Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Hurst v. Florida on capital sentencing in Florida, as well as on issues raised by Hurst and other issues of import to this Court. Hurst and amici curiae 1 contend first that Hurst should be granted an automatic life sentence under the provisions of section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2016), Failing that, Hurst contends that the constitutional error in his sentencing proceeding cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that instead a new penalty phase proceeding is required....

...er the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that in order for the trial court to impose a sentence of death, the jury’s recommended sentence of death must be unanimous. For the reasons we will explain, we reject Hurst’s claim that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2016), mandates that Hurst receive an automatic life sentence....

...Florida that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violated this guarantee of the right to a jury trial on all elements of the crime of capital murder, the Supreme Court evaluated Florida’s existing capital sentencing scheme by first noting that, pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), the maximum sentence a capital felon may receive on the basis of the conviction alone is life imprisonment. Id. at 620. That statute made clear that a person convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death only if a separate sentencing proceeding “results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.” Id. (quoting § 775.082(1), Fla....

...The Court explained that in Florida, the trial judge has no jury findings on which to rely. Id. (citing Steele, 921 So.2d at 546 ). A close review of Florida’s sentencing statutes is necessary to identify those critical findings that underlie imposition of a death sentence, which is a matter of state law. First, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provided: *52 (1)A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...OF PENALTY.—Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082.......

...ndment and Hurst’s right to critical jury findings, and Hurst v. Florida error occurred in this case, we must next determine if, as Hurst contends, he is entitled to an automatic sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. IV. SECTION 775.082(2), FLORIDA STATUTES Because the Supreme Court held that a portion of Florida’s sentencing scheme that bases imposition of a death sentence on judicial factfinding violates the Sixth Amendment, Hurst and supporting amici contend that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2015), requires this Court to vacate his death sentence and sentence him to life in prison without the possibility of parole....

...to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1). No sentence of death shall be reduced as a result of a determination that a method of execution is held to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. § 775.082(2), Fla....

...State, 267 So.2d 8, 9-10 (Fla.1972). This Court agreed and, pursuant to the motion of the Attorney General, the sentences at issue were commuted to life. Id. at 9 . However, nowhere in Anderson did this Court construe or express any opinion regarding the meaning of section 775.082(2), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman ....

...20 While it is impossible to glean a consistent ruling from the plurality decisions of the Justices in Furman , it can be seen why the Florida Attorney General asked this Court to vacate a large number of death sentences after Furman was issued, and why, in Anderson , this Court agreed. The State contends that section 775.082(2) exists only to assure that a life sentence will be imposed on individuals previously sentenced to death if capital punishment as a penalty is declared unconstitutional generally or for any given capital offense....

...2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding capital punishment for intellectually disabled persons is unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 , 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (holding capital punishment as a penalty for raping an adult woman violates the Eighth Amendment). We agree with the State. When section 775.082(2) is viewed in the context of this State’s response to the plurality opinion in Furman , and in light of the fact that Furman was based on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment principles, we conclude that the statute does not mandate automatic commutation to life sentences after the decision in Hurst v....

...There is no indication in the Hurst v. Florida decision that the Supreme Court intended or even anticipated that all death sentences in Florida would be commuted to life, or that death as a penalty is categorically prohibited. Moreover, the text of *66 section 775.082(2) refers to the occasion that “the death penalty” is held to be unconstitutional to determine when, and if, automatic sentences of life must be imposed....

...Florida focused its decision on that portion of the capital sentencing process requiring a judge rather than a jury to make all the findings critical to the imposition of the death penalty. The Court did not declare the death penalty unconstitutional. Accordingly, we hold that section 775.082(2) does not require commutation to life under the holding of Hurst v....

...2428 (Breyer, J., concurring in result). Justice O'Connor dissented and opined that facts that increase the maximum penalty should not be treated as elements. Id. at 619 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). . See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 775.082(1), Fla....

...2726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, referred to the Court’s judgments as ”strik[ing] down a penalty ... [long] thought necessary.” Id. at 465, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). . Our construction of section 775.082(2) is supported by historical records concerning this legislation at the time it was being considered by the Legislature....

...In light of the concurrent sentences of the same length McBride is serving as a habitual offender, applying collateral estoppel to his successive motion will not result in a manifest injustice. In fact, as the State notes, resentencing McBride for the life felony could very well result in an increase in his prison term. See § 775.082, Fla....

...murder count at issue here. Although a habitual offender sentence was not authorized for a life felony, the thirty-year sentence on this count is within the applicable statutory maximum of a "term of years not exceeding 40 years" for a life felony. § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...a sentence that does not exceed the maximum penalty authorized for the offense. Because McBride agreed to his unauthorized sentence as part of a plea and the thirty-year sentence does not exceed the maximum penalty authorized for a life felony under section 775.082(3)(a), he is not entitled to relief via rule 3.800(a)....

...At first blush, the district court's decision appears reconcilable with the other cases because they involve different statutes. Unlike Hearns, which involved section 776.08, the other districts have decided *217 this issue in the context of the prisoner releasee reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual . . . within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility. . . . § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

...; State v. Crenshaw, 792 So.2d 582, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (following Brown ); Branch v. State, 790 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("[B]attery on a law enforcement officer [is] a qualifying offense that falls within the ambit of statutory subsection [775.082(9)](a)(1)( o ), which includes `[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.'")....

...being the victim's status. Yet if BOLEO were to count as a forcible felony, the ramifications would be significant. The maximum punishment a defendant can receive for committing misdemeanor battery against an ordinary citizen is one year in prison. § 775.082, Fla....

...ght to seek appellate review of certain *657 constitutional issues which he had presented) and received concurrent sentences as a habitual felony offender (pursuant to section 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1997)) and a prison releasee reoffender (pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)(the "Act"))....

...493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). This protection is "designed to ensure that the *658 sentencing discretion of the courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature." Id. at 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536. Relevant to this question, section 775.082(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part, that, "[u]pon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender... such a defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced" in accordance with the Act. Pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a)2.c., Florida Statutes (1997), the sentence provided for a felony of the second degree is "a term of imprisonment of fifteen years." However, section 775.082(8)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, further, that "[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law." Importantly, section 775.082(8)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1997), reflects the intent of the Legislature "that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection." (Emphasis added)....

...atute, its effect is to establish a sentencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law," the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. See § 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...The First District found that this did not violate double jeopardy: In the PRR Act, the Legislature wrote, "Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084, or any other provision of law." Sec. 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...authorized by law is clear. Because Grant qualified as a prison releasee reoffender and the State sought sentencing pursuant to the Act, the trial court was required to impose the mandatory minimum with respect to Grant's sexual battery offense. See § 775.082(8)(a)2 a, Fla....

...e qualifying defendant, as required by section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1993)); Kelly v. State, 359 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (setting aside illegal sentence of twenty years imprisonment for sexual battery where thirty years was required by section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes). While imposition of equal concurrent sentences thus did not violate double jeopardy principles, it did, nonetheless, violate the express provisions of the Act. As recognized by the First District in Walls, 765 So.2d at 734, because "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration," a trial court is "without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony...

...e of the Act." Id. Here, the classification of a "prison releasee reoffender" as one who commits an enumerated crime "within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor," § 775.082(8)(a)1., Fla....

...by law, and must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence." Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida. The Legislature's intent to apply the Act to all qualifying defendants who commit an enumerated offense after the Act's effective date is clear. See § 775.082(8)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1997) (defining "prison releasee reoffender" as " any defendant who commits or attempts to commit" one of the felonies enumerated in 775.082(8)(a)1 "within three years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor")(emphasis supplied)....

...State, 754 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (finding that such concurrent sentences do not violate double jeopardy). But cf. Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding—without implicating the double jeopardy provision— that, because "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the PRR sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration," concurrent, equal habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender sentences are not authorized)....

...The Supreme Court described Florida’s capital procedure: First-degree murder is a capital felony in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 782.04 (l)(a) (2010). Under state law, the maximum sentence a capital felon may receive on the basis of the conviction alone is life imprisonment. § 775.082(1)....

...REVISED OPINION LEWIS, J. We have for review State v. Cotton, 728 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), [1] both involving the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, codified in part in former section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)(the "Act")....

...tence Cotton, a qualifying defendant for whom the State sought sentencing under the Act, as a "prison releasee reoffender." In affirming Cotton's sentence, the Second District held that, where a defendant claims one of the circumstances set forth in section 775.082(8)(d)1, Florida Statutes, the trial court (not the prosecutor) has the responsibility to determine facts, and authority to exercise discretion, regarding whether or not to impose a mandatory sentence under the Act....

..."prison *347 releasee reoffender." The First District, noting that its interpretation conflicted with Cotton, [3] certified [4] the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Id....

...tive history [5] and by a subsequent clarifying amendment, we hold that—at least to the extent that the Act is properly construed to establish a mandatory minimum sentence—it does. Prior to amendment, the Act provided, in pertinent part [6] : *348 775.082....

...effective date of this subsection, to the President of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, Inc. The association must maintain such information, and make such information available to the public upon request, for at least a 10-year period. § 775.082, Fla....

...termines that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection. Ch. 99-188, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified in section 775.082(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1999))(emphasis supplied)....

...Lastly, even when the Act is properly viewed as a mandatory minimum statute, its effect is to establish a sentencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law," the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. See § 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...Thus, rather than circumscribing the State's ability to invoke the Act, the exceptions provision appears to intend the opposite effect—that the State be held accountable for its prosecuting policies under the statute. This interpretation is consistent with section 775.082(8)(d)2, which requires the state attorney to explain, in writing, the sentencing deviation in every case "in which the offender meets the criteria in paragraph (a) and does not receive the mandatory minimum prison sentence." Pursuant...

...However, as stated earlier, the exceptions do not restrict the State's ability to prosecute under the Act. Rather, they appear to signal the Legislature's opposite intent that, in qualifying cases, unless "extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender," § 775.082(8)(d)1.d., Fla. Stat. (1997), the Act should be applied. See § 775.082(8)(d)1 (reflecting the Legislature's intent that "offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection, unless any of the following circumstances exist")(emphasis added)....

...The ultimate determination of the sentence, when discretion in sentencing can be exercised, cannot also rest with that branch of government. Since this Act gives the discretion in sentencing to the executive branch, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. NOTES [1] We have consolidated the two review proceedings from these separate appeals for disposition by one opinion. [2] Chapter 98-204, section 10, Laws of Florida, amended this section, renumbering section 775.082(8)(a)1. as section 775.082(9)(a)1; however, the language of the subsection remained the same until July 1, 1999....

...3d DCA 1999)(holding that the sentencing provisions of the Act are mandatory). See Coleman v. State, 739 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The Fourth District later agreed with Cotton, and also certified conflict with McKnight. See State v. Wise, 744 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that, pursuant to section 775.082(8)(d)1, the trial court has the responsibility to make findings of fact and exercise its discretion in determining the application of an enumerated exception to the mandatory sentence), review granted, 741 So.2d 1137 (1999)....

...cial review ... the problem of judicial interference with legislative authority has been eliminated. Nevertheless, our concern about unwarranted interference with prosecutorial prerogative persists...."). [10] This provision is currently codified as section 775.082(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Similarly here, it is appropriate to consider the time since the prior violent felony was committed as well as the substantial mitigation in determining whether death or a life sentence is appropriate. [5] Larkins was convicted for a murder which occurred in 1990. At the time of the offense, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1989) provided that "[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." § 775.082(1), Fla....

...fore this Court is whether the mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life provide the trial judge with discretion to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory maximum for the crime contained in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2004). For the reasons explained below, we hold that the specific provisions of the 10-20-Life statute with regard to mandatory minimums control over the general provisions of section 775.082 regarding statutory maximums....

...fullest extent of the law. Thus, we conclude that the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082....

...eclassified from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2004). The maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is fifteen years, and the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony is thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b)-(c), Fla....

...ges a firearm and as the result of the discharge, inflicted death or great bodily harm ("minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison"). § 775.087(2)(a)(1)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 775.082(3)(b)—which is not part of the 10-20-Life statute—provides that a person convicted of a first-degree felony must be punished by "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. .... (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...1st DCA 2005), both of which involved defendants convicted of attempted second-degree murder reclassified as a first-degree felony under the 10-20-Life statute. The Second District in Sousa held that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not override the language in section 775.082(3)(b) that provides for a thirty-year sentence....

...was subject to section 775.087(2)(a)(3) of the 10/20/life statute, which required that he be sentenced "to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." It could be argued that the language of this statute overrides the language in section 775.082(3)(b) that provides for a thirty-year sentence....

...2d DCA 2005) (describing maximum penalty in appendix to opinion). Id. at 640 (footnote omitted). The First District in Wilson also held that the mandatory minimum term provided for in section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not override the statutory maximum of thirty years in 775.082(3)(b)....

...ANALYSIS The conflict issue before this Court is whether, under the 10-20-Life statute, specifically section 775.087(2)(a)(3), a trial court can sentence a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence provided for in section 775.082....

...f life in prison" under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) gives the trial court the discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the range of twenty-five years to life, even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of thirty years provided for under section 775.082(2)(c)....

...ether the statute provides trial courts with the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum sentence anywhere in the range of twenty-five years to life under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082....

...947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence. § 775.087(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Subsection (2)(c) addresses the situation where the minimum terms of imprisonment mandated in subsection (2) either exceed or are less than the sentences that could be imposed under section 775.082, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2004), or the Criminal Punishment Code in chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2004): If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...A related principle is that when a court interprets a statute, it must give full effect to all statutory provisions. Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Police Dep't, 934 So.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla.2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Section 775.082(3)(b), which is in the general sentencing statute, provides the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony: "For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute,...

...er, section 775.087(2)(a)(3) clearly states: "[T]he convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." Section 775.087(2)(c) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed....

...In resolving any perceived conflict between the statutory maximum in the general sentencing statute and the mandatory minimum range of twenty-five years to life, we conclude that the specific provisions of section 775.087(2)(a)(3) prevail over the general provisions of the 775.082 regarding statutory maximums....

...Under this principle of statutory construction, section 775.087(2)(a)(3), which specifically addresses a situation where a defendant, in the course of certain enumerated felonies, discharges a firearm and, as a result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm is inflicted upon any person, prevails over section 775.082(3)(b), which is a general sentencing statute and provides the sentences for all first-degree felonies. Section 775.082 covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm....

...on Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute: The PRR statute is part of the general sentencing provision of chapter 775. It provides the mandatory minimum sentence for anyone deemed a prior releasee reoffender within the general sentencing *749 scheme. See § 775.082, Fla....

...inimum within the range of twenty-five years to life. Consequently, we conclude that Mendenhall was properly sentenced to thirty-five years with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the statutory maximum of thirty years contained in section 775.082 for Mendenhall's offense....

...impose new statutory maximums for gun-related offenses, but rather the intent was to mandate significant statutory minimum sentences. The answer to the statutory construction question— whether section 775.087 always trumps the statutory maximums of 775.082—cannot be resolved by a plain reading of 775.087(2)(a). The Legislature could have easily indicated that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) overrode all statutory maximums provided in 775.082. It did not. Rather, reading 775.082 and 775.087 together, as the doctrine of in pari materia requires and as the Legislature indicates in section 775.087(2)(c), leads to the conclusion that the statutory minimum sentence for a crime in which a firearm is discharged is governed by section 775.087, but that the statutory maximums provided in 775.082 are not overridden unless the statutory maximums of 775.082 are less than the statutory minimums of section 775.087. See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). Simply put, section 775.087, when read together with section 775.082, does not specify overriding of the statutory maximums in all cases and does not provide that the range provided for in section 775.087(2)(a)(3) wholly nullifies any statutory maximum....

...State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 199 (Fla.2007)). The issue in this case is one of statutory construction that involves the interplay between section 775.087(2), which authorizes mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes, and section 775.082, which authorizes *752 a maximum sentence of thirty years for the conviction of a first-degree felony. Section 775.087 is meant to be read together with other sentencing statutes such as section 775.082 and is not its own self-contained sentencing scheme. The statute clearly contemplates interplay between itself and other statutes. The Legislature even provided guidance as to how the statute should be read together with section 775.082. See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (explicitly addressing situations where the mandatory minimum is either more or less than the statutory maximums provided for elsewhere and specifically referencing section 775.082). Thus, we must read section 775.087(2)(a)(3) together with sections 775.087(2)(c) and 775.082....

...construction principle that a specific statute controls over the general. However, the statutes address different things and are meant to be read together as indicated by section 775.087(2)(c)—section 775.087(2) specifies mandatory minimums whereas section 775.082 specifies statutory maximums....

...Simply put, although section 775.087 is specific as to statutory minimums, it is not specific as to statutory maximums. Under section 775.087(2)(c), if the " minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed." § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). On the other hand, if the " mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment... are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...y the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section." Id. (emphasis added). Based on section 775.087(2)(c), the minimum sentence to be imposed under 775.087 does not trump the statutory maximum provided in 775.082 unless the minimum sentence exceeds the statutory maximum....

...es and uses the firearm during the course of the commission of the felony "shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years." Therefore, when subsections (2)(a)(1) and (2)(a)(2) are read in conjunction *753 with subsection (2)(c) and section 775.082, it is easy to determine in what circumstances the minimum term specified is greater than the statutory maximum or when the mandatory minimum is less than the statutory maximum. It is also clear as to how many years should be imposed or included as the mandatory minimum. The clash between the statutory maximums of section 775.082 and the minimum sentences of 775.087 occurs when applying section 775.087(2)(a)(3), which is the only subsection to provide for a range....

...Whether the range is meant to be considered as exceeding the statutory maximum is unclear. The majority concludes that the trial court has discretion to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life, irrespective of the maximum penalty on the underlying charge under section 775.082. This interpretation nullifies the statutory maximums of section 775.082, without any indication that the Legislature intended for this nullification to occur....

...However, the majority overlooks situations where the phrase would apply. For example, if a defendant is convicted of a first-degree felony that is enhanced by the 10-20-Life statute to a life felony, see § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat., the maximum *754 sentence would then be life imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(a)(3), Fla....

...We should err on the side of applying the rule of lenity when the alternative construction of an ambiguous statute would result in such harsh consequences. Mendenhall was convicted of a second-degree felony, which carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). His conviction was enhanced by section 775.087(1)(b) to a first-degree felony, the maximum sentence for which is thirty years. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...of separation of powers. CONCLUSION The Legislature has not evinced a clear intent for section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to override all statutory maximums. Rather, the Legislature gave guidance as to how section 775.087(2)(a)(3) should be read together with section 775.082, which is a clear indication that statutory maximums were meant to play some role in sentencing under the statute....

...lation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999). A jury convicted Adaway of both charges. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the sexual battery charge, which was a mandatory sentence under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...r vaginal penetration of another by any other object." § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1999). When a person at least eighteen years old commits sexual battery on a person under twelve, the statute deems it "a capital felony, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 921.141." § 794.011(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). As written, the cross-referenced section provides that capital sexual battery is punishable by death. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...We have upheld such a sentence as applied to the crime of oral union with the genitals of a child under twelve. See Banks, 342 So.2d at 470. In 1995, the Legislature eliminated the possibility of parole for convictions of capital sexual battery. See Ch. 95-294, § 4, at 2718, Laws of Fla. Thus, section 775.082 now provides that a person convicted of capital sexual battery "shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole." § 775.082(1), Fla....

...[3] I also note that the trial court would have been compelled to sentence Adaway to life imprisonment for this crime even if it were classified as a life felony. Adaway was separately sentenced to thirty years' incarceration as a prison releasee reoffender for lewd and lascivious molestation on the same victim. Under section 775.082(9)(a)(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court is required to impose a life sentence upon a prison releasee reoffender who commits a life felony....

...Adaway's conduct, oral-vaginal union, would not have constituted capital sexual battery before the 1974 amendment to section 794.011. [5] For a life felony committed after July 1, 1995, the trial court may impose a term of imprisonment of life or a term of years not exceeding life. See § 775.082(3)(a)(3), Fla....

...shes *12 and carnally knows a female of the age of ten years or more, by force and against her will, or unlawfully or carnally knows and abuses a female child under the age of ten years, shall be guilty of a capital felony, punishable as provided in § 775.082." Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1971), provided: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury, in which case the punishment shall be life imprisonment....

...substantive claim as being “without merit.” Id. at 459 & n.4. C. Before Bates’ 1995 resentencing proceeding (his third sentence proceeding before a jury), the Florida legislature amended Fla. Stat. § 775.082 to provide that a defendant convicted of capital murder could either be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1) (1995) (“A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death ....

... Case: 13-11882 Date Filed: 09/05/2014 Page: 8 of 80 Bates’ 1982 crimes, under which life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 25 years was the only alternative to death for the crime of first-degree murder. See id. § 775.082 (1983); see also Hudson v....

...2d 256, 262 (Fla. 1998). Bates was concerned that the jury might sentence him to death to avoid the possibility that under a life sentence he could eventually be released from prison. He sought to avoid that by having the amended version of § 775.082, which provided life without parole as the only alternative to a death sentence, applied to him and the jury instructed that it could impose a life without parole sentence in lieu of death. Bates stated that he would waive any rights he had to parole eligibility under the pre-amendment version of § 775.082, along with any claim that retroactively applying the revised statute to his criminal conduct would violate ex post facto principles....

...He also challenged the trial court’s refusal to inform the jury about his other consecutive sentences. The Florida Supreme Court rejected those claims on the merits and affirmed the death sentence. Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1999). In doing so the court held that the amended version of Fla. Stat. § 775.082 did not apply retroactively to crimes committed before its effective date of May 25, 1994, because there was no clear legislative intent to overcome the presumption that state laws apply only prospectively....

...articulated in Simmons v. South Carolina, was violated at his 1995 resentencing by the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury either that: (1) it could impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole under the 1994 amendment to Fla. Stat. § 775.082; (2) he had agreed to waive parole eligibility under the pre- amendment version of that statute; or (3) he had already been sentenced to two life terms plus fifteen years on his other counts of conviction, all of which would run consecutively to any sentence he received for murder. In support of this claim, Bates asserts that retroactively applying the 1994 version of § 775.082 to the murder he committed in 1982 would not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it would not work to his disadvantage and he had otherwise agreed to waive any ex post facto rights. Because he had agreed to waive his eligibility for parole under the pre-amendment version of § 775.082, Bates maintains that he was entitled under Simmons “to an accurate jury Here, then, even if Bowers had objected, and even if he had gotten a new trial with a new jury, he would still have faced the huge body of inculpatory evidence offered by the State....

...hich “might well” distract them “from the other vital issues in the case.” Id. at 168–69, 120 S.Ct. at 2121. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Bates’ Simmons claim based on its interpretation of the 1994 amendment to Fla. Stat. § 775.082....

...at 2120 (“[A] parole-ineligibility instruction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law.”). The Florida Supreme Court’s twin determinations — that the 1994 amendment to § 775.082 does not apply retroactively to Bates’ criminal conduct and that he had no right under state law to waive his parole eligibility — conclusively establish that Bates would be eligible for parole if the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment....

...Dep’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 886, 903 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law is binding on federal courts.”). Bates insists that there was no ex post facto impediment to retroactively applying the amended version of § 775.082 to his pre-amendment criminal conduct because, under the circumstances of his case, it would not work to his disadvantage and he otherwise agreed to waive his ex post facto rights....

...orida Supreme Court’s adjudication of the Strickland claim was not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). B. Bates makes three related claims with respect to revised Florida Statute § 775.082(1), which provides for a possible sentence of life without parole. First, Bates argues that the resentencing judge erred by failing to allow Bates to waive his right against ex post facto application of laws in order to apply the newer version of § 775.082(1) to him, which provides a possible sentence of life without parole.9 Second, Bates maintains that the judge erred by failing to enter Bates’s soliloquy seeking retroactive application of the sentencing statute into evidence so that...

...24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1981) (providing a two prong test to determine if a statute violates the ex post facto prohibition, asking (1) is the law retrospective, and if so, (2) if it is disadvantageous to the offender). Here, Bates argues that the amended § 775.082(1), if applied, would be advantageous, not disadvantageous, under the circumstances of his resentencing. 69  Case: 13-11882 Date Filed: 09/05/2014 Page: 70 of 80 would have known that he would be imprisoned for a long time....

.... Our analysis of this issue causes us to reject appellant’s waiver arguments. Because the 1994 amendment can have no effect on appellant’s sentencing, we conclude that the waiver of an ex post facto claim in respect to the 1994 amendment to section 775.082 is of no consequence....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PARKER, Acting Chief Judge. Kenneth Grant appeals his sentence for sexual battery, which the trial court entered pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the Act), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The Fourth District has provided the following analysis: The test for determining duplicity of subject "is whether or not the provisions of the bill are designed to accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort." Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, in addition to adding section 775.082(8), also amended sections 944.705, 947.141, 948.06, 948.01 and 958.14....

...because it restricts plea bargaining). As to reasons two and three, this court has interpreted the Act to give the trial court the discretion to determine whether a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender for purposes of sentencing under section 775.082(8)....

...After a jury found him guilty, he was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender to fifteen years in prison. Id. In the instant case, Grant was released from the Department of Corrections on May 31, 1996, and the sexual battery occurred on August 5, 1997, just over one year later. Section 775.082(8)(a)1....

...legislative objective. Reasons one through four are rendered moot by this court's decision in Cotton that the trial court has the discretion to determine whether a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender for purposes of sentencing under section 775.082(8)....

...Mr. Grant negotiated a plea to receive a fifteen-year sentence in this case for a sexual battery that is classified as a second-degree felony. Thus, a sentence of fifteen years has been an authorized legal sentence for this crime for many years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Huggins, 744 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. White, 736 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because the language of section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), is ambiguous, we approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Huggins, which held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not applicable to a defendant who is convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling....

...Both Huggins and the State agree that the dwelling was not occupied at the time of the crime. Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to the offense, Huggins sought clarification from the trial court as to whether the Prison *277 Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR), section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q), Florida Statutes (1997) [1] , applied to him....

...ease from prison. Had Huggins been sentenced under the PRR, a mandatory fifteen-year sentence would have been imposed. Over the State's objection, the trial court ruled that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses in section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We likewise agree with the trial court and approve the decision of the Fourth District holding the PRR inapplicable to burglary of an unoccupied structure and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Both the State and Huggins argue that the language of section 775.082(8)(1)(q) is clear and unambiguous, although they advocate opposite interpretations....

...he premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. (2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...775.084 if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender: . . . . (c) Enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling or structure, and 1. Uses a motor vehicle ... or 2. Causes damage to the dwelling or structure ... (3) Burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...both the trial and appellate courts. Neither the State's nor the defendant's interpretation of the language "occupied structure or dwelling" can be said to be unreasonable. Because we hold that the phrase "occupied structure or dwelling" as used in section 775.082(8)(1)(q) is susceptible to differing constructions, we are bound to construe the language most favorably to the defendant....

...2d DCA 1999), and cases that followed in that district, the First District in Foresta v. State, 751 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 767 So.2d 456 (Fla.2000), and the Fifth District in Whiten v. State, 765 So.2d 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). LEWIS, J., concurs. LEWIS, J., dissenting Section 775.082(9)(a)1.q, Florida Statutes, defines a "prison releasee reoffender" as "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit ......

...sed sentencing guidelines on or after January 1, 1994, must be within the 1994 guidelines unless there is a departure sentence with written findings. If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure....

...d sentence" based on scoresheet calculations. Because the sentencing guidelines encompassed by the 1994 statutory revisions do not explicitly authorize trial courts to utilize the 25% discretionary range to exceed the statutory maximums set forth in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1993), I agree with the result reached by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Myers v....

...tatutory maximum. [5] The Fourth District in Myers agreed with the Fifth District that the trial court possessed the authority to impose the recommended sentence based on the total sentence points, even though it was outside the statutory maximum of section 775.082....

...The disagreement between Myers on one side and Green, Mays and Wilkins on the other was limited to whether the trial court possessed the statutory authority to further increase the recommended sentence by an additional 25%, when the recommended sentence already exceeded the statutory maximum of section 775.082....

...[7] Prior to 1994 amendments, the sentencing guidelines required that all sentences imposed by trial court judges be "within any relevant minimum and maximum sentence limitations provided by statute and must conform to all other statutory provisions." § 921.001(5), Fla. Stat. (1991). Section 775.082 sets forth the mandatory minimum sentences and the statutory maximums for all degrees of felonies and misdemeanors. The amended version of subsection 921.001(5) provides in pertinent part that: If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure. § 921.001(5), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis supplied). It is this provision that authorizes the trial court to exceed the statutory maximums of section 775.082, when "a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum." The determination of the extent of the trial court's authority to exceed the statutory maximum depends, in large part, on whether the term "recommended sentence"...

...dge has the discretion to enhance it, why not also the discretion to mitigate it within the usual range? As we have just stated, we are unable to find anything in the statutory text that authorizes such a discretionary enhancement further beyond the section 775.082 maximum....

...The Fifth District attempted to resolve the conflict discerned in Judge Farmer's opinion in Myers by transposing the articles so that the statute would read: If the [substituting "the" for "a"] recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, a [substituting "a" for "the"] sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure....

...actual statutory text states " the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed." § 921.001(5) (emphasis supplied). It is only by changing the articles that the Fifth District is able to conclude that even when the recommended sentence exceeds the section 775.082 maximum, the court could still impose a 25% variation because it would be "a sentence under the guidelines." Green, 691 So.2d at 504....

...f the defendant. Given the maxims of statutory construction applicable to criminal statutes, we must construe these provisions favorably to the defendant. Thus, I conclude that a trial court has statutory authority to exceed the statutory maximum of section 775.082 only when the recommended sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, but does not have authority to utilize the 25% discretionary variation to further exceed the section 775.082 statutory maximum. KOGAN and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.082 sets forth maximum terms of imprisonment for various crimes. See § 775.082, Fla....

...d must conform to all other statutory provisions."). [3] See ch. 93-406, § 5, at 2920, Laws of Fla. [4] See also § 921.0014(2), Fla. Stat. (1995) ("If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure."). [5] In Martinez v. State, 692 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 697 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1997), the total sentence points on the guidelines scoresheet resulted in a recommended sentence within the statutory maximum delineated by section 775.082....

...on being considered a departure. Staff Analysis, SB 26-B at 436 (emphasis supplied). [11] Subsection 921.0016(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1995), specifies that "[a] departure sentence must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided by s. 775.082." By implication it could be argued that all other sentences may exceed the relevant maximum sentence limitations....

...9 (Fla.2000), that "for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that `if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.'" The district court then recognized potential statutory conflict between two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code: (1) section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code can be harmonized. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(25) states in pertinent part: The permissible range for sentencing must be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in section 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, any sentence to state prison must exceed 1 year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed....

