Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976). · Go Syfert
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1,008 citation events (148 in the last 25 years) across 56 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Arizona v. Christopher Michael Montoya (ariz, 2024-08-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Christopher Michael Montoya
Ariz. · 2024 · confidence medium
In fact, excusing a juror because of his “views on capital punishment” is structural error that requires reversal, State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534 , 552 ¶ 46 (2003), unless the juror is “irrevocably committed” to vote for or against the death penalty “regardless of the facts and circumstances,” Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 522 n.21 (1968)); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728–29. ¶76 Additionally, we have previously rejected the argument that a potential juror’s response that the death …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DUCLOS v. STATE (2×)
Okla. Crim. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Among these are a faulty jury instruction on reasonable doubt, Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); intentional racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors, Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254, 263-64, 106 S.Ct. 617, 623, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); denial of the right to a public trial, Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 49, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2217, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); denial of the right to self-representation, McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); improper exclusion of qualified capital …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Lambert
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Gray, 481 U.S. at 659 -60 (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123-24 (1976) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Stewart
Cal. · 2004 · confidence medium
(Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 841 , 105 S.Ct. 844 ] (Witt); Davis v. Georgia (1976) 429 U.S. 122, 123 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 339 , 97 S.Ct. 399 ]; Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 622 , 107 S.Ct. 2045 ] (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.).) I.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Heard
Cal. · 2003 · confidence medium
(See Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648 , 664—666, 668 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 622 , 107 S.Ct. 2045 ]; Davis v. Georgia (1976) 429 U.S. 122, 123 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 339 , 97 S.Ct. 399 ].) Accordingly, under compulsion of these applicable federal decisions, we shall reverse the judgment as to the sentence of death and remand the matter for a new penalty trial before a properly selected jury.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Szuchon v. Lehman
3rd Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Gray, 481 U.S. at 668 ; Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shajuan Lee McRae v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
For examples of capital cases that review the propriety of having struck a qualified juror, see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45-50 (1980) (erroneous exclusion of juror in capital murder trial violated 6th and 14th Amendments; states may not execute sentence of death where even one putative juror has been excluded merely because of general objection to capital punishment); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (holding that venireperson is properly excluded only if he or she is "'irrevocably committed'" against death penalty regardless of facts and circumstances that might emerge at trial;…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eugene Williams Gall, Jr. v. Phil Parker, Warden
6th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1988); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (holding that the improper exclusion of one veniremember out of 83 was reversible error).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rhines (2×)
S.D. · 1996 · confidence medium
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1976); see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 , 107 S.Ct. 2045 , 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (plurality opinion).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Farina v. State
Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
See generally Davis; see also Gray, 481 U.S. at 659 , 107 S.Ct. at 2052 ; Davis, 429 U.S. at 123 , 97 S.Ct. at 400 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gray v. Mississippi (8×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1987 · confidence medium
As the Court observes, we have said that “if a venireman is improperly excluded [for cause], any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand.” Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (1976) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. Witt (2×)
SCOTUS · 1985 · confidence medium
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (1976).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Clark O'Bryan v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent (8×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1983 · signal: contra · confidence medium
Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558 , 564 n. 7 (5th Cir.1982), aff'd in relevant part, 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 678 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 , 102 S.Ct. 1636 , 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982); Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir.1979), aff'd, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc); contra, Davis, supra, 429 U.S. at 124 , 97 S.Ct. at 400 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 24 A. The Standard of Appellate Review. 25 As a threshold matter, we address the question of the appropriate standard of appellate review in federal habeas proceedings…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chandler v. State
Fla. · 1983 · confidence medium
Id. at 123, 97 S.Ct. at 400 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Henry Hance v. Walter D. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center
11th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
The scope of this holding is clarified by Justice Rehnquist in dissent who refers to it as “a per se rule that precludes application of even the harmless-error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967).” 429 U.S. at 123-24 , 97 S.Ct. at 399-400; accord Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (5th Cir.1979), adhered to, 626 F.2d 396 (1980) (en banc); Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3495 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Newlon (2×)
Mo. · 1982 · confidence medium
In its reiteration of the Witherspoon rule the Court in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1976), stated: “Unless a venireman is ‘irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings’ ... he cannot be excluded.. .. ” Here the three excused fall into the class properly excluded.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Clark
R.I. · 1980 · confidence medium
Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 399-400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Collins v. State
Ga. · 1979 · confidence medium
This complies with Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 511 (1968); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (1976); and Goodwin v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 193 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1978 · confidence medium
