Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). · Go Syfert
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Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 6× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1998 · …congressional authorization to sue the state ... clearly present" when title vii amended to allow suits against "governments governmental agencies ⚠ not in text
cited 5× by 3 distinct cases, 1998–2022 · …congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. at p. 456 ✓
G Cite: 2 distinguished/criticized. Strongest: Shepard v. Byrd (Cited "but see")
cited 4× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2001 · …when congress acts pursuant to 5, it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant. at p. 456 ≈ altered
5,642 citation events (1,452 in the last 25 years) across 175 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hayes v. Condlin (nysd, 2024-02-26) · Strongest negative: Christy Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Antonio J. Morrison James Landale Crawford, and Cornell D. Brown William E. Landsidle, in His Capacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth, Law Professors Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault the Antidefamation League Center for Women Policy Studies the Dc Rape Crisis Center Equal Rights Advocates the Georgetown University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic Jewish Women International the National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault the National Network to End Domestic Violence National Organization for Women Northwest Women's Law Center the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Incorporated Virginia National Organization for Women Virginia Now Legal Defense and Education Fund, Incorporated Women Employed Women's Law Project Women's Legal Defense Fund Independent Women's Forum Women's Freedom Network, Amici Curiae. United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant, and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison James Landale Crawford, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Cornell D. Brown William E. Landsidle, in His Capacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth, Law Professors Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault the Antidefamation League Center for Women Policy Studies 2 the Dc Rape Crisis Center Equal Rights Advocates the Georgetown University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic Jewish Women International the National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault the National Network to End Domestic Violence National Organization for Women Northwest Women's Law Center the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Incorporated Virginia National Organization for Women Virginia Now Legal Defense and Education Fund, Incorporated Women Employed Women's Law Project Women's Legal Defense Fund Independent Women's Forum Women's Freedom Network, Amici Curiae (ca4, 1999-03-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 48 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Abrogated Christy Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Antonio J. Morrison James Landale Crawford, and Cornell D. Brown William E. Landsidle, in His Capacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth, Law Professors Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault the Antidefamation League Center for Women Policy Studies the Dc Rape Crisis Center Equal Rights Advocates the Georgetown University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic Jewish Women International the National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault the National Network to End Domestic Violence National Organization for Women Northwest Women's Law Center the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Incorporated Virginia National Organization for Women Virginia Now Legal Defense and Education Fund, Incorporated Women Employed Women's Law Project Women's Legal Defense Fund Independent Women's Forum Women's Freedom Network, Amici Curiae. United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant, and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison James Landale Crawford, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Cornell D. Brown William E. Landsidle, in His Capacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth, Law Professors Virginians Aligned Against Sexual Assault the Antidefamation League Center for Women Policy Studies 2 the Dc Rape Crisis Center Equal Rights Advocates the Georgetown University Law Center Sex Discrimination Clinic Jewish Women International the National Alliance of Sexual Assault Coalitions the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault the National Network to End Domestic Violence National Organization for Women Northwest Women's Law Center the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Incorporated Virginia National Organization for Women Virginia Now Legal Defense and Education Fund, Incorporated Women Employed Women's Law Project Women's Legal Defense Fund Independent Women's Forum Women's Freedom Network, Amici Curiae (2×)
4th Cir. · 1999 · signal: compare · confidence high
Compare Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 (holding that state sovereign immunity may be abrogated by federal statute enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), and EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 , 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054 , 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) ("[W]hen properly exercising its power under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers."), with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (holding that state sovereign immunity may not be abrogat…
discussed Abrogated Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University (2×)
4th Cir. · 1999 · signal: compare · confidence high
Compare Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 (holding that state sovereign immunity may be abrogated by federal statute enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), and EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 , 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054 , 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (“[W]hen properly exercising its power under §. 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.”), with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (holding that state sovereign immunity may not be ab…
examined Distinguished National Labor Relations Board v. Spring Road Corp. (3×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451 , 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (payments barred in Edelman were “indistinguishable from a monetary award against the State itself which had been prohibited in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 , 65 S.Ct. 347 , 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).”) (emphasis added); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (Edelman would bar plaintiff “seeking damages from the public treasury”). .
examined Distinguished Merrill Eugene Riggle v. State of California (3×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451 , 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2668 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (payments barred in Edelman were "indistinguishable from a monetary award against the State itself which had been prohibited in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 , 65 S.Ct. 347 , 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).") (emphasis added); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (Edelman would bar plaintiff "seeking damages from the public treasury") 2 Ostensibly, both acts are primarily designed to be enforced through criminal penalties.
