Nat'l Bank of North Am. v. Assocs. of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 (1976). · Go Syfert
Search
Nat'l Bank of North Am. v. Assocs. of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 (1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
140 citation events across 30 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Leavitt v. Jane L. (scotus, 1996-06-17) · Strongest negative: Stinnett v. Third Nat. Bank of Hampden Cty. (mnd, 1978-02-03)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited "but see" Stinnett v. Third Nat. Bank of Hampden Cty. (3×)
D. Minnesota · 1978 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 , 96 S.Ct. 1632, 1633 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Citizens & Southern Nat’l Bank v. Bou gas,-U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 88, 94 , 54 L.Ed.2d 218 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leavitt v. Jane L. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1996 · confidence medium
But when it is put forward in the face of a statutory text that explicitly states the opposite, it is plainly error. * * * We have summarily set aside unsupportable judgments in cases involving only individual claims, see, e. g., Board of Ed. of Rogers v. McCluskey, 458 U. S. 966, 969-971 (1982); National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U. S. 460, 460-461 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fajkus v. First National Bank of Giddings (2×)
Tex. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 38, n. 4 , 98 S.Ct. 88, 90, n. 4 , 54 L.Ed.2d 218 (1977); North America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460, 461, n. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 1632, 1633, n. 1 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976); Michigan Nat.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Design Decor, Inc. v. Barczak
Mass. App. Ct. · 1978 · confidence medium
National Bank of No. America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460, 461 (1976).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1977 · confidence medium
It is now settled that the statute’s provision concerning venue in state courts, despite the presence of what might be regarded as permissive language, “is not permissive, but mandatory, and, therefore, 'that national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located.’ ” 4 National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460, 461 (1976), quoting Mercantile Nat.
examined Cited "see" Vinton v. Trustbank Savings, F.S.B. (3×)
D. Del. · 1992 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U.S. 460 , 96 S.Ct. 1632 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1975); Michigan National Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 , 83 S.Ct. 914 , 9 L.Ed.2d 961 (1962). 16 Moreover, the district of the failed financial institution’s principal place of business would always have both jurisdiction and venue, so there is no reason for Congress to expressly assert that it “shall have jurisdiction” unless Congress meant to establish mandatory and, with the exception of the District of Columbia, exclusive venue.
examined Cited "see" Anderson v. Warren (In Re Dean Ford, Inc.) (3×)
Bankr. N.D. Ga. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 , 96 S.Ct. 1632 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976).
cited Cited "see" Oracle Wetmore Co. v. Citibank, N. A.
N.D. Ohio · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 461 , 96 S.Ct. at 1633 .
examined Cited "see" Diversacon Industries, Inc. v. National Bank of Commerce of Mississippi (3×)
5th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
In construing the venue provision of the act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 94 , the Court specifically held in Citizens National Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 , 98 S.Ct. 88 , 54 L.Ed.2d 218 (1977), that despite the appearance of permissive language in the statute, “... national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located ... ”, the language is clear. 434 U.S. at 38 , 98 S.Ct. at 90 , 54 L.Ed. at 222; See National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U.S. 460 , 96 S.Ct. 1632 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976) (quoting Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. at 561 , 8…
cited Cited "see" Attorney General v. INDUS. NATIONAL BANK OF RI
Mass. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See National Bank of N. America v. Associates of Obstetrics & Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 , 461-462 n* (1976); Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591, 593-594 (1963).
examined Cited "see" Chase Manhattan Bank v. BANCO DEL (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 , 96 S.Ct. 1632 , 48 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976); Exchange *938 National Bank of Chicago v. Rotocast Plastics Products, Inc., 341 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (Opinion filed Jan. 11, 1977).
examined Cited "see" The Chase Manhattan Bank v. Sailboat Apartment Corp. (4×)
SCOTUS · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See National Bank v. Associates of Obstetrics, 425 U. S. 460 (1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." J. G. Ferguson Publishing Co. v. First National Bank
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also National Bank of North America v. Associates of Obstetrics and Female Surgery, Inc., supra, 425 U.S. 460 . where the court on similar facts remanded (Apr. 27. 1976) to determine the issue of waiver.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA
v.
ASSOCIATES OF OBSTETRICS AND FEMALE SURGERY, INC., Et Al.
75-1106.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 26, 1976.
425 U.S. 460
Rehnquist.
Cited by 53 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

The petitioner is a national banking association with its principal place of business in New York. It has no offices or agents in Utah and does not regularly conduct business in that State. The respondent Associates of Obstetrics brought a breach-of-contract action against the petitioner in a Utah state court, seeking damages on the ground that the petitioner had induced the respondent to lend a large sum of money to a Utah corporation on the representation that the loan would be protected and that the petitioner had defaulted on this agreement. The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the venue provision of the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5198, 12 U. S. C. § 94. That section provides that venue for actions against a national banking[*461] association shall lie “in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.” After the Utah trial court granted the petitioner’s motion, the respondent filed an amended complaint alleging that the petitioner had waived the protection of § 94 by making a loan to the Utah corporation and seeking to place that corporation into bankruptcy in a Federal District Court in Utah. The state trial court denied a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the venue provision of the National Bank Act is “permissive and not exclusive,” Associates of Obstetrics v. Apollo Productions, Inc., 542 P. 2d 1079, 1080.

In Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555 (1963), and Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591 (1963), this Court held that the provision in §94 concerning venue in state, county, or municipal courts is not permissive, but mandatory, and, therefore, “that national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located.” 371 U. S., at 561. Accordingly, we grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court. Since that court did not reach the respondent’s contention that the petitioner had waived the provisions of § 94, the case is remanded for a determination of that issue.* See Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, supra, at 594.

It is so ordered.

The respondent also argues that § 94 does not apply because this action is local in nature. See Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66 (1880). This argument is based on the fact that a loan was made by[*462] the petitioner to a Utah corporation and that the petitioner has claimed a security interest in the assets of that corporation in a bankrupcy petition. But the Robertson decision established that such factors do not bring a case within the local-action exception to § 94 carved out by Casey v. Adams, supra. See 372 U. S., at 593-594.

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141 (1889), recognized that the exemption of national banking asso[*462] ciations from suit in counties or cities other than those in which they were located was a personal privilege of the associations which could be waived by them. Id., at 145. This exception to the otherwise mandatory nature of this, venue limitation has been carried forward in the current recodification of the federally created privilege. Michigan Nat. Bank v. Robertson, 372 U. S. 591, 594 (1963). In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), the Court held that by designating an agent for service of process within a State, a corporation gave its consent to be sued in federal court within that State notwithstanding the provisions of the predecessor to 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), which accorded defendants in federal courts a privilege regarding venue essentially equivalent to that found in 12 U. S. C. § 94. I see no reason for concluding that the venue privilege extended by § 94 is of a different nature from that contained in § 1391, or that it may not be similarly waived by the conduct of a national banking association. Thus, I believe Neirbo establishes that petitioner National Bank could be deemed to have consented to being sued in Utah by providing an agent for service of process in that State or otherwise qualifying to do business therein according to Utah law. The record before us does not reveal whether such facts may exist in this case, however, and the Utah courts apparently engaged in no inquiry along these lines. I therefore agree with the Court’s decision to remand this case to the Utah court in order that it can examine whether petitioner may have waived the privilege afforded it by § 94.