Veniremen may not constitutionally be excluded for cause “simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction”, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968), and exclusion of a single veniremen for such cause renders the death penalty constitutionally infirm, Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alderman v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1978 · confidence medium
In Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (97 SC 399, 50 LE2d 339) (1976), the court said in a per curiam opinion: "Unless a venireman is `irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings' ( 391 U. S. at 522 n. 21), he cannot be excluded; if a venireman is improperly excluded even though not so committed, any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand." In reaching this conclusion the court cited Harris v. Texas, 403 U. S. 947 (1971), which reversed the death p…
examined Cited "see" Wolfe v. Clarke (6×)
E.D. Va. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
Gray, 481 U.S. at 668 , 107 S.Ct. 2045 (“because the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the constitutional right to an impartial jury ... and because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system” harmless-error analysis cannot apply); see Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam) (“[ujnless a venireman is ‘irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings,’ he cannot be exc…
examined Cited "see" Parks v. Warren (3×)
E.D. Mich. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-352 , 86 S.Ct. 1507 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).
examined Cited "see" State v. Anderson (6×)
Ariz. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
examined Cited "see" State v. Simon (6×)
N.J. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
In Adams v. Texas, supra , the United States Supreme Court held that "a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 448 U.S. at 45 , 100 S.Ct. at 2526 , 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 ; see Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed. 2d 339 (1976); see also Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 352 , 700 A. 2d 306 (stating that a potential juror can be removed for cause based on that belief "if such views would s…
examined Cited "see" Greene v. State (4×)
Ga. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 399-400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195 (7d & e), 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Calabrese (3×)
unknown court · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam) (exclusion of jurors who are not irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 , 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168-69 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.). .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Calabrese (3×)
unknown court · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam) (exclusion of jurors who are not irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 , 92 S.Ct. 2163, 2168-69 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.) 5 We do not decide whether this same result would apply where a de minimis number of jurors is involved.
examined Cited "see" Andrews v. State (3×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Clyde Major Thompson, AKA Clyde Johnson (6×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See id., 106 S.Ct. at 623-24 (plurality opinion) (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam)). 5 Conclusion We remand for a hearing, in accordance with the procedure outlined in this opinion, on the prosecution’s motive in exercising its peremptory challenges.
examined Cited "see" Pickens v. State (4×)
Ark. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385 , 659 S.W.2d 68 (1983) (quoting from Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976)).
discussed Cited "see" Vasquez v. Hillery (2×)
SCOTUS · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) ; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 351-352 (1966).
examined Cited "see" State v. Welcome (3×)
La. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
examined Cited "see" Willie Jasper Darden v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida (6×)
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 , 1081 & n. 8 (11th Cir.1983).
examined Cited "see" Buffington v. State (6×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
examined Cited "see" Hartfield v. State (4×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 (1976).
examined Cited "see" State v. Blair (6×)
Mo. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 615 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 , 102 S.Ct. 432 , 70 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981).
examined Cited "see" State v. Harrington (6×)
Tenn. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969).
examined Cited "see" Evans v. State (6×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
examined Cited "see" Franklin v. State (4×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 399 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Chambers v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Davis v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122, 123 (97 SC 399, 50 LE2d 339) (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Griggs v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (97 SC 399) (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Brock v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See and cf. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 399 (1976).
cited Cited "see" Lewis v. Commonwealth
Va. · 1977 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Chanthadara (3×)
10th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657-68 , 107 S.Ct. 2045 , 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (erroneous exclusion of one potential juror based on her views on the death penalty was reversible constitutional error); see also O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir.1983) (“The courts have required a death sentence to be set aside even if only one potential juror has been excluded for opposing the death penalty on grounds broader than those set forth in Witherspoon.”) (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976)). a.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Fuller v. Johnson (3×)
5th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
Where the court finds that even one juror was improperly excluded, the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing, because the right to an impartial adjudication is “ ‘so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.’ ” Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 , 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2057 , 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 , 97 S.Ct. 399, 400 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) (per curiam) (remanding capital case for reconsideration where a single juror was erroneously removed for bias).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Walker v. State (3×)
Okla. Crim. App. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Banks v. Texas (4×)
SCOTUS · 1983 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Davis v. Georgia 429 U. S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Martin (3×)
La. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Smith v. Hopper
Ga. · 1977 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (97 SC 399, 50 LE2d 339) (1976).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Davis
v.
Georgia
76-5403.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 6, 1976.
429 U.S. 122
Blackmun, Rehnquist.
Cited by 350 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