discussed Limited Cesca v. Western Illinois University Board of Trustees
C.D. Ill. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
XIV, § 5; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provision of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
discussed Limited Sherman v. Public Employees Retirement System
S.D. Ohio · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
discussed Limited Kelly v. NYS UCS
2d Cir. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e think that the eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Limited PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Cf. Katz, 546 U. S., at 372–373 (holding that “those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause” understood it to “operat[e] free and clear of the State’s claim of sover- eign immunity”); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that state sovereign immunity is neces- sarily limited by the enforcement provision of the Four- teenth Amendment); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 , 314–318 (1904) (holding that Article 3, §2, gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over a suit brought by one State against another); Texas, 143 U. S., at 642–646 (hold- ing that Artic…
examined Limited Allen v. Cooper (3×)
E.D.N.C. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, see hans v. louisiana, 134 u.s. 1 , 10 s.ct. 504 , 33 l.ed. 842 (1890), are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Limited Gray v. Florida State University (In Re Dehon, Inc.) (3×)
Bankr. D. Mass. · 2005 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Limited Rzadkowski-Chévere v. Administration for Child Support Enforcement (3×)
D.P.R. · 2005 · confidence low
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (Eleventh Amendment is limited by the enforcement power under §§ 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, in this instance, sexual discrimination); see also, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed., 527 U.S. at 637 , 119 S.Ct. 2199 ; Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 , 123 S.Ct. 1972 , 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003); Espinal-Dominguez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 35…
examined Limited Wessel v. Glendening (4×)
4th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (cita- tion omitted)).
examined Limited Wessel v. Glendening (3×)
4th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)). 14 Section 5 grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of" the Fourteenth Amendment, including the following portion of § 1: 15 No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State depri…
discussed Limited Varner, Iris I. v. IL State University
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he eleventh amendment, and the principles of state sovereignty which it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of sec. 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Limited Dr. Iris I. Varner, and United States of America, Intervening v. Illinois State University (3×)
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he eleventh amendment, and the principles of state sovereignty which it embodies, ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
discussed Limited Amos v. Md. Dept of Public Safety (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
In contrast, Congress may abrogate a State's sover- eign immunity when it enacts valid legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (cita- tion omitted)).
examined Limited Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services (3×)
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence low
In contrast, Congress may abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity when it enacts valid legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
examined Limited Granville Amos v. Maryland Department Of Public Safety And Correctional Services (3×)
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence low
In contrast, Congress may abrogate a State's sovereign immunity when it enacts valid legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
examined Limited Vega Castro v. Puerto Rico (3×)
D.P.R. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 , 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (Overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 2273 , 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), thereby eliminating Interstate Commerce Clause as an authority to abrogate); See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 , 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (Eleventh Amendment is limited by the enforcement power under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, in that instance, sexual discrimination).
examined Limited Stein v. Kent State University Board of Trustees (3×)
N.D. Ohio · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of back pay since limited by enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
discussed Limited Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma David Walters, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Pueblo of Sandia v. Bruce King, Governor, State of New Mexico State of New Mexico, States of Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington, Amici Curiae. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Reservation v. State of New Mexico Bruce King, Governor of the State of New Mexico, States of Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington, Amici Curiae. Kickapoo Tribe, Also Known as Kickapoo Nation in Kansas, of the Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas Steve Cadue, Tribal Chairman of the Kickapoo Nation in Kansas Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, a Federally Recognized Tribe v. State of Kansas
10th Cir. · 1994 · confidence low
"When Congress acts pursuant to Sec. 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." Id. (upholding money award against a state under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the "Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, ... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 24 Not un…
discussed Limited The Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, the State of Washington Booth Gardner, Governor of the State of Washington Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General of the State of Washington Franklin L. Miller, Deputy Director of the Washington State Gambling Commission, the Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington State, the State of Washington Booth Gardner, Governor of the State of Washington Ken Eikenberry, Attorney General of the State of Washington Franklin L. Miller, Deputy Director of the Washington State Gambling Commission (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 , 96 S.Ct. at 2671 (Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
examined Limited Busbee v. Smith (3×)
D.D.C. · 1982 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
e think that the eleventh amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Limited Dorothy C. Parker v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (6×)
D.C. Cir. · 1977 · signal: cf. · confidence low
Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (award of attorneys’ fees and back pay against state government employers pursuant to Title VII does not violate the Eleventh Amendment since that Amendment is limited by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
examined Cited "but see" Rose ex rel. Rose v. Nebraska (3×)
8th Cir. · 1984 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 315 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992 , 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 677 , 94 S.Ct. at 1362 (federal court’s remedial power, consistent with Eleventh Amendment, is limited to prospective injunctive relief and may not include retroactive award requiring payment of damages from state treasury); but cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (sovereign immunity does not bar Title VII backpay award against a state).
