Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). · Go Syfert
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Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “custodial arrest”
2,184 citation events (272 in the last 25 years) across 124 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Evans (md, 1999-01-26) · Strongest negative: State v. Nittolo (fla, 1975-07-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" State v. Nittolo (3×)
Fla. · 1975 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see State v. Gustafson, Fla. 1972, 258 So.2d 1 , aff'd Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973).
examined Cited "but see" State v. Nittolo (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1974 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see State v. Gustafson, Fla. 1972, 258 So.2d 1 , aff’d Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973).
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Evans (3×)
Md. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
custodial arrest
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Milton Allen
4th Cir. · 2026 · confidence medium
More generally, the government maintains in this case that Gant does not invalidate a warrantless search “of a backpack or cross-body bag an arrestee [on foot] is wearing” during his arrest, arguing that “[Allen’s] bags should be subject to search pursuant to lawful arrest even if they are no longer within reach at the times of search.” (Citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 235–36 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262, 266 (1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Perez
1st Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973) (crumpled cigarette package in a coat pocket); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262, 266 (1973) ("cigarette box" in a coat pocket); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-05 (1974) (clothing).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Niebling
N.H. · 2024 · confidence medium
See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bressi v. Pima County Board of Supervisors
D. Ariz. · 2022 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court reported: Outside of the context 20 of inventory or administrative inspection cases, “we have repeatedly held and asserted the 21 contrary.” Id. at 812-13 (citing United States v. Villamonte–Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 , 22 n. 3 (1983) (finding otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel not rendered invalid 23 because U.S. Customs officers accompanied by state policeman and followed informant's 24 tip that marijuana was on vessel; dismissed idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip 25 the agents of their legal justification); United States v. Robinson, 414 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hale
N.M.C.C.A. · 2020 · confidence medium
United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 143 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cletus Greene v. State of Missouri
Mo. · 2019 · confidence medium
Though the search occurred after the initial search of Mr. Gustafson’s person and outside the area of his immediate control, the Supreme Court found the warrantless search of the cigarette box was lawful because “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search . . . .” Id. at 263-64 (alterations in original).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Scottize Danyelle Brown
Iowa · 2019 · confidence medium
Further, the Court cited Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S. Ct. 488, 492 (1973), where it held that a post-arrest search was valid even though it was not justified by safety concerns.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Scottize Danyelle Brown
Iowa · 2019 · confidence medium
Further, the Court cited Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S. Ct. 488, 492 (1973), where it held that a post-arrest search was valid even though it was not justified by safety concerns.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Macabeo
Cal. · 2016 · confidence medium
(See Gustafson v. Florida (1973) 414 U.S. 260, 266 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 456 , 94 S.Ct. 488 ]; Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 236.) The exception has its limits, however.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Belote v. State (2×)
Md. · 2009 · confidence medium
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 , 94 S.Ct. at 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 441 ; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lindsey v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 232-235 (III) (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427) (1973) (consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the person of a suspect under custodial arrest based on probable cause may be searched incident to the arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260, 263-267 (I), (II) (94 SC 488, 38 LE2d 456) (1973) (accord); LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 5.2 (a) (4th ed. 2006). 4 “An actual touching of a person with a hand is not essential to constitute a valid arrest.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rodriguez
Cal. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
(E.g., U.S. v. Green (7th Cir. 1997) 111 F.3d 515, 521 [“It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a warrant—in a sense requiring an official call of ‘Oily, Oily, Oxen Free.’ ”]; U.S. v. Hudson (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 425, 439-440 ; see People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 583 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 601 P.2d 207 ] [arrest on warrant discovered as result of improperly prolonged traffic stop does not bar prosecution for underlying offense].) Once it is agreed the officers c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Oyenusi
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-23 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-72 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 572, 591-92 (1982); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 456, 461-62 (1973); Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 477 , 38 L.Ed. 2d at 441 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. McKay (3×)
Cal. · 2002 · confidence medium
(See Gustafson, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 265, 94 S.Ct. 488 .) As with all discretionary enforcement decisions, the officer's choices may be challenged as being based on invalid criteria, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of protected statutory or constitutional rights.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. State (15×) also: Cited "see"
Md. · 2002 · confidence medium
