Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). · Go Syfert
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Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Albert Delon v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2019-04-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2015 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2015 2020 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Albert Delon v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355, 355-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that the appellant’s release from federal custody while housed at a county jail qualified as constructive release from a correctional facility for purposes of PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)1.), disapproved by Lewars, 259 So. 3d at 796 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Dazarian Cordell Lewars
Fla. · 2018 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Weekly at D1099-1100, --- So.3d at ---- - ----, 2017 WL 1969691 , with Wright , 180 So.3d at 1044 -46 , and Louzon , 78 So.3d at 680-81 ; cf. Taylor , 114 So.3d at 355-56 (construing the similar language pertaining to federal institutions consistently with the decisions in Louzon and Wright ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FRED GRAY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The trial court denied relief based on Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355, 355-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), in which this court held that a defendant’s release from federal custody while in county jail to perform substantial assistance constitutes constructive release from a federal correctional 2 facility for purposes of the PRR statute, adopting the reasoning of Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678, 680-81 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Ray Mon Wright (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Subsequently, in Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the Fourth District affirmed the appellant’s PRR sentence based upon the reasoning in Louzon, which the Fourth District adopted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burns v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
We expressly recognized a distinction regarding fundamental error between a disputed element of a crime and an element of a crime about which there is no dispute in the case.”); Fussell v. State, 154 So.3d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“An erroneous jury instruction cannot be fundamental unless it pertains to a matter genuinely at issue in the case.”); Taylor v. State, 114 So.3d 355, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (rejecting claim of fundamental error for failure to give an afterthought instruction with regard to robbery because the defense at trial was one of misidentification).
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: accord · confidence high
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have all held that to accept Taylor's argument "would be inconsistent with the [l]egislature's clear intent to provide for a greater sentence for individuals who commit a qualifying offense within three years of completion of a previously imposed prison sentence." Wright, 180 So. 3d at 1045 ; Louzon, 78 So. 3d at 681 ; accord Taylor, 114 So. 3d at 356 .
cited Cited "see" Sims v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. State, 114 So.3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Louzon v. State, 78 So.3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Rollinson v. State, 743 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State of Florida v. Ray Mon Wright
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
Chad Lament TAYLOR
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 4D10-4007.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 15, 2013.
114 So. 3d 355
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nan Ellen Foley, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant., Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Gross, Levine, Warner.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
WARNER, J.

We affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for robbery with a weapon. He claims fundamental error where the trial court failed to give an afterthought instruction, as the theft upon which the robbery was based occurred after the battery of the victim. See Perkins v. State, 814 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). His defense at trial, however, was one of misidentification. Claiming that the theft was an afterthought was inconsistent with that defense. See Wright v. State, 705 So.2d 102, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“Inconsistencies in defenses are permitted so long as the proof of one does not necessarily disprove the other.”). Moreover, appellant never requested an afterthought instruction. Thus, it cannot be a fundamental error to fail to give an unrequested instruction inconsistent with his defense at trial.

As to appellant’s PRR sentence, we affirm based upon Louzon v. State, 78 So.3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), the reasoning of which we adopt. Here, appellant qualified as a PRR, because he committed the present offense within three years after his release from a federal correctional facility. Appellant was still in federal cus[*356] tody, even though housed in a Palm Beach County jail in order to perform substantial assistance. His release from federal custody while housed at the county jail still constitutes constructive release from a federal correctional facility for purposes of section 775.082(9)(a)(l) [1] , Florida Statutes. As pointed out in Louzon,

To accept [the defendant’s] argument would place form over substance and would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s clear intent to provide for a greater sentence for individuals who commit a qualifying offense within three years of completion of a previously imposed prison sentence. To accept [his] argument would also mean that in order for the State to ensure that a defendant [in the defendant’s] situation was eligible for subsequent PRR sentencing, it would have to physically transfer an individual from jail to a Department of Corrections facility [or a federal correctional institution] — where the individual would then be entitled to an immediate release. Courts should not, construe a statute so as to achieve an absurd result.

78 So.3d at 681.

Affirmed.

GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
1

Section 775.082(9)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that any defendant is a prison release reoffender who commits an enumerated felony (including robbery) "within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections ... or within 3 years after being released from a correctional institution of ... the United States, ... following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.”