Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972). · Go Syfert
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Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 6× by 1 distinct case · …collateral estoppel is part of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy guarantee....
450 citation events (141 in the last 25 years) across 56 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Butler v. State (md, 1994-06-27)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Butler v. State (12×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited "see, e.g."
Md. · 1994 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence high
collateral estoppel is part of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy guarantee....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JONES
D.N.J. · 2025 · confidence medium
See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 55 (1971) (holding that retrial of petitioner for assault and murder after his acquittal of the murder of different victim present during the bombing was barred because it “would require relitigation of the same ultimate fact determined adversely to the State in the previous trial—i.e., whether it was the petitioner who had mailed the bomb”); Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 (1972) (holding that collateral estoppel barred the petitioner’s retrial for robbery after acquittal for the murder of the same victim during the same incident where the …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Currier v. Virginia
SCOTUS · 2018 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U. S. 366, 367 (1972) (per curiam) (applying Ashe to a second trial where state law prohibited a single trial of the charges at issue).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Wilkinson v. Doug Gingrich
9th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Harris, 404 U.S. at 56 (holding that a second murder prosecution was precluded by defendant’s acquittal in first murder trial); Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 370 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a subsequent prosecution for robbery was precluded by the defendant’s prior acquittal for murder; the “case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2×)
Cal. · 2009 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs challenge the former finding and defendants challenge the latter. (2) For purposes of collateral estoppel, an issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding. ( People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 ].) In considering whether these criteria have been met, courts look carefully at the entire record from the prior proceeding, including the pleadings, the evidence, the jury instructions, and any special jury findings or verdicts. ( Turner v. Arkansas (1972) …
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ratliff (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 798, 801-02 , 92 S. Ct. 2096, 2099 (1972) (holding that defendant could not be tried for robbery occurring at a murder when jury had found defendant not guilty of accessory to murder because he was not present at murder scene); Ashe v.Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 , 25 L.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Bies v. Bagley (3×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Id. at 366, 369 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
See, for example, in addition to Ashe, Simpson v. Florida, supra, 403 U.S. 384 ; Harris v. Washington, supra, 404 U.S. 55 ; Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 370 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Shagoury (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 1978 · confidence medium
See Sealfon v. United States, supra at 579; Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Stergion
Iowa · 1976 · confidence medium
This limitation must be kept in view when determining the impact of the sweeping admonition in Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 475-476 , that a trial court confronted with a double jeopardy defense based on a prior general verdict of acquittal must “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” See also Turner v. Arkansas, 407 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kowal
N.H. · 1976 · confidence medium
Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 (1972).
examined Cited "see" Ricky Langley v. Howard Prince, Warden (7×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas , 407 U.S. 366 , 369-70, 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972) (per curiam); Harris v. Washington , 404 U.S. 55 , 57, 92 S.Ct. 183 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971) (per curiam); Simpson v. Florida , 403 U.S. 384 , 386, 91 S.Ct. 1801 , 29 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971) (per curiam). 4 Turner , Harris , Simpson , and Ashe all involved blanket acquittals.
examined Cited "see" Bies v. Bagley (8×)
6th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner, 407 U.S. at 369-70 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 .
discussed Cited "see" People v. Smith (2×)
Colo. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 369 , 92 S.Ct. at 2098-99 .
examined Cited "see" State v. Lynch (3×)
Neb. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S. Ct. 2096 , 32 L.
examined Cited "see" Ferrell v. State (10×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Md. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, supra, 407 U.S. at 368-369 , 92 S.Ct. at 2098-2099 (Court reviewed trial record, including jury instructions, in determining that issue at the two trials was the same); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 580 , 68 S.Ct. 237, 240 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948) (Court reviewed evidence and prosecution’s theory at first trial, in determining that acquittal on a conspiracy charge precluded subsequent prosecution for substantive offense); Bowling v. State, supra, 298 Md. at 402-403 , 470 A.2d at 800-801 .
examined Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Brown (6×)
Pa. · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 , 92 S.Ct. 183 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 , 91 S.Ct. 1801 , 29 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600 , 425 A.2d 313 (1980); Commonwealth v. Peluso, 481 Pa. 641 , 393 A.2d 344 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602 , 373 A.2d 90 (1977) (plurality opinion).
examined Cited "see" State v. Flittie (6×)
S.D. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Hastings (2×)
N.H. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
State v. Kowal, 116 N.H. 699, 700 , 366 A.2d 877, 878-79 (1976); see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 (1972) (per curiam).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Lima (6×)
D.C. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 , 68 S.Ct. 237 , 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948).
examined Cited "see" United States Ex Rel. Taylor v. Redman (3×)
D. Del. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