...ection 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general provision of section 921.002(1)(g) that sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum. We do, however, hold that when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose....

...." Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed....

...(2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. (b) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. (c) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084....

...An unadministrable statute is constitutionally defective. Merely because the sentencing portion of the robbery statute is unconstitutionally vague does not mean that Alvarez cannot be incarcerated. He should be resentenced for 30 years or less, as specified in Section 775.082(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...to an inmate's becoming eligible for parole. Of course, compliance with the mandatory minimums, set forth in Sec. 775.087, Fla. Stat. (1977), is necessary. [1] § 813.011, Fla. Stat. (1973), now appearing in § 812.13(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). See also § 775.082(4)(b), Fla....

...Mann's first claim is that the death sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Mann argues that at the time of his penalty phase, the maximum sentence under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1989), was life in prison without the possibility for parole for twenty-five years....

...This Court recently rejected the argument that Apprendi applied to capital sentencing schemes. See Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1752, 149 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001). In Mills, we also rejected the argument that the maximum penalty under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1979), was life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. See id. at 536. Instead, we wrote that "[t]he plain language of section 775.082(1) is clear that the maximum penalty available for a person convicted of a capital felony is death." Id. The 1989 version of section 775.082(1) argued by Mann is identical to the 1979 version....

...We agree that the sentence by the trial court constitutes double jeopardy and reverse. After appellant's conviction, the trial court found that appellant qualified as both a prison releasee reoffender ("PRR") and a habitual felony offender ("HFO") pursuant to sections 775.084 and 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The court then sentenced appellant to a total of thirty years. The judge specified that the first fifteen years would be served as a PRR. Under the prison releasee reoffender statute, the maximum term for the offense committed by appellant is fifteen years. See § 775.082(8)(a)2.c. The last fifteen years were to be served as an HFO, for which he would receive full credit for time served. The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not allow any type of early release, including gain time. See § 775.082(8)(b)....

...ntical criminal act. A reading of the statute reveals that the Legislature did not intend to authorize an unconstitutional "double sentence" in cases where a convicted defendant qualified as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual offender. Section 775.082(8)(c) states: "[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law." We conclude that this section overrides the mandatory duty to sentence a qualifying defendant as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8)(d), where the court elects to hand down a harsher sentence as a habitual offender....

...count (2) grand theft; count (3) resisting a law enforcement officer with violence; and count (4) battery on a law enforcement officer. At sentencing, the court imposed the five-year sentence mandated by the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), for Count (3)....

...The court reasoned that, "[u]nlike a habitual offender sentence, a PRR sentence is not enhanced beyond the statutory maximum; rather, the PRR statute establishes that the only lawful sentence for a PRR offender is the statutory maximum, which must be served in its entirety." Id. (citing § 775.082(9), Fla....

...We find that this statute expresses clear legislative *629 intent that prison releasee reoffenders be "punished to the fullest extent of the law" and that trial judges have the discretion to impose greater sentences of incarceration as authorized by law. See § 775.082(9)(c)-(d), Fla....

...The testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained; c. The victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provides a written statement to that effect; or d. Other extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender. § 775.082(9)(a)-(d)(1)., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). [3] Paragraph (b) indicates that section 775.082(9) dictates a minimum sentence or sentencing floor, not a statutory maximum....

...Construing the PRR Act, this Court stated: [T]he Legislature's intent both to provide a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to the [Prison Releasee Reoffender] Act and to allow for imposition of the greatest sentence authorized by law is clear. . . . . . . [B]ecause "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration," a trial court is "without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony...

...tute, its effect is to establish a sentencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law, " the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. See § 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...On appeal, the First District read "the subsections at issue in pari materia, and in light of the legislative direction that offenders previously released from prison `be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as *632 provided in this subsection. . . .' § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...r. Such an interpretation and application would completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA. The Legislature unquestionably intended that those sentenced under the PRRPA would "be punished to the fullest extent of the law." § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...850 So.2d at 493-94. We also held that this result was mandated by the CPC, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2000), which stated that "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." As Grant and Nettles demonstrate, a CPC sentence may follow a PRR sentence for the same offense....

...criminal episode, as in Reeves' case. Reeves' position would "completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA," that prison releasee reoffenders "be punished to the fullest extent of the law." Nettles, 850 So.2d at 493 (quoting § 775.082(9)(d)(1), Fla....

...State, 867 So.2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) [same], we conclude that these consecutive sentences, which arise from one criminal episode and together exceed the maximum incarceration permitted for any individual count under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, see § 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), remain illegal and must be reversed....

...d concurrently or consecutively. [2] The ordering of sentences to run consecutively to each other is referred to as "stacking." See Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1983). [3] In Nettles, 850 So.2d at 487, we interpreted the following portion of section 775.082(9)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2000): Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender ....

...We reasoned in Nettles that this provision does not apply to CPC sentences. We distinguished the sentencing guidelines from the CPC, stating: Conceptually, the CPC and the former sentencing guidelines are not synonymous, and, therefore, the PRRPA's reference to the sentencing guidelines in section 775.082(9)(a)3....

...In its decision, the Fifth District ruled upon the following question certified to be of great public importance: DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES , 570 U.S. 99 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed. 2d 314 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM? Id....

...For the reasons explained below, we hold that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual finding, but conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. Where the error cannot be deemed harmless, the proper remedy is to resentence the juvenile offender pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b) 2., Florida Statutes (2016)....

...aws of Florida. See Williams I , 171 So.3d at 144 . Chapter 2014-220 was enacted to bring Florida juvenile sentencing law into compliance with United States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Horsley II , 160 So.3d at 394 . It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent part: (b)1....

...eview of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c). Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. The session law also created section 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2017), which provides, in pertinent part: (2)(a) A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b) 1....

...is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years [unless the juvenile offender has been previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses that were part of a separate criminal transaction or episode]. .... *285 (c) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 15 years under s. 775.082(1)(b) 2., s. 775.082(3)(a) 5.b., or s. 775.082(3)(b) 2.b....

...allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different range had been applicable. Id. at 114-15 , 133 S.Ct. 2151 . Section 775.082(1)(b) The relevant portion of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides: (b)1....

...(Emphasis added.) Thus, a finding that a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim results in a minimum sentence of forty years' imprisonment under subsection (1)(b)1. Without this finding, the trial court is not required to impose a minimum sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b) 2., Fla....

...We concluded that "[i]n light of the clear and uncontested record evidence of penetration," the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 524 . Based upon Galindez , the applicable question in evaluating whether an Alleyne violation is harmful with respect to section 775.082(1)(b) is whether the failure to have the jury make the finding as to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim contributed to his sentence-stated differently, whether the record dem...

...kill, or attempted to kill Brookins, the Alleyne violation here was not harmless. Remedy Williams suggests two alternative remedies for the Alleyne violation that occurred: empanel a new jury to make the requisite finding or resentence him pursuant section 775.082(1)(b) 2., the applicable provision where there is a finding that the juvenile offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim....

...hat *293 is not harmless. Here, because the record fails to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins, he is entitled to be resentenced under section 775.082(1)(b) 2....

...t note them and avoid them. Id. at 518-19 (citation omitted). In light of the constitutional concerns presented by the Pena court with respect to empaneling a jury where a harmful Alleyne error has occurred, we conclude that resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b) 2. is the more prudent course. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing, we answer the certified question by holding that *294 Alleyne requires the jury to make the factual finding under section 775.082(1)(b) as to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Although we conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review, the violation here cannot be deemed harmless. Therefore, Williams is entitled to resentencing under section 775.082(1)(b) 2....

...r appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Denise S. Calegan, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, Judge. The appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), and its application to him....

...years in prison, pursuant to the enhancements allowed under the Act. The Act, which became effective on May 30, 1997, provides for greater penalties for certain offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility. See § 775.082(8)(a)1....

...ss. The Act defines a prison releasee reoffender as "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit ... robbery ... within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor." § 775.082(8)(a)1 (emphasis added)....

...See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Conquest, 658 So.2d 928, 929 (Fla.1995). This statute clearly includes appellant. Although section 944.705(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the Department of Corrections to give notice to every inmate of the provisions of section 775.082(8), section 944.705(6)(b) provides that the trial court can impose an enhanced sentence under the Act regardless of whether a defendant has received such notice....

...designed to accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort." Burch v. State, 558 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1990)(quoting State v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 163 So. 270, 283 (Fla.1935)). Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, in addition to adding section 775.082(8), also amended sections 944.705, 947.141, 948.06, 948.01 and 958.14....

...First, it certified conflict with the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Hall v. State, 837 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Helms v. State, 890 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), on the issue of whether the mandatory minimum sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082(9) Florida Statutes (2000), must be imposed concurrently with a lesser mandatory minimum sentence under section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000) (the 10-20-LIFE statute)....

...Because he committed these offenses just over two months after being released from prison, McDonald was properly designated and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on the first three counts which are enumerated offenses under the PRR statute. § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2000). The trial court imposed concurrent mandatory life sentences on the carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm counts. § 775.082(9)(a)3a, Fla. Stat. (2000). As a PRR, McDonald must serve 100 percent of his life sentences and is not eligible for any form of early release. § 775.082(9)(b), Fla....

...victions for robbery with a firearm" because, according to Frazier v. State, 877 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), "under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery is thirty years in prison." McDonald, 912 So.2d at 77 (citing §§ 812.13(2)(a), 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla....

...`fullest extent of the law,' including the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences," this Court held that the HFO sentence could be imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence only if the HFO sentence was greater than the PRR sentence. Id. (quoting § 775.082(8)(d)(1), Fla....

...as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years. . . . . . . . (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...FE sentence is less than the PRR sentence. Id. The Fourth District further concluded that the legislative intent expressed in section 775.087(2)(d), that violators be "punished to the fullest extent of the law," is the same clear intent expressed in section 775.082(9)(d)(1) that was noted by this Court in Grant....

...LIFE sentence be imposed concurrently even where another statutory sentence is greater. See § 775.087(2)(c) ("If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082 [including the PRR statute] . . ., then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section."). Moreover, the two related provisions of chapter 775—the 10-20-LIFE statute, section 775.087, and the PRR statute, section 775.082—should be construed in pari materia....

...Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D.Ill. 1926)). The PRR statute is part of the general sentencing provision of chapter 775. It provides the mandatory minimum sentence for anyone deemed a prior releasee reoffender within the general sentencing scheme. See § 775.082, Fla....

...See § 812.13(2)(a) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...We limit our review to the two certified conflict issues because we find that McDonald's other claims are without merit. With regard to the fifth issue McDonald raises, we note that McDonald was properly categorized as a "prison releasee reoffender" under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...on but the lesser 10-20-LIFE sentence remains valid. The offender will still be required to serve the 10-20-LIFE sentence in full. [7] In Knight, this Court answered in the affirmative the following question of great public importance: DOES SECTION [775.082(8)(a)2], FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT "A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY LIFE," APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING LIFE? 808 So.2d at 211. Section 775.082(8)(a)(2) was renumbered in 1998 as section 775.082(9)(a)(2)....

...Whether Peters’ 99 Year Sentence was Unconstitutional as a Violation of Graham’s Ban on Sentencing Non-Homicide Juveniles to Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole In his next issue on appeal, Peters contends that, in the wake of the Graham decision, sections 775.082(3)(b) 7 and 812.13(2)(a), 8 Florida Statutes (1989), are unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, since the maximum penalty for an aggravated first degree felony is harsher than the sentence faced by a juvenile convicted of a life felony....

...A life felony committed between October 1, 1983, and July 1, 1995, 9 “is punishable by life imprisonment or by a term of imprisonment not to exceed foriy years.” Peters v. State, 658 So.2d 1175, 1175-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...e without the possibility of parole, the practical reality is that, in such situations, a trial judge is limited to imposing any term of imprisonment up to forty years. See, e.g., Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103,1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holding that section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1987), “gives the court the discretion to sentence [a juvenile defendant] to less than forty years”)....

...d in determining what score he would have had if those were in fact not out of sequence or — and were all prior convictions. (Emphasis added). . In his brief, Peters’ sole references to raising this issue were performed at the 1991 sentencing. . Section 775.082(3) sets the parameters for life felony and first degree felony sentencing, providing in its 1989 variation as follows: (a) For a life felony committed prior to October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years...

...Section 812.13(2)(a) provides as follows: If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s.775.082, s.775.083, or s.775.084. . Under the current variant of the statute, life felonies committed on or after July 1, 1995, are punishable "by a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” § 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla....

...urrent five-year sentences. The Postconviction Court's Order Walker claimed in his postconviction motion that he is not subject to PRR sentencing in these cases because his offenses were not enumerated or forcible felonies under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

...is equally applicable to the PRR statute because the critical language is the same in both instances. Under the PRR statute, "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual" is a qualifying offense. § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(o)....

...te process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...r offering to do violence or actually doing it. For this reason, resisting arrest with violence is an offense that qualifies under the PRR statute as "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(o)....

...Attempted Robbery With respect to Walker's offense of attempted robbery, the postconviction court correctly denied Walker's motion. The Hearns analysis is inapplicable to attempted robbery. This crime is an enumerated offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(g)....

...commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. (2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender: (a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person. (b) Is armed, or arms himself within such structure or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous wea...

...and the structure or conveyance entered is a dwelling or there is a human being in the structure or conveyance at the time the offender entered or remained in the structure or conveyance, the burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. Otherwise, burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. 10 committed not for profit....

(“PRR”) sentence for the burglary pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, and a concurrent five-year

KELLY, Judge. Victor Lee Lopez appeals from his Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for felony battery with a weapon. See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...Because the motion fails to establish a valid basis for postconviction relief under any standard, we affirm. Ives claims that his mandatory minimum sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) was illegal because the state produced only hearsay evidence to prove the date he was released from prison. See § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...ercise of its sentencing discretion. State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 118 (Fla.2005). In this case, the trial court had no discretion and must impose a PRR sentence if the state shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies. § 775.082(9)(a)3, Fla....

...Chloupek, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Kevin Rollinson appeals his sentence imposed pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the "Prison Releasee Reoffender Act" ("Act"), after his conviction for burglary of a structure (Count I), grand theft (Count II), and battery on a law enforcement officer (Count III). He asserts that the Act is facially unconstitutional on numerous grounds. I BACKGROUND Section 775.082(8)(a)1....

...must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence." This section, enacted in Chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, became effective May 30, 1997, and provides greater penalties for offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility. See § 775.082(8)(a)1., Fla....

...The trial court denied this motion and sentenced appellant on Count III to five years imprisonment pursuant to the Act. This appeal follows. II EX POST FACTO Rollinson initially argues that because he was released from prison prior to the 1997 enactment of section 775.082(8), application of the Act to his case violates the ex post facto clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions....

...433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997)). The Act is not being applied retroactively to Rollinson; it is being applied to criminal conduct that occurred in July 1997, after enactment of the statute in May 1997. Rollinson committed the acts in question after section 775.082(8) became law, so he had constructive notice of the statute's enhanced sentencing provisions....

...The Act is not being unconstitutionally applied to Rollinson as an ex post facto law. See Plain v. State, 720 So.2d 585 *588 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 909 (Fla.1999). III SINGLE SUBJECT Rollinson committed his offenses on July 19, 1997. The Act was codified as section 775.082(8) on May 30, 1997....

...This court has previously held that the Act does not violate the single subject requirement of Article III. See Young v. State, 719 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So.2d 915 (Fla.1999). IV SEPARATION OF POWERS Rollinson argues that section 775.082(8) "effectively gives a state attorney mandatory sentencing authority over a criminal defendant, thus eliminating a trial court's discretion to impose sentence," in violation of the separation of powers clause of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. In State v. Wise, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D657, 744 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. 95,230, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1999), we construed the statute in a way that reserved some discretion in the trial court for sentencing, by interpreting section 775.082(8)(d)1....

...The Florida Supreme Court has stated that "publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions." State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991) (citations *590 omitted); see W.J. v. State, 688 So.2d 954, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section 775.082(8)(a)2 of the Act also requires the state attorney to prove that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender by a preponderance of the evidence....

...I concur with the majority opinion and write separately to address the separation of powers argument. A recent amendment to the statute nullifies our reading of the statute in State v. Wise, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D657, 744 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. 95,230, 741 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1999). Section 775.082(8)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1997), provides: It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law ......

...Even if our construction of the statute in Wise was incorrect, I agree with the conclusion in McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), that the statute does not unconstitutionally place a sentencing decision with the prosecutor. While finding that the factors in 775.082(8) are considerations for the state attorney, McKnight held that: [The Act] clearly provides that the state "may" seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a P[rison] R[eleasee] R[eoffender]. A prosecutor's decision to seek enhanced penalties under section 775.082(8) ......

...5th DCA 1999); Woods v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D831, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (agreeing tacitly with McKnight, expressly disagreeing with Cotton, and certifying conflict), rev. granted, No. 95,281, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999). McKnight correctly concluded that "section 775.082(8) affords prosecutors a power that is no greater than that traditionally exercised in the charging decision." McKnight, 727 So.2d at 318. NOTES [1] The 1998 Supplement to this section renumbered 775.082(8)(a)1. to 775.082(9)(a)1....

...Toolan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent. ANSTEAD, J. We have for review the decision in Knight v. State, 791 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), in which the First District certified the following question as one of great public importance: DOES SECTION [775.082(8)(a)2.a.], FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT "A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY LIFE," APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING LIFE? [1] 791 So.2d at 490....

...es, "If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." (Emphasis Added.) [2] The State Attorney also filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties against Knight as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under the provisions of section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997). At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Knight guilty of robbery with a firearm. The trial court then sentenced *212 Knight to be imprisoned for a term of natural life as a PRR, pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., as well as imposing a three-year minimum mandatory term due to the robbery being committed with a firearm, pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...On direct appeal, the First District affirmed Knight's sentence. [3] See Knight, 791 So.2d at 490. On motion for rehearing and certification the First District added the aforementioned certified question of great public importance. See id. ANALYSIS Section 775.082(8)(a)2.a. provides that if the trial court determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant must be sentenced: "For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life." On the other hand, the PRR provision in section 775.082(8)(a)2.b....

...to a sentence of life. Hence, he contends his sentence should have been limited to a maximum term of thirty years imprisonment. The First District rejected Knight's contention: "This Court has also found that the term felony punishable by life in subsection 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997), covers both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by a term of years not exceeding life." 791 So.2d at 490....

...The First District relied upon the reasoning set out in its earlier decision in Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2753, ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 1112715 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec.8, 1999). In Brown, the First District reasoned that the wording "felony punishable by life" in section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997), included both life felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by life....

...at D2754, at ___. The court explained: Appellant also challenges his life sentence, asserting that because his armed burglary conviction is a first degree felony punishable by life, not a life felony, the maximum sentence he could have received under section 775.082(8) was 30 years; hence, his life sentence is illegal....

...d third degree, and stated that first degree felonies punishable by life were first degree felonies regardless of the sentence imposed (life or a term of years). Id. at 268-69. Appellant argues that because he was convicted of a first degree felony, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(b) provides a maximum sentence of 30 years. We cannot agree. Subsection 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) provides for an enhanced life sentence for a "felony punishable by life." The statute does not use the term "life felony," but rather uses the term "felony punishable by life," which includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life. Because appellant's armed burglary conviction under section 810.02(2)(b), *213 Florida Statutes (1997), is a first degree felony punishable by life, the life sentence imposed under section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) was legal....

...In so saying, we are not persuaded by appellant's analogy to the habitual felony offender statute, which at one point did not include an enhancement for life felonies. See Burdick; Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992). Unlike the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a) unambiguously includes both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by life....

...Here, as in Brown, Knight cites this Court's holding in Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267, 268-69 (Fla.1992), in which we held that "[t]here is no separate classification for first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment" in section 775.081, Florida Statutes (1989). Further, Knight argues that section 775.082(8)(a)2.a....

...Based upon the Legislature's unambiguous language and its apparent purpose in providing for mandatory life sentences in PRR cases when the underlying offense carries a maximum life sentence, we conclude that the phrase "felonies punishable *214 by life," used in section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997), provides for a mandatory life sentence for prison releasee reoffenders who commit either life felonies or first-degree felonies punishable by life....

...Accordingly, we approve the decision below of the First District and answer the certified question in the affirmative. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The First District asked this Court to address section 775.082(9)(a)3.a., Florida Statutes (1999). However, because Knight's offense occurred on August 23, 1998, his prison releasee reoffender sentence is controlled by the 1997 Florida Statutes, and we therefore revise the certified question to involve section 775.082(8)(a)2.a., Florida Statutes (1997)....

...into the mandatory minimum penalties for those who have offended within three years of being released from prison. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Criminal Justice Appropriations, HB1371 (1997) Staff Analysis 1 (final April 2, 1997) (on file with comm.). Compare § 775.082(3), Fla. Stat. (1997), with § 775.082(8), Fla....

...ed, suspended, or revoked. He does not challenge his conviction on appeal; *174 he only challenges his sentence. He contends that the trial court erred in imposing a prison sentence because the record does not support the court's finding pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2009), that a nonstate prison sanction would present a danger to the public. Alternatively, Appellant contends that his prison sentence violates Apprendi [1] and Blakely [2] because it exceeds the nonstate prison sanction required by section 775.082(10) and is based on a finding made by the court rather than the jury....

...Appellant proceeded to trial and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court noted that Appellant's conviction was a third-degree felony, subjecting him to up to five years in prison even though he only had 8.2 points on his sentencing scoresheet. Appellant argued that, pursuant to section 775.082(10), the court could not impose a prison sentence absent a finding that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public....

...pen to the Court for the protection of the public from Defendant's irresponsible and dangerous behavior. Appellant contends that these findings are not supported by the record and, therefore, the trial court erred in imposing a prison sentence under section 775.082(10). We agree. Section 775.082(10) provides: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...n. However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. The clear purpose and obvious intent section 775.082(10) was to keep certain offenders out of the state prison system....

...up to the statutory maximum in limited circumstances and only if the court explains its reasons in writing. The first sentence of the statute provides that the presumptive mandatory sentence for qualifying offenders is a "nonstate prison sanction." § 775.082(10), Fla....

...sentencing the offender to a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public. Id. The trial court's findings must be in writing. Id.; see also Hutto v. State, 50 So.3d 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). There is very little case law interpreting section 775.082(10)....

...The court specifically held that "`danger may, at least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm.'" Id. at 644 (quoting U.S. v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192, 192-93 (9th Cir.1992)); see also id. at 645 (concluding that there is "nothing in the language of section 775.082(10) that suggests that the Legislature intended to limit the meaning of `danger to the public' only to persons threatening physical violence or injury")....

...e accidents or engaging in high speed chases with law enforcement. Accordingly, because the trial court's findings are unsupported by the record, the court erred in imposing a prison sentence rather than a nonstate prison sanction in accordance with section 775.082(10). In sum, for the reasons stated above, we reverse Appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall sentence Appellant to a nonstate prison sanction as required by section 775.082(10)....

...These findings, which are based on facts or reasonably foreseeable consequences, all support the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a nonstate prison sanction is not sufficient to protect the public. This explains why the State correctly conceded at oral argument that "on these facts," the prison sentence under section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, violates the holding of Blakely — not because the judge's findings are flawed, but because only a jury of Appellant's peers can make such a finding....

...Thus, the trial court could not impose a sentence greater than one year in the county jail, two years of community control, or up to five years of probation, or any combination thereof, unless a jury determined that the greater sentence was necessary to protect the public. Accordingly, the majority should not interpret section 775.082(10) based on sentencing guidelines principles now rendered obsolete by Blakely....

...t presented below and the unique and tortured procedural history of the sentencing process in this case, which culminated in a perfunctory resentencing "hearing" at which the trial court simply imposed the same sentence it had initially imposed. [4] Section 775.082(10) was enacted in 2009 as a part of a cost-savings measure for the Department of Corrections, and the legislative staff analysis characterized the statute as a "prison diversion approach" pursuant to which the trial court was require...

...he tools to function successfully in the community. Id. at 3. [5] See generally § 921.0016, Fla. Stat. (1995); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701, 3.988. [6] This common understanding is consistent with the usage of the phrase in section 921.00241, which, like section 775.082(10), was enacted through chapter 2009-63, Laws of Florida....

...Robinson guilty of the offense of second-degree murder with a firearm under section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (2006). Second-degree murder is *922 a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in sections 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Robinson to thirty years in prison followed by lifetime probation. Mr. Robinson argues that his sentence is illegal because the maximum sentence for a life felony is a term of imprisonment for life or a term of imprisonment not exceeding forty years. See § 775.082(3)(a)(2)....

...2d DCA 1998); Walker v. State, 660 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Stokes v. State, 658 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). But Mr. Robinson's argument is incorrect. Because Mr. Robinson committed the offense after July 1, 1995, the applicable statute is section 775.082(3)(a)(3)—not section 775.082(3)(a)(2)....

...Following a plea colloquy in March 1984, the trial judge accepted the plea, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced Coban to life imprisonment. The record does not show that Coban was advised that he would be required to serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...The trial judge found the plea voluntary and denied relief. On appeal, the district court determined that the plea had been voluntarily entered but that the failure of the judge to mention the parole restrictions in his oral pronouncement or written sentence rendered section 775.082(1) non-applicable....

...The parties agree that it is not and urge we decide the case on the issue of voluntariness: if Coban did not voluntarily plead to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole until twenty-five years are served, we should vacate the plea. We agree. There are only two possible penalties for first-degree murder under section 775.082(1)....

...The plenary power of the legislature to prescribe punishment for criminal offenses cannot be abrogated by the courts in the guise of fashioning an equitable sentence outside the statutory provisions. It is uncontroverted that Coban was not informed of the twenty-five year parole restriction contained in section 775.082(1) during the plea colloquy and that neither the oral nor written sentence apprised him of this restriction....

...United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S.Ct. 224, 19 L.Ed.2d 221 (1967); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir.1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 978, 11 L.Ed.2d 975 (1964). Coban responds that the twenty-five year minimum sentence under section 775.082(1) is an automatic and direct consequence of a guilty plea to first-degree murder....

...Although we agree with the state that information about parole eligibility *42 is normally a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and a trial judge is not required to apprise a defendant of such information, we are not persuaded that this rule is applicable under the narrow circumstances presented here. As we read section 775.082(1), in the absence of a death penalty, the statute provides for an automatic minimum mandatory term of twenty-five years upon an adjudication of guilt....

...Often a life sentence can be just that and he may never get parole. NOTES [*] The certified questions are WHETHER, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OUTLINED IN OUR OPINION; (1) THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA MAY BE CONSIDERED VOLUNTARY AND HIS SENTENCE INTERPRETED TO BE A LIFE SENTENCE TO WHICH SECTION 775.082(1) HAS NO APPLICABILITY; OR (2) THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS SUBJECT TO THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 775.082(1); OR (3) THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA MUST BE SET ASIDE AS INVOLUNTARY? 502 So.2d at 1264-65.

...1993)("[o]nce reenacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject requirement of Article III."). [1] We also reject appellant's attack on the Prison Release Re-offender Act, section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which we have recently held has no ex post facto effect on defendants who, although released from prison prior to the effective date of the Act, commit their crimes after that date....

...L. Weekly D2309, D2310 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct.14, 1998). Appellant also urges that his sentence under the Prison Release Re-Offender Act was error because his charged crime of burglary of a dwelling is not a qualifying offense bringing him under the Act. Section 775.082(8)(a)(1) provides the following, in pertinent part: "Prison releasee reoffender" means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: .......

...[7] In imposing sentences greater than five years, the trial court obviously relied upon section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes (1993), which authorizes a trial court to impose a guidelines scoresheet which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by section 775.082: Sentences imposed by trial court judges under the 1994 revised sentencing guidelines on or after January 1, 1994, must be within the 1994 guidelines unless there is a departure sentence with written findings. If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure. If a departure *1276 sentence, with written findings, is imposed, such sentence must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082....

...aggravated assault, · aggravated battery, · kidnapping, · escape, · breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, · attempt to commit any of the aforementioned crimes, or · any battery upon a law enforcement officer or firefighter. [7] § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...appellee. KLEIN, J. Appellant was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with a battery and aggravated battery. We affirm all issues, but discuss one, whether the Prison Release Re-offender Act is an ex post facto law as applied to appellant. The Act, section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which became effective May 30, 1997, provides for greater penalties for offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility. § 775.082(8)(a)1....

...Having been transferred to us from the District Court of Appeal, First District, this cause is before us on direct appeal from the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, that court having inherently passed on the constitutionality of Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes....

...a Statutes. On appeal to this Court, appellant challenges the judgment and sentence of the trial court on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove a "union" as required by Section 794.011, Florida Statutes, and that Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which carries a *470 minimum of 25 years imprisonment prior to eligibility for parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution of Florida....

...Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, provides: "A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person 11 years of age or younger in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon said person commits a capital felony punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 921.141. If the offender is under the age of 18, that person shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084." "Sexual battery" is defined in Section 794.011(1)(f), Florida Statutes to mean "....

...Appellant placed his mouth on the penis of the 8 year old victim and drank his urine. There was a "union" by appellant's mouth (oral) with the young boy's penis. Appellant attacks the constitutionality of the minimum 25 years imprisonment prior to eligibility for parole found in Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, as it applies to him sub judice by Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, on the basis that said punishment is cruel and unusual in light of the act committed by him. We cannot agree. Recently in Dorminey v. State, 314 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1975), and Owens v. State, 316 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1975), this Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, against the challenge of legislative usurpation of executive power. In Dorminey, supra, this Court opined: "The determination of maximum and minimum penalties to be imposed for violation of the laws remains a matter for the Legislature. The lower court correctly ruled that Florida Statute 775.082 was constitutional, there being no legislative usurpation of executive power." Appellant in O'Donnell v. State, 326 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1975), argued that minimum mandatory sentence required by Sections 805.02 and 775.082, Florida Statutes, relating to requirement that one convicted of a life felony be sentenced to life or a term of years not less than thirty, constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment and violates due process and equal protection of the laws....

...imum mandatory sentence of 30 years to be excessive in terms of constitutional prohibitions." We find that the imposition of a life sentence with a minimum 25 years imprisonment prior to eligibility for parole as required by legislative enactment — Section 775.082(1) and Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, upon appellant does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Wendy Benner-Leon, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before FLETCHER, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ. SORONDO, J. Sharon McKnight (defendant), appeals from a five year sentence imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act. See ch. 97-239, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 775.082(8), Fla....

...on a law enforcement officer and criminal mischief. The applicable sentencing *315 guidelines range was eighteen to thirty months in state prison. The state requested that the defendant be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), pursuant to section 775.082(8)....