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pallone (2×)
Wis. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207, 210-11 , 418 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973); Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153 ; State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 623-24 , 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ohio · 2000 · confidence medium
However, Justice Stewart suggested that it was an unreasonable seizure in his concurring opinion in Gustafson v. Florida, supra, 414 U.S. at 266, 94 S.Ct. at 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 462 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Earl
Ark. · 1998 · confidence medium
Similarly, in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973), the Court held a search incident to arrest may be conducted even when the custodial arrest is for driving without a driver’s license, a minor traffic violation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dennis v. State (2×)
Md. · 1997 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] The cases to which the Court referred were: United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584, n. 3 , 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2584, n. 3 , 77 L.Ed.2d 22, 28, n. 3 (1983); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 , 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 178 (1978). [1] In the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, the State urged: Regardless of the disposition in Maryland v. Wi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ohio Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Gustafson, supra, 414 U.S. at 265, 94 S.Ct. at 491-492 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 461 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Curtis
C.A.A.F. · 1996 · confidence medium
In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court held that there may be “a full search” of an arrestee incident to “a lawful custodial arrest.” See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264, 94 S.Ct. 488, 491 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whren v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1996 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 236 (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed”) (footnotes omitted); Gustafson, supra, at 266 (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Meyer
Iowa · 1996 · confidence medium
In Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973), the Court held a search incident to arrest may be conducted even when the custodial arrest is for driving without a driver’s license, a very minor traffic violation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Harmon (2×)
Utah · 1995 · confidence medium
Id. at 266-67 , 94 S.Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 450 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 2858 n. 11, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has not imposed constitutional restrictions on authority to arrest for routine traffic stops), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220-21 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 470 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (defendant similarly conceded the legality of arrest for driving on suspension an…
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cook (4×) also: Cited "see"
Iowa · 1995 · confidence medium
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-66 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 491-92 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 460-61 (1973); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-36 , 94 S.Ct. at 476-77 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 440-41 ; State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2d 327, 329-30 (Iowa 1976), The Iowa legislature has extended this broad search incident to arrest exception.
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pierce (8×) also: Cited "see"
N.J. · 1994 · confidence medium
Instead, the petitioner has fully conceded the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest. [Id. at 266-67, 91 S.Ct at 492, 38 L.Ed.2d at 462 (Stewart, J., concurring).] Similarly, in United States v. Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512 (1988), in respect of a driver stopped and detained for failing to wear a seat belt, the Tenth Circuit noted that “ ‘[t]here can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. at 1519 (alteration in original) (quoting Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barber
W.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 477 n. 6; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 265-67, 94 S.Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J., concurring).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Monroe (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
(Cf. Gustafson v. Florida (1973) 414 U.S. 260, 266 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461-462 , 94 S.Ct. 488 ] [search incident to arrest valid where officer takes traffic citee into custody following arrest]; People v. Wohlleben (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 461, 463 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 826 ] [minor traffic violation not a basis for custodial arrest]; see also U.S. v. Guzman (10th Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 [auto stop a limited seizure akin to investigative detention].) 3 It is only after the traffic arrest is made that the provisions which forbid, allow, or mandate the officer to bring the arrestee before a magistrat…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Alvarez v. United States (4×) also: Cited "see"
D.C. · 1990 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973); cf. id. at 266 , 94 S.Ct. at 492 (Stewart J., concurring); Hill v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 236 , 418 F.2d 449, 452 (1968); Watts v. United States, 297 A.2d 790, 792 (D.C.1972); State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45 , 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (en banc).
examined Cited as authority (rule) People v. Graves (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ill. App. Ct. · 1990 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 456, 461-62 , 94 S. Ct. 488, 492 (observation of rolled cigarettes by officer with training in identification of illegal substances justified seizure of cigarettes as evidence of crime); see generally 2 W.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Williams (8×) also: Cited "see"
Pa. · 1990 · confidence medium
United States v. Gustafson, supra, 414 U.S. at 265, 94 S.Ct. at 491-92 , 38 L.Ed.2d at 456 . ("Though the officer was not required to take the [offender] into custody . . . we do not find [this] determinative of the constitutional issue.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Meredith