To the contrary, Ashe requires a court to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the plead *456 ings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matters and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 ; see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368 , 92 S.Ct. 2096, 2098 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
examined Cited "see" State v. Johnson (6×)
Mo. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 , 92 S.Ct. 2096, 2098 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Simon v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
examined Cited "see" United States v. William George Dunbar, M.D. (6×)
5th Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
The collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause, Id. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , therefore prohibits the state from relitigating an issue against a particular defendant unless "taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, . . . a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration," Id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (citation omitted); See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Lawrence T. Day. United States of America v. Eric J. Sheffey (6×)
D.C. Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972). 19 In Green v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 184 , 426 F.2d 661 (1970), we held that admission against defendants of evidence that had been the subject of a count of which defendants had been acquitted in a previous trial was inadmissible in the second trial under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Sousley (3×)
W.D. Mo. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Johnson v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 422 U.S. 1024 , 95 S.Ct. 2619 , 45 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975); McDonald v. Wainwright, 493 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3rd Cir. 1955); Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146, 158 (9th Cir. 1955); Erlich [Ehrlich] v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 19…
examined Cited "see" Bobby Hardwick v. Ollie Doolittle, Jailer and William Anderson, Sheriff (3×)
5th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
The collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause, id. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , therefore prohibits the state from relitigating an issue against a particular defendant unless “taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, ... a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration,” id. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 (citation omitted); see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Abney v. United States
SCOTUS · 1977 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U. S. 366 (1972); Colombo v. New York, 405 U. S. 9 (1972).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Larry Wayne Brown, United States of America v. Larry Edward Hendrix (3×)
8th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Johnson v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1024 , 95 S.Ct. 2619 , 45 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975); McDonald v. Wainwright, 493 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1955); Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146, 158 (9th Cir. 1955); Erlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944). 3 .
examined Cited "see" Henry v. State (4×)
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 108 , 63 A.2d 599, 605 (1949); State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 166-67 , 180 A. 266, 269-70 (1935); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303-04 (1878); see Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368-70 , 92 S.Ct. 2096, 2098-99 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 , 92 S.Ct. 183, 184 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 , 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195-96 (1970).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Rolston (2×)
Mich. Ct. App. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v Arkansas, 407 US 366 ; 92 S Ct 2096 ; 32 L Ed 2d 798 (1972).
examined Cited "see" State v. Barnett (6×)
N.M. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972) and opinion of Judge Hendley in State v. Tijerina, 84 N.M. 432 , 504 P.2d 642 (Ct.App.1972).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Ricky Langley v. Howard Prince, Warden (4×)
5th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g. , Turner , 407 U.S. at 369 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Vincent Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI (3×)
3rd Cir. · 2017 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 369 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972) (per curiam) (applying Ashe and ruling in defendant’s favor on issue preclusion double jeopardy claim because "[t]he only logical conclusion” from the trial record was that the defendant had already been acquitted of the act for which the Government sought to retry him). 13 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." White v. State (3×)
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Though applicable to criminal and civil causes, collateral estoppel, “[w]hen applied to criminal cases, ... acquire[s] a constitutional dimension by reason of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states as a result of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1969).” Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665 , 668 n. 2, 381 A.2d 671 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839 , 99 S.Ct. 126 , 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978); see also Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368 , 92 S.Ct. 2096, 2…
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Cassey (3×)
R.I. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 *676 U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183 , 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Prince v. State (3×)
Ala. Crim. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 , 91 S.Ct. 1801 , 29 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971) and Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Thompson (3×)
E.D. Ark. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, in this regard, Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 , 92 S.Ct. 2096 , 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); United States v. Brown, supra; Johnson v. Estelle, supra; Erlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944); and United States v. Barnes, 386 F.Supp. 162 (E.D.Tenn.1973).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Michel
Mass. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Commonwealth v. Peluso (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971); Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
Turner
v.
Arkansas
71-1309.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 22, 1972.
407 U.S. 366
Blackmun, Rehnquist.
Cited by 127 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 72%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Maryland (4)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