examined Cited "but see" George Rose, as Next Friend of Marla Rose v. State of Nebraska, George Rose, as Next Friend of Marla Rose v. State of Nebraska, George Rose, as Next Friend of Marla Rose v. Charles Thone (3×)
8th Cir. · 1984 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 315 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992 , 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, 415 U.S. at 677 , 94 S.Ct. at 1362 (federal court's remedial power, consistent with Eleventh Amendment, is limited to prospective injunctive relief and may not include retroactive award requiring payment of damages from state treasury); but cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (sovereign immunity does not bar Title VII backpay award against a state). 15 It is true en…
examined Cited "but see" Shepard v. Byrd (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 1984 · signal: but cf. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts
discussed Cited "but see" Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1982 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (“Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts”); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 ; Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 .
examined Cited "but see" 14 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1486, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,476 Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, United States of America v. City of St. Louis (3×)
8th Cir. · 1977 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976).
examined Cited "but see" Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis (3×)
8th Cir. · 1977 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 , 96 S.Ct. 2666 , 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hayes v. Condlin (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
could not have been intended to include states as parties defendant.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) ROMANELLI v. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF REGISTERED NURSES
E.D. Pa. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) KADEL v. FOLWELL
M.D.N.C. · 2021 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
title vii . . . abrogates immunity for suits against a state in its capacity 'as employer.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kravitz v. State of New York (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
could not have been intended to include states as parties defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cammarata v. The City University of New York
E.D.N.Y · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the claims against cuny may proceed as congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity for title vii claims.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Laro v. New Hampshire (6×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
1st Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 4 verbatim quotes · confidence high
when congress acts pursuant to 5, it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Mixon v. Ohio (4×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
were it not for the fifth section of mendment, there might be room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the state.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Tanya Mixon, Denise Thomas, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. The State of Ohio and Michael White, Mayor of the City of Cleveland (4×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
were it not for the fifth section of mendment, there might be room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the state.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Hunter v. Dove
S.D. Ohio · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the 1981 claims are barred by the eleventh amendment of the united states constitution . . .. the title vii claims are not.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Common Cause v. Rucho (3×)
M.D.N.C. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
there can be no doubt that this line of cases has sanctioned intrusions by congress, acting under the civil war amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Wampler v. Pennsylvania, Department of Labor & Industry (3×)
M.D. Penn. · 2007 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 'by appropriate legislation' the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Jenkins v. Dekalb County (3×)
N.D. Ga. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
when congress acts pursuant to s 5 ... it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Coger v. Connecticut (3×)
D. Conn. · 2004 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
there is no dispute that in enacting the 1972 amendments to title vii to extend coverage to the states as employers, congress exercised its power under section five of the fourteenth amendment.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Fitzpatrick v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp. (2×)
E.D. Pa. · 1999 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) John Humenansky v. Regents of the University of Minnesota (6×)
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence low
congressional authorization to sue the state ... clearly present" when title vii amended to allow suits against "governments governmental agencies
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Denise Chavez, United States of America, Intervenor v. Arte Publico Press Nicolas Kanellos University of Houston (12×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we think that congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) John Humenansky v. Regents of the Univ.
8th Cir. · 1998 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
congressional authorization to sue the state . . . clearly present" when title vii amended to allow suits against "governments governmental agencies
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Froebel v. Meyer (3×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Wis. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we think that congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, provide for private suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
FITZPATRICK Et Al.
v.
BITZER, CHAIRMAN, STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT COMMISSION Et Al.
75-251.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 28, 1976.
427 U.S. 445
Paul W. Orth argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-251 and for respondents in No. 75-283. With him on the brief in No. 75-251 were Austin Carey, Jr., Edward Gallant, Jack Greenberg, and Eric Schnapper. With him on the brief in No. 75-283 were Messrs. Carey and Gallant., Sidney D. Giber, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for respondents in No. 75-251 and for petitioners in No. 75-283. With him on the briefs were Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General, and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Assistant Attorney General., Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, and Walter W. Barnett.†
Rehnquist, Rbhnquist, Burger, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmün, Powell, Brennan, Stevens.
Cited by 1,671 opinions  |  Published
17 passages pin-cited by 18 cases
Pinpoint authority: #4,587 of 633,719
Citer courts: Eighth Circuit (7) · N.D. Georgia (5) · E.D. Pennsylvania (4) · First Circuit (3) · Seventh Circuit (3) · D. Connecticut (3) · District of Columbia (3)