...ht to an unbiased sentencing process, and their right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, particularly with regard to whether extenuating circumstances exist which would make sentencing under the statute inappropriate." The relevant portions of section 775.082(8) read as follows: (a)1....

...tement to that effect; or d. Other extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender. The statute further provides that anyone sentenced under its provisions must serve 100% of the sentence imposed by the court. See § 775.082(8)(b), Fla....

...— for a first degree felony, a 30-year term of imprisonment. — for a second degree felony, a 15-year term of imprisonment. — for a third degree felony, a 5-year term of imprisonment. Essentially, then, the mandatory minimum is the maximum statutory penalty under s. 775.082, F.S....

...felonies within five years would fall within the scope of the habitual offender statute, this bill is distinguishable from the habitual offender statute in its certainty of punishment, and its mandatory nature. The habitual offender statute basically doubles the statutory maximum periods of incarceration under s. 775.082 as a potential maximum sentence for the offender....

...ound guilty by a jury—as in this case—the trial judge would be free to embark on a fact-finding mission at time of sentencing to determine whether, "the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to prove the highest charge available." § 775.082(8)(d)1.a....

...Had that been the case it would have been the duty of the trial judge to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case. Likewise, judicial findings regarding whether "the testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained," section 775.082(8)(d)1.b, or whether "other extenuating circumstances which preclude the just prosecution of the case," section 775.082(8)(d)1.d, exist, would also be inappropriate....

...In the former instance all material witnesses would have testified so there would be no fact-finding to do, and the latter is clearly a question for the state's attorney and not for the judge. The only exception in subsection (d) which could arguably be subject to some kind of fact-finding by the court would be 775.082(8)(d)1.c, "the victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provides a written statement to that effect." This subsection, however, must be read in pari materia with the other exceptions listed, all of which are clearly addressed to the state....

...As discussed above, the Legislature has prescribed that the sentencing provisions of the statute are mandatory where the state complies with its provisions. [2] The statute clearly provides that the state "may" seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a PRR. A prosecutor's decision to seek enhanced penalties under section 775.082(8) (or pursuant to any of the provisions of section 775.084), is not a sentencing decision....

..."To permit a court to initiate proceedings for enhanced punishment against a defendant would blur the lines between the prosecution and the independent role of the court as a fair and unbiased adjudicator and referee of the disputes between the parties." Id. at 626. Section 775.082(8) gives the state a vehicle to obtain the ultimate end of a sentence to the statutory maximum term for a qualified *318 offender....

...l penalties available to the sentencing court (e.g., charging first degree murder, which mandates death or life imprisonment, rather than a lesser degree of murder or manslaughter, which would allow imposition of a guidelines sentence). Accordingly, section 775.082(8) affords prosecutors a power that is no greater than that traditionally exercised in the charging decision. Although we realize that neither the conclusions of other states nor of the federal courts are binding on our analysis of the separation of powers challenge here, we look to other jurisdictions for guidance. [3] The statutes most analogous to section 775.082(8) are the so-called "three-strike" statutes, which mandate that qualified recidivist felons receive life sentences once the government files an information (or indictment) charging the predicate offenses and proves the existence of the same....

...The court rejected the separation of powers argument, observing that "the state's attorney has always enjoyed wide discretion, including the decision whether to initiate any prosecution at all, to choose which of several charges shall be brought, and to manage litigation." Id. at 1331. Based on our analysis, we conclude that section 775.082(8) does not violate the separation of powers provision of the Florida Constitution....

...Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. VAN NORTWICK, J. George Turner raises numerous constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (the Act), under which he was sentenced upon his conviction for three counts of felony battery....

...State, 557 So.2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Finally, appellant argues that the Act denies due process of law because it gives the victim of an offense the authority to preclude application of the Act to the defendant who committed the offense(s) against that victim. See § 775.082(8)(d)1.c., Fla....

...aised in any other case involving the validity of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, nor has it been briefed or argued in the instant appeal. We therefore do not determine its viability here. We cannot agree that a due process violation is posed by section 775.082(8)(d)1.c....

...Rather, as we interpret it, this provision merely expresses the legislative intent that the prosecution give consideration to the preference of victims when considering application of the Act. We also reject appellant's argument that any deference to a victim's preference under section 775.082(8)(d)1.c....

...State, 742 So.2d at 807 (Sharp, W., J., dissenting), and Lookadoo v. State, 737 So.2d at 637, 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Sharp, W., J., dissenting). As in Woods v. State, supra , we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED. KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We infer from the dissent in Lookadoo v. State, 737 So.2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(Sharp, W., J., dissenting), that this argument was raised and rejected in that case. [2] Subparagraph (d)1. to section 775.082(8), provides: (d)1....

...State, 750 So.2d 6 (Fla.1999), and adopt the dissenting opinion in Bates. We decline to do so. Before May 25, 1994, defendants convicted of capital murder faced two sentencing options: death or life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...However, in 1994, the Legislature enacted chapter 94-228, Laws of Florida, section 1, which amended the statute to replace the option of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years with life in prison without eligibility for parole. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...entencing proceeding. 750 So.2d at 9. This Court applied the rules of statutory construction and stated that "without clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law is presumed to apply prospectively." Id. at 10. The Court then applied that rule to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1995), and found that there was "no unequivocal language that the Legislature intended this amendment [to section 775.082(1)] to apply retroactively." Id....

...As we stated in Bates, under the rules of statutory construction, there must be a clear expression of intended retrospective application. See State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321 (Fla.1983). In the instant matter, the Legislature did not, by clear and unequivocal language, express its intent for section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1995), to apply retroactively....

...ized that the 1994 amendment applied to offenses committed on or after May 25, 1994. As a result, Orme is not eligible to receive a life sentence without the possibility of parole. See Hudson v. State, 708 So.2d 256 (Fla.1998) (the 1994 amendment to section 775.082(1) cannot be applied retroactively); Craig v....

...Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. EN BANC HAZOURI, J. Stanley Huggins (Huggins) was charged with burglary of a dwelling. Prior to accepting Huggins's plea of guilty, the trial court was called upon to consider whether the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), [1] applied to Huggins as he had burglarized *1216 an unoccupied dwelling....

...Had Huggins been sentenced under the PRR, the trial court would have been required to sentence him to a mandatory sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Corrections. The state appeals. We affirm the trial court's decision and hold that the PRR section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q) does not apply to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling....

...ied structure." The failure to do so creates an ambiguity which is susceptible to differing constructions. Because of the rule of lenity codified in section *1217 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997), [3] we conclude that the word "occupied" found in section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q) modifies both structure and dwelling....

...(b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence. § 775.082(8)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). The 1998 amendments to section 775.082 have caused renumbering of the statute and the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act now appears at subsection (9) of the statute. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Robert Walls, challenges the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), arguing that the statute violates both the separation of powers and single subject provisions of the state constitution....

...He also claims that his double jeopardy rights were violated by the imposition of sentences as both a habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender for the same crimes. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Appellant's contention that section 775.082(8) violates the state constitution's separation of powers clause has been previously rejected in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999). Consistent with Woods, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES THE PRISON RELEASE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Appellant's contention that section 775.082(8) violates the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution has likewise been rejected....

...087(1), Fla. *734 Stat. (1997). He correctly argues that the sentencing forms reflect he was adjudicated and sentenced as both a habitual felony offender under section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), and as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8). Under the facts of this case, the trial court acted outside its authority in sentencing appellant as both a habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender. Section 775.082(8)(a)2 provides that once a defendant is determined to be a prison releasee reoffender, he or she must be sentenced in accordance with sentencing scheme set out in subsections (a) through (d). Section 775.082(8)(c) provides: "Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s....

...ntencing scheme by imposing greater sentences under the habitual felony offender statute. In the instant case, appellant was convicted of first-degree felonies punishable by life. The prison releasee reoffender sentence for those crimes is life. See § 775.082(8)(a)2 a, Fla....

...Under section 775.084(4)(a)1, life and first-degree felonies are punishable by a term of life imprisonment. Thus, appellant's sentence under the habitual felony offender statute, life, is the same as his sentence under the prison releasee reoffender statute. Because section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the prison releasee reoffender sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration, and because a life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a l...

...The trial court denied the motion concluding that the jury did not need to find that the place burglarized was an occupied dwelling because the PRR statute applies to "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . [a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." See § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...Like battery on a law enforcement officer in Hearns, the offense could be committed by an unlawful touching during a burglary and does not necessarily include the threat or use of physical force or violence. Based on Hearns, Tumblin could not be sentenced as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)1.o, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Brown's second argument is that the death sentence in his case is unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He argues that at the time of his penalty phase, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provided the maximum sentence was life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years....

...Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., recused. NOTES [1] The murder occurred in 1986; therefore, Brown's citation to the 1983 version of section 775.082(1) is in error....

...the 1983 version. We have rejected Brown's challenge to the 1979 version in Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1752, 149 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001), and the 1989 version in Mann. The 1983, 1985, and 1987 versions of section 775.082(1) are identical to the 1979 and 1989 versions of the statute.

...Winstead, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellee. BLUE, Judge. The State appeals the habitual offender sentences imposed on Sammy Cotton and argues that the trial court erred by failing to impose further enhanced sentences pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. See § 775.082(8)(a), Fla....

...Because the record supports the trial court's finding that an exception exists in this case, we affirm. A defendant who commits, or attempts to commit, one of certain enumerated felonies within three years of being released from a state correctional facility is a "prison releasee reoffender." See § 775.082(8)(a)1. The statute provides for lengthy mandatory sentences for such defendants. Subsection 775.082(8)(d)1 sets out four circumstances or exceptions which make the mandatory sentence discretionary....

...state attorney, it would have done so in unequivocal terms. The record supports the trial court's finding that "the victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provided a written statement to that effect." Because section 775.082(8)(d) provides this as one of the authorized exceptions to imposition of the mandatory sentence, we affirm....

CANADY, J. In this case, we consider whether a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault qualifies a defendant for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...m was inside a car. Because the offense for which Hackley was convicted occurred less than three years after he had been released from serving another sentence in state prison, the trial court sentenced Hackley to life in prison as a PRR pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...fense must be answered consistently under both the VCC statute and the PRR statute,” id. at 217 , because both statutes extended to any felony which “involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Id. (quoting § 775.082(9)(a)1.o, Fla....

...CONCLUSION We therefore quash the First District’s decision on review and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We approve the Fifth District’s decision in Shaw . It is so ordered. POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. . Those portions of section 775.082(9)(a)1 relevant to this decision have remained unchanged since the time of Hackley’s crime, conviction, and sentencing. The sole revision to section 775.082(9)(a)1 since that time has been to add "or s....

...felony, it drops one category to life felony. § 775.081(1), Fla. Stat. Therefore, assuming sexual battery is only a life felony, attempted sexual battery is a second degree felony which carries a maximum term of fifteen years. §§ 777.04(4)(b) and 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...State, 429 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) [1] that held even though sexual battery under section 794.011(2) is not a capital crime in the sense that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, the punishment for that crime must still be imposed under section 775.082(1) to its constitutional limits. This means that one convicted under section 794.011(2) must be automatically "punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." Section 775.082(1). In so holding, this court followed the lead of the Florida Supreme Court in Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972) wherein the court preserved the sentencing under section 775.082(1) when it said: *494 We find no difficulty with a continuation of the sentencing for these former "capital offenses" under § 775.082(1) as automatically life imprisonment upon conviction, inasmuch as that is the only offense left in the statute......

...r all purposes including sentencing. Therefore, applying our analysis in Rusaw to the instant case, appellant committed two first degree felonies, § 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat., and therefore was correctly sentenced to thirty years for each violation. § 775.082(3)(b)....

...nder penalties upon conviction. At a jury trial on July 16, 1998, the jury found Lewis guilty. *107 The State then filed its notice to seek habitual felony offender penalties on August 12, 1998. On September 18, 1998, Lewis filed a motion to declare section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the "Prison Releasee Reoffender Act," unconstitutional....

...to ten years imprisonment followed by ten years of probation and, as a prison releasee reoffender, to fifteen years in prison. Lewis contends that being sentenced both as a habitual violent felony offender and as a prison releasee reoffender, under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), otherwise known as the "Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act," ["PRR"], violates the prohibitions against double jeopardy provided in the Fifth Amendment and Article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution....

...more statutorily identified upward or downward departure grounds. If the judge found a ground for upward departure, he or she was authorized to impose any sentence within the relevant maximum sentence for the particular degree of crime set forth in section 775.082, Florida Statutes. § 921.0016(1)(e) (1995). Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1995), entitled "Penalties", which long predates the advent of sentencing guidelines, identifies the range of penalties applicable to every degree of offense existing in Florida from a capital felony to a second-degree misdemeanor. This statute expressly sets forth the maximum penalty for every degree of offense. A second-degree felony, for example, is punishable "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years." § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). The maximum penalties set forth in section 775.082 are referred to as the "statutory maximum" for each offense....

...sible a sentencing range for the single offense that exceeded 180 months, it is true that the 40 "sexual penetration" victim injury points assessed by the trial judge increased McCloud's available sentence above the statutory maximum by four months. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...e felony (180 months), the Apprendi issue is resolved. It appears to us that the Florida courts that have considered Apprendi thus far understand the term "statutory maximum" under Florida's sentencing scheme to be the maximum penalties set forth in section 775.082....

...ry without a jury finding that victim injury was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that because Caraballo's sentence of twenty-three years for the first-degree felony was less than the statutory maximum of thirty years as set forth in section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes, the defendant was not entitled to relief under Apprendi. We hold that, in Florida, for purposes of determining a constitutional violation under Apprendi, the relevant "statutory maximum" is found in section 775.082....

...Krechowski, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. SAWAYA, J. Adam Jerome Durr appeals a final judgment and sentence finding him guilty of one count of armed robbery with a firearm or deadly weapon and one count of armed burglary of a dwelling. On appeal, Durr contends that section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("the Act"), is unconstitutional....

...as arrested. The State filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties against Durr as a habitual felony offender. Additionally, the State filed its notice of intent to seek to have Durr sentenced as a prison releasee *646 reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1999). Thereafter, the jury found Durr guilty as a principal to the above-referenced crimes. A sentencing hearing was held and in accordance with section 775.082(8)(a)2., Durr was sentenced to a term of natural life without the possibility of parole for each charge to run consecutively....

...under the Act for crimes arising out of the same criminal episode. Section 921.16(1) is an integral part of the Criminal Punishment Code and applies to guidelines sentences imposed pursuant to the Code. Furthermore, the Act specifically provides in section 775.082(8)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997) that upon proof "that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines...." Although trial courts ma...

...On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. W. Joel Boles, Judge. December 10, 2018 WINSOR, J. Demeko Ladjuan Sims was convicted of armed robbery and petit theft, and he received a life sentence as a Prison Releasee Reoffender. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...5 threat, which the theft charge did not. Just as in McKinney, there was no double-jeopardy violation. 2 D. Finally, Sims argues that his life sentence was unconstitutional. His sentence was based on section 775.082(9), which requires a life sentence for a “Prison releasee reoffender,” defined to include someone who commits robbery within three years after release from prison....

...onflict with the Eady decision. ANALYSIS Section 775.081, Florida Statutes, titled "Classifications of felonies and misdemeanors," states that "[a] capital felony and a life felony must be so designated by statute." § 775.081(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). Section 775.082, Florida Statutes, titled "Penalties," states that for first-degree felonies, a defendant is subject to "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). On the other hand, section 775.082(3)(a) states that a defendant is subject to a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding forty years for a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983....

...ife felonies" to trump the express provisions of the guidelines and to override the Legislature's express penalty provision of life for a second-degree murder conviction. In doing so, the Eady court failed to give effect to the express provisions of section 775.082, which allows for alternative penalties for first-degree felonies including life imprisonment when expressly provided. Similarly, the Eady court overlooked the express provisions of the sentencing guidelines that provide for separate scoring for first-degree felonies punishable by life. While the Eady court did not address section 775.082, the Betancourt court expressed the view that section 775.082 authorized the punishment of life imprisonment for first-degree felonies when specifically provided by statute....

...The Florida Statutes authorize punishment for a first-degree felony as follows: "For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. ..." Id. § 775.082(3)(b)....

...intended." State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989)(quoting Hunter ). In the present case, the legislature made battery, which is ordinarily a misdemeanor, a third degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(b). In section 775.082(8)(a)1....

...s and have committed certain felonies. Absent an ambiguity, and there is none here, the imposition of one sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not improper, and we recede from Oliveira. Appellant also attacks the constitutionality of section 775.082(8)(a)1....

...Mandel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before COPE, GODERICH, and RAMIREZ, JJ. PER CURIAM. Carlton Rock appeals his conviction and sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, arguing that he was improperly sentenced as a Prison Releasee Reoffender *299 pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2000). Because burglary of an unoccupied dwelling does not qualify as a predicate offense for the imposition of a prisoner releasee reoffender sentence, we reverse. Section 775.082(9)(a)1 enumerates the felonies that serve as a predicate offense for the imposition of a prisoner releasee reoffender sentence....

...The State argues that Huggins should not be relied upon because the decision is not yet final since rehearing is pending before the Florida Supreme Court. Nonetheless, that decision controls until it is altered or overturned. The State also argues that the 2001 amendment to section 775.082(9)(a)1 indicates the intent of the legislature to include burglary of an unoccupied dwelling or structure as a predicate offense for the imposition of a prisoner releasee reoffender sentence....

...a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows: .... d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years. § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla....

...775.084 or any other provision of law. (d) 1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection.... § 775.082(9)(c)-(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). [3] Further complicating the issue is a provision from the CPC which states, "If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...s of 66.4 months. [Nettles] does not dispute that he qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender. During the plea colloquy, the judge adequately advised [Nettles] that the PRRPA designation would cause him to serve the entire sentence day-for-day. See § 775.082(9)(b), Fla....

...This Court finds that the Defendant's argument is without merit. Nettles, 819 So.2d at 243-44. Under these facts, where a defendant's minimum CPC sentence is greater than the sentence provided for by the PRRPA, the sections of the PRRPA excerpted above pose an interpretation concern. While section 775.082(9)(c) authorizes a greater sentence under the habitual offender statute, or any other provision of law, section 775.082(9)(a)3....

...specifically excludes sentencing under the guidelines and mandates a five-year sentence. However, here, if the defendant is sentenced to only five years pursuant to the PRRPA, his sentence would not be to the fullest extent of the law as authorized by the CPC, and intended by the Legislature under section 775.082(9)(d)1....

...he [PRRPA]" could be ascertained through the language of the PRRPA providing, "such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the guidelines." Id. at 1005. Following this reasoning, the district court concluded that "a defendant sentenced under section 775.082(8) cannot be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced according to the provisions of the PRRPA." Id....

...Specifically, the court reasoned: We read the subsections at issue in pari materia, and in light of the legislative direction that offenders previously released from prison "be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection ...." § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...In analyzing the provision of the PRRPA that states, "Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines," § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla....

...tent with the language of the PRRPA and our holdings in Cotton and Grant. See id. Finally, in resolving the apparent conflict created by the provisions of the PRRPA, the First District enumerated an independent basis for its decision by holding that section 775.082(9)(a)3., which specifically excludes sentencing under the guidelines, is not applicable to sentencing under the CPC....

...Therefore, we conclude that a defendant may be sentenced pursuant to both the PRRPA and the CPC. Thus, the sentence agreed to by Nettles, imposed by the trial court, and affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal was a legal sentence. We reject the contention that section 775.082(9)(a)3., which provides that a defendant eligible for sentencing under the PRRPA "is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines," renders Nettles' sentence illegal....

...al sentencing points] up to and including the statutory maximum." § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). Conceptually, the CPC and the former sentencing guidelines are not synonymous, and, therefore, the PRRPA's reference to the sentencing guidelines in section 775.082(9)(a)3....

...r. Such an interpretation and application would completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA. The Legislature unquestionably intended that those sentenced under the PRRPA would "be punished to the fullest extent of the law." § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...s effect is to establish a sentencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law," the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. Id. (quoting § 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...Applying the principles stated in Cotton and Grant, in addition to the statutory provisions, we again hold that the PRRPA establishes a mandatory minimum sentence, a "sentencing floor," and no provision of the PRRPA prevents a court "from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law." § 775.082(9)(c)....

...he CPC, is a legal sentence. As we have held, it is authorized by the PRRPA, but more importantly, it is mandated by the CPC. The CPC provides, "If the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...The majority correctly concludes that no actual conflict exists between the three cases. The statutory language raising the issue in all the cases comes from the PRRPA's statement that a defendant proven to be a prison releasee reoffender "is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines," § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2000), and the PRRPA's contrasting statements that the PRRPA does not prevent the imposition of a greater sentence under "any other provision of law" and that each defendant should be punished "to the fullest extent of the law." § 775.082(9)(c)-(d)1., Fla....

...ed the CPC as the new sentencing scheme. Id. (citing ch. 97-194, §§ 1, 2, at 3674, Laws of Fla.). The timing of the two enactments further supports the inference that the Legislature knowingly intended only to refer to the sentencing guidelines in section 775.082(9)(a)3....

...for a guidelines sentence."). The district courts in Wilson and Irons correctly found that a defendant cannot be sentenced under both the sentencing guidelines and the PRRPA because the PRRPA specifically precludes application of the guidelines. See § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2000); Wilson, 793 So.2d at 1006; Irons, 791 So.2d at 1224-25. In Wilson, however, the Second District Court of Appeal went further, determining that the reference in section 775.082(9)(c) to "any other provision of law" applies only to enhanced penalty provisions, such as the habitual offender statute, and not to a general sentencing statute....

...That is a harsher sentence than one based solely on the guidelines/CPC. For these reasons I would find that the defendant's sentence imposed under both the PRRPA and the CPC is illegal and would remand this case for sentencing under the PRRPA only. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (2000). [2] §§ 921.002-.0027, Fla. Stat. (2000). [3] Section 775.084, referred to in section 775.082(9)(c), is commonly known as the habitual offender statute....

...[4] Resolution of this issue, i.e., under which statute or statutes Nettles should be sentenced, is imperative because the PRRPA requires that a defendant serve one hundred percent of his sentence. As a result, a defendant sentenced under the PRRPA is not eligible for gain time, see § 775.082(9)(b), whereas a defendant is eligible for gain time if sentenced under the CPC....

...[5] As noted above, Wilson involved the interaction between the PRRPA and the sentencing guidelines, while Nettles examined the relationship between the PRRPA and the CPC. [6] Wilson involved the 1997 version of the PRRPA, which was then codified in section 775.082(8). While the PRRPA was subsequently renumbered as section 775.082(9) in 1999, the language remained the same....

...Lamarian Jackson appeals his convictions and sentences for armed robbery and aggravated battery with a firearm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We write only to address Jackson's challenges to the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...We recently upheld the validity of this act against separation of powers, due process, and equal protection challenges. See Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). As we did in Woods, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Jackson's challenge to the constitutionality of section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), on the basis that it violates the single subject requirement of Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, is also without merit....

...90-day window during which petitioner could have petitioned the Supreme Court 1 Capital sexual battery was formerly punishable by death. Today, it is capital only in name. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008); Fla. Stat. 775.082(2). 2  Case: 18-10767 Date Filed: 04/12/2019 Page: 3 of 17 of the United States for writ of certiorari expires)....

...The court analogized the factual circumstances to its decision in State v. Enmund, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985) where it approved of consecutive twenty-five year mandatory minimums for separate and distinct homicides arising from a robbery. While recognizing that Enmund involved section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which authorizes twenty-five year mandatory minimums for capital felonies, the supreme court concluded that the intent behind both section 775.082(1) and section 775.087(2) is to vest trial courts with broad discretion to impose mandatory minimums concurrently or consecutively for separate and distinct offenses involving multiple victims....

...Distinct from what the supreme court has termed enhancement statutes, such as section 775.087(2) and section 775.084(4)(b), are statutes where the minimum penalty for the crime is explicitly set forth by statute such as the 25 year mandatory minimum for capital felonies. See § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). Therefore, the supreme court has held that under section 775.082(1), a court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive 25 year mandatory minimums for capital felonies because they are not deemed enhancements....

...Cillo argues that because lewd and lascivious conduct is a second-degree felony, see § 800.04(5)(c)(2), then the maximum sentence he could receive was fifteen years unless the sentences were imposed consecutively for a total of forty-five years, see § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Ward was charged in three informations with five offenses. He was sentenced at a single sentencing hearing in April 2001. He pleaded nolo contendere and agreed to certain sentences, the longest of which was fifteen years' imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Because the Act does not require an occupied dwelling, we reverse. The legislature has defined a prison releasee reoffender as a defendant who, within three years of being released from prison, commits or attempts to commit an offense from the list enumerated in the statute. See § 775.082(8)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (1997). The list of qualifying offenses includes "[b]urglary of an occupied structure or dwelling." § 775.082(8)(a)1q....

...Section 784.07(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: *560 Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty ... shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825. Section 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001. Finally, section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows: (a) ... for a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. Appellant argues that because section 775.0825 specifies the penalty for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, no other penalty statute applies. He reasons that since section 775.0825 only authorizes a sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole, the trial court had no authority to impose three consecutive life sentences, each carrying twenty-five year terms of imprisonment without parole. Appellant apparently fails to recognize that section 775.0825 prescribes a minimum sentence. It does not affect the imposition of a sentence pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)....

...1983), appeal after remand, 459 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), decision quashed, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985). Enmund, Jeanette Armstrong and Sampson Armstrong robbed and murdered Mr. and Mrs. Kersey. Enmund, 399 So.2d at 1365. For the two murders, the trial court sentenced Enmund, pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1983), to consecutive terms of life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twenty-five years....

...h or to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. Any such person not sentenced to death "shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." § 775.082(1), Fla....

...eligible for parole from a conviction of first-degree murder may be imposed either consecutively or concurrently, in the trial court's discretion, for each and every homicide. See § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1983). Enmund, 476 So.2d at 168. Although section 775.082(1) deals with a capital felony whereas section 775.0825 deals with a life felony, the statutes contain identical language regarding mandatory punishment....

...4th DCA 1989), we remand this cause to the trial court with directions to clarify the sentences imposed and to enter such corrected sentencing orders as may be appropriate. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. LETTS and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The relevant portion of § 775.082(1) states: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole......

...ent or safety measures to protect the well-being of its employee, ANDREW P. HORNE. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant, as hereinabove alleged, the Defendant, SCARBOROUGH, violated Florida Statute 440 and Florida Statute 775.082, and 29 U.S.C....

...mployee, Keith A. Creason. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions to act of Defendant, SCARBOROUGH CIVIL CORPORATION, *1148 as hereinabove alleged, Defendant, SCARBOROUGH CIVIL CORPORATION, violated § 440.11 Florida Statutes and § 775.082 Florida Statutes and 29 CFR 666(e), providing for a maximum penalty that be may [sic] imposed which exceeds sixty (60) days imprisonment of Defendant, SCARBOROUGH CIVIL CORPORATION, supervisory personnel....

...ence. The defendant does not, however, claim that he does not qualify as a PRR because he did not commit a qualifying offense within three years after being released "from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections." See § 775.082(9) Fla....

...See § 812.133, Fla. Stat. (1997). Durden argues (i) that L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997), required the trial court either to grant a judgment of acquittal or to give a jury instruction that a common pocketknife is not a deadly weapon and (ii) that section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to the state attorney and violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution....

...1st DCA 1999) and Jackson v. State, 744 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). As in Woods and Jackson, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED; question certified....

...State, 747 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The trial court denied Brinson's motion, finding that the record conclusively refuted Brinson's rule 3.850 allegations. However, because that conclusion was based on an invalid interpretation of the statutory term "release," see § 775.082(8)(a)(1), Fla....

...He received a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years as a PRR. In his motion, Brinson claimed that he did not qualify as a PRR because he did not commit his new offense within three years of being "released from a state correctional facility." See § 775.082(8)(a)(1)....

...1995 and was last released on March 23, 1995, according to a Department of Corrections document. The trial court attached this document to the order denying Brinson's motion. [1] In his rule 3.850 motion, Brinson contends that the word "release" in section 775.082(8)(a)(1) means actual release from a state prison sentence, not release from temporary confinement that happens to be in state prison....

...The State appeals the trial court's decision to sentence the Defendant, Andres Alexis Miranda, as an Habitual Felony Offender rather than as a Prison Releasee Reoffender. The State asserts that the trial court's refusal to impose an enhanced penalty pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act ("PRRPA"), section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), was erroneous....

...under the PRRPA); See Roundtree v. State, 786 So.2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Cruz-Bertances v. State, 786 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Rodriguez v. State, 773 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). *1044 The State characterizes statutory amendments made to section 775.082(9)(a)(1), effective July 1, 2001, as solely a "clarification" of existing law, [2] thus permitting the PRRPA sentencing sought in the instant case....

...Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000)(concluding that PRRPA, which removes substantially all sentencing discretion from judicial branch and places it instead in executive branch, does not encroach on judiciary's sentencing function in violation of doctrine of separation of powers). [2] Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2000) provides in part: 1....

...tence. See § 921.1401, Fla. Stat. (2017). Additionally, at the hearing, the sentencing court would have the - 10 - discretion to impose a term of years sentence as low as forty years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(1)(b)1., Fla....

...3D16-1090, 2017 WL 1018513, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 15, 2017) (“Notwithstanding the fact that he will be reevaluated for the possibility of parole in 2022, we conclude the defendant is correct and that he is entitled to resentencing under sections 775.082(3)(c) and 921.1401.”); Miller v....

...1st DCA 2007). By contrast, the new sentencing law affords juvenile offenders the opportunity to argue for a sentence of forty years with judicial review of their - 26 - sentences at twenty-five years. See § 775.082(1)(b)1., Fla....

...mandatorily imposed life sentence without parole that is not “proportionate to the offense and the offender.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 406. Based on Florida’s objective parole guidelines, an individual who was convicted of a capital offense under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1990), as Atwell was, will have a presumptive parole release date of anywhere from 300 to 9,998 months in the future....

...5th DCA 2016), even the Fifth District acknowledged: What is certain is that, like Atwell, the statutory scheme Williams was sentenced under provided only for the death penalty or life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...Although unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal, we will briefly address the sentencing issue raised by Louzon in the event that Louzon is ultimately convicted of a robbery offense. Louzon claims he was ineligible to be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a) because the record failed to reflect that he had ever been physically in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Section 775.082(9)(a) defines a "prison releasee reoffender" as a person who commits an enumerated offense within three years after being "released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections...." In the instant case,...

...offense, he was not physically transferred to the Department of Corrections. Louzon had 609 days credit for jail time served and, thus, his sentence was found to have been fully served. Louzon argues that in order to qualify for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a), he must have been physically present at, and then released from, a Department of Corrections facility....