Colo. · 1988 · confidence medium
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265, 266 , 94 S.Ct. at 491, 492 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. King
Wis. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973). *211 In a more recent case, State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153 , 388 N.W.2d 565 , cert. denied, — U.S. —, 93 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Sanchez
Cal. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Gustafson v. Florida, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 265 [ 38 L.Ed.2d at p. 461 ], the defendant was arrested for a minor traffic violation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New Jersey v. T. L. O. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1985 · confidence medium
Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a shabby swindle that the police are quite right in suppressing, was not one which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community. . . ." 335 U. S., at 459-460 . [24] While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation of a city ordinance may conduct a full-blown search f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michigan v. Long (2×)
SCOTUS · 1983 · confidence medium
See also id., at 237-238 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("The search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest" (footnote omitted)); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260, 264 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Streets
Iowa · 1983 · confidence medium
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 476-77 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440-41 (1973) (arrest for traffic offense; heroin seized admissible in trial for a narcotics offense); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 491-92 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461-62 (1973) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New York v. Belton (2×)
SCOTUS · 1981 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Gustafson v. Florida 414 U. S. 260, 266 (concurring opinion). [3] Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robbins v. California (2×)
SCOTUS · 1981 · confidence medium
If, however, the occupants of a car have an opportunity to take contraband out of a suitcase and secrete it somewhere else in a car, see Sanders, 442 U. S., at 768, 770, n. 3 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), then I would conclude that police have probable cause to search the entire car, including the suitcase, without a warrant. [10] See post, at 455, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, and the quotation from United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 , post, at 461. [11] JUSTICE STEWART apparently believes that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments might provide some impediment to police taking a defendant…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Roger William Rice and James Gregory Williford (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 476 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Maxfield
N.H. · 1981 · confidence medium
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973), or the New Hampshire Constitution.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curry v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
See Code Ann. § 27-207 (Ga. L. 1975, p. 1209); Highland v. State, 144 Ga. App. 594 ( 241 SE2d 477 ); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260, 263-266 (94 SC 488, 38 LE2d 456).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Myers
Ariz. · 1977 · confidence medium
Such a search is still lawful even if the items seized later prove not to be weapons, fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of the offense charged, or contraband: “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.” Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 477 , quoted in Gustafson, supra, 414 U.S. at 266, 94 S.Ct. at 492 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Farrell
Iowa · 1976 · confidence medium
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 434 , *330 436 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 460-461 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Santangelo
S.D.N.Y. · 1975 · confidence medium
As I indicated in the prior disposition, the plain-view justification, see e. g., United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1972), seems inapplicable, and this situation does not appear to be covered by United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 476 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 440 (1973) or Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-6 , 94 S.Ct. 488, 491-92 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 (1973), which legitimate a search of the person as incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brisendine (2×)
Cal. · 1975 · confidence medium
(People v. Belvin, supra.) Having in the course of a lawful search of the knapsack come across the bottle and envelopes, the officer was entitled to inspect them (cf. United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. 218, 236 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 ]; Gustafson v. Florida, supra, 414 U.S. 260, 266 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 456, 461 ]), and when that inspection revealed contraband he was entitled to seize it (United States v. Robinson, supra; Gustafson v. Florida, supra).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. John Wayne Marshall
5th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Appellant concedes that on the basis of the recent decisions in United States v. Robinson, 1973, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , and Gustafson v. Florida, 1973, 414 U.S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 , search of his person and of the area within his immediate control was permissible, incident to the lawful custodial arrest, to preserve evidence or prevent flight, or for the personal protection of the arresting officers.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gustafson
v.
Florida
71-1669.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 11, 1973.
414 U.S. 260
James M. Russ argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Michael F. Cycmanick., Barry Scott Richard, Deputy Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and Nelson E. Bailey and C. Marie Bernard, Assistant Attorneys General.*
Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Po-Well, Powell, Marshall, Douglas, Brennan.
Cited by 697 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 74%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Maryland (3)