Lead Opinion

[*447] Me. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis of[*448] “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin/'[1] The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the effect of our decision in Edelman was to foreclose Congress’ power. We granted certiorari to resolve this important constitutional question. 423 IT. S. 1031 (1975). We reverse.

I

Petitioners in No. 75-251 sued in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of all present and retired male employees of the State of Connecticut. Their amended complaint asserted, inter alia, that certain provisions in the State’s statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated against them because of their sex, and therefore contravened Title VII of the 1964 Act, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). Title VII, which originally did not include state and local govern-[*449] merits, had in the interim been amended to bring the States within its purview.[2]

The District Court held that the Connecticut State Employees Retirement Act violated Title VII's prohibition against sex-based employment discrimination. 390 F. Supp. 278, 285-288 (1974).[3] It entered prospective injunctive relief in petitioners’ favor against respondent state officials.[4] Petitioners also sought an award of retroactive retirement benefits as compensation for losses[*450] caused by the State's discrimination,[5] as well as “a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” [6] But the District Court held that both would constitute recovery of money damages from the State’s treasury, and were therefore precluded by the Eleventh Amendment and by this Court’s decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra.

On petitioners’ appeal,[7] the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed with the District Court that the action, “insofar as it seeks damages, is in essence against the state and as such is subject to the Eleventh Amendment.” 519 P. 2d 559, 565 (1975). The Court of Appeals also found that under the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, “Congress intended to authorize a private suit for backpay by state employees against the state.” Id., at 568. Notwithstanding this statutory authority, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court and held that under Edelman a “private federal action for retroactive damages” is not a “constitu[*451] tionally permissible method of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights.” 519 F. 2d, at 569. It reversed the District Court and remanded as to attorneys’ fees, however, reasoning that such an award would have only an “ancillary effect” on the state treasury of the kind permitted under Edelman, supra, at 667-668. 519 F. 2d, at 571. The petition filed here by the state employees in No. 75-251 contends that Congress does possess the constitutional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize their Title VII damages action against the State. The state officials’ cross-petition, No. 75-283, argues that under Edelman the Eleventh Amendment bars any award of attorneys’ fees here because it would be paid out of the state treasury.

II

In Edelman this Court held that monetary relief awarded by the District Court to welfare plaintiffs, by reason of wrongful denial of benefits which had occurred previous to the entry of the District Court’s determination of their wrongfulness, violated the Eleventh Amendment. Such an award was found to be indistinguishable from a monetary award against the State itself which had been prohibited in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). It was therefore controlled by that ease rather than by Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), which permitted suits against state officials to obtain prospective relief against violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Edelman went on to hold that the plaintiffs in that case could not avail themselves of the doctrine of waiver expounded in cases such as Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964), and Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973), because the necessary predicate for that doctrine was congres[*452] sional intent to abrogate the immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment. We concluded that none of the statutes relied upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization by Congress to join a State as defendant. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant. The provisions of the Social Security Act relied upon by plaintiffs were held by their terms not to “authorize suit against anyone,” 415 U. S., at 674, and they, too, were incapable of supplying the predicate for a claim of waiver on the part of the State.