...Resisting an officer with violence, in violation of section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2006), is a "felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual," and so is punishable under the prison releasee reoffender statute. § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...*751 The statutory language to be construed in the present case defines offenses eligible for prison releasee reoffender sentencing to include any felony involving "the use or threat of physical force or violence ... within 3 years after [the felon's] ... release[] from a state correctional facility." § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2006). Offering to do violence plainly involves the "threat of physical force or violence" while actually doing violence plainly involves the "use ... of physical force or violence." § 775.082(9)(a)1. o., Fla. Stat. (2006). Under section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. Michael L. Gray argues that his sentence, pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Release Reoffender Act, is unconstitutional....

...icial branches of government. He also argues application of the statute to him violates the Florida and United States Constitutions' prohibition against ex post facto criminal statutes. [2] We affirm. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has reviewed section 775.082, Florida Statutes, and has held that it does not violate the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions....

...but it cannot impose a sentence. Young v. State, 699 So.2d 624 (Fla.1997); State v. Bloom, 497 So.2d 2 (Fla.1986). Under the statutory scheme, the prosecution has the sole discretion to seek imposition of the minimum mandatory minimum provisions of section 775.082(8)....

...State, 732 So.2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion. W. SHARP, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent because, in my view, there are serious constitutional questions concerning the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), under which Gray was sentenced....

...That is contrary to the traditional role played by the courts in sentencing, a role which in my view, is constitutionally mandated. Pursuant to the statute, the prosecution has the sole discretion to seek imposition of the mandatory minimum provisions of section 775.082(8)....

...It requires the court to determine whether the prosecution has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant meets the statutory criteria for imposition of the longer sentence ( i.e., that he or she has committed a certain specified kind of crime within three years after being released from prison). § 775.082(8)(a)2., Fla....

...The statute makes quite clear that the discretion to seek the mandatory sentence is to be exercised primarily by the prosecutor. [6] It provides that the prosecutor may decide not to seek sentencing under this statute if "extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution *809 of the offender." § 775.082(8)(d)1.d. In section 775.082(8)(d)2., the state attorney is required to explain any "sentencing deviation" (any decision not to seek sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender) in writing and maintain such decisions in a file....

...Motion for Rehearing and/or Certification GRANTED. DAUKSCH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Art. I, § 1; Art. II, § 1; Art. III, § 1. [2] Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const.; Art. I, § 9, Art. I, § 10, U.S. Const. [3] See e.g., §§ 921.001—.0016, Fla. Stat. (1997); see also, §§ 775.0823 (mandatory minimum for violent offenses committed against law enforcement officers, correctional officers, state attorneys, assistant state attorneys, justices, or judges), 775.0845 (reclassification for wearing a mask while committing of...

...ted battery), 775.0875 (mandatory minimum for capital felonies), Fla. Stat. (1997). [1] Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. Art. I, §§ 9 and 10. [2] Art. 2, § 3, Fla. Const. [3] See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1; Art. II, § 1; Art. III, § 1. [4] § 775.082(8)(a)2. [5] § 775.082(8)(d)1.c. [6] There are three other exceptions in the statute: one for the victim's statement mentioned above, and two other circumstances relating to the inability of the prosecution to prove its case. § 775.082(8)(d)1.a....

...procedural and substantive due process. See, e.g., Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla.1991). [4] Life felonies are punishable by a term of imprisonment for life if the life felony occurred after July 1, 1995. See § 775.082(3)(a)3, Fla.Stat. (1995). First-degree felonies are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment not to exceed 30 years, unless the offense is one that specifically provides for a life term. See § 775.082(3)(b). Second degree felonies are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years, see section 775.082(3)(c), and third-degree felonies are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment not to exceed five years. See § 775.082(3)(d)....

...In order to obtain a conviction, the state had to establish that the invitation was precipitated by trick or fraud under Howard. The special jury instruction correctly set forth the law stated in Howard. During sentencing, the state sought to have Gordon sentenced as both a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), and an habitual felony offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997). The state argued that the 15 year mandatory minimum of section 775.082(8)(a)2.c....

...The court declined to sentence Gordon, in addition, as a prison releasee reoffender. The state has cross-appealed this sentencing issue, arguing that the trial court did not have the discretion not to impose a prison releasee reoffender sentence, since Gordon qualified for the sentence under section 775.082(8)(a)1 and the state sought the sentence pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a)2. The state's argument implicates two subsections of the prison releasee reoffender act. Section 775.082(8)(c) provides: Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 [pertaining to violent career criminals, habitual felony offenders, and habitual violent felony offenders] or any other provision of law. Section 775.082(8)(b) states: A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under paragraph (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence. (Emphasis supplied). The provisions of a criminal sentencing statute, such as section 775.082(8), "must be strictly construed according to their letter." Perkins v....

...See Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1314 (observing that the "state's reliance on common law rules of construction such as ejusdem generis must yield to the rule of strict construction"). Applying these principles, the mandatory minimum sentence provision of section 775.082(8)(b) applies to persons "sentenced under paragraph (a)" of the act. Had Gordon been sentenced under paragraph (a), he would have to have received the 15 year sentence specified for a second degree felony in section 775.082(8)(a)2.c....

...tenced according to the provisions of paragraph (c), and the mandatory minimum sentence of paragraph (b) does not apply. Thus, where the state seeks and obtains an habitual offender sentence greater than that which would otherwise be provided for in section 775.082(8)(a)2 .a.-d., the mandatory minimum sentence of section 775.082(8)(b) does not apply....

...he defendant qualified for such enhanced sentencing. We agree and reverse and remand for resentencing. A jury found the defendant guilty of robbery with a firearm and grand theft. The state sought to have the defendant sentenced as a PRR pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2011), and introduced evidence that he committed the robbery within three years of his release from prison....

...the defendant committed the robbery within three years of his release from prison. The court declined to sentence the defendant as a PRR, instead sentencing him to thirty-five years in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison. Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), provides for enhanced sentencing as a PRR if a defendant is convicted of an enumerated offense, which includes robbery, “within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections ......

...Appellant was still in federal cus *356 tody, even though housed in a Palm Beach County jail in order to perform substantial assistance. His release from federal custody while housed at the county jail still constitutes constructive release from a federal correctional facility for purposes of section 775.082(9)(a)(l) 1 , Florida Statutes....

...ty [or a federal correctional institution] — where the individual would then be entitled to an immediate release. Courts should not, construe a statute so as to achieve an absurd result. 78 So.3d at 681 . Affirmed. GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . Section 775.082(9)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that any defendant is a prison release reoffender who commits an enumerated felony (including robbery) "within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections ......

...This court ordered the State to respond to McKenzie's claim that the trial court imposed illegal sentences beyond the statutory maximum term, and the State properly concedes that McKenzie's life sentences exceed the statutory maximum penalty of thirty years' incarceration for first-degree felonies. See § 775.082(3)(b)....

...LO and the defendant's suspicious conduct consistent with guilt). Appellant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him under both section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act ("PRRPA"), and section 775.082(3)(a) ("10-20-Life"). The court sentenced appellant under the PRRPA to life for robbery with a firearm, five years each for two counts of aggravated assault, and fifteen years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, all to run concurrently. Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a), the court imposed the same prison terms for each count but ordered that each was to run consecutively....

...he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2000). A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be punished by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...ars for third-degree felonies. See Bryant v. State, 876 So.2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Additionally, appellant was originally charged with five counts of second-degree felonies. Second-degree felonies have a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...ce of incarceration "as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence." Also, section 775.087(2)(c), Florida Statutes, states that if the minimum mandatory term under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by sections 775.082, 775.084 or the Criminal Punishment Code, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed, but if the minimum mandatory term under this section is less than the sentence authorized under sections 775.082, 775.084 or the Criminal Punishment Code, then the sentence imposed "must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section." Therefore, the statute reaffirms that the statutory maximum is the greater of either the minimum mandatory term under this section, which is 25 years, or the statutory maximum under section 775.082, which is 30 years in this case, or the maximum authorized by the habitual offender statute or the Criminal Punishment Code....

...Without further facts, it is impossible to determine whether the sentence in that case was a legal sentence on other grounds, such as under the habitual felony offender statute. The combined sentence imposed by the trial court in this case exceeds the statutory maximum under section 775.082, Florida Statutes, and therefore it is illegal....

...The question is whether section 775.087(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (the "10/20/life" statute), will permit a twenty-five year mandatory minimum prison sentence with an additional twenty years of probation to follow where the statutory maximum prison sentence for the offense is capped at thirty years under section 775.082....

...at 292; see also State v. Waldron, 835 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Section 775.087(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by section 775.082, section 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by section 775.082, section 775.084, or the criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed must include the mandatory minimum as required by this section....

...Prison Releasee Reoffender Act was an illegal ex post facto application of the law. Specifically, he claims that the crimes for which he was charged and convicted occurred on April 1, 1997, prior to the statute's effective date of May 30, 1997. See § 775.082(8)(a)1, Fla. Stat. *699 (1997) [1] ; Ch. 97-239, § 2, Laws of Fla. Arnold's release date from prison was July 3, 1996. The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8)(a)1, provides for greater penalties for offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility....

...Hence, we hold that appellant's sentence pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act was an illegal ex post facto application of the law. Conviction affirmed; sentence vacated and remanded with instructions to impose a guidelines sentence. WARNER, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.082(8)(a)1 was renumbered in the 1998 supplement to section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED PER CURIAM. It has come to our attention that the Florida Legislature has changed the penalties for capital felonies but that the standard jury instructions for penalty proceedings in capital cases were not amended to reflect these changes. Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provided: (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death. In 1994, section 775.082(1) was amended to read: (1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s....

...f convicted of murder in the first degree or of a capital felony under s. 790.161, shall be ineligible for parole, or (b) If convicted of any other capital felony, shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. § 775.082, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). Thus, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment was no longer eligible for parole. [1] The following year, the legislature further amended section 775.082(1) so that a capital defendant sentenced to life imprisonment is ineligible for parole irrespective of the category of capital crime committed. Ch. 95-294, § 4, Laws of Fla. Accordingly, this Court, on its own motion, amends the standard instructions on "Penalty Proceedings—Capital Cases F.S. 921.141" to reflect the amendments to section 775.082....

...tted. Note to Judge When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823....

...ears. Note to Judge When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823....

...ears. Note to Judge When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823....

...read, was correctly stated. Note to Judge The following question is to be asked each juror: Do you, [Mr.] [Ms.] _____, agree and confirm that a majority of the jury join in the advisory sentence that you have just heard read by the clerk? NOTES [1] Section 775.082(1), as amended in 1994, became effective on May 25, 1994....

...nder for both counts. The maximum sentence for the third degree felony of attempted robbery is ten years as a habitual felony offender, see § 775.084(4)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (2001), with a five year minimum mandatory as a prison releasee reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a)3 d, Fla....

...ant challenges the fifteen year minimum mandatory sentence as a prison releasee reoffender. The defendant correctly argues that the crime of burglary of an occupied conveyance is not a qualifying offense under the prison releasee reoffender statute. § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2001). The State, however, argues that the defendant nonetheless qualifies as prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9)(a)1 o because the burglary involved "the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." We disagree with the State's argument because the jury specifically found that the burglary was committed without an assault....

...ife, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989), which subjected Mr. Manuel to sentencing for "a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment," § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...Manuel's two attempted murder convictions were each life felonies. See §§ 775.087(1)(a), 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989); § 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). These life felonies were punishable by "a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years." § 775.082(3)(a)....

...e for first-degree murder. See Atwell v. State, 128 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). We remand this case for resentenc-ing on the first-degree murder count in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the *1043 Florida Statutes....

...e, unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter eyent such person shall be punished by death. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...andatorily imposed life sentence without parole that is not “proportionate to the offense and the offender.” Horsley, 160 So.3d at 406 . Based on Florida’s objective parole guidelines, an individual who was convicted of a capital offense under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1990), as Atwell was, will have a presumptive parole release date of anywhere from 300 to 9,998 months in the future....

...921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and: (a) If convicted of murder in the first degree or of a capital felony under s. 790.161, shall be ineligible for parole. § 775.082(l)(a), Fla....

...exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by statute for the offense. 360 So.2d at 383. The maximum period of incarceration provided by statute for the offense in this case was imprisonment for life or imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. § 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). Section 775.082(3)(a) has been interpreted to prohibit a court from sentencing a defendant for a life felony committed after October 1, 1983, to a term of incarceration for a period of years exceeding 40. Spivey v. State, 526 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The question raised in this case is whether section 775.082(3)(a) also disallows a sentence where the combined periods of incarceration and probation exceed 40 years. The law is well established that "a penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of those against whom it would operate." State v. Holmes , 360 at 383. Thus, we hold that once the trial judge sentences a defendant under section 775.082(3)(a) to a term of years as opposed to a term of imprisonment for life, the total sentence, including any probationary period, must not exceed 40 years....

...The version of the Act applicable to petitioner's offense clearly indicates that a prison releasee reoffender is "any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit [a qualifying crime] within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility." § 775.082(8)(a)(1), Fla....

...In our decision in Grant, we quashed the Second District's decision to the extent that it approved the imposition of equal, concurrent sentences under the Act and another recidivist statute. That issue is of no concern here, as the petitioner in the instant case was sentenced exclusively under the Act. [2] See § 775.082(8)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). [3] Clark's related argument, that the Legislature simply did not intend for incarcerated persons to be subject to sentencing under the Act, is similarly unavailing. [4] See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...Paul also challenges his enhanced sentence for shooting into an occupied building. He claims that a conviction of shooting into a dwelling in violation of section 790.19 does not constitute a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute. § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree. § 790.19, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The PRR statute permits the imposition of *1137 a PRR sentence if the crime is "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...fit within the same "catch-all" forcible felony provision of the PRR statute. In explaining our result we said: we affirmed the sentence because the PRR statute allows for the imposition of a PRR sentence for one of the enumerated felonies or under section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...sed sentencing guidelines on or after January 1, 1994, must be within the 1994 guidelines unless there is a departure sentence with written findings. If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure. If a departure sentence, with written findings, is imposed, such sentence mustbe within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082....

...The failure of a trial court to impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines is subject to appellate review pursuant to chapter 924. However, the extent of a departure from a guidelines sentence is not subject to appellate review." [e.s.] Next he asserts that section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), prescribes 15 years as the maximum sentence for these sexual battery convictions....

...[3] Counsel then argues as follows: "The sentences of 18 years are illegal because the `guideline recommended sentence' was not in excess of the statutory maximum. Under the terms of the statute the court below could not impose sentence beyond the statutory maximum allowed by section 775.082....

...The recommended sentence length may not be increased if the total sentence points have been increased for that offense by up to, and including, 15 percent. If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure....

...sed sentencing guidelines on or after January 1, 1994, must be within the 1994 guidelines unless there is a departure sentence with written findings. If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure. If a departure sentence, with written findings, is imposed, such sentence must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082....

...ursuant to chapter 924. However, the extent of a departure from a guidelines sentence is not subject to appellate review." [e.s.] As we have already showed, the points in this case yield a state prison sentence greater than the maximum authorized by section 775.082(3)(c). Under the first highlighted sentence in the above quote, the trial court must impose a sentence of imprisonment for the guidelines period greater than section 775.082, unless the trial court is prepared to impose a departure sentence. But, as the second highlighted sentence shows, a departure sentence must itself not exceed "the maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082." We must attempt to harmonize these two provisions. When the recommended sentence under the guidelines already exceeds *897 the section 775.082 maximum, it appears from this text that the only kind of departure sentence authorized is a mitigating departure—i.e., a sentence less than the guidelines range at the lower end. That, in turn, reveals yet another anomaly. If the imposition of the recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum is truly mandatory, "the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed," then the usual discretion to sentence within a range of plus 25% of the recommended sentence has been, to that extent, taken away. Yet that appears to be precisely what the legislature intended by the exact text it employed. In other words, when the recommended sentence is greater than the section 775.082 maximum, the sentencing judge has two alternatives: (1) impose the recommended sentence, or (2) instead impose a mitigating departure sentence. The statute appears to allow no discretion to exceed a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum by the 25% period. This makes some sense if one supposes that the legislature intended to require more severe punishment on one whose recommended sentence exceeds the section 775.082 maximum....

...of legislators. Applying this clear statutory text, we specifically reject the state's argument that the guidelines authorize a trial court to enhance a recommended sentence by a period of up to 25% when the recommended sentence is greater than the section 775.082 maximum. Both section 921.001(5) and section 921.0016(1)(e) are very clear that a departure sentence may not exceed the section 775.082 maximum. See § 921.001(5) ("If a departure sentence, with written findings, is imposed, such sentence must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082."); and § 921.0016(1)(e) ("A departure sentence must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided by s. 775.082."). Moreover, both sections 921.001(5) and 921.0014(2) expressly require the imposition of a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum. See § 921.001(5) ("If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure." [e.s.]), and § 921.0014(2) ("If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure."). While the 25% range from the recommended sentence is discretionary, there is nothing in the text clearly specifying that the 25% range may be used to increase the recommended sentence further beyond the section 775.082 maximum. In contrast, as we have just seen, there is specific authority—in fact, a mandatory direction—to impose a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum, but that authorization is limited to a recommended sentence and does not include the discretionary authority to enhance a recommended sentence within the 25% range. The absence of express textual authority to impose a discretionary range enhancement up to 25% greater than a recommended sentence that is itself greater than the section 775.082 maximum leads us *898 to the conclusion that there is no such authority. We also note a subtle difference in the texts of section 921.001(5) and section 921.0014 as regards the imposition of a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum. Section 921.001(5) states that: "If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure." Section 921.0014 states: "If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure." In section 921.001(5), the pertinent term is "under the guidelines," while in section 921.0014 the term is "recommended under the guidelines." Because diff...

...In both provisions the legislature is referring to the raw "recommended sentence" and not to a sentence within the allowable 25% range. This is made clear by the careful specification in both provisions that "the sentence under the guidelines" [e.s.] must be imposed even though it exceeds the maximum provided in section 775.082. If the legislature had intended that the trial court could impose a recommended sentence that already exceeds the section 775.082 maximum by an additional 25%, the framework and text of the entire chapter strongly indicate that it would have worded the mandatory recommended sentence provision in both section 921.001(5) and section 921.0014(2) explicitly to include the additional 25% discretionary authority. Because in neither formulation did the legislature add any words that convey that precise meaning, it follows that the recommended sentence that must be imposed when it exceeds section 775.082 is the unenhanced version without the additional 25%....

...entencing judge. In other words this variance is not mandatory. The state reads the provision authorizing adjustments to the recommended sentence within the 25% range to allow the trial court to adjust a recommended sentence that is greater than the section 775.082 maximum by even an additional 25%....

...dge has the discretion to enhance it, why not also the discretion to mitigate it within the usual range? As we have just stated, we are unable to find anything in the statutory text that authorizes such a discretionary enhancement further beyond the section 775.082 maximum. We emphasize that we have no quarrel with the concept of the "wandering" maximum sentence now employed in the 1994 revision of the guidelines—by which we refer to the authority to impose a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum. This has the effect of increasing the maximum penalty set forth in section 775.082 by a period calculated in accordance with the defendant's prior record of convictions and the nature and circumstances of the sentencing offense....

...s of the primary and additional sentencing offenses, there is no possible claim of lack of notice as to the guidelines maximum that will be imposed for these offenses. *899 We expressly reject defendant's contention that, because there is nothing in section 775.082 that would give him notice to "check" chapter 921, he lacked notice of the precise penalty imposed on him. One is charged with knowledge of all the Florida Statutes, not merely the one that favors a party in litigation. We take express note of section 775.082(8), which provides in part that "a reference to this section constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference." This provision should alert the reader to the likelihood that section 775.082 has been incorporated into other statutes. Thus, when the statutes in chapter 921 refer to section 775.082, as sections 921.001(5) and 921.0014(2) expressly do, they have incorporated it by reference. The mere fact that section 775.082 itself does not expressly refer to sections 921.001(5) and 921.0014(2) does not render any of these statutes indefinite or unclear....

...5th DCA 1997), and suggests thereby that the sentence in this case was proper. In Martinez the court considered on motion for rehearing virtually the same issue we confront in this case. There is an important difference in that the recommended sentence in Martinez was within the section 775.082 maximum, while here it exceeds it. But the trial judge in Martinez elected to enhance the recommended sentence within the 25% permitted variance, and the enhanced sentence then exceeded the section 775.082 maximum....

..."After defining the `recommended sentence,' id. § 921.0014(1), to include the 25 percent increase and 25 percent decrease, the statute goes on to say, `If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure.' Id....

...When increased by 25 percent, the defendant's recommended sentence was 7.7 years, which exceeds the 5-year legal maximum. The trial court was entitled to impose the sentence that it did." 692 So.2d at 204. See also Mays v. State, 693 So.2d 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (recommended sentence less than section 775.082 maximum; sentence imposed greater than maximum but within 25% variance range; sentence affirmed on basis of Martinez )....

...provided by the total sentence points." As we have previously explained, we construe the quotation in Martinez taken from section 921.0014(1) [5] —"If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence *900 recommended under the guidelines must be imposed absent a departure"—to allow only a mitigating departure but not an aggravating departure further beyond the section 775.082 maximum....

...this provision, and the discretionary 25% variance provision of the same statute, to create an ambiguity which we must resolve in favor of the defendant. Thus while this provision authorizes the imposition of a recommended sentence greater than the section 775.082 maximum, it does not allow the imposition of sentence enhanced by a 25% variation above the recommended sentence. We disagree with the analysis of both Martinez and Mays to the extent that it applies to the case we face today, in which the recommended sentence itself exceeds the section 775.082 maximum without any variation. For these and additional reasons, we also disagree with Green v. State, 691 So.2d 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). In that case, the recommended sentence was 65.8 months and the trial court sentenced the defendant to 72 months, but the section 775.082 maximum was 60 months....

...Explaining its rationale, the court stated: "The emphasized line from section 921.001(5) quoted above should read, for purposes of clarity, as follows: `If the recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, a sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure.' It would appear, from a grammatical standpoint, that the articles in the foregoing sentence are misplaced in the printed statute." 691 So.2d at 503....

...larification" for grammatical purposes has effectually rewritten the statute. In the statutory text published by the legislature, the passage reads: "If a recommended sentence under the guidelines exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise authorized by s. 775.082, the sentence under the guidelines must be imposed, absent a departure." The reader will note that first the legislature has written "a recommended sentence"; but, after the reference to section 775.082, the legislature has written "the recommended sentence." The fifth district's revision of the statutory text is to change "the court must impose the sentence under the guidelines," to read instead that "the court must impose a sentenc...

...The indefinite article a has an accepted sense of "any, "while the definite article, the, used before a noun specifies a definite and specific noun, as opposed to any member of a class. [6] This transposition of articles enabled the fifth district to conclude that even when the recommended sentence exceeds the section 775.082 maximum the court could still impose a 25% variation sentence because it would still be a sentence under the guidelines....

...(Supp.1994). [6] Actually we do not agree that the use of a in the first reference to "recommended sentence" was grammatically improper. In context it is readily apparent that the legislature intended to refer to any recommended sentence that exceeds the section 775.082 maximum, so it was entirely proper for the legislature to use the indefinite a....

...ssault, and one count of tampering with evidence based on events that occurred when Toye was seventeen years old. The trial court sentenced Toye to the required sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murders, see § 775.082(1), Fla....

...still receive such a sentence under a discretionary sentencing scheme that takes into consideration the offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 . But the decisions in Miller and Roper effectively invalidated section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), as applied to juveniles convicted of a capital felony, such as Toye who was sentenced in 2006 under the identical statute....

...Reliance on the Old Rule Second, retroactive application of Miller does not cast a large cloud of uncertainty over the finality of judgments as have *546 other decisions retroactively affecting a defendant’s trial or conviction. The law that can no longer be enforced after Miller , section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), had been in effect since May 25,1994....

...1st DCA 2012) (Wolf, J., concurring) (suggesting the trial court “impose a sentence of a term of years up to life without [the] possibility of parole”) with Horsley v. State, 121 So.3d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA) (reviving the previous version of the statute, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and imposing a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years), review granted, No....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. *739 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. LAWRENCE, J. The appellant, Ennio Foresta (Foresta), was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), to fifteen years in prison for burglary of a dwelling. Foresta challenges section 775.082(8) on various constitutional grounds which have been rejected by this court in Turner v....

...1st DCA 1999), and Durden v. State, 743 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In accordance with Turner and Durden, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Foresta also argues that the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute, which authorizes sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender when a defendant is convicted of "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling[,]" section 775.082(8)(a)1.q, Florida Statutes (1997), should not apply in his case since he was convicted of the crime of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling....

...ary of an unoccupied dwelling." Id. at 1186 ( citing State v. White, 736 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). The Fourth District Court of Appeal, however, in State v. Huggins, 744 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in an en banc opinion, held that "the PRR section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q) does not apply to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling." Id....

...[2] Because this offense does not qualify for PRR sentencing, we reverse. The PRR statute in effect at the time of Gorham's offense specifies the offenses to which it applies. The only burglary offenses are "burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure." § 775.082(9)(a)1q, Fla. Stat. (2003), and "armed burglary." § 775.082(9)(a)1p, Fla....

...The statute does not include burglary of a conveyance or burglary with an assault or battery as a qualifying offense. The PRR statute also contains a "catchall provision" of "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)1 o, Fla....

...imposed sentence in this case. [2] Gorham's motion notes that the sentencing judge repeatedly stated during the sentencing hearing that he did not want to impose a life sentence but was required to do so because he felt bound by the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)3a, Fla....

...Appellant's lowest permissible prison sentence on the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet would have been 250.8 months while the maximum sentence he could have received would have been the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses as provided in section 775.082. § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000) ("The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing.")....

...Under the Apprendi analysis, the trial court erred in assessing victim injury points for moderate injury without a jury finding as to whether the "damage to person" was moderate or slight. "[I]n Florida, for purposes of determining a constitutional violation under Apprendi, the relevant `statutory maximum' is found in section 775.082." McCloud v....

...denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 553, 154 L.Ed.2d 455 (2002). The statutory maximum penalty for DUI manslaughter, a first degree felony pursuant to section 316.193(3)(c) 3.b., Florida Statutes (2000), is a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies for prison releas-ee reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...We disapprove the opinion in the conflicting case of Crapps . Paul Charles Paul was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Paul, 59 So.3d at 194 . Persons convicted under section 790.19 may be subjected to penalties under section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the “prison releasee reof-fender” (PRR) statute, which specifies that a defendant who commits “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” (...

..., the catchall provision) within three years of being released from a state correctional facility is a PRR who is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced to the *1060 mandatory minimum sentences specified in section 775.082(9)(a)3. In Paul’s case, the trial court determined that he qualified as a PRR under the catchall provision and thus sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen years for the second-degree felony of shooting into an occupied vehicle. See § 775.082(9)(a)3.c., Fla....

...as the 2001 version of the statute at issue in Paul. Crapps, 968 So.2d at 627 . Crapps appealed his conviction to the First District Court of Appeal, and argued that his conviction was not a qualifying offense to classify him as a PRR, under section section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2005) — the same argument that Paul made to the Fourth District....

...ANALYSIS The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether, as a matter of law, shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualified for enhanced sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, i.e. section 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...used or occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall *1062 be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...State, 31 So.3d 962, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Rather, the issue is whether the trial court had the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years in prison under the 10/20/Life statute, even though appellant was receiving a mandatory life sentence under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...nhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 750 (Fla.2010). Moreover, the plain language of section 775.087(2)(c) states: “If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...d by another sentencing statute. In this case, because appellant was convicted of a capital offense and did not receive the death penalty, the trial court was required to sentence appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). But the trial court was also required to impose a concurrent mandatory minimum sentence under the 10/20/Life statute, even if the 10/20/Life sentence was less than the sentence to be imposed under section 775.082(1). Here, the 10/20/Life statute authorized the trial court to sentence appellant within the range of 25 years to life under section 775.087(2)(a)3. Thus, while the trial court was required to sentence appellant to life in prison under section 775.082(1), the trial court had the discretion to impose a 25-year sentence as the concurrent mandatory minimum sentence under the 10/20/Life statute....

...3d DCA 2000); Diaz v. State, 567 So.2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Farrow v. State, 573 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.410. Third, Smith argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a prison releasee reoffender, pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2006). In order to seek the imposition of a prison releasee reoffender sentence, the State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a)3, Fla....

...To qualify as a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant must have committed or attempted to commit certain felonies, such as robbery, "within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections...." § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...Florida Statutes, to which appellant pled nolo contendere, is not "a crime which is, under the laws of this state, a felony of the first ... degree " [emphasis supplied] within the terms of § 958.04(1)(b). The terminology in question is defined by § 775.082(3), Florida Statutes, to include a felony which is punishable, "when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." Section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes, provides appellant's offense of second degree murder "shall constitute a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in § 775.082......

..., be classified a life *438 felony, beyond the purview of Chapter 982, because it may be punished by life imprisonment. Instead, the precisely stated classification of "life felony," in existence at the time Chapter 982 was adopted, was contained in § 775.082(3), Florida Statutes, limiting that class of felonies to those for which one may be punished as follows: "For a life felony, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years not less than 30....

...ree." We also note that the general classification section of Chapter 775 includes as a "felony of the first degree" an offense which "when specifically provided by statute [is punishable] by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life... ." Section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes. As above noted, the latter statute limits life felonies to those having a penalty of "a term of years not less than 30," which is not true for appellant's offense of second degree murder under § 775.082(3)(b)....

...[8] Again, Wainwright's sentences that are in issue in this claim are all life sentences. Accordingly, we order that the trial court's marks on these blanks be struck so that Wainwright's sentencing forms for the non-capital offenses reflect the imposition of no mandatory minimum terms under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and no retention of jurisdiction under section *516 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...disclosed or produced, grant a continuance, grant a mistrial, prohibit the party from calling a witness not disclosed or introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. [7] See § 775.082(1), Fla....

...n (lesser included of Count IV), and felony cruelty to animals (Count V). He was sentenced to life in prison without parole on Count I; life on Counts II and III, to run consecutive to Count I, as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida Statutes, section 775.082(9) (1997); one year on Count IV and five years on Count V, both to run consecutive to Count I....

...4th DCA 1999); Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999); as we did in Simmons, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: Does the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, codified as section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), violate *1289 the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution? As to the remaining issues he raises on appeal, we affirm as unpersuasive....

...Before WELLS and CORTIÑAS JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. CORTIÑAS, Judge. The State of Florida ("State") appeals on the ground that the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant, Sergio Garcia, below the mandated sentence required under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("Act"), section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Under the Act, the State may seek to have a defendant sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender and, as such, the defendant is not eligible for a sentence under the sentencing guidelines. In those situations, the defendant "must be sentenced" as provided under the Act. § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...er a valid traffic stop. A third count involving felony driving while license suspended or revoked was severed. In the prosecution for the batteries, the State filed timely written notice of intent to seek to have the appellant sentenced pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides for an enhanced penalty for prison releasee reoffenders [1] . The trial court found that the appellant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8)(a)....

