green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
27.1 score
“ollateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.”
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971
1998
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined
Cited "but see"
State v. Canon
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
But cf. Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971) (overturning state court ruling that defendant could be retried because the judge erroneously excluded evidence of identity).
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Tolle v. Bowser
ollateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Card v. Cargor
“The Supreme Court has found issue preclusion under Ashe only three other times.” Langley v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 157 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 369–70 (1972) (per curiam); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971) (per curiam); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James v. Parish
The United States Supreme Court has “held that collateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)); see also, Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Evans
Cir. 2016) (quoting Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam) (“Criminal collateral estoppel is generally ‘an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.’”)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Currier v. Virginia
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James Wilkinson v. Doug Gingrich
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Discussion A. Collateral Estoppel and Ashe v. Swenson Collateral estoppel is “an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gonzalez v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark
Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the petition. “ [Collateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971); see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 . “ ‘[Wjhen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment’ of acquittal, it ‘cannot again be litigated’ in a second trial for a separate offense.” Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gonzalez v. Dist. Ct.
Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the petition. "[C]ollateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971); see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 . "[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment' of acquittal, it 'cannot again be litigated' in a second trial for a separate offense." Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 ).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Castillo-Basa
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443 .3 In Ashe, 3 Castillo-Basa frames his argument on appeal as a claim based on “dou- ble jeopardy and collateral estoppel.” As the Supreme Court has explained, collateral estoppel in the criminal context — the protection against the relitigation of issues previously determined — is “an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Castillo-Basa
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443 .3 In Ashe, 3 Castillo-Basa frames his argument on appeal as a claim based on “dou- ble jeopardy and collateral estoppel.” As the Supreme Court has explained, collateral estoppel in the criminal context — the protection against the relitigation of issues previously determined — is “an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Butler v. State
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-461 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1196— 1203, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 478-484 (1970) (concurring opinion by Brennan, J.); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 387 , 91 S.Ct. 1801, 1803 , 29 L.Ed.2d 549, 553 (1971) (concurring opinion by Brennan, J.); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 , 92 S.Ct. 183, 184 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212, 215 (1971) (concurring opinion by Brennan, J.). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lucido v. Superior Court
(2×)
(See Harris v. Washington (1971) 404 U.S. 55, 56 [ 30 L.Ed.2d 212, 214-215 , 92 S.Ct. 183 ] [collateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment]; Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 707 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 ] [Fifth Amendment guaranty against double jeopardy enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment]; see also United States v. Oppenheimer (1916) 242 U.S. 85, 87 [ 61 L.Ed. 161, 164 , 37 S.Ct. 68 , 3 A.L.R. 516 ] [doctrine of res judicata applicable in criminal cases; “It cannot…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rivera v. Ohio
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 56 (1971); see Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656-661 (1977).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brooks v. Oklahoma
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cousins v. Maryland, 429 U. S. 1027 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dempsey v. United States, 423 U. S. 1079 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Susi v. Flowers, 423 U. S. 1006 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Vardas v. Texas, 423 U. S. 904 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, 423 U. S. 902 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissen…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spradling v. Texas; And Dunn v. Texas
“Since the state courts have finally rejected a claim that the Constitution forbids a second trial of the petitioner, a claim separate and apart from the question whether the petitioner may constitutionally be convicted of the crimes with which he is charged, our jurisdiction is properly invoked under 28 U. S. § 1257.” Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 56 (1971).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Hastings
Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam); State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 266 , 385 A.2d 844, 846-47 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thompson v. Oklahoma
See Cousins v. Maryland, ante, p. 1027 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Dempsey v. United States, 423 U. S. 1079 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Susi v. Flowers, 423 U. S. 1006 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Vardas v. Texas, 423 U. S. 904 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, 423 U. S. 902 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., diss…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cousins v. Maryland
See Dempsey v. United States, 423 U. S. 1079 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Susi v. Flowers, 423 U. S. 1006 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Vardas v. Texas, 423 U. S. 904 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, 423 U. S. 902 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan,…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ragano v. United States
See Dempsey v. United States, 423 U. S. 1079 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Susi v. Flowers, 423 U. S. 1006 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Vardas v. Texas, 423 U. S. 904 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, 423 U. S. 902 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan,…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Peluso
(2×)
That being so, the constitutional guarantee applies, irrespective of whether the jury considered all relevant evidence, and irrespective of the food faith of the State in bringing successive prosecutions.” 404 U.S. at 56-57 (Emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dempsey v. United States