All parties in the instant litigation agree with the Court of Appeals that the suit for retroactive benefits by the petitioners is in fact indistinguishable from that sought to be maintained in Edelman, since what is sought here is a damages award payable to a private party from the state treasury.[8]

Our analysis begins where Edelman ended, for in this Title VII case the “threshold fact of congressional authorization,” id., at 672, to sue the State as employer is clearly present. This is, of course, the prerequisite found present in Farden and wanting in Employees. We are aware of the factual differences between the type of state activity involved in Farden and that involved in the present case, but we do not think that difference is material for our purposes. The congressional authorization involved in Parden was based on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause; here, however, the[*453] Eleventh Amendment defense is asserted in the context of legislation passed pursuant to Congress’ authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.[9]

As ratified by the States after the Civil War, that Amendment quite clearly contemplates limitations on their authority. In relevant part, it provides:

“Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
“Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”

The substantive provisions are by express terms directed at the States. Impressed upon them by those provisions are duties with respect to their treatment of private individuals. Standing behind the imperatives is Congress’ power to “enforce” them “by appropriate legislation.”

The impact of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, and the reach of congressional power under § 5, were examined at length by this Court in Ex 'parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880). A state judge had been arrested and indicted under a federal criminal statute[*454] prohibiting the exclusion on the basis of race of any citizen from, service as a juror in a state court. The judge claimed that the statute was beyond Congress’ power to enact under either the Thirteenth[10] or the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first observed that these Amendments “were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress.” Id., at 345. It then addressed the relationship between the language of § 5 and the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment:

“The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Congress to enact. ... It is said the selection of jurors for her courts and the administration of her laws belong to each State; that they are her rights. This is true in the general. But in exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise all its[*455] granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.
“The argument in support of the petition for a habeas corpus ignores entirely the power conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. Were it not for the fifth section of that amendment, there might be room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of the moral duty of the State .... But the Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete." Id., at 346-348.

Ex parte Virginia’s early recognition of this shift in the federal-state balance has been carried forward by more recent decisions of this Court. See, e: g., South Carolina v. Katsenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 238-239 (1972).

There can be no doubt that this line of cases has sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded on the expansion of Congress’ powers— with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty— found to be intended by the Framers and made part of the Constitution upon the States’ ratification of those[*456] Amendments, a phenomenon aptly described as a “carv[ing] out” in Ex parte Virginia, supra, at 346.

It is true that none of these previous cases presented the question of the relationship between- the Eleventh Amendment and the enforcement power granted to Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce “by appropriate legislation” the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is “appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.[11] See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945).

Ill

In No. 75-283, the state officials contest the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that an award of attorneys’ fees in[*457] this case would under Edelman have only an “ancillary effect” on the state treasury and could therefore be permitted as falling outside the Eleventh Amendment under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). 415 U. S., at 667-668. We need not address this question, since, given the express congressional authority for such an award in a case brought under Title VII,[12] it follows necessarily from our holding in No. 75-251 that Congress’ exercise of power in this respect is also not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in No. 75-283 on this basis.

The judgment in No. 75-251 is

Reversed.

The judgment in No. 75-283 is

Affirmed.

1

Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter 1964 Act), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), provides:

“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
2

As relevant here, the definition of “person” in § 701 (a) of the 1964 Act, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §2000e (a), was amended by § 2 (1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (hereinafter the 1972 Amendments), 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. §2000e (a) (1970 ed., Supp, IV), to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions.”

The express exclusion of “a State or political subdivision thereof” provided in § 701 (b) of the former was stricken by § 2 (2) of the latter, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. §2000e (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 2 (5) of the 1972 Amendments, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), amended § 701(f) of the 1964 Act, 42 U. S, C. § 2000e (f), to include within the definition of “employee” those individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.”

The 1972 Amendments retained the right of an individual aggrieved by an employer’s unlawful employment practice to sue on his or her own behalf, upon satisfaction of the statutory procedural prerequisites, and made clear that that right was being extended to persons aggrieved by public employers. See 1972 Amendments, § 4 (a), 86 Stat. 104, 42 U. S. C. §§2000o-5 (a)-(g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

3

Petitioners had also alleged that the retirement plan was contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in view of its ruling under Title VII the District Court found no reason to address the constitutional claim. 390 F. Supp., at 290.

4

In No. 75-251, respondent Bitzer is the Chairman of the State Employees’ Retirement Commission, and the other respondents are the Treasurer and the Comptroller of the State of Connecticut. These officials are cross-petitioners in No. 75-283.