...Second, the appellant challenges the Act as a violation of the separation of powers clause. Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. This argument was found meritless in Woods, in which another panel of our court certified the following question: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 740 So.2d at 25....

...To support its position, the State notes that the prison releasee reoffender statute includes the express "intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph [8](a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection." § 775.082(8)(d)1., Fla....

...individual." Given the requisite proof that the appellant is a prison releasee reoffender, the trial court properly relied upon statutory subsection (8)(a)2.d., which mandates "a term of imprisonment of 5 years" for a third-degree felony. Nowhere in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), did the Legislature address consecutive vs....

...lected to impose the terms concurrently because consecutive sentences were not "necessary." The conviction and sentences are AFFIRMED. BARFIELD, C.J., and LAWRENCE, J., CONCUR. NOTES [1] The "Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act," which amended section 775.082, Florida Statutes, took effect on May 30, 1997, the date of the appellant's offenses....

...The appellant challenges an order of the trial court summarily denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. The *1033 appellant alleged that he was convicted of a second-degree felony, and that his current sentence of 20 years total exceeds the statutory maximum for second-degree felonies, which is 15 years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...L'Italien, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. GROSS, J. After a jury trial, appellant Derrick Gurley was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling. The trial court sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...cocaine, grand theft, reckless driving, and driving while license suspended. Watson raises four points on appeal, three of which require reversal. First, Watson argues that his sentences imposed pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (Act), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), must be reversed because the Act is unconstitutional....

...enses. Watson contends that resisting arrest with violence is not a qualifying offense under the Act. However, the Act includes as a qualifying offense "any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(8)(a)1....

...provisions of section 775.084 upon remand. Fourth, Watson argues that his sentencing points were improperly enhanced by the law enforcement multiplier because the information did not charge him with a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act, section 775.0823, Florida Statutes (1997). When the information fails to charge the defendant with a violation of section 775.0823, the defendant cannot be sentenced pursuant to its provisions....

...State, 652 So.2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Turner v. State, 623 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The defendant's reliance is misplaced however, because these cases are factually distinguishable. In this regard, the cases cited above involved "life felonies" punishable under section 775.082(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, whereas here the defendant's crimes are first degree felonies punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life under section 775.082(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes....

...In all other respects, the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J. and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.02(2)(b), (1989). [2] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). [3] §§ 794.011(3), 777.04(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). [4] § 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat....

...d guilty of resisting an officer with violence. Since resisting an officer with violence is a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence, the offense is a qualifying offense under the prison releasee reoffender statute. See § 775.082(8)(a)1....

...Clark argues that, because he was incarcerated in county jail at the time the offense occurred, he cannot be considered a releasee. We disagree. There is no restriction in the language of the statute concerning a person's confinement status when a qualifying crime is committed. See § 775.082(8)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (1997). The term releasee only has reference to a defendant's having been "released from a state correctional facility" within the specified period of three years, not whether the defendant is currently incarcerated. § 775.082(8)(a)1., Fla....

...incarcerated and within three years of being released from Florida State Prison, is a qualifying offense under the prison releasee reoffender statute. Next, Clark contends that his sentence imposed pursuant to the prison releasee reoffender statute, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), must be reversed because the statute is unconstitutional....

...Clark was charged and found guilty of resisting the officers with violence. He received a five-year term of imprisonment under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, which is only slightly longer than the sentence he likely would have received under the guidelines. Section 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ), Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes prison releasee reoffender treatment for any person who commits "any felony that involves the use or threat of use of physical force or violence against an individual," so long as the person qualifies as a prison releasee. [1] We already have special penalties for violent crimes against correctional officers. See § 775.0823, Fla....

...I fully agree that correctional officers have a difficult job and need the protection of the law, but this Act is likely to result in more problems than solutions within our prisons and jails. NOTES [1] Although not applicable at the time of this case, section 775.082(9)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), now designates all state prisoners, whether they ever have been released, as releasee reoffenders.

...ury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or policymaking duties and was not a violation of a law, whether or not a violation was charged, for which the maximum penalty which may be imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082. To interpret the effect of this amendment, we must look to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1993), which sets forth the penalties for categories of crimes, to determine which violations of law carry penalties in excess of 60 days....

...Conduct tantamount to a second-degree misdemeanor would not abrogate a managerial employee's worker's compensation immunity under subsection 440.11(1) because a second-degree misdemeanor carries a maximum term of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days. § 775.082(4)(b), Fla....

...Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. After pleading guilty to two counts of felony petit theft, Wilford McCloud was sentenced to two years in prison, followed by two years of community control. He now appeals, contending that pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2009), he should have received a non-state prison sanction. We disagree and affirm. The Florida Legislature enacted section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, which provides: (10) If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...ection in other parts of the community. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing McCloud to a prison sanction based on its determination that McCloud "could present a danger to the public." There is nothing in the language of section 775.082(10) that suggests that the Legislature intended to limit the meaning of "danger to the public" only to persons threatening physical violence or injury....

...Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. JOANOS, J. Appellant appeals both the denial of his motion to declare the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act unconstitutional, and the judgment and sentence imposed pursuant to that statute, i.e., section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). Appellant challenges the constitutionality of section *65 775.082(8) on eight separate grounds....

...concurrently with 30-year violent career criminal sentences, because it is fundamental that a person cannot be sentenced twice for the same offense). In Crump, this court rejected the vagueness argument advanced by appellant in this case, i.e., that section 775.082(8) is unconstitutionally vague because the legislature failed to define the terms "sufficient evidence," "material witness," the degree of materiality required, "extenuating circumstances," and "just prosecution." The court explained...

...However, we certify the following question previously certified in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), review granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999), as a question of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED....

...ysical force or violence against an individual" within three years after being released from a state correctional facility in this, or any other jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense whose punishment is more than a year in this state. § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla....

...The issue to be here resolved is whether the offense of attempted burglary of an unoccupied structure is a felony of the third degree or a misdemeanor of the first degree. Appellant urges that the trial court erred when imposing a five year sentence pursuant to Section 775.082(3)(d) Florida Statutes (1975) upon adjudicating appellant guilty of attempted burglary of an unoccupied structure in accordance with his plea of guilty....

...Section 777.04(4)(c) Florida Statutes (1975) provides: "If the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to is a felony of the second degree or any burglary, the person convicted shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084." The Attorney General of the State of Florida, in Opinion 077-4, attempted to construe and interpret several statutes therein cited, and concluded: "It is my firm opinion that the phrase `......

...It is within the province of the legislature to punish attempted burglaries more severely than other attempted third degree felonies. The statute clearly provides that if the offense attempted was "any burglary" then the person convicted shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. Section 775.082 Florida Statutes (1975), entitled "Penalties" provides punishment "For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years." The learned trial judge did not err....

MAY, C.J. The defendant appeals his sentence of five years in prison for grand theft. He argues the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence to a prison term without a jury finding that he was a “danger to the community,” pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...ing the defendant was a “danger to the community.” Defense counsel objected and argued that a jury must find the defendant is a “danger to the community” under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...nity,” citing McCloud v. State, 55 So.3d 643 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The court sentenced the defendant to five years in prison. On appeal, the defendant continues to argue that the trial court was required to sentence him to non-state sanctions under section 775.082(10) absent a jury finding that he was a “danger to the community.” He argues that under Blakely , he is entitled to a jury determination of any fact which enhances his sentence. We disagree for two reasons. First, section 775.082(10) is a mitigation 1 statute, not an enhancement statute....

...Let’s start with Florida’s crime and punishment statutes. The State charged the defendant with grand theft, pursuant to section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2010). The grand theft charge is a third-degree felony subject to a maximum penalty of five years in Florida State Prison. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...the maximum sentence allowed for the degree of crime. § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. (2010). In 2009, due to an ever-increasing prison population, the cost of prison building and operation, and the downturn in the economy, the Florida Legislature enacted section 775.082(10)....

...only to another separate crime, rather than those involved in a single prosecution.” Stafford, 818 So.2d at 694 (citation omitted); Mondesir, 814 So.2d at 1173 (footnote and emphasis omitted). To support that holding, those courts also relied upon section 775.082(2)(d)’s accompanying legislative staff analysis: Consecutive Sentences The bill provides that the Legislature intends for the new minimum mandatory sentences to be imposed for each qualifying count, and the court is required to impo...

...Sousa II’s later disapproval of Mondesir’s holding implicitly rejected our reasoning in Arutyunyan . Because Arutyunyan conflicts with today’s decision, we recede from Arutyunyan . In reaching our conclusion, we note that the supreme court in Sousa II did not address our sister courts’ reliance upon section 775.082(2)(d)’s accompanying legislative staff analysis advising that the statute “does not explicitly prohibit a judge from imposing the minimum mandatory sentences concurrent to each other.” Fla....

...ximum for these offenses. See, e.g., Caraballo v. State, 805 So.2d 882, 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (finding no error in imposing victim injury points that increased the defendant's sentence because the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997)); McCloud v....

...Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does not authorize a court to impose a lesser sentence than otherwise required by law. . . . (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...maximum is thereby increased and the court must impose the minimum mandatory. Id. at 519-20. Appellant's conviction was based upon his discharge of a firearm which resulted in the victim's death. He was convicted of a second degree felony and under section 775.082(3)(c), the statutory maximum sentence is fifteen years....

...der to the harshest sentence possible when the offender is convicted of an enumerated crime and uses a firearm. In this case, the defendant was convicted of third degree murder, a second degree felony offense, carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." Subsection (2)(c) then provides that "[i]f the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...Nothing in section 775.087(2) or Inmon v. State, 932 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), suggests otherwise. The jury made a finding that defendant discharged a firearm and killed the victim during a robbery. The ordinary penalty for this second-degree felony is 15 years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. . . . [(c)] If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...is not sincere in her expression of remorse. (3) That the Defendant poses a very real threat to the community and that imprisonment is the only real deterrent this Court sees to future criminal acts by this Defendant. Dinkines appeals her sentence. Section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2010), adopted in 2009, provides: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction. However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. § 775.082(10), Fla....

...3d DCA 2012) (“[A] defendant’s expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility are appropriate factors for the court to consider in mitigation of a sentence....”). However, this remorse factor was of no legal import regarding Dinkines’s sentence pursuant to the various requirements of section 775.082(10)....

...nonstate prison sanction. The record in this case does not support the trial court’s finding that Din-kines could be a danger to the public without a prison sentence. Thus, the trial court must fashion a nonstate prison sentence that comports with section 775.082(10)....

...Stat. (2010). . Dinkines stipulated that the thumbprint on the Florida Pawn Broker Transaction Form from the pawnshop belonged to her. . As Dinkines's conviction was for a third-degree felony, the statutory maximum for her crime was five years. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). This court has recently characterized section 775.082(10) as a "mandated mitigation of an otherwise available maximum penalty.” Porter v....

...The question in Mendenhall was whether the trial court could impose a thirty-five-year minimum mandatory sentence under section 775.087(2)(a)3 for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm when the maximum sentence for that offense is thirty years under section 775.082(3)(b)-(c). 48 So.3d at 742. The supreme court concluded first that "the specific provisions of section 775.087(2)(a)(3) prevail over the general provisions of the [sic] 775.082 regarding statutory maximums." 48 So.3d at 748....

..." 48 So.3d at 750 *1044 (emphasis added). "[W]e conclude that the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082." 48 So.3d at 742....

...r. Thus, his upward departure sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense. Affirmed. DAVIS, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur. . The judgment describes this conviction as a first-degree life felony. This designation was not based on section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), but rather on section 775.084(4)(a)(l).

...State, 770 So.2d 655, 658 (Fla.2000), the supreme court looked to legislative intent to determine that sentencing a defendant both under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act ("PRRA") and as a HFO does not violate double jeopardy. The PRRA was a separate sentencing provision contained in section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Because there are differences between the provisions for discretionary early release, designation as both a HFO and a VCC does make some difference to appellant. Therefore, the trial court must choose one or the other but not both. Unlike the PRRA, there is no mandatory duty on the court to sentence as a VCC. Compare § 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla....

...enty-one year old. A review of a sentence in the context of a constitutional violation is subject to de novo review. Guzman v. State, 68 So.3d 295, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The trial court found that Dempsey was a "prison releasee reoffender." Under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, a defendant who qualifies as a "prison releasee reoffender" must be sentenced in accordance with the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("Act"). Under the Act, for a felony "punishable by life," a defendant is subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. § 775.082(9)(a)3.a., Fla. Stat. (2002) Furthermore, Dempsey was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, which is subject to life imprisonment. See §§ 782.04(1)(a), 777.04(4)(b), 775.087(1)(a), 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla....

...However, the defendant does not allege that a plea offer was ever made to her nor that her trial counsel advised her to reject the plea offer. As such, the defendant's allegation is insufficient to obtain relief. [2] AFFIRMED. PLEUS and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 775.082(9)(a)3-b, 775.082(9)(b) Fla....

...At the plea conference, Eldredge admitted he had been released from prison within the last three years. Eldredge pled guilty to the information as charged; the State maintained he should be sentenced as a PRR for the burglary of a dwelling charge. § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). According to the State, the burglary charge qualified as a predicate offense for imposition of a PRR sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), Florida Statutes, "Burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling." The court noted there was conflict among the Circuits, regarding whether or not the word "occupied" modified "dwelling" in the statute, i.e., whether the...

...ng the occupancy of the dwelling. Therefore, we find the trial court did not commit error in refusing to sentence Eldredge as a PRR, where he was only adjudicated guilty of burglary of a dwelling. Yet, the State contends statutory amendments made to section 775.082(9)(a)(1), effective July 1, 2001, merely "clarified" existing law, and should therefore be applied retroactively, permitting the PRRPA sentencing sought in this case. § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), Fla....

...Because appellant is not entitled to relief under either rule, we affirm. In this case, appellant was convicted in 1992 of first degree murder and armed robbery. He was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. The court sentenced him to life in prison on both counts. Pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1989), appellant’s conviction for the capital offense of first degree murder required that the court impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years....

...The statute in effect at the time appellant committed his offenses on August 30, 1990, provided in relevant part: "A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole ... § 775.082(1), Fla....

...(2001), and burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (2001). Bodie challenges his convictions on several grounds, but we find no error and affirm the convictions without further discussion. Bodie also contends that he was improperly sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender, § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (2001). On this point he is correct. We reverse the sentences and remand for further proceedings. It is the State's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender. § 775.082(9)(a)(3)....

...tention "was born of judicial interpretation." C.C., 841 So.2d at 658. Precedent on this issue reflects a distinction in adult and juvenile sentencing. In the criminal justice system, the maximum sentence for an offense is prescribed by statute. See § 775.082, Fla....

...Consequently, mandatory credit on indeterminate commitments is counterproductive to the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society set out by the Legislature in chapter 985. The ceiling on juvenile residential commitments corresponding to the punishment authorized for the same offense in section 775.082, Florida Statutes, can also preempt rehabilitation and the protection of society....

...certified question regarding statutory revival in the negative, quash the underlying decision that adopted statutory revival as the remedy, and remand this case for resentencing in conformance with chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes. BACKGROUND Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr., was seventeen years old in June 2006 when he participated in the robbery of a convenience store in Palm Bay, Florida, during which one of the owners was shot in the chest and killed....

...present.” The State argued that Miller “did not prohibit, as a categorical bar, a life sentence, without the possibility of parole, to a juvenile offender, convicted of first-degree murder.” According to the State, Miller stands for the proposition that § 775.082(1), Fla....

...Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). This language, which made the sentence for first-degree murder a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender who is ineligible for the death penalty, was included in section 775.082(1) from May 25, 1994 until July 1, 2014. -6- a trial court “has to have some discretion to be able to examine the background, the facts, and the circumstances, the age of the Defendant, t...

...district courts as to how to comply with Miller, the Fifth District certified the following question for this Court’s review: WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012), WHICH INVALIDATED SECTION 775.082(1)’S MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES CONVICTED OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER, OPERATES TO REVIVE THE PRIOR SENTENCE OF LIFE WITH PAROLE ELIGIBILITY AFTER 25 YEARS PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED IN THAT STATUTE? Id....

...mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 2470, 2471, 2475. Under Miller, a “mandatory sentencing scheme[]” that requires life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender—as did the version of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, in effect from May 25, 1994 until July 1, 2014—violates the Eighth Amendment. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. The State does not dispute that the prior version of section 775.082(1) is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders under Miller, because it provided for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of a capital homicide offense and di...

...2d DCA 2014) (Villanti, J., concurring in part and - 13 - dissenting in part) (“No one disagrees that the effect of the decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Miller is to invalidate the current version of section 775.082(1).”)....

...cited favorably to the statutory revival option. See Rodriguez-Giudicelli v. State, 143 So. 3d 947, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding that “the trial court did not err when it applied the doctrine of statutory revival to sentence Rodriguez-Giudicelli pursuant to the 1993 version of section 775.082(1) for a premeditated murder - 15 - committed when he was a minor”); Toye, 133 So....

...sentencing options available to it on remand” and stating that “this court should address the issue and specifically should utilize the doctrine of statutory revival to authorize the postconviction court to impose a legal sentence on Toye pursuant to the 1993 version of section 775.082(1)”). The second approach regarding the appropriate remedy allows for “a sentence of a term of years without possibility of parole,” which Judge Wolf’s separate opinion in Washington considered to be the only option t...

...view that “the trial judge’s decision to resentence the juvenile defendant in this case to forty years without parole on the murder charge finds express statutory support in Florida’s sentencing statute” because the defendant could be sentenced as a “life” felon under section 775.082(3)(a)3....

...Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida - 17 -  The substantive provisions of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, that are of importance to the issue currently before this Court are set forth in sections one, two, and three of the legislation, which have been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes....

....... [Section 2] 921.1401—Sentence of life imprisonment for persons who are under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense; sentencing proceedings.— (1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of an offense described in s. 775.082(1)(b), s. 775.082(3)(a)5., s. 775.082(3)(b)2., or s. 775.082(3)(c) which was committed on or after July 1, 2014, the court may conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine if a term of imprisonment for life or a term of years equal to life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. (2) I...

...� means a person sentenced to imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2014, and committed before he or she attained 18 years of age. (2)(a) A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b)1....

...been convicted of one of the following offenses, or conspiracy to commit one of the following offenses, if the offense for which the person was previously convicted was part of a separate criminal transaction or episode than that which resulted in the sentence under s. 775.082(1)(b)1.: 1....

...Human trafficking for commercial sexual activity with a child under 18 years of age; 9. False imprisonment under s. 787.02(3)(a); or 10. Kidnapping. (b) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 25 years under s. 775.082(3)(a)5.a. or s. 775.082(3)(b)2.a. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years. (c) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 15 years under s. 775.082(1)(b)2., s. 775.082(3)(a)5.b., or s. 775.082(3)(b)2.b....

...with parole eligibility. See Partlow, 134 So. 3d at 1032 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The State of Florida unequivocally advocates that only one constitutional sentencing option exists: revival of the 1993 version of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which imposes a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 25 years.”)....

...Defendant, Frank Wise, was charged with burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. The crimes occurred in the home of his mother, Bernice Wise, on July 31, 1997. The state filed a notice of intent to seek classification of defendant as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), which became effective May 30, 1997....

...are to be punished to the full extent of the law unless any one of certain specified circumstances exist, specifically that the victim does not desire the offender to receive a mandatory sentence and provides a written statement to that effect. See § 775.082(8)(d)c, Fla....

...She also acknowledged her signature on the witness statement. The court ruled that the defendant would be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines for the crimes of burglary of a dwelling and petit theft and refused to apply the harsher sentence [2] called for under section 775.082(8)(a)....

...It is left to the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion whether or not to accept the victim's written statement in mitigation or reject it and sentence the defendant under subsection (8)(a) 2. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We note that section 775.082(8) is not a model of clarity and may be susceptible to differing constructions. That being so, section 775.021(1) [3] requires us to construe section 775.082(8) most favorably to the accused....

...ct conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Cotton, 728 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA, 1998), with which we are in accord. Thus, we certify direct conflict with McKnight. AFFIRMED. POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.082(8) provides as follows: (8)(a)1....

...ing Attorneys Association, Inc. The association must maintain such information, and make such information available to the public upon request, for at least a 10-year period. [2] Defendant would be subject to a term of imprisonment of 15 years under Section 775.082(8)(a)2.c, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...A prison releasee reoffender sentence is appropriate only if the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced is one of the *747 enumerated felonies or "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla....

...ced as a habitual felon. Our supreme court reversed, holding that the imposition of a habitual offender sentence pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1995), was not authorized after revocation of probation where a guidelines sentence under section 775.082 was originally imposed....

...y for a third-degree felony. [1] *517 See King, 681 So.2d at 1140 (a sentence which is not authorized by statute is also illegal pursuant to rule 3.800 if the total sentence imposed exceeds the statutory maximum for the particular offense); see also § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...tutional liberty interests." 658 So.2d at 986. Like Callaway, where our supreme court found that consecutive habitual offender sentences were not statutorily authorized, our supreme court found in King that sentencing a defendant under both sections 775.082 and 775.084 is "not authorized by section 775.084" and is "in fact inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." King, 681 So.2d at 1140....

...3.700, 3.800(a), 3.800(b), and 3.850 (2009), to correct, vacate, or set aside his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). Appellant *981 argues that because his prior release from prison occurred before the effective date of the PRR statute (§ 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

...Second, even if considered on the merits, Appellant's facial and "as applied" challenges to the PRR statute are absurd. Appellant's facial challenge has been addressed and rejected by clear precedent. At the time Appellant was sentenced as a PRR in 1998, section 775.082(9)(a)(1) defined a PRR as any defendant who committed an enumerated offense "within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor." Ample caselaw has found n...

...ful. Similarly meritless is Appellant's "as applied" challenge. Appellant was released from imprisonment on October 19, 1995. Within three years of his release, on July 28, 1998, he committed robbery, an enumerated offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(g), Fla....

...Attempted second degree murder is a second degree felony. See §§ 782.04(2), 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006). If the offense is committed with a firearm, the crime is reclassified to a first degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1)(b), subject to a sentence not to exceed thirty years. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) was twenty-five years to life imprisonment. However, once the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty year maximum penalty for a first degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b)....

...The trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to correct sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1) is AFFIRMED. The rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), does not apply when the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum permitted by section 775.082, Florida Statutes....

...[1] The State concedes error. The State concedes that the twenty-five-year sentence is illegal and must be vacated because it exceeds the statutory maximum allowed under the Act for attempted second-degree murder, a felony of the second degree. [2] See § 775.082(8)(a)2 c, Fla....

...If the State does not agree to the fifteen year sentence, then Howell must be allowed to withdraw his plea. We affirm the denial of Howell's other claim without discussion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. BLUE, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). The Act now appears at section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant's conviction of robbery by sudden snatching, but reverse the five year mandatory minimum condition of his ten year sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. Section 775.082(9)(a)1g, Florida Statutes (2002) of the Act includes a robbery committed within three years after being released from prison, but does not refer to robbery by sudden snatching....

...12 years of age or older, without that person's consent, and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury is guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1987) states in pertinent part: (3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows: (a) For a life felony committed prior to October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years not less than 30 and, for a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. (Emphasis added). The emphasized language of section 775.082(3)(a) gives the court the discretion to sentence Frison to less than forty years....

...In considering the rule 3.800(a) claim, the postconviction court found that McDuffie pleaded no contest to second-degree murder, a violation of section 782.04, Florida Statutes (1991), a felony of the first-degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in section 775.082. Therefore, the postconviction court found that McDuffie's sole reliance on section 775.082 was misplaced as section 782.04 specifically provided that second-degree murder is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life....

...irearm, a violation of sections 782.04(2) and 775.087, Florida Statutes (1991). Pursuant to section 782.04(2), second-degree murder is "a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...rson is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony. Therefore, McDuffie's second-degree murder conviction required reclassification to a life felony due to McDuffie's use of a firearm. Section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), states that a person who has been convicted of a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, may be punished by "a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years." Therefore, McDuffie's forty-five-year prison sentence exceeds the forty-year statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(a)....

...State, 804 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Consequently, McDuffie's forty-five-year prison sentence is illegal and must be reversed. See Ramos v. State, 931 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that fifty-year sentence for life felony was illegal where section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), proscribed punishment by life imprisonment or for a term not exceeding forty years); Miranda v....

...The defendant, Dax Anthony Rodriguez, appeals the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to *1223 rule 3.850, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure, complaining that the judge improperly sentenced him both under the habitual offender statute and under the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Grand theft is not an enumerated offense under PRR. The state, however, argues that Rodriguez can be sentenced under PRR under count one. We disagree. There is a conflict in the districts as to whether burglary of an unoccupied dwelling qualifies for PRR treatment. Section 775.082(8)(a) enumerates "[b]urglary of an occupied structure or dwelling" as applicable for sentencing under PRR....

...4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, 761 So.2d 332 (Fla.2000) the Fourth District unanimously held in its en banc decision that "[b]ecause of the rule of lenity codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997), we conclude that the word `occupied' found in section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(q) modifies both structure and dwelling." Thus, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses and PRR is not applicable to sentencing for a conviction on that charge....

...Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. Larry Carl Cook appeals his conviction and sentencing for robbery with a firearm [1] and resisting arrest without violence. [2] Cook was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act....

...AFFIRMED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. ON MOTION TO CERTIFY THOMPSON, J. We grant the Appellant's Motion to Certify and certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur....

...2d DCA 2001), the decision to seek prison releasee reoffender sentencing is usually made by the assistant state attorney. There is no allegation that Tanner was involved in making this decision. Further, it appears that the discretion of the prosecutor under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is fairly limited. Section 775.082(9)(d) provides that it is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison, who commit certain crimes, be punished to the fullest extent of the law as provided by the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act....

...*1238 of the entire office staff. See Meggs in and for Second Judicial Circuit v. McClure, 538 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Stabile also challenges the validity of his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender. He was sentenced as such pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)1, as a defendant who committed armed burglary within three years of being released from a state correction facility....

...sonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 810.02(b). The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act mandates a sentence of life imprisonment for a "felony punishable by life," and a term of thirty years for a "felony of the first degree." § 775.082(9)(a)3.a; b., Fla....

...This court has held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act mandates a life sentence for felonies "punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." State v. Newmones, 765 So.2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The first and fourth districts agree but have certified the question. *1239 DOES SECTION 775.082(8)(a)2a, FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT "A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY LIFE," APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING LIFE? Bennett v....

...eoffender Act because armed burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not specified as a qualifying offense under the Act. In State v. Huggins, ___ So.2d ___, 2001 WL 278107 (Fla. Mar.22, 2001), the Florida Supreme Court held that the word "occupied" in section 775.082(9)(a)1.q....

...ims made by the defense and fair comment on the evidence. [3] Cases Nos. 92-35473, 93-33755 and 93-32068. [4] The statute provides that "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling" is a qualifying offense under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. § 775.082(9)(a)1.q., Fla....

...entices any person less than 16 years of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality, prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity commits lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...th any other object; and, that the victim was between the ages of twelve and sixteen. See § 800.04(1)(a), (4), Fla. Stat. (1999). If the State succeeded in proving these elements, the accused faced a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison. See § 775.082(3)(c) Fla....

...The verdict the jury returned in this case finds only that the Defendant was guilty of lewd and lascivious battery. Therefore, the Defendant's argument that it is impossible to determine that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was penetration is correct. This is not, however, dispositive to the State. Under section 775.082, the Defendant could have been sentenced to fifteen years in prison. See § 775.082 Fla....

...first degree felony, and that he therefore should not have been sentenced to a thirty year term of imprisonment. An aggravated battery is ordinarily a second degree felony punishable by a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment. See § 784.045(2), and § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. However, the appellant's offense was properly reclassified as a first degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, and was thus punishable by up to thirty years imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...If, as in the instant case, the offense is committed with a firearm, the crime is reclassified to a first-degree felony pursuant to section 775.087(1)(b), subject to an enhanced sentence not to exceed thirty years. See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); see also § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...of sentencing error. We reverse and remand for resentencing. Because the state relied solely on hearsay evidence regarding Appellant's release date from prison, it failed to prove an essential requirement for sentencing pursuant to the PRR Act. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...That attempt offense is a life felony, punishable by a "term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years net exceeding life imprisonment." [2] However, an attempted capital sexual battery is classified as a first degree *277 felony. [3] It is punishable at a maximum of 30 years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...State, 711 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). A defendant cannot by a plea agreement accept a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum. See Gonzales at 722. REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 794.011(2), 777.04(4)(b), 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. [2] § 775.082(3)(a)3, Fla....

...The trial court sentenced Moss to twenty-five years’ incarceration followed by five years’ probation on his convictions for counts two, four, five, and six. Each of the foregoing convictions was for a second-degree felony with a statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. See §§ 800.04, 775.082(3)(e), Fla....

...sed by the trial court in this case exceeded those authorized by the Code. See § 921.0024(2); Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (“If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed.”)....

statutory support in Florida’s sentencing statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes. In short, while federal

...On appeal, the State argues this case, which involved the defendant biting the victim and causing the need for emergency medical attention, sufficiently established the requisite violence for imposition of a PRR sentence for the felony battery charge under the catch-all provision of section 775.082(9)(a)1.( o ), Florida Statutes (2005). That provision provides for a PRR sentence for "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)1.( o )....

...r violence." Spradlin, 967 So.2d at 378. The defendant was released from the Department of Corrections on August 23, 2005. Less than a year later, the defendant committed the instant felony battery charge. This qualifies the defendant as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)1.( o )....

...However, we need not decide that issue because Miller does not apply to Starks’ sentence. The record reveals that Starks’ conviction of second-degree murder was enhanced to a life felony under section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000), because of his use of a firearm. Section 775.082(3)(a)(3) provides that a life felony is to be punished “by a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” Thus, because the statute under which Starks was sentenced did not...

...on Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”) sentence for attempted burglary of a structure while masked is an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) because this offense does not qualify him for an enhanced sentence under section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2012) (the “PRR statute”)....

...Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Wilkes qualified as a PRR. On the charge of attempted burglary while masked, the court imposed a thirty-year sentence on him as a habitual felony offender, with an additional fifteen-year sentence under the PRR statute. 2 Section 775.082(9)(a) establishes enhanced and mandatory sentences under certain defined circumstances and for certain enumerated felonies....