Lead Opinion

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner James Gustafson was convicted in a Florida trial court for unlawful possession of marihuana. At his trial the State introduced into evidence marihuana which had been seized from him during a search incident to his arrest on a charge of driving without possession of an operator’s license. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, reversed petitioner’s conviction, holding that the search which had led to the discovery of the marihuana was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 243 So. 2d 615 (1971). The Supreme Court of Florida in turn reversed that decision, 258 So. 2d 1 (1972), and petitioner sought certiorari in this Court. We granted certiorari, 410 U. S. 982 (1073), and set the case for argument with No. 72-936, United States v. Robinson, also decided today, ante, p. 218. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.

At approximately 2 a. m., on January 12, 1969, Lieutenant Paul R. Smith, a uniformed municipal police officer of Eau Gallie, Florida, was on a routine patrol in an unmarked squad car when he observed a 1953 white Cadillac, bearing New York license plates, driving[*262] south through the town. Smith observed the automobile weave across the center line and back to the right side of the road “three or four” times. Smith testified that he observed the two occupants of the Cadillac look back; after they apparently saw the squad car, the car drove across the highway and behind a grocery store, and then headed south on another city street.

At that point Smith turned on his flashing light and ordered the Cadillac over to the side of the road. After stopping the vehicle, Smith asked petitioner, the driver, to produce his operator’s license. Petitioner informed Smith that he was a student and that he had left his operator’s license in his dormitory room in the neighboring city of Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner was then placed under arrest for failure to have his vehicle operator’s license in his possession. It was conceded by the parties below and in this Court that the officer had probable cause to arrest upon learning that petitioner did not have his license in his possession, and that he took petitioner into custody in order to transport him to the stationhouse for further inquiry.[1]

Smith then proceeded to search the petitioner’s person. Smith testified that he patted down the clothing of the petitioner, “outside and inside, I checked the belt, the shirt pockets and all around the belt, completely around inside.” Upon completing his patdown, he testified, he placed his hand into the left front coat pocket of the coat petitioner was wearing. From that pocket he extracted a “long chain” and a Benson and Hedges cigarette box. Smith testified that he then “opened [the cigarette box] and it appeared there were marihuana cigarettes in the box.[2] I had been shown this in training[*263] at the police department and these appeared to be marihuana to me.”

I

Petitioner urges that there could be no evidentiary-purpose for the search conducted by Smith, and therefore the authority to search for weapons incident to a lawful arrest is controlled by the standards laid down in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Petitioner contends that this case is different from United States v. Robinson, ante, p. 218, in that petitioner had experienced no previous encounters with the officer in this case, and the offense for which he was arrested was “benign or trivial in nature,” carrying with it no mandatory minimum sentence as did the offense for which Robinson was arrested. Petitioner points out that here, unlike Robinson, there were no police regulations which required the officer to take petitioner into custody, nor were there police department policies requiring full-scale body searches upon arrest in the field. Petitioner also points to the fact that here, as in Robinson, the officer expressed no fear for his own well-being or for that of others in dealing with the petitioner.

We have held today in United States v. Robinson that “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the[*264] authority to search, and ... in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Ante, at 235. Our decision in Robinson indicates that the limitations placed by Terry v. Ohio, supra, on protective searches conducted in an investigatory stop situation based on less than probable cause are not to be carried over to searches made incident to lawful custodial arrests. We stated in Robinson:

“The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217 (1960). The standards traditionally governing a search incident to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry standards by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for which the arrest is made.”. Ante, at 234.

Neither Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), nor Peters v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), relied upon by petitioner, purported to limit the traditional authority of the arresting officer to conduct a full search of the person of an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, ante, at 225-226, 228-229. Indeed, as our decision in Robinson indicates, not only has this been established Fourth Amendment law since the decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), but it was also the rule both at common law and in the early development of American law. United States v. Robinson, ante, at 230-233.

[*265] Though the officer here was not required to take the petitioner into custody by police regulations as he was in Robinson, and there did not exist a departmental policy establishing the conditions under which a full-scale body search should be conducted, we do not find these differences determinative of the constitutional issue. Id., at 223 n. 2.[3] It is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest and placed the petitioner in custody. In addition, as our decision in Robinson makes clear, the arguable absence of “evidentiary” purpose for a search incident to a lawful arrest is not controlling. Id., at 233.[4] “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need[*266] to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.” Id., at 235.

II

We hold, therefore, that upon arresting petitioner for the offense of driving his automobile without possession of a valid operator’s license, and taking him into custody, Smith was entitled to make a full search of petitioner’s person incident to that lawful arrest. Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that Smith did not indicate any subjective fear of the petitioner or that he did not himself suspect that the petitioner was armed. Having in the course of his lawful search come upon the box of cigarettes, Smith was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the homemade cigarettes which he believed to contain an unlawful substance, he was entitled to seize them as “fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband” probative of criminal conduct. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 154-155 (1947); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 299, 307 (1967); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 149 (1972); United States v. Robinson, ante, at 236. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore

Affirmed.

[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, see ante, p. 237.]

1

Brief for Petitioner 9.

2

Upon placing petitioner under arrest for driving without possession of an operator’s license and after removing the chain and the cigarette box from petitioner’s clothing, Smith told the assisting[*263] officer on the scene to check the other passenger of the Cadillac to see if he had an operator's permit so that he could drive the car tO the station. Smith then put petitioner in the back seat of the squad car. Smith then opened the cigarette box and observed the rolled cigarettes he believed to be marihuana. He then told the other officer to place the other passenger in the squad car so that he could also be transported to the station, for the purpose of investigation. The passenger was frisked by the other officer and placed in the squad car; no charges were placed against the passenger. In addition to the marihuana conviction which we here review, petitioner was charged with driving without possession of an operator’s license; that charge was dropped when petitioner produced a valid operator’s license at a later date.