5

Section 706 (g) of the 1964 Act, 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 86 Stat. 107, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), provides in part:

“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.”
6

See § 706 (k) of the 1964 Act, 78 Stat. 261, 42 TJ. S. C. § 2000e-5(k).

7

Respondent state oficiáis did not appeal from the District Court’s finding of a Title VII violation and the entry of prospective in-junctive relief.

8

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ arguments that the retroactive benefits would not be paid out of public funds from the state treasury, and that the rule in Edelman and Ford Motor Co. was therefore inapplicable. 519 F. 2d, at 564-565. Petitioners have not challenged this ruling here.

9

There is no dispute that in enacting the 1972 Amendments to Title VII to extend coverage to the States as employers, Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415, pp. 10-11 (1971). Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976).

10

“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

“Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
11

Apart from their claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of the remedy established by Title VII in this case, respondent state officials do not contend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

12

See n. 6, supra.

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Brennan,

concurring in the judgment.

This suit was brought by present and retired employees of the State of Connecticut against the State Treasurer, the State Comptroller, and the Chairman of the State Employees’ Retirement Commission. In that circumstance, Connecticut may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment, since that Amendment bars only federal-court suits against States by citizens of other States. Rather, the question is whether Connecticut may avail itself of the nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity as a bar to a claim for damages under Title VII. In my view Connecticut may not assert sovereign immunity for the reason I expressed in dissent in Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973): The States surrendered that immunity, in Hamilton’s words, “in the plan of the Convention” that formed the Union, at least insofar as the States granted Congress[*458] specifically enumerated powers. See id., at 319 n. 7; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). Congressional authority to enact the provisions of Title VII at issue in this case is found in the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, two of the enumerated powers granted Congress in the Constitution. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 131-134 (1970) (Black, J.); id., at 135-150 (Douglas, J.); id., at 216-217 (Harlan, J.); id., at 236-281 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.) ; id., at 282-284 (Stewart, J.); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651 (1966). I remain of the opinion that “because of its surrender, no immunity exists that can be the subject of a congressional declaration or a voluntary waiver.” Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., supra, at 300.

I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgment.

In my opinion the commerce power is broad enough to support federal legislation regulating the terms and conditions of state employment and, therefore, provides the necessary support for the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, even though Congress expressly relied on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But I do not believe plaintiffs proved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because I am not sure that the 1972 Amendments were “needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,” see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651, I question whether § 5 of that Amendment is an adequate reply to Connecticut’s Eleventh Amendment defense. I believe the defense should be rejected for a different reason.

Even if the Eleventh Amendment does cover a citizen’s[*459] suit against his own State,[1] it does not bar an action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute, Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159-160. Since the Connecticut pension law has been held to be invalid, at least in part, Ex parte Young makes it clear that the federal court properly acquired jurisdiction of the proceeding.

The Eleventh Amendment issue presented is whether the court has power to enter a judgment payable immediately out of trust assets which subsequently would be reimbursed from the general revenues of the State. Although I have great difficulty with a construction of the Eleventh Amendment which acknowledges the federal court’s jurisdiction of a case and merely restricts the kind of relief the federal court may grant,[2] I must recognize that it has been so construed in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 TJ. S. 651, and that the language of that opinion would seem to cover this case. However, its actual holding appears to be limited to the situation in which the award is payable directly from state funds and “not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future” with a substantive determination. Id., at 668.

The holding in Edelman does not necessarily require the same result in this case; this award will not be paid directly from the state treasury, but rather from two[*460] separate and independent pension funds. The fact that the State will have to increase its future payments into the funds as a consequence of this award does not, in my opinion, sufficiently distinguish this case from other cases in which a State may be required to conform its practices to the Federal Constitution and thereby to incur additional expense in the future. Since the rationale of Ex parte Young remains applicable to such cases, and since this case is not squarely covered by the holding in Edelman, I am persuaded that it is proper to reject the Eleventh Amendment defense.

With respect to the fee issue, even if the Eleventh Amendment were applicable, I would place fees in the same category as other litigation costs. Cf. Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U. S. 70.

1

As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall has pointed out, the Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable to this situation. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412; see also Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298-324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

2

Neither the language of the Eleventh Amendment nor the rationale of Ex parte Young draws any distinction between proceedings in law or in equity. The Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.’-' U. S. Const., Arndt. 11.