...another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...The crime of attempted felony murder for which Wilkes was also convicted falls within the statute, and this court finds no error in imposing the enhanced PRR sentence for this charge. However, the crime of attempted burglary of a structure is not a specifically enumerated offense under section 775.082(9)(a). The PRR statute may apply to that charge if it is deemed a qualifying offense under the statute’s so-called “catch-all” provision. See § 775.082(9)(a)l.o, Fla....

...upied at the time of the offense. The statutory elements of this crime do not require proof of the use or threat of use of physical force or violence. Therefore, the offense cannot qualify as a predicate offense under the “catchall” provision of section 775.082(9)(a)l.o....

...Valentine Rodriguez entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of aggravated assault [1] and three counts of felony battery, [2] with the understanding that he would be sentenced to a total of ten years' imprisonment, minimum mandatory, as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...State, 867 So.2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), we conclude that these consecutive sentences, which arise from one criminal episode and together exceed the maximum incarceration permitted for any individual count under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, see § 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), remain illegal and must be reversed....

...For the count of attempted armed robbery, the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years, to run concurrently with the life sentence. Felony murder in Florida is a capital felony punishable by death or a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See §§ 782.04(l)(a)2.d., and 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...entencing in conformance with that opinion. The sentence imposed as to count 2 is affirmed. AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ROWE, J., concurs; WOLF, J., concurs with Opinion. . Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2009), states in full: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s....

...cted of any one of the crimes listed in the statute. Neither manslaughter nor attempted manslaughter appears on the list. He also asserted that attempted manslaughter was a second degree felony punishable by no more than fifteen years in prison. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Count [I] of this case.” Cunningham argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty years each on counts II and III because the maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter with a firearm, a second degree felony, is fifteen years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2002)....

....... The total sentence points shall be calculated only as a means of determining the lowest permissible sentence. The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively.... If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. If the total sentence points are greater than or equal to 363, the court may sentence the offender to life imprisonment. (emphasis added.) Thus, according to section 921.0024(2), the fifteen-year maximum under section 775.082 is inapplicable and, at the motion hearing, the trial court properly resentenced Cunningham to twenty years in prison on counts I and II without a minimum mandatory....

...Here, the appellant points to the portion of the record which demonstrates his entitlement to relief. Moreover, if the appellant's assertions are correct, his sentence of 20 years' imprisonment exceeds the maximum authorized sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for a second-degree felony. See § 775.082, Fla....

...First, he argues that the trial court erred in enhancing the false imprisonment charge from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony based on his use of a weapon during the offense. Second, he asserts that the trial court erred in imposing a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2006), on the false imprisonment charge....

...However, we reverse for correction of the PRR sentence that was imposed in error. A defendant may be sentenced as a PRR if the defendant commits or attempts to commit any of the crimes specifically listed in the PRR statute or if the felony involved "the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o )....

...— whether a PRR sentence may be based on a false imprisonment conviction—and, applying Hearns, have concluded that a conviction for false imprisonment is not subject *119 to PRR sentencing. See Mosquera v. State, 16 So.3d 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("Section 775.082(9)(a) provides that certain enumerated offenses may be sentenced as a PRR, but false imprisonment is not among them."); Sinclair v. State, 973 So.2d 665, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("False imprisonment is not an enumerated felony under subparagraph 775.082(9)(a)[(]1[)].")....

...rowing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. § 776.08. The list of offenses subject to PRR sentencing in accordance with section 775.082(9)(a)(1) is similar, especially the phrase "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." [2] This finding by the jury was required in order to enhance Mr....

...dure 3.800(a). Because his two rule 3.800(a) motions concern the same claim, we consolidate his appeals sua sponte. The postconviction court determined that Mr. Johnson's sentences did not violate the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRR), § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...The supreme court observed that, under the PRR, "`[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to [the HFO statute] or any other provision.'" Id. at 658 (citing § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997), now § 775.082(9)(c)) (emphasis supplied)....

...e incarceration period of the HFO sentence exceeds the PRR sentence. Id. at 658-59. The sentences in Grant involved equal periods of incarceration under the HFO and PRR. Grant's reasoning is equally applicable to a true split sentence. We reiterate, section 775.082(9)(c) provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law....

...2001-239, § 1, at 2193, Laws of Fla. Because Mr. Dehart committed his crime after the effective date of the amendment, the State's notice that the defendant qualified for PRR sentencing was appropriate. The trial court was required to sentence Mr. Dehart in accordance with section 775.082(9)(a)(3)(c), and its later decision to strike the PRR designation was erroneous. *617 Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the defendant is entitled to be present. ALTENBERND, C.J., and VILLANTI, J., Concur. NOTES [1] § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), Fla....

...greater sentence, Tilley should have received no more than a total of fifteen years in prison or probation for each offense. The seventeen-year sentences imposed (seven years prison and ten years probation) on each count is an illegal sentence. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...ER, J. Keith Cassista appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. He alleges that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”) under section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2006), because he had not been “released from a state correctional facility” within three years prior to the date that he committed the offense in the instant case....

...State, 864 So.2d 492, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). To qualify as a PRR, the defendant must have committed or attempted to commit certain enumerated felonies “within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections .... ” § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. W. SHARP, J. Smith appeals from his judgment and sentence for armed robbery, [1] for which he received enhanced punishment (a thirty-year term in prison) under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...5th DCA 1999), rev. granted, Case No. 96,765, 751 So.2d 1252 (Fla. Jan. 18, 2000); Moon v. State, 737 So.2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), rev. granted, Case No. 96,459, 751 So.2d 1253 (Fla, Jan. 6, 2000); Cook v. State, 737 So.2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997) provides in part: (8)(a)1....

...rsuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2001). Brown asserts that his split sentence of 35 years' incarceration followed by 10 years of probation exceeds the statutory maximum penalty of 30 years' incarceration for a first-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...The trial court did not impose a minimum mandatory term of 45 years, but a split sentence totaling 45 years, with a 25-year minimum mandatory term. Once the trial court imposed a minimum mandatory term of 25 years, it could not exceed the 30-year maximum penalty for a first-degree felony under section 775.082....

...Because we conclude that the defendant could not be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines, we affirm. Wade Wilson pleaded guilty in four separate cases to multiple counts of burglary, petit theft, and grand theft. Wilson qualified as a prison releasee reoffender and was sentenced as such pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). In each case, the trial court sentenced Wilson to the fifteen-year mandatory sentence required under section 775.082(8) and imposed lesser sentences on other counts, with all sentences to run concurrently....

...The issue presented in this case is whether a defendant may be sentenced under the PRRPA and the sentencing guidelines when his guidelines sentence exceeds the mandatory sentence under the PRRPA. The controversy arises from an apparent conflict within the subsections of *1005 section 775.082(8). Section 775.082(8)(a)(2) reads, in part: 2....

...idence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced [as a prison releasee reoffender] .... (emphasis added). However, section 775.082(8)(c) states that "[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s....

...However, words in a penal statute must be strictly construed. Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991). Where words are susceptible to more than one meaning, they must be construed most favorably to the accused. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). In enacting section 775.082(8), the legislature expressed a clear intent that defendants be punished to the fullest extent of the law and be sentenced pursuant to the provisions contained in the PRRPA. In fact, the legislature expressly stated in section 775.082(8)(d)(1) that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection...." However, in examining the legislature's statement in section 775.082(8)(a)(2) that "such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the guidelines," we conclude that the clear and unambiguous meaning of the provision is that a defendant sentenced under section 775.082(8) cannot be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced according to the provisions in the PRRPA. The remaining question is whether section 775.082(8)(c), which authorizes the imposition of a greater sentence of incarceration pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997), or "any other provision of law," prevails over the statute's earlier preclusion of a guidelines sentence. [1] Our inquiry focuses on what the legislature meant by "any other provision of law." § 775.082(8)(c)....

...of the particular provision. *1006 Id. at 942. Thus, in accordance with this principle, the possibility that the phrase "any other provision of law" might authorize a guidelines sentence is overridden by the specific exclusion of such a sentence in section 775.082(8)(a)(2)....

...d to mean other penalty enhancement statutes similar to section 775.084 rather than the general sentencing provisions of the sentencing guidelines. Given the express exclusion of the sentencing guidelines from application to a sentence imposed under section 775.082(8) and in accordance with the principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, we conclude that section 775.082(8) does not authorize a guidelines sentence even when that sentence would be greater than the mandatory sentence provided by the PRRPA. We recognize that it is possible the legislature intended that a defendant whose guidelines sentence range is greater than the mandatory sentence under section 775.082(8) be sentenced under both the PRRPA and the sentencing guidelines....

...ence under the PRRPA, then it must include in the statute language which more clearly reflects that intent. Accordingly, we affirm Wilson's sentence. BLUE, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur. NOTES [1] We note that the supreme court has concluded that section 775.082(8)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes the trial court to impose a prison releasee reoffender sentence and a habitual felony offender sentence under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997), if the habitual felony offender sentence is greater. Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000). However, we do not find Grant applicable in this case because the application of the habitual felony offender statute is specifically authorized in section 775.082(8)(c), and unlike this case, there is no contrary provision prohibiting a prison releasee reoffender from being sentenced as a habitual felony offender.

...Consistent with the plea agreement, Thomas was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by twenty years of probation. [2] He did not appeal his sentence, but now contends that his sentence is illegal since in the aggregate, it exceeds the fifteen-year maximum term authorized for a second-degree felony by section 775.082(3)(c)....

...e degree higher for punishment purposes. In the instant case, the Defendant was charged with a second degree felony. Since he used a gun during the felony, it was reclassified as a first degree felony and it was punishable by 30 years in prison. See section 775.082, Fla....

...y limits. However, the supplemental authority also revealed a conflict within our district. In Green v. State, 630 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the court noted an "apparent conflict" in decisions within this court concerning the interplay between section 775.082(3)(b) and statutes which specifically permit sentences for a term of life....

...a term of years is imposed, then the term can not exceed thirty years. Rucker, 553 So.2d at 213. This court relied upon Rucker in its decision in Robinson v. State, 621 So.2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). [3] This court interpreted the interplay between section 775.082(3)(b) and statutory authority for life sentences in a contrary fashion in Salas v....

...violent crimes, or a pattern of increasingly serious criminal activity. [3] It appears that this court made its decision on the grounds that the offenses were improperly characterized as life felonies which allow for a term of imprisonment for life. § 775.082(3)(a)....

...s. Ironically, the statutory language allows the latter to be punished more severely than the former. In Salas, this court reversed 99 year sentences imposed for sexual batteries, life felonies, because they exceeded the 40 year sentence limit under section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...At the same time, the court upheld 99 year sentences for kidnapping because kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...f claim one of his motion. A jury convicted Brown of first-degree murder pursuant to section 782.04(1), Florida Statutes (1987). For that offense, he was sentenced to prison for "a term of Natural Life (25 Year Minimum Mandatory)" in accordance with section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: "A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole unless [...

...n Leon County. See id.; see also Stovall v. Cooper, 860 So.2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (en banc). Accordingly, the order denying Brown's rule 3.800(a) motion is affirmed in all respects. Affirmed. FULMER and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] In 1994, section 775.082(1) was amended to eliminate the possibility of parole for capital offenses....

...states that the “unlawful killing of a human being . . . [w]hen perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed . . . is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in [Fla. Stat. §] 775.082.” Section 775.082 states, in pertinent part: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in [Fla. Stat. §] 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1). Section 921.141, in turn, lists the aggravating circumstances that may warrant a death sentence....

...[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual ... within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility ... following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state." § 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Fla. Stat. (2002). The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2002), does not increase a defendant's penalty beyond the statutory maximum; rather, it puts limits on the trial court's discretion....

...If the state, therefore, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant meets the definition of a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant must be sentenced for a term of imprisonment of five years if the crime committed was a felony of the third degree. § 775.082(9)(a)3.d., Fla....

...Kidnapping is a first-degree felony. § 787.01(2). Mr. Jackson's use of a firearm resulted in a reclassification to a life felony. See § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). The maximum sentence for a life felony is life or a term of years not to exceed forty. § 775.082(3)(a)....

...d degree felony, once a defendant falls within the purview of the statute, “the trial court has discretion ... to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” Mendenhall v....

...rlying felony.” Dallas v. State, 898 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). 1 Here, Wiley was convicted of third-degree murder, a second degree felony punishable by a maximum sentence of fifteen (15) years in prison. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). Applying the reclassification portion of the statute, Wiley’s offense was properly reclassified as a first degree felony, punishable by up to 30 years in prison. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...In Mendenhall , the Florida Supreme Court construed this provision to provide “the trial court [with] discretion ... to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” 48 So.3d at 742 ....

...2 However, while Mendenhall pertained to the trial court’s discretion to set a mandatory minimum sentence, it did not address whether the trial court might impose a sentence longer than the mandatory minimum and in excess of the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082....

...ourt has no discretion to sentence the defendant under the act. See State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000); Johnson v. State, 766 So.2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Smith argues there is an exception to the mandatory PRR sentence requirement found in section 775.082(d), Florida Statutes, which provides: It is the intent of the legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law in as provided in the subsect...

...tion c., which allows the court not to sentence the offender as a prison releasee reoffender if the victim does not want the *251 offender to receive a prison releasee reoffender sentence. Id. at 1221. These authorities offer no assistance to Smith. Section 775.082(d)1 clearly gives the state attorney, not the trial court, discretion to seek a punishment less than the PRR Act requires when extenuating circumstances exist, including whether the victim favors a lesser sentence....

...As a result of this incident, the appellant was charged with attempted robbery and battery of a person over 65 years of age. The jury found Phillips guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to two consecutive five year terms of incarceration as a PRR pursuant to the provisions of section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Secondly, the appellant argues that the state attorney, subsequent to a PRR sentence being imposed, no longer has authority or discretion to seek removal of the PRR designation. PRR sanctions, however, are invoked solely at the discretion of the state. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). Section 775.082(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes, specifies that "the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender." We conclude the state attorney can choose to request the removal of a PRR designation on...

...entencing "floor." If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence "pursuant to [the habitual offender *275 statute] or any other provision of law," the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. Cotton, 769 So.2d at 354. Paragraph 775.082(9)(c) of the PRR specifically provides: "Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s....

...prison. In his rule 3.850 motion, Lopez alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the PRR sentence. Lopez claimed that he did not *1152 qualify as a PRR because solicitation to commit murder is not an enumerated offense under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the PRR statute....

...Although Lopez framed his motion as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he more properly alleges a claim of an illegal sentence. Such a claim is also cognizable pursuant to rule 3.850. See Brinson v. State, 851 So.2d 815, 815-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Summers v. State, 747 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Section 775.082(8)(a)(1) defines the term "prison releasee reoffender" as: "Prison releasee reoffender" means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: a....

...Solicitation to commit murder is not an offense that is specifically enumerated under the statute. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that Lopez qualified for sentencing under the PRR statute because solicitation to commit murder was encompassed within the catch-all provision of section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(o) as a "felony that involved the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." Our research has not disclosed any reported cases which address the question of whether solicitation to commit murder is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute....

...nalty: "The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." This language is substantially similar to the language in the provision of the PRR statute at issue here. § 775.082(8)(a)(1)(o), Fla....

...We find all arguments relating to Hill's conviction unpersuasive and affirm his conviction. However, we reverse and remand Hill's sentence. The trial court sentenced Hill to life in prison without parole as a prison releasee reoffender under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act in section 775.082(9)(a)3 of the Florida Statutes ("PRRPA")....

...n under Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), to sentence him to a term of years. Miller held that a mandatory life sentence without parole for capital murders committed by juveniles — the only sentence allowed by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes — violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution....

...out parole sentence for the rare case 1 where Miller would allow that sentence. Id. In a competing thorough and thoughtful analysis, with which we fully agree, Judge Makar concluded that statutory revival should be used to revive the 1993 version of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, which mandated a sentence of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years....

...Finally, consistent with our agreement with Judge Makar’s opinion in PaHlow, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great public importance the fol *1133 lowing question: “Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which invalidated section 775.082(l)’s mandatory imposition of life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, operates to revive the prior sentence of life with parole eligibility after 25 years previously contained in that statute?” Partlow, — So.3d at - n....

...However, on the McHam charge, the jury convicted Wencel on the lesser-included charge of trespass while armed. They acquitted Wencel on the charge of attempted armed burglary on the Capps home. Wencel was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia. Wencel was sentenced pursuant to the Prison Release Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8)(a)1, Florida Statutes, (1997) [1] , to life in prison on the armed burglary conviction and concurrent five year sentences on the remaining counts....

...The jury's verdict, which included an acquittal on one charge and conviction of the lesser-included offense on another, belies its being swept away by sympathy or prejudice. Wencel also appeals his life sentence as a Prison Release Reoffender. Florida Statute section 775.082(8), the "Prison Release Reoffender Act," imposes sentencing consequences on persons who commit or attempt to commit certain felonies, including armed burglary, within three years of being released from a state correctional facility....

...We agree with the trial court's ruling that expert fingerprint comparison testimony is not essential for Prison Release Reoffenders' sentencing. The state is not required to provide fingerprint identification to meet its burden of proof on sentencing under section 775.082(8)(a)3, as is specifically required by statute for habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084(3)(e)....

...This issue has recently been addressed and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000). See also Simmons v. State, 762 So.2d 913 (Fla.2000). AFFIRMED. STEVENSON and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The 1998 Supplement to this section has been renumbered from section 775.082(8) to section 775.082(9)....

...nt with forced sexual intercourse). Thus Dr. Colombo's testimony was properly admitted. With regard to the sentencing issue, Irons was convicted of sexual battery, a second degree felony, punishable by up to fifteen years is prison. §§ 794.011(5); 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...both the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and the sentencing guidelines when the guidelines' sentence exceeds the mandatory sentence under the Act, and that the Act's sentence is mandatory. The court noted the two contradictory directives of the Act. Section 775.082(8)(a)(2) provides that a defendant who is a prison releasee reoffender is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. Section 775.082(8)(c) provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to section 775.084 or any other provision of law." It applied the statutory rule...

...llegal search. We rejected that argument in Irons v. State, 787 So.2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [3] Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [4] § 921.0014(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). [5] See § 775.082(8)(a)1.d. and 775.082(8)(a) 2.c., Fla....

...[1] In case 99-20146, Tolbert agreed to sixty months' as a habitual felony offender ("HFO"). [2] In April 2001, Tolbert filed his motion to correct sentence citing Grant, which held that equal concurrent sentences with both HFO and PRR designations were not authorized under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act. § 775.082(8), Fla....

...ed during the same sentencing hearing. Therefore, because Tolbert did not receive the dual designations on any single offense, the principle announced in Grant was not violated in this case. Affirmed. BLUE, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur. NOTES [1] § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997), and § 775.082(9), Fla....

...: (2) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person 11 years of age or younger in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon said person commits a capital felony punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 921.141. If the offender is under the age of 18, that person shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...The court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment with the requirement that he serve at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole. Since appellant was eighteen years or older at the time the crime was committed, he had committed a capital felony punishable according to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...In Florida, murder in the first degree is the only existing capital offense." 417 So.2d at 982. Thus, he asserts that he can be sentenced for no more than a life felony which does not authorize the imposition of the twenty-five year minimum mandatory term in prison. § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...irst degree murder prosecutions after the death penalty had been held unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). We note, however, that the Donaldson opinion specifically preserved the sentencing under section 775.082(1) when it said: We find no difficulty with a continuation of the sentencing for these former "capital offenses" under § 775.082(1) as automatically life imprisonment upon conviction, inasmuch as that is the only offense left in the statute......

...ces. 265 So.2d at 502-03. Thus, we hold that even though sexual battery under section 794.011(2) is not a capital crime in the sense that it may result in the imposition of the death penalty, the punishment for that crime must still be imposed under section 775.082(1) to its constitutional limits. This means that one convicted under section 794.011(2) must be automatically "punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." § 775.082(1)....

...The supreme court must have felt the same way when it struck down the death penalty for sexual battery in Buford v. State because it directed that the defendant be "imprisoned for life, with no eligibility for parole during the first twenty-five years." 403 So.2d at 954. Our holding in this case is further buttressed by section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (1981), which reads: (2) In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a pers...

...r a capital felony shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1). Thus, it is apparent that the legislature intends for the penalties prescribed by section 775.082(1) to fully apply to capital felonies to the extent that they are constitutionally permissible. Our decision may not squarely conflict with the holding in Hogan because in that case there was never any intention to punish under section 775.082(1)....

...We affirm appellant's convictions for robbery with a firearm and carjacking with a firearm. However, we reverse and remand appellant's sentence. Appellant was given two life sentences for these convictions as a Prison Releasee Reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes ("PRRPA")....

...Because he committed these offenses just over two months after being released from prison, McDonald was properly designated and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on the first three counts which are enumerated offenses under the PRR statute. § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2000). The trial court imposed concurrent mandatory life sentences on the carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm counts. § 775.082(9)(a)3a, Fla. Stat. (2000). As a PRR, McDonald must serve 100 percent of his life sentences and is not eligible for any form of early release. § 775.082(9)(b), Fla....

...Although the fifteen-year HFO sentence with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum term as a PRR did not violate double jeopardy, the court determined that the equal terms violated "the express provisions of the [PRR] Act." Id. The court explained that the PRR statute, section 775.082(9)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: "Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s....

...horized under the PRR statute or any other provision of law. Section *76 775.087(2)(a)3(c), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s....

...ces for his convictions for robbery with a firearm, a first degree felony punishable by life. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). McDonald claims that under the PRR statute the mandatory sentence for robbery with a firearm is thirty years in prison. § 775.082(9)(a)3, Fla....

life felony occurred after July 1, 1995. See § 775.082(3)(a)3, Fla.Stat. (1995). First-degree felonies

...Ketterer also contends on appeal that the written sentence for resisting an officer with violence filed in this case imposes an illegal sentence of five years and a day, which the State concedes was error. We reverse the sentence on the resisting arrest charge because it imposes an impermissible time period. § 775.082(9)(a)3.d., Fla....

...of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Appellant alleges that he received a sentence totaling 20 years (15 years' incarceration plus 5 years' probation) for a second-degree felony, which is above the statutory maximum he could receive for the offense. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maximillian J. Changus, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. Roosevelt Richardson appeals from sentence which was enhanced pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ON MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION THOMPSON, J. We grant appellant's motion for certification pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a), and certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Motion for Certification GRANTED....

...Thomas was charged with burglary and attempted burglary committed two days later. He was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, attempted burglary of a dwelling and escape. The trial court sentenced Thomas as a prison releasee reoffender for the burglary and attempted burglary. Thomas was sentenced pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his/her confinement or to return within the prescribed time to the place of confinement is "an escape from the custody of the department...." § 945.091(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). See also § 775.082(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). In summation, I would affirm the trial judge's designation of Thomas as a prison releasee reoffender and therefore subject to the releasee-reoffender sanction provided by section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...th an assault or battery. We affirm his conviction without comment. As for his life sentence, Williams, citing Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), argues that he does not qualify for Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentencing under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2005). Specifically, Williams argues his offense is not a "forcible felony" that would qualify him for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(o)....

...In this Anders [1] proceeding, Leonardo Gonzales appeals after imposition of judgment and sentence pursuant to a written plea agreement. In circuit court case number 97-332, defendant-appellant Morales was sentenced under the Prison Release Reoffender Punishment Act. See § 775.082(8)(a), Fla....

...We reject that argument on authority of McKnight v. State, 727 So.2d 314, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), review granted, 740 So.2d 528 (Fla.1999). We certify that we have passed on the following question of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Affirmed; question certified....

...He was subsequently re-sentenced to concurrent 45-year sentences pursuant to Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and its progeny. He now asks this Court to vacate those sentences and remand for resentencing under section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes, in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Henry v....

...Second-degree murder is a first-degree felony, punishable by life imprisonment. § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Attempted second-degree murder is thus a second-degree felony, punishable by no more than fifteen years' imprisonment. §§ 777.04(4)(c), 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Sousa was charged with committing these crimes while using a firearm, the offense was reclassified as a first-degree felony. § 775.087(1)(b). The maximum term of imprisonment for a reclassified first-degree felony, without some special sentencing enhancement, is thirty years' imprisonment. § 775.082(3)(b)....

...ife statute, which required that he be sentenced "to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." It could be argued that the language of this statute overrides the language in section 775.082(3)(b) that provides for a thirty-year sentence....

...rst-degree murder was a capital felony. Any person convicted of first-degree murder and not sentenced to death “shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. ...” § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1987). Attempted first-degree murder with a firearm was a life felony (sections 777.04(4)(b), 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987)), punishable “by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.” § 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). Armed robbery with a firearm was a first-degree felony punishable “by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” §§ 775.082(3)(b), 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...t-degree murder. In fact, the trial court had no discretion whatsoever; given that the death penalty had been waived by the State, the trial court was required by law to impose a sentence of life without parole eligibility for twenty-five years. See § 775.082(1), Fla....

...Of course, even if the State had not waived the death penalty in this case, subsequent decisions have established that Lawton, a juvenile at the time of the homicide, was not eligible for the death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). . In 1994, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.082(1) to eliminate parole eligibility for first-degree murder....

...Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We find all issues raised in regard to the underlying conviction unpersuasive and affirm Brady's conviction of second degree murder. However, the State concedes the trial court erred in dually sentencing Brady under both section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the Prison Release Reoffender Punishment Act ("PRRPA") and section 775.087(2)(a), the "10-20-Life" statute, where the PRRPA sentence was for Life, but the 10-20-Life sentence was only for 25 to Life....

...[[Image here]] o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual; ... within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor. § 775.082, Fla....

...(citing Shaw v. State, 26 So.3d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)). However, because burglary with assault or battery encompasses the alternative of battery, which includes the nonforce option of mere touching, that offense cannot support the PRR enhancement under section 775.082(8)(a)(l)(o)....

...So Ellis is correct that his PRR enhancement is not supported under this section, but our analysis does not end there. II. PRR DESIGNATION BASED ON A “CLEAR JURY FINDING” Another offense in the list of predicates for the PRR enhancement identified in section 775.082(8)(a)(l) is “q....

...As Ellis has not identified parts of the record that would tend to demonstrate that a rational jury would not have found that the dwelling was occupied, his motion does not warrant relief. *482 We conclude that although the forcible felony prong in section 775.082(8)(a)(l)(o) does not support the PRR enhancement for Ellis’s conviction for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, Ellis’s rule 3.800(a) motion did not sufficiently demonstrate from the face of the record that the trial court erred in applying the enhancement under section 775.082(a)(l)(q)....

...The offense at issue in Hearns was battery on a law enforcement officer, a detail that does not affect our analysis in this case. . The PRR statute was later amended to omit from item q. the requirement that a dwelling be occupied: "Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure.” § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(q), Fla....

...State, 750 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The elements of such offense were not specifically alleged in the information. State v. Von Deck, 607 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1992). On the state's cross-appeal, however, we reverse the trial court's order finding section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, unconstitutional....

...*441 We nevertheless certify the question we certified in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999), as a question of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for resentencing....

...a life sentence to prison for the factual scenario that was in evidence at trial, there would be a miscarriage of justice, as well as a waste of the State's incarcerative resources," today's decision requires imposition of a life sentence on remand, § 775.082(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), in which case Mr. Stewart would "not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release." § 775.082(8)(b), Fla....

...Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. In this case, prior to accepting Jason Litton's plea of guilty to the charged offenses of burglary of a dwelling and dealing in stolen property, the trial court was called upon to consider whether the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), [1] applied to Litton as he had burglarized an unoccupied dwelling....

...(b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence. § 775.082(8)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)(emphasis added).1998 amendments to section 775.082 have caused renumbering of the statute and the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act now appears at subsection (9) of the statute. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Albert Edwin Brooks, Jr., appeals his judgment and sentence for felony battery. He argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Prison Releasee Reof-fender (PRR) because the offense of felony battery under section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2010), is not a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...t specifically listed in and does not fall under the catch-all provision of the PRR statute. But felony battery does fall under the catch-all provision, and thus Brooks’ PRR sentence was proper. Qualifying offenses for PRR sentencing are listed in section 775.082(9)(a)(1). Felony battery is not included in the list of qualifying offenses. However, section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(o) contains a catch-all provision which states “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” is a qualifying offense....

...ulting in almost ten years of legal constraint. See Summers v. State, 625 So.2d 876, 880 n. 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (en banc), approved, State v. Summers, 642 So.2d at 744. This is not an anomaly, but on the contrary is the explicit legislative intent. Section 775.082, Florida Statutes, establishes legal maximum penalties, and must be read in pari materia with Section 948.06 Florida Statutes, which regulates probation. Section 775.082 specifies that "A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows ... For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years." Id. § 775.082(3)(d) (emphasis added)....

...e PRR statute. In finding that the trial court had the discretion to impose a criminal punishment code sentence consecutively to a PRR sentence for offenses arising from the same criminal episode, the Court stated, *391 "Paragraph (b) indicates that section 775.082(9) dictates a minimum sentence or sentencing floor, not a statutory maximum.......

...probation — are illegal, because Ms. Clussman was convicted of third-degree felonies in each of these counts. A sixty-month term of imprisonment is the maximum sentence that the trial court could have legally imposed for a third-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...*912 The defendant argues that his PRR sentence is illegal because the PRR statute does not make aggravated fleeing and eluding a predicate offense for such enhanced punishment. By the PRR statute's clear text, aggravated fleeing and eluding is not designated as a predicate crime. § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000), held that although concurrent sentences as a PRR and a habitual felony offender did not violate double jeopardy, the imposition of such sentences did violate the PRR act itself. Citing to Walls v. State, 765 So.2d *840 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), the court stated: [B]ecause "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration," a trial court is "without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony...

...State, 789 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Thus, pursuant to Grant, the appellant was properly sentenced for robbery with a firearm, a first degree felony. Under the PRR Act, a first degree felony is punishable by thirty (30) years imprisonment. See § 775.082(8)(a)2.b., Fla....

...The trial court's imposition of the concurrent life sentences for the two counts of carjacking was error because the sentence for each carjacking conviction under both the PRR Act and the Violent Career Criminal Act is life. As the State properly concedes, pursuant to section 775.082, a court may impose a concurrent sentence under section 775.084 only if it is a greater sentence....

...than the maximum sentence for each offense. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2006). [1] The trial court properly sentenced him to ninety-nine months for the three second-degree-felony burglaries of a dwelling that carry fifteen-year maximum sentences. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...(2006); § 810.02(3)(b). However, the ninety-nine-month sentences for burglary of a structure, burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft of a motor vehicle were illegal because they are third-degree felonies that carry five-year maximum sentences. See §§ 775.082(3)(d); 810.02(4)(a), (b); 812.014(2)(c)(6)....