On December 24, 1968, petitioner, one Richard Turner (no relation to petitioner), the decedent Larry Wayne Yates, and one other person were involved in a poker game, which lasted until the early hours of Christmas morning. After he left the game, Yates was murdered and robbed, and an information filed on December 27 charged that:

“[Petitioner] on the 25th day of December, 1968 .. . did unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and violently take from the person of one Larry Wayne Yates . . . a sum of money in excess of $300.00 . . . forcibly and against the will of the said Larry Wayne Yates . . . and while perpetrating said crime of robbery as aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, and with premeditation and deliberation did kill and murder one Larry Wayne Yates . . . .”

[*367] On April 24, 1969, petitioner received a general verdict of acquittal on this information.

On October 3, 1969, however, a county grand jury indicted petitioner for the robbery of Yates and alleged that petitioner

“on the 25th day of December, 1968, in Hempstead County, Arkansas, did unlawfully take from Larry Yates by force and intimidation lawful currency in the amount of Four Hundred Dollar's ($400.00) belonging to the said Larry Yates, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas.”

Petitioner moved to dismiss this indictment on double jeopardy and res judicata grounds, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, it was stipulated that “the murder charge, of which Defendant Dennis Turner was acquitted, and the robbery charge arose out of the same set of facts, circumstances, and the same occasion” and that “the same testimony adduced by the State of Arkansas in the murder trial will necessarily need be reintroduced in this robbery charge.” A divided Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner’s motion, Turner v. State, 248 Ark. 367, 452 S. W. 2d 317 (1970), holding that the only question determined at the murder trial was whether petitioner was guilty of murder. The court pointed out that under state law, murder and robbery charges could not be joined in one indictment or information and that no offense could be jointly tried with murder. Petitioner’s rehearing petition, which argued the relevance of this Court’s holding in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), announced seven days after the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision, was denied. Petitioner then entered the complete transcript of the murder trial into the record and once again moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy and res judicata grounds, and the trial court again denied the motion.[*368] Aja amended stipulation provided that the evidence the State would present on the robbery charge would be identical with , that it introduced on the murder charge. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, 251 Ark. 499, 473 S. W. 2d 904 (1971), declining to consider the applicability of this Court's decision in Ashe v. Swenson, supra,- because it held that its earlier decision denying petitioner relief now constituted the “law of the case.”

Petitioner contends that Fifth Amendment principles of double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), prevent his trial on the robbery indictment, because the State is collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues already determined in his favor at the murder trial, determinations that make his conviction on the robbery charge a logical impossibility. Collateral estop-pel is part of the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy guarantee, Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and it is “a matter of constitutional fact [this Court] must decide through an examination of the entire record.” Id., &t 443. Thus,, the rejection of petitioner’s claim by the Arkansas Supreme Court on procedural grounds does not foreclose our inquiry on this issue.

In Ashe, the defendant had been tried and acquitted by a general verdict of the robbery of one member of a . poker game. He was then tried and convicted of the robbery of another of the poker players. This Court reversed his conviction, concluding that “[t]he single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury [in the first trial] was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers,” 397 U. S., at 445, and that, this issue once having, been determined by a jury in the petitioner’s - favor, the State was forestalled from relitigating it.

In the present case, petitioner was not charged with robbery at the first trial, but the State has stipulated that the robbery and murder arose out of “the same set of[*369] facts, circumstances, and the same occasion.” The crucial question, therefore, is what issues a general verdict of acquittal at the murder trial resolved. The jury was instructed that it must find petitioner guilty of first-degree murder if it found that he had killed the decedent Yates either with premeditation or unintentionally during the course of a robbery. The jury’s verdict thus necessarily means that it found petitioner not guilty of the killing. The State’s theory, however, is that the jury might have believed that petitioner and Richard Turner robbed Yates, but that Richard actually committed the.murder. This theory is belied by the actual instructions given the jury.* The trial judge charged that:

“An accessory is one who stands by, aids, abets, or assists . . . the perpetration of the crime..
“All persons being present, aiding and abetting, or ready and consenting to aid and abet, in any felony, shall be deemed principal offenders, and indicted or informed against, and punished as such.” (Court’s Instruction No. 13.)

Had the jury found petitioner present at the crime scene, it would have been obligated to return a verdict of guilty of murder even if it believed that he had not actually pulled the trigger. The only logical conclusion is that the jury found him not present at the scene of the murder and robbery, a finding that negates the possibility of a constitutionally valid conviction for the robbery of Yates.[*370] This case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and must be reversed. See Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971).

The writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

These instructions reflect Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2227 which makes accessories before the fact to first-degree murder subject to the same punishment as principals. Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-118 abolished the distinction between principals and accessories before the fact and also provides that “all accessories before the fact shall be deemed-principals and punished as such.” Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-119 defines an accessory as “he who stands by, aids, abets, or assists . . . the perpetration of the crime.”

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,

concurring.

Given the decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970) (see, however, my dissent in Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971)), I join the judgment of the Court.

The Chief Justice, rather than taking summary action in this case, would hear oral argument and give the matter plenary consideration.