See Susi v. Flowers, ante, p. 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Vardas v. Texas, ante, p. 904 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, ante, p. 902 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement); Waller v. …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Susi Et Al. v. Flowers, Judge
See Vardas v. Texas, ante, p. 904 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stewart v. Iowa, ante, p. 902 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement of Doug las, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.,); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stewart v. Iowa
See Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerinas v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vardas v. Texas
See Stewart v. Iowa, ante, p. 902 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Waugh v. Gray, 422 U. S. 1027 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, supra (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Best
Contra, e. g., Harris v. Washington (1971), 404 U. S. 55, 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Waugh v. Gray
See Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wells v. Missouri
See Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement) ; Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ciuzio v. United States
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 . 448, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Mullin v. Wyoming, 414 U. S. 940 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Oklahoma, 409 U. S. 1017 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tijerina v. New Mexico
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Missouri, 4…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moton v. Swenson
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Smith v. Missouri, 4…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Henry v. State
(2×)
Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 108 , 63 A.2d 599, 605 (1949); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 166-67 , 180 A. 266, 269-70 (1935); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303-04 (1878); see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368-70 , 92 S.Ct. 2096, 2098-99 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 , 92 S.Ct. 183, 184 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195-96 (1970).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ex parte Kent
The finality of the judgment in this case, at least with respect to the double jeopardy claim, is squarely decided by Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 56 (1971).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. Missouri
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 405…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hysaw v. Estelle, Corrections Director
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 40…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chase v. Oklahoma
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 40…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Waller v. Florida
It is my view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, at 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (Do…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mullin v. Wyoming
That, in my opinion, requires that we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse, for I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, at 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Miller v. Oregon, 405 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robinson v. Neil
I adhere to my view that, regardless of the similarity of the offenses, the Double Jeopardy Glause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see Grubb v. Oklahoma, post, p. 1017 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); M…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grubb v. Oklahoma
I adhere to my view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances not present here, “to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (concurring opinion); see Miller v. Oregon, 405 U. S. 1047 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Donald M. Wingate v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida
Instead the Court speaks in terms of prohibiting a relitigation in any future lawsuit between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial. 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 475 ; Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. at 385 , 91 S.Ct. at 1802 , 29 L.Ed. 2d at 551 ; Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 , 92 S.Ct. 183, 185 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212, 215 (1971).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Turner v. Arkansas
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
Given the decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970) (see, however, my dissent in Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971)), I join the judgment of the Court.
discussed
Cited "see"
JONES
See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 55 (1971) (holding that retrial of petitioner for assault and murder after his acquittal of the murder of different victim present during the bombing was barred because it “would require relitigation of the same ultimate fact determined adversely to the State in the previous trial—i.e., whether it was the petitioner who had mailed the bomb”); Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 (1972) (holding that collateral estoppel barred the petitioner’s retrial for robbery after acquittal for the murder of the same victim during the same incident where the …
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Buenaventura Castillo-Basa
(2×)
See Harris, 404 U.S. at 56-57 , 92 S.Ct. 183 (reversing a state court decision that, despite collateral estoppel, permitted retrial because important inculpatory evidence had been, in the state court's view, wrongly excluded); id. (holding that collateral estoppel applies "irrespective of whether the jury considered all relevant evidence, and irrespective of the good faith of the States in bringing successive prosecutions").
examined
Cited "see"
Ex Parte Taylor
(8×)
See Green v. Estelle, 601 F.2d 877, 878-79 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that, for collateral estoppel purposes, appellate court must take jury "at its word," even if the verdict appears influenced by mercy). [30] 404 U.S. 55 , 92 S.Ct. 183 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971). [31] Id. at 56-57 , 92 S.Ct. 183 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Christiania General Ins. Corp. of New York v. Northern Victor Partnership
See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971); Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1986); Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1504 (11th Cir.1990). 12 AFFIRMED. * Honorable Fern M.
examined
Cited "see"
Ex Parte Spears
(6×)
See, Harris v. Washington , 404 U.S. 55 , 92 S.Ct. 183 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Grady v. Corbin , 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Dorsey
(2×)
See State v. Harris, 78 Wn.2d 894 , 480 P.2d 484 , rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 55 , 30 L.
examined
Cited "see"
City of Port Arthur, Tex. v. United States
(3×)
See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 , 92 S.Ct. 183, 184 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C.Cir.1978); Laughlin v. U.S., 474 F.2d 444 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 , 93 S.Ct. 2784 , 37 L.Ed.2d 402 , rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 882 , 94 S.Ct. 169 , 38 L.Ed.2d 130 (1973); Inmates, D.C.