The petitioner in this case was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after trial by a jury selected in violation of the standards enunciated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and applied in Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478 (1969), and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U. S. 262 (1970). The Witherspoon case held that “a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 391 U. S., at 522.

The Supreme Court of Georgia found that one prospective juror had been excluded in violation of the Witherspoon standard. The court nevertheless affirmed the conviction and death sentence, reasoning that the erroneous exclusion of one death-scrupled juror did not deny the petitioner a jury representing a cross section of the community since other jurors sharing that attitude were not excused for cause: “The rationale of Witherspoon and its progeny is not violated where merely one of a qualified class or group is excluded where it is shown, as here, that others of such group were qualified to serve. This record is completely void of any[*123] evidence of a systematic and intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors so as to deny the appellant a jury of veniremen representing a cross section of the community.” 236 Ga. 804, 809-810, 225 S. E. 2d 241, 244-245.

That, however, is not the test established in Witherspoon, and it is not the test that this Court has applied in subsequent cases where a death penalty was imposed after the improper exclusion of one member of the venire. See Wigglesworth v. Ohio, 403 U. S. 947 (1971), rev’g 18 Ohio St. 2d 171, 248 N. E. 2d 607 (1969); Harris v. Texas, 403 U. S. 947 (1971), rev’g 457 S. W. 2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Adams v. Washington, 403 U. S. 947 (1971), rev’g 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P. 2d 558 (1969). Unless a venireman is “irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings,” 391 U. S., at 522 n. 21, he cannot be excluded; if a venireman is improperly excluded even though not so committed, any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand.

Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun join,

dissenting.

As is clear from the most cursory reading, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), does not inexorably lead to the result this Court now reaches. Indeed, much of the language in that opinion would support the reasoning, and the result, reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The extension of Witherspoon to cover the case where a sole venireman is excluded in violation of its test deserves plenary consideration, not a per se rule that precludes application[*124] of even the harmless-error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). There is no indication that the Supreme Court of Georgia was wrong when it observed that the “record is completely void of any evidence of a systematic and intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors so as to deny the appellant a jury of veniremen representing a cross section of the community,” 236 Ga. 804, 809-810, 225 S. E. 2d 241, 245.

It is, moreover, unclear whether the State was entitled to another peremptory challenge,* and surely Witherspoon does not decide whether the presence of unexercised peremptory challenges might render harmless the improper exclusion of a limited number of veniremen. Finally, the defect in this case is not that a juror was improperly excluded because she was not irrevocably opposed to the death penalty; rather, the defect is a failure to question sufficiently to determine whether or not she was irrevocably opposed. It is not inconceivable that a hearing with the excluded juror could be conducted now to finish the aborted questioning and determine whether she would have, in fact, been excludable for cause.

The effects of the arguably improper exclusion, in short, are too murky to warrant summary reversal of the sentence imposed. Since I do not believe this case is controlled by our past decisions, I would grant certiorari and set the case for argument.

Nonnally, the defense, in a capital case, is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges, and the State is entitled to one-half as many as the defense. Ga. Code Ann. § 59-805 (1965). In this case, the transcript reveals that the defense utilized 21 peremptory challenges; the State, 10.