3

Smith testified that he wrote about eight to 10 traffic citations per week, and that about three or four out of every 10 persons he arrested for the offense of driving without a license were taken into custody to the police station. Smith indicated that an offender is more likely to be taken into custody if he does not reside in the city of Eau Gallie. Finally, Smith testified that after making a custodial arrest, he always searches the arrestee before placing him into the patrol car.

4

The State of Florida argues in this Court that there was an evidentiary purpose for the search of petitioner. It is contended that Smith’s observation of the erratic motions of the car that petitioner was driving created a reasonable suspicion that the petitioner may have been under the influence of some intoxicant. Upon confronting petitioner after stopping the ear, Smith indicated that he noticed that the petitioner’s eyes were “bleary.” The State argues that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner for driving while intoxicated, and that Smith thought Gustafson was intoxicated when he confronted him. Since Smith did not detect an odor of alcohol during that confrontation, the State argues it was reasonable for the officer to search the petitioner’s person for drugs that may have been the cause of the suspected intoxication. Florida makes it a criminal offense to drive while intoxicated not only by alcohol, but also by unlawful drugs. Fla. Stat. Ann. §317.201 (1968).

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring.

It seems to me that a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights[*267] under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But no such claim has been made. Instead, the petitioner has fully conceded the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest. That being so, it follows that the incidental search of his person was also constitutionally valid. To hold otherwise would, as the Court makes clear in this case and in United States v. Robinson, ante, p. 218, mark an abrupt departure from settled constitutional precedent.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Marshall,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my opinion in United States v. Robinson, ante, p. 238. The facts show that after arresting petitioner Gustafson for driving without possession of an operator’s license, Officer Smith conducted a search of petitioner’s person in which he removed a Benson and Hedges cigarette box. The officer put petitioner in the back seat of the squad car and then opened the cigarette box, disclosing marihuana cigarettes. As my Brother Stewart indicates, ante, at 266 and this page, no challenge was made either here or below with respect to the lawfulness of Officer Smith’s decision to effect a full custodial arrest for this minor traffic offense. Whether or not it was lawful for the officer to have searched petitioner’s person and removed the cigarette package before placing petitioner in the squad car, see United States v. Robinson, ante, at 250-255 (Marshall, J., dissenting), there was no justification for his opening the package and looking inside.

There was no reason to believe, and Officer Smith did not in fact believe, that petitioner was a dangerous person or that the package contained a weapon. The package’s weight alone no doubt would have indicated that it did not contain a gun or knife. In any event,[*268] even were it possible that the package contained some sort of weapon — say a razor blade — there was no chance the petitioner could use it once it was in the officer’s hands. The opening of the package had no connection whatsoever with the protective purpose of the search.

The State argues, and the Florida Supreme Court found, see 258 So. 2d 1, 2 (1972), that Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion petitioner was intoxicated, justifying searching for intoxicating drugs such as marihuana. Leaving aside the question whether the officer could search for intoxicants, absent probable cause that petitioner had committed an offense involving intoxication, I do not find sufficient evidence in this record to support the conclusion that Officer Smith even had a reasonable suspicion petitioner was intoxicated. To begin with, Officer Smith neither arrested petitioner for driving while intoxicated nor did he give petitioner a sobriety test. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 322.261 and 322.262 (1968). Smith testified that petitioner did not have any trouble getting out of his car, did not have difficulty standing up, and did not slur his speech when answering the officer’s questions. Nor did the fact that petitioner’s car weaved across a lane justify such a suspicion. As Officer Smith testified, he did not arrest petitioner on a careless-driving-by-weaving charge because there was simply not enough evidence. If there was not enough evidence to justify a charge for the weaving itself, I find it hard to understand how there could be enough evidence to suspect that petitioner was intoxicated. Officer Smith testified that petitioner’s eyes looked bleary, but that was hardly surprising, since the arrest took place at 2 a. m.

The only need for a search in this case was to disarm petitioner to protect Officer Smith from harm while the two were together in the patrol car. The search con[*269] ducted by Officer Smith went far beyond what was reasonably necessary to achieve that end. It therefore fell outside the scope of a properly drawn “search incident to arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. I would reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court holding that the fruits of the search could be admitted at petitioner’s trial.