HARRIS
v.
WASHINGTON Et Al.
v.
WASHINGTON Et Al.
70-5213.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 16, 1971.
Burger, Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Swenson.
Cited by 198 opinions | Published
Lead Opinion
On June 10, 1969, a bomb sent through the mail exploded in the residence of Ralph Burdick in Clark County, Washington. The explosion killed Burdick and the petitioner’s infant son, Mark Allen Harris, and seriously injured the petitioner’s estranged wife, Laila Violet Harris. The petitioner was tried in a state court for the murder of Ralph Burdick and was acquitted by a jury. He was immediately rearrested on informations charging the murder of Mark Allen Harris and the assault upon Laila Violet Harris. To these informations the petitioner entered pleas of former jeopardy and collateral estoppel, and moved to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion and struck the defenses.
The state Court of Appeals granted a writ of prohibition on the grounds of collateral estoppel, finding that “the record demonstrates without question that the retrial of petitioner for assault and murder will require relitigation of the same ultimate fact” determined adversely to the State in the previous trial — i. e., whether it was the petitioner who had mailed the bomb. 2 Wash. App. 272, 291-292, 469 P. 2d 937, 948. The Supreme[*56] Court of Washington agreed that the same ultimate issue was involved in both prosecutions, but nevertheless reversed the Court of Appeals and denied the writ of prohibition. The court noted that a ruling on the admissibility of evidence during the murder trial had resulted in the exclusion, on grounds having “no bearing on the quality of the evidence,” of a letter allegedly written by the petitioner and containing threats against the lives of Mr. Burdick and Mrs. Harris. 78 Wash. 2d 894, 901, 480 P. 2d 484, 487-488. Because of its view that this evidence would clearly be admissible in the second trial, the court held that the issue of identity had not been “fully litigated” in the previous trial, and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar a subsequent trial in which litigation of the issue will be “complete.”
Since the state courts have finally rejected a claim that the Constitution forbids a second trial of the petitioner, a claim separate and apart from the question whether the petitioner may constitutionally be convicted of the crimes with which he is charged, our jurisdiction is properly invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 558.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, we held that collateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784. We said that collateral estop-pel “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” 397 U. S., at 443. The State concedes that the ultimate issue of identity was decided by the jury in the first trial. That being so, the constitutional guarantee applies, irrespective of whether the jury considered all relevant evidence, and[*57] irrespective of the good faith of the State in bringing successive prosecutions.
Since Ashe v. Swenson, supra, squarely controls this case, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment is
Reversed.
Dissent
dissenting.
The Court’s summary act without hearing argument in this case is wrong in two respects: first, it is another instance of importing into the administration of criminal justice the civil doctrine of collateral estoppel to which I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 460 (1970); second, even assuming the collateral estoppel approach has validity, the evidence in this case in the second trial is not the “same evidence” on which the first case was submitted so that this is not a case for application of that unsound doctrine.
Dissent
dissenting.
My own views on the issue presented by this case were expressed when I wrote for the Court of Appeals in Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F. 2d 40 (CA8 1968), reversed and remanded, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). I am not persuaded as to the rightness of the Court’s imposing in that case— as a Fifth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment imperative — the concept of collateral estoppel upon a state[*58] criminal proceeding. I could have understood a flat overruling of Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464 (1958), and of Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U. S. 571 (1958), despite the interim appearance of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969). But overruling those two cases was a step the Court, for reasons that escape me, refused to take or felt it could not take.
Neither am I persuaded by the “single frolic” or “one criminal episode” or “same transaction” theory espoused by the Justices in concurrence in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S., at 448-460. That approach would place multiple but separate-shot murders under the protective umbrella of double jeopardy. I cannot subscribe to reasoning that would necessarily produce a result of that kind.
I therefore dissent.