...A jury found Thomas Partlow guilty of first-degree murder (Count One) and robbery with a deadly weapon (Count Two). The trial court adjudicated him guilty of both offenses and sentenced Partlow to a mandatory life sentence without eligibility for parole on Count One pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2009), and to 45 years’ incarceration on Count Two....

...conducting the individualized inquiry required by Miller . The State argues that the only sentencing option available to the trial court is a mandatory sentence of life, with a possibility of parole in twenty-five years, pursuant to the "revival" of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Therefore, the court concluded that it was required to sentence the defendant as a PRR to only fifteen years on the burglary charge. On the felony battery count, the trial court imposed a concurrent five-year sentence. The PRR statute in effect at the time of the defendant's offense, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2005), provides in pertinent part: (9)(a)1....

...Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an unoccupied structure; . . . within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility . . . following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. § 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o )-(q), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Subsection 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ), which provides that forcible felonies qualify as PRR offenses, is sometimes referred to as the "catch-all provision." As explained below, although there has been some focus in the case law on the fact that burglary of a...

...utory construction to ascertain intent." Borden at 595 (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005)). As set forth above, the PRR statute expressly lists burglary of a dwelling as a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), Fla. Stat. (2006). It further provides that the sentencing court must look to the degree of the qualifying offense to determine the length of PRR sentence. See § 775.082(9)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). For a first-degree felony punishable by life, such as burglary of a dwelling with an assault, the PRR statute provides that the defendant must be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. See §§ 775.082(9)(b) and 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The burglary statute provides, (2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...le burglary of a dwelling, but not for a greater degree of that same crime. Burglary of a dwelling is an enumerated offense. Burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery is simply a greater degree of burglary. The legislature acknowledged in subsection 775.082(9)(a)(3) that varying degrees of qualifying offenses may exist and, accordingly, it provided for varying sentences in that subsection....

the first degree, punishable as provided in section 775.082 or section 775.083.(b) a second or subsequent

...State, 738 So.2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The State concedes, however, that under the authority of Everett v. State, 770 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), Jefferson's minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years is improper. The life felony was added to section 775.082(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1995), by chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, which has since been declared unconstitutional....

...State, 763 So.2d 283 (Fla.2000); Salters v. State, 758 So.2d 667, 671 (Fla.2000)(applicable window period for challenges to chapter 95-182 commenced on or after October 1, 1995 and before May 24, 1997). Therefore, the fifteen year minimum mandatory sentence provided by section 775.082(4)(b)1 is not applicable to Jefferson....

...Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. STONE, J. Jones appeals his conviction and sentence of sexual battery on a child under twelve years old. He asserts that the trial court erred by designating him a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)(3), Florida Statutes....

...unusual punishment. We affirm. Section 794.011, Florida Statutes, provides that "[a] person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person less than 12 years of age commits a capital felony." Capital felonies are punishable under section 775.082, Florida Statutes, which provides for punishment by death or life imprisonment without parole. Under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, however, a defendant who qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender must be sentenced in accordance with the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("Act")....

...The court concluded that sexual battery of a child qualifies as a non-capital offense for purposes of the post-conviction time limits under rule 3.850. Id. Here, there is no reason not to treat the statutory "capital" offense as "non-capital" for the purpose of applying section 775.082(9)(a)....

...The legislative intent of the Act is to deter prison releasees from committing further serious crimes. It is inconceivable that the legislature did not intend capital sexual battery, as a "felony punishable by life," to fall within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the trial court validly imposed sentence under section 775.082(9)(a)....

...State, 121 So.3d 660, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). .Wooden v. State, 42 So.3d 837, 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("[0]nce the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty year maximum penalty for a first degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b)....

...Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant *559 Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. ALLEN, J. The appellant in this direct criminal appeal challenges his sentences imposed pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the "Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act," following his convictions for resisting arrest with violence and felony petit theft. We reject the appellant's various constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), but we vacate the sentence for felony petit theft because felony petit theft is not an offense for which a prison releasee reoffender sentence may be imposed....

...1st DCA 1999); the cruel or unusual punishment challenge, see Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); the due process challenges, see Turner v. State , Woods v. State ; and the equal protection challenge, see Woods v. State . The appellant also contends that section 775.082(8) is unconstitutionally vague because the legislature failed to define the terms "sufficient evidence," "material witness," the degree of materiality required, "extenuating circumstances," and "just prosecution." But it has long been...

...1st DCA 2015), Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), and Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The certified conflict concerns the construction of one element of the definition of “prison releasee reoffender” provided in section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2012)....

...The part of the statute at issue requires the defendant, within the three years preceding his or her commission of a qualifying offense, to have been “released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor.” § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...3d at 355- 56. We have jurisdiction due to the certification of conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the Second District in Lewars and hold that release from a county jail under the circumstances of this case does not satisfy the language of section 775.082(9)(a)1. -2- We therefore disapprove the decisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts in Wright, Taylor, and Louzon. FACTS Dazarian Cordell Lewars was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Lewars, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1098. For this offense, Lewars was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment under section 775.082(9), the prison releasee reoffender (PRR) statute, over his objection that the PRR statute does not apply to him....

...committing the burglary” for which he was given a PRR sentence. Id. In reversing Lewars’ PRR sentence, the Second District relied on the plain, unambiguous language of the PRR statute, reasoning as follows: The pertinent language of section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q) defines a PRR as “any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit ....

...in meaning and, therefore, need not employ any other rules of statutory construction. institution of . . . the United States . . . following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.” § 775.082(9)(a)1. -6- Miller, 227 So....

...of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.” St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 694 (Fla. 1918)). Section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...county jail does not satisfy the “released from” element of statute’s PRR definition. This language addresses the 2. The 2012 statute is cited in this opinion because Lewars was released from the sentence the State argues satisfies section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...2012) (“A ‘jail’ is a detention center used by local governments for persons who are awaiting trial or have been convicted of misdemeanors.” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 910 (9th ed. 2009)). Therefore, a defendant’s release from a county jail is not sufficient to satisfy the plain language of section 775.082(9)(a)1. The surrounding language in section 775.082 confirms the plain meaning of the specific provision at issue, showing that release from a particular type of facility, namely a prison or its equivalent—and not a county jail—is a necessary component of the PRR definition. The PRR statute’s focus on the facility where a defendant served a prior sentence begins in the title of section 775.082, which notes that this section provides “mandatory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison.” That focus is also manifested in the label that the statute gives to a defendant who qualifies for these mandatory minimum sentences: “prison releasee reoffender.” § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...-9-  Continuing its focus on prisons as facilities, the PRR statute makes release from “a correctional institution” of certain other jurisdictions a way to satisfy the “released from” component of the PRR definition. § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...facility within a prison system, particularly in Florida. Cf. Gaulden v. State, 195 So. 3d 1123, 1128-29 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in result) (relying on the common understanding of a particular phrase to decide its meaning). Further, the jurisdictions listed in section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...efinition must be “of” the highest governmental divisions of the jurisdictions at issue shows that this portion of the statute is concerned with identifying facilities that are equivalent to prisons in Florida’s criminal justice system. See § 775.082(9)(a)1. The requirement of section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...o jail, the PRR statute states that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection.” § 775.082(9)(d)1. This direct statement of legislative intent—the only one in the statute—focuses on “release[] from prison,” which is a type of facility, rather than release from a prison-length sentence. That the length of the sentence is not a determining factor under section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...on or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. - 11 - § 775.082(9)(a)2....

...e by the Legislature.” State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 95 (Fla. 2012). Therefore, it applies “only under rare and exceptional circumstances.” Id. (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). Such circumstances are not attendant to section 775.082(9)(a)1. Judge Makar, in his dissent from the Wright decision, explained why the plain language of section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...This reasoning applies equally to the arguments presented in this case. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that “release from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor,” § 775.082(9)(a)1., does not include release from a county jail. Therefore, commission of a PRR-qualifying offense within three years of release from jail, rather than prison, does not satisfy the requirements of section 775.082(9)(a)1. - 17 - Accordingly, we approve the Second District’s decision in this case and disapprove the decisions of the First and Fifth Districts in Wright and Louzon....

...Butterworth, Attorney General; Bryan Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant entered a plea of nolo contendre to resisting an officer with violence and was sentenced as a Prison Releasee Reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...escape, arguing that the trial court did not have discretion in determining whether to sentence Crenshaw pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the "Act") after the State filed notice of Crenshaw's qualifications to be sentenced under such. § 775.082, Fla....

...2d DCA 2001), this court held that battery on a law enforcement officer is a qualifying offense for prison releasee reoffender sentencing. Further, the escape offense in this case is a qualifying offense under the Act, as it is a felony that involved the use of physical force or violence against an individual. See § 775.082(8)(a)(1)( o )....

...5th DCA 2010) (“[O]nce the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it -3-  could not exceed the thirty year maximum penalty for a first degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b)....

...der s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the minimum sentence. Id. But for the 10-20-Life statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes, provides the statutory maximums for the crimes involved in this case. Specifically, for count III in this case, the statutory maximum sentence for a first-degree felony2 is 30 years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...3d at 742, clarified the issue of “whether the mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life provide the trial judge with discretion to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty- five years to life without regard to the statutory maximum for the crime contained in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2004).” And this Court expressly 2....

...-6- “conclude[d] that the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for in section 775.082.” Id. As to count III, which is at issue in this case, the information, jury verdict, judgment, and sentence demonstrate that Hatten was charged with and found guilty of attempted second-degree murder, a felony that is listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q....

...State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1999); see also Turner v. State, 745 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Durden v. State, 743 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). This court has also found that the term "felony punishable by life" in subsection 775.082(8)(a)(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), covers both life felonies and first degree felonies punishable by a term of years not exceeding life....

...Thus, the Act requires a life sentence for robbery with a firearm, and the trial court imposed the correct sentence. Accordingly, we AFFIRM appellant's sentence, and, as we did in Woods, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED....

...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATION PER CURIAM. We grant Appellant's Motion for Rehearing and Certification of a Question of Great Public Importance only to the extent that we add the following certified question to our previously issue opinion of March 27, 2000: DOES SECTION 775.082 (9)(A)3A, FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT "A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY LIFE," APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF...

...of six years or less in prison if the revocation is based on a substantive violation.”) In this case, Jacques was on probation for trafficking in cocaine, a first degree felony, which permits a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...Thus, the court held that the interpretation of the statute in Carawan controlled for defendants whose crimes were controlled by the prior version of the statute. In Miranda, the Third District held that the retroactive application of an amendment to section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 793 So.2d at 1044. Section 775.082(9)(a)(1) was amended by the legislature in response to the supreme court's decision in State v. Huggins, 802 So.2d 276 (Fla.2001), which interpreted section 775.082(9)(a)(1) to exclude convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling from its sentencing scheme. The amended statute provided for sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(1) for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Because the retroactive effect of the statute would have been to require enhanced sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(1) for the defendant, the court found that a retroactive application of the amended statute would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 793 So.2d at 1044; see also State v. Eldredge, 801 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (refusing to apply section 775.082(9)(a)(1) retroactively), review denied, 823 So.2d 126 (Fla.2002)....

...ollowed by a total of ten years' probation for the remaining two counts. In her motion under rule 3.800(a), Hollybrook alleged that her downward departure sentence of seven years' imprisonment improperly exceeded the statutory maximum for the crime. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), imposes a maximum of five years' imprisonment for a third-degree felony....

...We reversed and concluded that since the trial court chose to impose a downward departure sentence, then pursuant to section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court was required to sentence the defendant within the statutory maximum of five years provided in section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...plea agreement, is contrary to sections 921.001(5) and 921.0016(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1997). These statutes specify that any departure from the recommended guidelines sentence "must be within any relevant maximum sentence limitations provided in s. 775.082." Id....

...nt shall be ordered to pay a fine of $50,000." Section 775.083 is the general law that gives discretion to a trial court to impose a fine in a criminal case. It has long provided that a fine may be imposed "in addition to any punishment described in s. 775.082." Section 775.082 establishes the general terms of imprisonment for most offenses. Because habitual offender sentencing is imposed pursuant to section 775.084 as an exception to the general penalties in section 775.082, the courts have uniformly held that it is illegal to impose a discretionary fine under section 775.083 in a case in which the rest of the sentence is imposed pursuant to the habitual offender provisions in section 775.084....

...Because his fine was mandatory under the language of section 893.135 and was not a discretionary fine under section 775.083, we conclude that the language in section 775.083, limiting fines under that statute to cases in which sentences are imposed under section 775.082, plays no role in our analysis....

...g Stanford [v. Kentucky ], 492 U.S. [361] at 395, 109 S.Ct. 2969 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) ])). The Henry Court ordered the case to be' remanded for resentencing in accordance with Florida’s 2014 juvenile sentencing legislation codified in sections 775.082 and 921.1402, Florida Statutes. Section 775.082(3)(c) provides, in relevant part, the following: Penalties; applicability of sentencing structures; mandatory minimum sentences for certain reoffenders previously released from prison....

...ccordance with s. 921.1402(2)(d). Section 921.1402(2)(d), provides: Review of sentences for persons convicted of specified offenses while under the age of 18 years. [[Image here]] (d) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of 20 years or more under s. 775.082(3)(c) is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 20 years....

...In addition, Johnson argues the trial court erred in sentencing him as a prison releasee reoffender because it ruled that it had no discretion not to do so when a victim submits a written opposition to the mandatory sentence. The victim in this case provided such a statement. At the time of Johnson's offense and sentencing, section 775.082(8)(d), Florida Statutes (1997) provided: a....

...enuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection. (emphasis added) Ch. 99-188, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified in section 775.082(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1999)).

...Defendant was found guilty by a jury of criminal mischief and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a prison release reoffender (PRR) sentence be imposed based upon the burglary conviction, a qualifying offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)1q, Fla. Stat. (2002). To establish that Ward qualified as a PRR, the State needed to prove defendant committed the burglary within three years after being released from prison. § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...When he was sixteen years of age in 2005, Lavrrick pled guilty and was sentenced to five years probation for robbery with a deadly weapon and armed carjacking. This appeal is from convictions and concurrent, statutorily authorized sentences to life in prison, see § 775.082, Fla....

...Prince's aggravated assault convictions arose from a road rage incident that occurred between Prince and two police officers in an undercover vehicle. At sentencing, the State sought to have Prince sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...to connect the Lynn Prince before the court for sentencing to the Lynn E. Prince identified in the certified computer record. Thus, as it did in Bodie, the State in this case has failed to meet its burden to prove that Prince qualified as a PRR. See § 775.082(9)(a)(3) (requiring the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a PRR as defined before the trial court may sentence the defendant as such)....

...Mark Wilensky of Dubiner & Wilensky, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Andrea Smith, appeals his sentence of fifteen years in state prison pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, on the grounds 1) that the trial judge erred in determining that sentencing under the Act was mandatory when the victim submits a letter to the judge requesting tha...

...ation of powers doctrine, violates the single-subject rule, violates the *576 equal protection clause, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, violates substantive due process rights, and that the exceptions to sentencing under the Act provided in section 775.082(8)(d)1....

to be a danger to the public. See § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat. (2013). At his sentencing hearing

...gation by a downward departure. *854 Section 316.193(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that: "Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084; however, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $1,000." Under section 775.082, a felony of the third degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 5 years. [2] We note that section 775.082 contains no mandatory provisions precluding downward departures from the sentence recommended by the guidelines....

...t of the sentencing hearing to serve as the written reasons. [4] In this case the trial judge made it clear that, if not precluded by our mandate from doing so, he would have otherwise imposed a downward departure sentence. That he was authorized by section 775.082 to impose a downward departure sentence is now abundantly clear to us, but our previous remand directions forbade him from doing so....

...departure sentence. Upon imposition of any departure sentence, we may then review the sufficiency of the reasons given by the trial judge for departing from the guidelines. DELL and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.656, Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...n for robbery. In this motion to correct illegal sentence, he argued that he did not qualify as a PRR because he did not commit the robbery within three years of being "released from a state correctional facility" as provided in the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...inimum as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). In August 2008, Defendant filed a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence in which he argued that his PRR enhancement was illegal because false imprisonment is not an enumerated felony listed in section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2004)....

...pursuant to rule 3.800(a)). We reverse the trial court's September 3, 2008 denial of the first rule 3.800(a) motion. The State's response to this court's order to show cause does not dispute that false imprisonment is not an enumerated felony under section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2004)....

...2007) (explaining that the only consideration in determining whether an offense is a forcible felony is the statutory elements of the offense); Sinclair v. State, 973 So.2d 665, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (reversing sentence and remanding for resentencing because false imprisonment is not enumerated in subsection 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2004)); see also § 787.02(1)(a), Fla....

deemed appropriate by the Legislature under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2018). Indeed, in this case

...On count 6, the defendant was convicted of violating section 800.04(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2003). For such convictions, the sentencing court is authorized to impose either a life sentence or a split sentence incorporating a term of 25 years' imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Fla....

...Seventeen years old, he was adjudicated delinquent for what would have been a second-degree felony (lewd or lascivious battery in violation of section 800.04(4), Fla. Stat. (2003)), punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, if he had been an adult at the time of the offense. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...That is why I join the judgment. In a case of simple battery, however — to take one example — a juvenile's spending three and a half months in custody before *893 entry of the disposition order might well determine the date he must be released from custody. See § 775.082(4)(a), Fla....

...As will be demonstrated below, sentences imposed pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, habitual violent felony offender statute, and violent career criminal statute are enhanced sentences within the meaning of Hale because they provide for sentencing in excess of the statutory máxi-mums set forth in section 775.082, Florida Statutes....

...Conversely, sentences imposed pursuant to the criminal punishment code, three-time violent felony offender statute, and prison releasee reoffender statute are not enhanced sentences within the meaning of Hale because they do not provide for sentencing in excess of the statutory máximums set forth in section 775.082. The criminal punishment code, found in section 921.0024, Florida Statutes (2005), states, in relevant part: “The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing....

...In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a term of imprisonment of 5 years. 2. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.[ 7 ] § 775.084(4)(c) (emphasis added). The prison releasee reoffender statute, found in section 775.082(9)(a)3., provides: If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison re-leasee reoffender....

...“Unlike a habitual offender sentence, a PRR sentence is not enhanced beyond the statutory maximum; rather, the PRR statute establishes that the only lawful sentence for a PRR offender is the statutory maximum, which must be served in its entirety.” Reeves v. State, 920 So.2d 724, 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Appellant, Lawrence D. Slocum, appeals his thirty-year sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) on count two, burglary of a conveyance with battery. Appellant argues that burglary of a conveyance with battery is not a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Appellant contended that burglary of a conveyance with battery was not a predicate offense to PRR sentencing under the statute. The trial court agreed with the State, reasoning that burglary with battery would fall under the catch-all provision of section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...The Tumblin court explained that burglary with an assault or battery "could be committed by an unlawful touching during a burglary and does not necessarily include the threat or use of physical force or violence," so the defendant "could not be sentenced as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...In case number 08-CF-6526, we affirm the revocation of probation, but we reverse the five-year sentence on the first-degree misdemeanor of petit theft. See § 812.014(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). We remand for the trial court to sentence Esquivel for the petit theft to a term of imprisonment of no more than one year. See § 775.082(4)(a), Fla....

...mary offense” and resisting an officer with violence (count II) as an “additional offense” because appellant was sentenced for those charges under the prison releas-ee reoffender statute, which is not governed by the sentencing guidelines. See § 775.082(8)(a)2., Fla....

...Since possession of cocaine is not a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act, the scoresheet should not have included a multiplier for law enforcement protection. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d)(22) (requiring imposition of a multiplier if the primary offense is a violation of the Law Enforcement Protection Act under section 775.0823, Florida Statutes)....

...y the Florida Legislature in 2014. See ch. 2014-220, Laws of Fla. We therefore quash the First District’s decision and remand this case for resentencing in conformance with chapter 2014- 220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes. FACTS AND BACKGROUND Rebecca Lee Falcon was fifteen years old in late 1997 when she took part in an attempted robbery that resulted in the death of a cab driver....

...tempted armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder and 207.5 months in prison for the attempted armed robbery. Under the version of the relevant Florida statute then in effect, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1997), Falcon’s sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole -5- for the first-degree murder was mandatory.2 Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the First District in 2001....

...according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...possibility of parole, but instead simply alters the procedures that must be followed before such a sentence may be imposed. We reject the State’s argument. As articulated by the Second District in Toye, Miller “effectively invalidated section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2012), as applied to juveniles convicted of a capital felony ....

...Thus, Miller “[p]laces beyond the authority of the state [of Florida] the power to . . . impose [a] certain penalt[y]”—mandatory life sentences for juveniles. 113 So. 3d 1058, 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Van Nortwick, J., specially concurring). Clearly, by invalidating section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, as applied to juveniles convicted of a capital homicide offense, Miller announced a prohibition on the state’s power to “impose certain penalties”—nondiscretionary sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole....

...ual felony offender. 1 . Because second-degree murder is a first-degree felony punishable by life, see section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (2007), Scott’s status as a prison releasee reoffender requires imposition of a mandatory life sentence. See § 775.082(9)(a)3.a„ Fla....

...He was found guilty as charged by a jury on April 24, 2001. In his motion, Duffy claimed that his sentence for capital sexual battery was illegal because the court imposed a life sentence without imposing the mandatory minimum twentyfive years with eligibility for parole, as required by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1991). Duffy cites to the 1991 statutes and erroneously states that the time frame alleged in the information commenced in 1992 instead of 1993. This error is of no significance because section 775.082(1) remained unchanged in 1993. In 1995, section 775.082 was amended to eliminate the possibility of parole for capital crimes that do not result in punishment by death....

...2d DCA 2003); Gilbert v. State, 680 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In its order, the trial court denied Duffy's motion "based upon the contents of the State's Response." In its response, the State acknowledged that Duffy correctly quoted the provisions of section 775.082(1), but asserted that the "second part of the statute which reads, `shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole,' does not set a cap on the amount of time a defendant may serve under a life sentence, rather it simply establishes a floor." The trial court erred by adopting the State's interpretation of section 775.082(1). The trial court was required to impose the life sentence mandated by section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), as well as the provision for parole eligibility after serving no less than twenty-five years....

...4th DCA 2012), which the Fourth District certified is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Montgomery v. State, 36 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). 1 For the reasons explained below, we approve the Fourth District’s holding that section 775.082(3)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2008), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for adults convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve. 1....

...(2008), which provides for downward departures in sentencing if certain mitigating circumstances are present.2 The trial court found that it had no discretion to impose a downward departure sentence, even though it was inclined to do so, because section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...Therefore, the trial court denied Rochester’s motion and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. The Fourth District affirmed the trial court, concluding that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment in section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...not intend to impose a mandatory minimum sentence in this section. Id. at 411. II. ANALYSIS Lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve by an adult is “a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a)4.” § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...bove is a mandatory minimum sentence.3 This involves an issue of statutory interpretation and is subject to de 3. We do not reach the State’s argument that, while imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment, section 775.082(3)(a)4. -3- novo review....

...the statute and its plain meaning.’ ” Tasker v. State, 48 So. 3d 798, 804 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)). We find that, contrary to Rochester’s argument, the use of the term “may” in section 775.082(3) does not give the trial court the broad discretion to impose a downward departure sentence of less than twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Rather, when section 775.082(3)(a)4. is read as a whole, it is clear that the phrase “may be punished as follows” in subsection 775.082(3) is simply referring to the trial court’s discretion to choose among the two sentencing alternatives listed in section 775.082(3)(a)4.—life imprisonment or a sentence of not less than twenty- five years followed by community control or probation for the rest of the offender’s life....

...Therefore, while the statute does give the trial court some discretion in which sentence it chooses to impose for violations of section 800.04(5)(b), under the plain meaning of the statutory language the trial court does not have the discretion to impose a sentence below the twenty-five year minimum set forth in section 775.082(3)(a)4.a(II). III....

...I dissent because the applicable statute does not preclude trial courts from imposing a downward departure sentence. Specifically, unlike a “mandatory minimum” statute that requires the defendant to serve a minimum sentence day- for-day, section 775.082(3)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2008), does not contain any -5- language indicating that the twenty-five-year sentencing minimum it sets forth is a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day, or that the application of gain time or other early release schemes is prohibited. In my view, because there is no requirement that the defendant serve the twenty-five-year minimum sentence provided in section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...Accordingly, Rochester— who was initially offered a sentence of seven and a half years by the State—should be resentenced. At the heart of this case rests a question of statutory construction regarding whether the sentencing minimum provided by section 775.082(3)(a)4. is a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day. Contrary to the majority’s construction of the statute, nothing within section 775.082(3)(a)4. expressly precludes a trial court from imposing a downward departure sentence....

...defendant’s sentence is subject to gain time. The Fourth District and this Court have determined that the use of the word “may” within the statute is permissive in allowing a trial court the choice of only the sentencing alternatives within section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...I disagree with this construction that the two sentences provided in the statute are the only sentencing options for a trial court to consider. -7-  To the contrary, as is generally true with sentencing statutes unless otherwise expressly stated, nothing within section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...precludes a trial court from imposing a downward departure sentence if the statutory criteria of sections 921.0026 and 921.00265, Florida Statutes, concerning the requirements and mitigating circumstances for which a departure is reasonably justified, are met. This is because, although the sentencing minimum mandated by section 775.082(3)(a)4. is twenty-five years, the sentence is not a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day such as those set forth in, for example, sections 775.082(9)(b) or 893.135(3), Florida Statutes, which contain specific language indicating that the sentence is a “mandatory minimum” or that the defendant is not eligible for any form of early release. See § 775.082(9)(b), Fla. Stat....

...947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”). -8-  While the majority acknowledges that the certified conflict issue in this case concerns whether the twenty-five-year sentencing minimum set forth in section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...include a downward departure, the sentence is not a “mandatory minimum” sentence in the sense that it precludes the application of gain time. See Answer Brief of Respondent at 12, Rochester v. State, No. SC12-1932 (Fla. June 3, 2013) (“The plain language in section 775.082(3)(a)4, however, does not preclude the application of gain time.”)....

...This Court does not reach that question, stating that it -9- was not addressed by the Fourth District even though the Fourth District in Rochester certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Montgomery that concerned whether a defendant’s sentence under section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...“mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day and a statutory sentencing minimum that need not, especially since the Second District’s opinion, with which the Fourth District certified conflict, held that the twenty-five-year minimum sentence provided in section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...(2008) (providing that a defendant “is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149,” prior to serving the minimum sentence). See also § 775.082(9)(b) (“A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release....

...ency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”). - 10 -  Moreover, if there is any ambiguity in the language of section 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II), we must construe it in favor of the defendant. See § 775.021(1)....

...Accordingly, we affirm Montgomery’s judgment and sentence but note that his sentence does not provide for a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment. Montgomery, 36 So. 3d at 188-89. For the same reasons set forth by the Second District, I would hold that section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...the discretion to impose a sentence of less than twenty-five years if it deemed it to be just. The trial court determined that the twenty-five-year sentence, followed by probation for the remainder of Rochester’s life, was required pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)4., and denied Rochester’s motion for a downward departure sentence....

...t have any discretion to downwardly depart from the minimum twenty-five-year sentence provided in the statute. Unlike other statutes that make a sentencing minimum a “mandatory minimum” that must be served day-for-day, there is no language in section 775.082(3)(a)4. indicating that the twenty-five-year sentencing minimum is a “mandatory minimum” or that the application of gain time or other early release schemes is prohibited....

...The victims wanted Coleman to be sentenced to an extensive, long-term drug rehabilitation program and filed a letter with the court to that effect. The State filed a notice of intent to seek classification of Coleman as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (1997), which became effective May 30, 1997. See Ch. 97-239, § 7, at 4404, Laws of Fla. Coleman sought relief from the mandatory provisions of the Act pursuant to the statutory exception found in section 775.082(8)(d)1.c....

...3d DCA 2002); Rodriguez v. State, 826 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). *818 We find the State properly confessed error on the defendant's fourth point. At the time of the offenses, burglary was not a qualifying offense under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

..."life in prison with twenty five years minimum mandatory with the possibility of parole." However, that sentence is functionally the same as his current sentence. After Defendant has served twenty-five years, he will become eligible for parole. See § 775.082(1), Fla....

...ction 1, Laws of Florida. As a result of that amendment, one convicted of a capital felony, unless sentenced to death, had to be sentenced to life imprisonment, and "[i]f convicted of murder in the first degree . . . shall be ineligible for parole." § 775.082(1)(a), Fla....

...on of a felony offense is to set the scope of any potential sentence. Life felonies, as the name implies, are punishable by a sentence of life in prison or a lengthy term of years, depending on the nature of the offense and when it was committed. § 775.082(3)(a). First-degree -4- felonies are generally punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b)(1). Second-degree felonies are generally punishable by a term not to exceed fifteen years. § 775.082(3)(d). And third-degree felonies are generally punishable by a term not to exceed five years. § 775.082(3)(e)....

...A capital felony receives the most severe punishment. Subject to the outcome of a penalty phase proceeding in a prosecution for a capital felony, such an offense is punished either by death or by life in prison without the possibility of parole. § 775.082(1)(a)....

...The legislature considered the possibility that the death penalty might be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or our own supreme court and provided that, in such circumstances, a person previously sentenced to death should be resentenced to life in prison without parole. See § 775.082(2). The Text of the Second-Degree Perjury and Capital Sexual Battery Statutes Unambiguously Makes Capital Sexual Battery a Capital Felony With an understanding of the classification of capital felonies behind...

...Nothing in section 837.02(2) suggests that any different meaning could have been intended. We recognize, of course, that the consequence of the classification of an offense as a capital felony is that the legislature deems it potentially eligible for imposition of the death penalty under section 775.082(1)(a). But that consequence does not make it reasonable to understand the term "capital felony" in the second- degree perjury statute as meaning only a felony that may constitutionally be punished by death. Nothing in either section 775.081(1) or section 775.082 says that the constitutional availability of the death penalty determines or influences the classification of a crime as a capital felony—i.e., nothing in those statutes says that a capital felony for which the death penalty is n...

...ces, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death. See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 57 (Fla. 2016). - 13 -  The supreme court held that the statutory maximum was death. Id. at 538. Citing section 775.082(1), the statute that makes the death penalty available for capital felonies, and section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), the statute establishing the procedure for determining whether to inflict it, the supreme court held that "th...

...penalty of death." Id. The version of the statute then in effect provided that a person convicted of a capital felony "shall be punished by life imprisonment" or, depending on the outcome of a sentencing proceeding, "shall be punished by death." Id. (quoting § 775.082(1), Fla....

...Antonio Levy challenges his sentence of eighteen months for the first-degree misdemeanor of possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis. 1 See § 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). The State concurs that because a first-degree misdemeanor is punishable by up to only one year in jail, § 775.082(4)(a), Levy must be resentenced....

