Group)
Tax Ct. · 2022 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (holding that, in reincorporation in which both corporations were organized under the laws of the same State, participating shareholders realized gain only to the extent of the cash they received).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." TBL Licensing LLC F.K.A. the Timberland Company, and Subsidiaries (A Consolidated Group)
Tax Ct. · 2022 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) (holding that, in reincorporation in which both corporations were organized under the laws of the same State, participating shareholders realized gain only to the extent of the cash they received).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fisher v. Commissioner (2×)
unknown court · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Paula Construction Co., 58 T.C. 1055, 1060 (1972), affirmed per curiam 474 F. 2d 1345 (C.A. 5, 1973); see also Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924); First Nat.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Rosalie M. Schubert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×)
4th Cir. · 1961 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Weiss v. Stern [Steam], 1923, 265 U.S. 242 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 ; United States v. Phellis, 1921, 257 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 63 , 66 L.Ed. 180 .” By the same reasoning, the application of tax deduction statutes should not be based on one of several possible assumptions of fact or on mere speculation and conjecture.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Goelet v. United States (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1958 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Weiss v. Stern, 1923, 265 U.S. 242 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 ; United States v. Phellis, 1921, 257 U.S. 156 , 42 S.Ct. 63 , 66 L.Ed. 180 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Pike v. United States (3×)
D. Conn. · 1951 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Weiss v. Stern, 265 U.S. 242 , 44 S.Ct. 490 , 68 L.Ed. 1001 , and Allen v. Werner, 5 Cir., 190 F.2d 840 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Grueby v. Chase Harris Forbes Corp.
Mass. · 1935 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U. S. 242 ; Metropolitan Stock Exchange v. Gill, 199 Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Weiss, Collector of Internal Revenue,
v.
Stearn; Weiss, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. White
Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for petitioner., Mr. Charles P. Hine, with whom Mr. Amos Burt Thompson was on the brief, for respondent in No. 262., Mr. John G. White, with whom Mr. A. V. Cannon and Mr. L. C. Spieth were on the brief, for respondent in No. 263.
McReynolds, Holmes, Walker.
Cited by 328 opinions  |  Published
[*251] Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents brought separate actions to recover money which they alleged petitioner unlawfully demanded of them as income tax. The question for our decision is this: Did they, by the transactions hereinafter detailed, dispose with profit of all or, as they maintain, of only half their interests in the National Acme Manufacturing Company, within the income provisions, Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757). Both courts below upheld their claims and gave judgments for appropriate refunds.

Under a definite written agreement the following things were done—

(A) Respondents and other owners delivered duly endorsed certificates representing the entire capital stock ($5,000,000) of the National Acme Manufacturing Company, incorporated under laws of Ohio — the old corporation — to The Cleveland Trust Company, as depositary. Messrs. Eastman, Dillon & Company deposited $7,500,000 with the same Trust Company. Representatives of both classes of depositors thereupon incorporated in Ohio the National Acme Company — the new corporation — with $25,000,000 authorized capital stock and powers similar to those of the old corporation. Pursuing the definite purpose for which it was organized, the new corporation purchased and took over the entire property, assets and business of the old one, assuming all outstanding contracts and liabilities, and in payment therefor issued to the Trust Company its entire authorized capital stock. It continued to operate the acquired business under the former management, and the old corporation was dissolved.

[*252] (B) The Trust Company delivered to Eastman, Dillon & Company certificates for half the new stock — $12,500,-000. To the owners of the old stock — to each his pro rata part — it delivered certificates representing the remaining half, together with the $7,500,000 cash received from Eastman, Dillon & Company. The owner of each $100 of old stock thus received $150 cash, also $250 of new stock representing an interest in the property and business half as large as he had before. Prior to the specified transactions his interest in the enterprise was 100/5,000,-000; thereafter it became 250/25,000,000, or 50/5,000,000.

The Collector ruled that each old stockholder sold his entire holding, and assessed respondent accordingly for resulting profits. Adopting a different view, the courts below held that he really sold half for cash and exchanged the remainder, without gain, for the same proportionate interest in the transferred corporate assets and business.

We agree with the conclusion reached below. The practical result of the things done was, a transfer of the old assets and business, without increase or diminution or material change of general purpose, to the new corporation; a disposal, for cash by each stockholder of half his interest therein; and an exchange of the remainder for new stock representing the same proportionate interest in the enterprise. Without doubt every stockholder became liable for the tax upon any profits which he actually realized by receiving the cash payment. If by selling the remainder he hereafter receives a segregated profit, that also will be subject to taxation. %

Petitioner relies upon United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, and Rockefeller v. United States, id. 176; also Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134, which followed them. As the result of transactions disclosed in the Phellis and Rockefeller Cases, certain corporate assets not exceeding accumulated surplus were segregated and passed to individual stockholders. The value of the segregated thing[*253] so received was held to constitute taxable income. Cullinan’s gain resulted from a dividend in liquidation actually distributed in the stock of a holding company incorporated under the laws of a foreign State, not organized for the purpose of carrying on the old business, and which held no title to the original assets.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, gave great consideration to the nature of income and stock dividends. It pointed out that, within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, income from capital is gain severed therefrom and received by the taxpayer for his separate use; that the interest of the stockholder is a capital one and stock certificates but evidence of it; that for purposes of taxation where a stock dividend is declared, the essential and controlling fact is that the recipient receives nothing out of the company’s assets for his separate use and benefit. The conclusion was that, “ having regard to the very truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing that answers the definition of income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.”

Applying the general principles of Eisner v. Macomber, it seems clear that if the National Acme Manufacturing Company had increased its capital stock to $25,000,000 and then declared a stock dividend of four hundred per cent., the stockholders would have received no gain — their proportionate interest would have remained the same as before. If upon the transfer of its entire property and business for the purpose of reorganization and future conduct the old corporation had actually received the entire issue of new stock and had then distributed this pro rata among its stockholders, their ultimate rights in the enterprise would have continued substantially as before — the capital assets would have remained unimpaired and nothing would have gone therefrom to any stockholder for his separate benefit. The value of his holdings would not have changed, and he would have retained the same essential rights in respect of the assets.

[*254] We can not conclude that mere change for purposes of reorganization in the technical ownership of an enterprise, under circumstances like those here disclosed, followed by issuance of new certificates, constitutes gain separated from the original capital interest. Something more is necessary — something which gives the stockholder a thing really different from what he theretofore had. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418; Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71. The sale of part of'the new stock and distribution of the proceeds did not.affect- the nature of the unsold portion; when distributed this did not in truth represent any gain.

Considering the entire arrangement we think it amounted to a financial reorganization under which each old stockholder retained half of his interest and disposed of the remainder. Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants; and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws enacted thereunder we must regard matters of substance and not mere form.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandéis dissent on the ground that the case falls within the rule declared in Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134.