...The question in this case is whether a defendant may, pursuant to a negotiated plea, be sentenced pursuant to both the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC), sections 921.002 through 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2000), and also the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA), section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000). We hold that such a sentence is not necessarily illegal, although the present sentence must be modified to reflect that the prison releasee reoffender portion of the sentence may not exceed the time specified by section 775.082(9)(a)3.d., Florida Statutes (2000)....

...s of 66.4 months. Appellant does not dispute that he qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender. During the plea colloquy, the judge adequately advised defendant that the PRRPA designation would cause him to serve the entire sentence day-for-day. See § 775.082(9)(b), Fla....

...d. The CPC scoresheet in the record before us reflects a lowest permissible sentence of 66.4 months. Under the PRRPA, a defendant convicted of a third-degree felony, as was appellant in this case, must serve a term of imprisonment of five years. See § 775.082(9)(a)3.d., Fla. Stat. (2000). Also, the PRRPA defendant must serve "100 percent of the court-imposed sentence." § 775.082(9)(b), Fla....

...Accordingly, appellant, relying upon the two cases mentioned above, argues that his sentence is illegal and must be vacated in favor of the five years provided by the PRRPA. We disagree. In Wilson, the court noted "apparent conflict" within the various subsections of section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). [*] Wilson, 793 So.2d at 1004. In particular, the court noted two provisions that it could not reconcile. Section 775.082(8)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997), provided that where the state attorney establishes that a defendant is "a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced [as a prison releasee reoffender]." Wilson, 793 So.2d at 1005. As noted by the Wilson court, however, the statute went on at section 775.082(8)(c) to state: Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law pursuant to s....

...Next, the court applied the principle of ejusdem generis to conclude that "any other provision of law" means only other penalty enhancement statutes similar to the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes, because that particular statute was mentioned specifically in section 775.082(8)(c), Florida Statues (1997)....

...ns of the PRRPA may well have conflicted with legislative intent. See Wilson, 793 So.2d at 1006 ("We recognize that it is possible the legislature intended that a defendant whose guidelines sentence range is greater than the mandatory sentence under section 775.082(8) be sentenced under both the PRRPA and the sentencing guidelines."); Irons, 791 So.2d at 1224 ("[W]e also think the Legislature probably did not intend this result....

...uidelines sentences."). We read the subsections at issue in pari materia, and in light of the legislative direction that offenders previously released from prison "be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection ...." § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...the mandatory sentence as specified in the PRRPA. We specifically note that the directive against guideline sentencing states that a defendant who is a prison releasee reoffender "is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines ...." § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla....

...§ 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act provides that an offender like appellant "is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced ... by a term of imprisonment of 5 years." § 775.082(9)(a)3.d., Fla. Stat. (2001). I would affirm the five-year sentence and reverse the guidelines sentence. NOTES [*] Now renumbered as section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The record attached by the trial court reveals that in case numbers 99-8246, 99-11054, and 99-11055, Bryant received sentences of 193.25 months, a little more than sixteen years in prison, for second degree felony burglary charges. The maximum sentence provided by law for a second degree felony is fifteen years. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...Bryant was also given 193.25 months in prison on count two, grand theft, in case number 99-11054. Bryant received this same sentence *624 in case number 99-11128 for attempted burglary. Both grand theft and attempted burglary as charged in these cases are third degree felonies punishable by a maximum of five years in prison. § 775.082(3)(d)....

...The defendant alleges that his fifty-year sentences were illegal with respect to the life felonies to which he pled guilty. He argues that under the statute in effect at the relevant time, a fifty-year sentence was not a permissible sentence for a life felony. See § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...To the extent that this statement implies that dual sentences under the Act and another recidivist statute are never allowed, and to the extent that it implies that a sentence under the Act must always be the longest in duration of any sentence imposed, Grant is controlling. As we stated in Grant, "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes [a sentencing] court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration." Grant, 770 So.2d at 659 (emphasis added). Therefore, the district court was correct in vacating the lesser sentence and we approve the result. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.082(8)(c), Florida Statutes....

...A prison releasee reoffender sentence is appropriate only if the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced is one of the enumerated felonies or "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual." § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

...We reversed, however, his PRR sentence for the crime of fleeing and eluding as a PRR sentence is appropriate only if the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced is one of the enumerated felonies or "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual," see section 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Florida Statutes (2002), and fleeing and eluding is neither an enumerated felony nor a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence....

...We deny the motion for rehearing, but write to explain our affirmance of the robbery by sudden snatching conviction and PRR sentence. In Smith, the trial court imposed a PRR sentence for the crime of "robbery by sudden snatching," equating the crime with the "robbery" that is one of the enumerated felonies under section 775.082(9)(a)1.g....

...State, 848 So.2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). Cohen is in accord. We did not affirm Thomas's PRR sentence for the crime of "robbery by sudden snatching" under the rationale that "robbery by sudden snatching" is the equivalent of the enumerated crime of "robbery" under section 775.082(9)(a)1.g. Rather, we affirmed the sentence because the PRR statute allows for the imposition of a PRR sentence for one of the enumerated felonies or under section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...a habitual felony offender. We must reverse because the sentence imposed is not authorized by law. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla.2000)(citing Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. dismissed, 779 So.2d 275 (Fla.2000); § 775.082(8)(c), Fla....

...For the two counts of dealing in stolen property, he was designated a habitual felony offender ("HFO") and sentenced to two 25-year sentences. The three sentences were imposed concurrently to each other. Miller appeals, raising a number of challenges primarily to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997) ("Act")....

...ples. Notably, the trial court did not sentence Miller as both a PRR and an HFO on each count, as was the case in Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We further conclude that Miller's final argument, dealing with the interpretation of section 775.082(8)(a)1.q., Florida Statutes (1997), was not properly raised before the trial court and, because it does not constitute fundamental error, may not be raised for the first time on appeal....

...See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (1999); Fla. R.App. P. 9.140. We therefore affirm appellant's convictions but, as in Woods, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? AFFIRMED....

the possibility of parole for 25 years. See, § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). I again agree with Judge

...For this reason, we affirm. The statute at issue defines a "prison releasee reoffender" as a person who commits a qualifying offense within three years after being released "from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections." § 775.082(9) Fla....

...ion of the same sentence in relation to Hill's conviction for robbery with a firearm in another incident. In both cases, the trial court sentenced Hill to life in prison without parole under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act ("PRRPA") in section 775.082(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Robert F. Medina (Medina) appeals his sentence for burglary of a dwelling, which the trial court entered pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the Act), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...After reviewing the record, we find the trial court's oral pronouncement consistent with the written sentence. Third, Medina argues that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not a qualifying offense under the Act. Medina points out that the Act lists "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling" as a qualifying offense. § 775.082(8)(a)1.q., Fla....

...Conner, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Patricia E. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *140 FULMER, Judge. Demetrius Jones appeals his sentence for felony battery arguing section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, is unconstitutional and the sentences imposed for that offense under both the Habitual Offender Statute and section 775.082(8) violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. In Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), this court recently considered and rejected the identical challenges to section 775.082(8)....

...). The trial court sentenced Cohen to five years in prison as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), stating that Cohen qualified for a PRR sentence because the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act identified "robbery" as a qualifying offense. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(g), Fla....

...Further, Williams requested and we granted leave to file supplemental briefing based on our holding in Hurst. Through supplemental briefing, Williams argues that his death sentence was imposed in violation of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst, and, as a result, his death sentence must be commuted to a life sentence pursuant to section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Alternatively, he argues that he must get a life sentence because Hurst error is structural error and, therefore, not amenable to harmless error review. The State argues that no error occurred at all in this case, but if it has, it is harmless. *566 In Hurst, we rejected the argument that section 775.082(2) requires commutation to a life sentence of a death sentence that was imposed in violation of Hurst v....

...ty of parole. Copeland raises three issues on appeal. We affirm on all grounds and write only to address Copeland’s argument that a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...e fight, immediately after which the victim was found bleeding to death in the parking lot from a gunshot wound in her chest. Copeland was seventeen years old at the time of the crime. Copeland was convicted of first-degree murder, a capital felony. Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), provides that a person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished either by death or by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole....

...2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without the *510 possibility of parole for those who were juveniles at the time of their crimes is unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Thus, under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), a juvenile convicted of a capital felony may not be sentenced to death nor to a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole....

...zed mitigation inquiry. Id. at 2471-75 . In Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), this Court held that life without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence for a juvenile convicted of a capital felony under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2012), as long as the trial court examines the mitigating factors in the case: [I]f the state ......

...We affirm the defendant's convictions, but reverse the sentence imposed on Count II. The court erred in sentencing defendant as a Prison Releasee Reoffender *557 ["PRR"] on that count. The offense on that count is not enumerated in the PRR statute, § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla....

...sentences under both statutes. [1] Appellant is correct. The prison releasee reoffender statute authorizes a court to deviate from its statutory scheme only to impose "a greater sentence of incarceration" under the habitual felony offender statute. § 775.082(9)(c), Fla....

...Lee Anthony Hall appeals his convictions and sentences for attempted second-degree murder, robbery, and armed burglary. We find merit only in his argument that his sentences are erroneous. The trial court sentenced Hall as a prison releasee reoffender, section 775.082(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1999) (Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act [PRRPA]), to life in prison with a minimum mandatory term of thirty years for the attempted second-degree murder, to be served concurrently with life sentences for the robbery and the armed burglary....

...Knight was a daycare worker who, according to the indictment, caused a child’s death “by exposing the child to diphenhydramine and/or placing the child in unsafe sleeping conditions.” She faces a potential thirty-year sentence if convicted. See § 775.082(3)(b)(l), Fla....

...However, since we are remanding this matter to the trial court for resentencing, it would be premature at this juncture to attempt to determine whether the limits established in Blakely apply. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2000), has been modified to apply to both occupied and unoccupied dwellings; however, the modification did not take effect until July 1, 2001.

...idence to support his claim, his motion was legally insufficient, and it was therefore properly denied by the trial court. However, we note that the defendant’s life sentence imposed as to count nine of the indictment for first degree murder under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that a person convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole....

...al to the legality of the sentence, as the statute is self-executing. See Jenkins v. State, 556 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (holding that the failure to include the twenty-five year mandatory minimum language is not fatal to implementation of section 775.082(1), as the statute is self-executing). *1039 Additionally, we note that the Florida Department of Corrections has fully recognized and applied section 775.082(1), and has included the twenty-five year minimum mandatory provision for the defendant’s first degree murder conviction in its commitment documents....

...We agree, and accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing. We affirm Appellant's judgment without further discussion. Appellant was convicted of robbery following a jury trial. At sentencing, the State sought to have Appellant classified as a PRR. See § 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla....

...After violating her probation, Thompson was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eighty-seven months' incarceration on all counts. Thompson asserts that her sentences on counts 8, 26, and 32 are illegal because they exceed the five-year statutory maximum for third-degree felonies under section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), and that it was improper for the trial court to round up the lowest permissible sentence reflected on her scoresheet, which was 86.1 months. When the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence provided for by section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed....

...State, 6 So.3d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (emphasis omitted) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2005)); see also Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (holding that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082 ......

...Angela Doyle Flaherty of Filipkowski and Haynes, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann Pfeiffer Howe, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *513 PARKER, Judge. Jerry Hamilton appeals his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender entered pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act ("the Act")....

...son, the court sentenced Hamilton as a prison releasee reoffender. On appeal, Hamilton argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a prison releasee reoffender without providing proof that he qualified for that designation, as required by section 775.082(8)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows...." § 775.082(8)(a)2., Fla....

...He maintains that the maximum sentence that could be imposed on count one was 30 years' incarceration because his conviction for attempted second degree murder, which is classified as a first degree felony under section 775.087(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2007), carries a maximum sentence of 30 years under section 775.082(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2007)....

...under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) was twenty-five years to life imprisonment. However, once the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty year maximum penalty for a first degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b)....

...dure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand with instructions. Livingston claims that he does not qualify as a prison releasee reoffender because he did not commit his new offense within three years of being released from a state correctional facility. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla....

...[1] He appeals the trial court's imposition of a three-year prison sentence where he scored less than twenty-three points on his sentencing scoresheet and the trial court failed to make written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public. We reverse. Section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2009) provides: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. (Emphasis added). The State does not dispute that under section 775.082(10), Goldberg was entitled to a nonstate prison sanction unless the court made written findings, supported by competent evidence, that imposition of a nonstate prison sentence could present a danger to the public....

...g, but again failed to include findings that the imposition of a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public. The trial court may well have been able to correct its initial failure to make the necessary written findings required by section 775.082(10) by doing so in response to Goldberg's rule 3.800(b)(2) motion....

remanding for imposition of a life sentence. See § 775.082(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). As I explained fully in

...Respondent. December 20, 2018 LAWSON, J. We review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Brown v. State, 233 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In Brown, the Fifth District expressly declared valid section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2015), which requires that a qualifying offender whose sentencing scoresheet totals 22 points or fewer be sentenced to a nonstate prison sanction unless the trial court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public....

...to a nonstate prison sanction. However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat. But for subsection (10), the penalty for a third-degree felony would be “a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years” pursuant to section 775.082(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...averne Brown’s argument that “her state prison sentence violates the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, because the jury did not find that she presents a danger to the public under section 775.082(10).” Brown, 233 So....

...isonment that, but for subsection (10), would apply to Brown’s third-degree felony conviction pursuant to subsection (3)(e). Id. at 1263-64 (citing Porter v. State, 110 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also id. at 1265-66 (“[S]ection 775.082(10) is a -3- mitigation statute, and not one that unconstitutionally allows an increase in the statutory maximum based upon judicial fact-finding.”). Because Brown has since served her sent...

...cts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” We agree with Brown that subsection (10) unambiguously sets the statutory maximum penalty, for Apprendi purposes as defined by Blakely, as “a nonstate prison sanction,” § 775.082(10), Fla....

...of subsection (10)’s validity in Brown and disapprove the Fourth District’s decision in Porter rejecting a similar Sixth Amendment challenge to subsection (10). In order for a court to impose any sentence above a nonstate prison sanction when section 775.082(10) applies, a jury must make the dangerousness finding. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 27, 2018....

...r, and the trial court was within its discretion to impose a sentence that it deemed just. The trial court denied Rochester’s motion for a downward departure sentence, concluding that it had no discretion to grant a departure sentence. Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court then sentenced Rochester to the mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years followed by a term of probation for life....

...years. Rochester was convicted under section 800.04(5)(b), which states, “[a]n offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim less than 12 years of age commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a)4.” § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...A term of imprisonment for life; or b. A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25 years’ imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the person’s natural life, as provided in s. 948.012(4). § 775.082(3)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Relying upon the language- of the sentencing statute, Rochester claims that the trial court may depart from the minimum terms in the statute because of the use of the word “may” in section 775.082(3)....

...or an aggravated fleeing and eluding charge. Id. (quoting McKendry, 641 So.2d at 47 ). In 2004, the crime for which Rochester was convicted was a first degree felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison. See § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). Through its enactment of the Jessica Lunsford Act in 2005, the legislature made the following changes to the 2004 versions of sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3): (1) a violation of section 800.04(5)0») became a life felony; and (2) section 775.082(3) carried a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Ch. 2005-28, §§ 4-5, at 7-8, Laws of Fla. Similar to McKendry , the fact that the legislature amended sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3) in 2005 establishes a clear and unambiguous expression of its intent to impose a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Moreover, the sentencing statute provides a specific alternative available to the sentencing judge. The Jessica Lunsford Act applies to Rochester because he was charged with committing the crime in May 2008. In the context of section 775.082(3)(a)4., we read “may” to mean that the trial court has the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum prison sentence of twenty-five years as an alternative to life imprisonment. However, the trial court does not have the discretion to go outside the two alternatives provided in section 775.082(3)(a)4. We reject Rochester’s interpretation that the legislature’s use of the word “may” is a grant of authority to the trial court to impose a sentence outside the confines of section 775.082(3)(a)4....

...an appropriate context.”); Woodland v. Lindsey, 586 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“The word ‘may’ in this context must be construed as an imperative to the court to exercise its authority.”). We hold that sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3)(a)4....

...2d DCA 2010). In Montgomery , the defendant appealed his judgment and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation in *411 violation of section, 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). The Second District affirmed his judgment and sentence and clarified that section 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II) — the 2008 version of the same statute Rochester was sentenced under — does not require a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five-years, and any ambiguity in the statute should be construed in favor of the defendant....

...The State argues that by its express terms, section 921.0026(1) is limited to those sentences calculable under the Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-.0024, Fla. Stat. Therefore, section 921.0026 would not be available to Rochester because section 775.082(3)(a)4. is not a Criminal Punishment Code sentence due to the fact that section 775.082(3)(a)4....

prosecutions. See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); § 775.082(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). Florida’s capital sentencing

...For each of these three armed robbery convictions, appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment under both the habitual felony offender statute and the prison releasee reoffender statute. Imposing sentences of equal length under both of these two statutes was error "[b]ecause section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the prison releasee reoffender sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration." Walls v....

...The record reflects that the defendant was charged in case number 97-332 with two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of burglary with assault. On April 3, 1998, the state filed a notice of the defendant's qualifications as a prison releasee reoffender and required sentencing term pursuant to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...wo counts of the reduced charge of aggravated battery, in exchange for a recommended sentence of fifteen years. Neither the written plea agreement nor the plea colloquy contains any form of reference to the prison releasee reoffender punishment act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). On May 19, 1998, the trial court adjudicated the defendant guilty, found that he qualified as a reoffender pursuant to section 775.082 and sentenced him pursuant to this section to fifteen years in state prison in case number 97-332, with a concurrent sixty month term in case number 97-285....

...owing the defendant to believe that he would not...." Although pre-plea correspondence between the defendant and his counsel demonstrates that the defendant was notified that the state intended to seek a prison releasee offender sentence pursuant to section 775.082, absolutely no mention of this section, or the fact that the fifteen-year sentence constituted a mandatory term, was made in either the written plea agreement or the plea colloquy conducted in open court. At the outset of the subsequent sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that the plea entailed that the defendant be sentenced under section 775.082....

...Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw plea and remand with directions for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim that the defendant's plea was involuntary due to misadvice *454 as to the application and mandatory nature of section 775.082(8)....

...That decision is for the trial judge after the presentation of evidence supporting and/or refuting it. However, if the trial court denies the defendant's motion to withdraw plea, we direct the court to correct the written sentencing order to reflect that the fifteen-year sentence is pursuant to section 775.082(8)....

...Regarding the third issue, however, we agree with Brookens that the trial court erroneously utilized his conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer as a qualifying offense to sentence him as a prison releasee reoffender. In State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007), the Florida Supreme Court observed that section 775.082, Florida Statutes, which authorizes a qualifying individual to be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender, does not specifically list battery on a law enforcement officer as a qualifying offense. The court also noted that in addition to those offenses specifically listed in the statute, section 775.082(9)(a)1. includes as a qualifying offense "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. . . ." § 775.082(9)(a)1....

...The court analyzed the elements of the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer to determine whether it qualifies as a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence and concluded that it does not. Because battery on a law enforcement officer is not a qualifying offense under section 775.082, Brookens was improperly sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender....

...The court lacked jurisdiction to do so while the appeal was pending. He prays on this appeal that we reverse the sentence so that court may effectively correct sentencing errors. We agree that the sentence on counts 2 and 3 for false imprisonment was improperly designated as a PRR. Section 775.082(9)(a) provides that certain enumerated offenses may be sentenced as a PRR, but false imprisonment is not among them. See Sinclair v. State, 973 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("False imprisonment is not an enumerated felony under subparagraph 775.082(9)(a)1."); see also State v....

...Causey, 503 So.2d 321, 322 (Fla.1987). Upon review by the court, it appears that a-sentencing error may exist. The scoresheet completed for sentencing and included in the record indicates Appellant' was assigned 14.8 total sentencing points. Under section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after Julyl, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony' as defined in s....

...This sentence is not supported by the score-sheet of 14.8 total sentencing points. Furthermore, the trial court made no written findings, supported by the record, to justify an upward departure from the presumptive mandatory sentencing of section *642 775.082(10), Fla....

...Hankins for treatment as a prison release reoffender. Instead, the discussion centered on whether Mr. Hankins' actions— apparently waving a partially opened, serrated three-inch pocketknife—would constitute a felony in Florida. III. The Florida PRR Statute Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), establishes that eligibility for a PRR designation on account of a release from out-of-state incarceration requires that the incarceration have been for "an offense for which the sentence is punishable...

...t. See Carpenter v. State, 785 So.2d 1182, 1205 (Fla.2001). Especially in light of the statutory requirement that we interpret criminal statutes strictly in favor of the defendant, § 775.021, we conclude that the out-of-state offense referred to in section 775.082(9)(a) must be interpreted to require that the elements of the out-of-state offense would be sufficient for a conviction under a Florida statute that is punishable as a felony....

...Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, George Saunders, appeals the trial court order summarily denying his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. In this motion, appellant alleged that his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1997), for burglary of a structure was illegal because the jury did not make an express finding that the burglary was of an occupied structure....

...gain being sentenced as both an HFO and a PRR in each case. The defendant filed a rule 3.800 motion challenging the trial court's imposition of equal terms of incarceration as a PRR and an HFO with respect to each of his three sentences. He cited to section 775.082(9)(c) of Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender statute which states: "Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to [Florida's HFO statute] or any other provision of law." (Emphasis added)....

...The trial court rejected this argument, holding that the defendant was sentenced to the 15 year prison sentence as a PRR and to 15 years plus ten years probation as an HFO and, accordingly, the HFO sentence is "greater" and thus legal. We disagree. Based on the specific language of section 775.082(9)(c), the sentences under review are illegal....

...sentences thus did not violate double jeopardy principles, it did, nonetheless, violate the express provisions of the Act. As recognized by the First District in Walls, 765 So.2d at 734 [ Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)], because "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration," a trial court is "without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony...

...In Lewis I, the defendant was sentenced to a 15 year mandatory minimum prison term as a PRR concurrent with a 10 year prison term, followed by 10 years of probation, as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO). In entering its decision, the Fifth District interpreted section 775.082(8)(c) as authorizing "the State to seek whichever sentence may imprison the defendant longer," but not as allowing dual sentences as both a PRR and an HVFO....

...l sentences under the Act and another recidivist statute are never allowed, and to the extent that it implies that a sentence under the Act must always be the longest in duration of any sentence imposed, Grant is controlling. As we stated in Grant, "section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes [a sentencing] court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration." Grant, 770 So.2d at 659 (emphasis added)....

...Accordingly, the 10 year probationary term which follows the defendant's 15 year HFO prison sentence, is not a "sentence of incarceration," and therefore, cannot be added to the 15 year HFO prison term in order to create "a greater sentence of incarceration" such that defendant's sentencing as an HFO and a PRR can stand. See § 775.082(9)(c), Fla....

...As such, we reverse the trial court's denial of the defendant's rule 3.800(a) motion and strike the defendant's HFO sentences, leaving only the PRR sentences in effect. REVERSED. GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a). [2] See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (2005). [3] See § 775.082, Fla....

...ed sentence. that a ten-year sentence could not be imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, we reverse. Resisting arrest with violence is third-degree felony that is punishable by up to five years in prison. See §§ 775.082(3)(e), 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2015). Where the State demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant qualifies to be sentenced as a PRR, the defendant must be sentenced to five years in prison for a third-degree felony. § 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d). A trial court may impose a single sentence pursuant to both the PRR and habitual felony offender (HFO) statutes but the HFO portion of the sentence must be longer than the PRR portion of the sentence. See § 775.082(9)(c) ("Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 [the HFO statute] or any other provision of law."); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that the plain language of section 775.082(8)(c), the predecessor to subsection 775.082(9)(c), only permits trial courts to impose an HFO term that is longer than the PRR term and that, therefore, trial courts may not sentence a defendant to an equal sentence under the HFO statute even when it is imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence); see also Wallace v....

...aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer]. That's as a PRR habitual offender." The trial court did not specify whether the PRR portion of the sentence was only for five years. Had it done so, the sentence would have been permissible. See §§ 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), 843.01. The written sentence also fails to offer any clarity as it provides for a ten- year sentence with both the PRR and HFO boxes checked....

the trial court’s determination pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, that sentencing appellant

...The trial court revoked his probation and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years' prison with credit for time served, followed by ten years' probation, and stayed the incarcerative portion of the sentence, placing Appellant on probation. Appellant's original forty-two year sentence was a legal one under section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), for a first-degree felony punishable by life....

...983, and before July 1, 1995, was punishable "by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years," although one convicted of a first-degree felony punishable by life could receive a sentence exceeding forty years. § 775.082(3)(a)2., Fla....

...See § 777.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). Howe's use of a firearm in the commission of the attempted offense reclassifies the offense to a felony of the first degree. See § 775.087(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). The maximum sentence for this crime is thirty years' imprisonment. § 775.082(3), Fla....

...Thus Howe's forty-two-year split sentence is illegal. Howe did not waive this error by failing to object below. See Forshee v. State, 579 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Reversed and remanded for the trial court to impose a sentence which does not exceed the limits set forth in section 775.082(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...applicable portion of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2001). Reversed, VCC sentence vacated, and remanded for resentencing. NOTES [1] Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2001); the defendant states that his offense date was February 15, 2001. [2] Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...exchange for a sentence of five years as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). In his motion to correct illegal sentence, he argued that he was illegally sentenced as a PRR because felony battery is neither a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing, see § 775.082(9)(a)(l), Fla....

...Stat. (2009), nor a forcible felony for purposes of the catchall provision of the PRR statute. The catchall provision allows for PRR sentencing for “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o)....

...[2] We note further that the defendant's written sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole constitutes an illegal sentence because the defendant's crime was committed in 1997 and, at that time, the Florida Statutes only authorized parole ineligibility for defendants convicted of capital felonies. See § 775.082(1), Fla....

...Robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony, punishable by life. See § 812.13(1),(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). An attempt to commit the crime is reclassified as a second-degree felony, which carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years in state prison. See § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008) and § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...2d DCA 2009) ("Robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony, and the attempt to commit a first-degree felony is a second-degree felony."). Because of Johnson's designation as a prison releasee reoffender, the trial court must impose the maximum penalty of fifteen years. See § 775.082(9)(a)3.c., Fla....

...Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Johnson's motion and remand with instructions that Johnson be resentenced in accordance with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. MONACO, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a). [2] See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...battery, and armed kidnapping are all lawful sentences without reclassification or enhancement. Armed burglary is a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983), and armed sexual battery is a life felony, § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...unless the “use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element”). 5 of 11 years . . . and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon . . . shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082”); § 775.082(3)(a), Fla....

...Albert Dennis (Defendant) appeals an order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence, filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the imposition of a mandatory life sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), pursuant to section 775.082(9), for the offense of burglary of a structure with a battery....

...The trial court's order of denial confirms that the offense was burglary of a structure with a battery, but asserts that this is an enumerated offense set forth in the PRR statute. It is not; burglary of a structure is enumerated only if the offender was armed or the structure was occupied. § 775.082(9)(a)1 & (9)(a)1....

...Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. David Parker appeals his conviction for burglary of a dwelling and the resulting fifteen-year sentence imposed pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act as codified at section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...1st DCA 2001), where, in cases such as the present, a jury does not make a finding that the dwelling was occupied, burglary of a dwelling does not fall within the offenses enumerated in the Act. Accordingly, like the defendant in Weems, Parker could not be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender pursuant to section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...As a result, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. It is well-settled that, once the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender, the trial court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes. See State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000); Johnson v. State, 766 So.2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). A trial court does not have discretion to depart from the sentence mandated by sec *1132 tion 775.082(9), and the refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law....

...a. R.Crim. P. 3.702(d)(19). Section 921.001(5) applies only if the recommended guidelines sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. In Cauble's case, he was convicted of one second-degree felony, the statutory maximum being fifteen years, see section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), and two third-degree felonies, the statutory maximum on each of those being five years, see section 775.082(3)(d)....

...at Zook was properly sentenced as a PRR because he pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling. However, at the time that Zook committed that offense, the PRR statute did not specify that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was a qualifying offense. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), Fla....

...he Fourth District Court of Appeal "which held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not applicable to a defendant who is convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling." See also Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Although section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q) was amended in 2001 to reflect that burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or not, would be a qualifying offense, the amendment did not take effect until July 1, 2001, and it could not be retroactively applied....

...ction of dealing in stolen property. If that was the offense for which the trial court intended to impose the PRR sentence, the sentence must still be reversed because dealing in stolen property is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)....

...3, and 01-10084, Zook was sentenced as a PRR for burglary of a conveyance. In case number 01-9956, Zook was sentenced as a PRR for both burglary of a conveyance and grand theft. Because none of the offenses qualify Zook for sentencing as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)(1), we reverse the sentences in those cases and remand for resentencing without the PRR enhancement....

...At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge dismissed Count I and sentenced Bryant to a five-year prison sentence on Count II only. Bryant’s offense was subject to the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC). See ch. 921, Fla. Stat. (2009). However, under section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, Bryant was entitled to a nonstate prison sanction unless the trial court made written findings that doing so “could present a danger to the public.” § 775.082(10), Fla....

...Here, “the parties agree and the record indicates that the trial court sentenced Bryant to a five- year prison sentence—despite the fact that he only scored 17.1 sentencing points— without making any written findings to support the upward departure.” Bryant, 93 So. 3d at 383; § 775.082(10), Fla....

...Stat. Bryant appealed to the district court and filed a motion to correct sentencing error in the trial court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Bryant, 93 So. 3d at 382. In each proceeding, he argued that because the trial court failed to enter the written findings required by section 775.082(10), the upward -2- departure sentence must be vacated and he must be resentenced to a nonstate prison sentence in accordance with his scoresheet....

...Bryant to a non-state prison sentence would have presented a pecuniary danger to the public based on his prior record.” Bryant, 93 So. 3d at 383. The district court “agree[d] with the State that the ‘danger to the public’ contemplated by section 775.082(10) may be a pecuniary one” and that the “record indicate[d] that such was the basis for the trial court’s imposition of a prison sanction.” Id....

...Because the trial court failed to correct its initial failure to make the requisite written findings, the Fifth District held: The trial court may well have been able to correct its initial failure to make the necessary written findings required by section 775.082(10) by doing so in response to Goldberg’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion....

...3d at 1074 (citation omitted). The district courts are thus in conflict regarding whether a trial court may impose a sentence that departs from the CPC on remand where the trial judge failed to comply with the requirements of -4- section 775.082(10) mandating the filing of written findings, both at the original sentencing and in response to the defendant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. ANALYSIS The issue in this case concerns whether a trial court may lawfully impose a prison sanction under section 775.082(10) on remand for resentencing. Because this is a pure question of law, our review is de novo. See Bradley James Jackson v. State, 64 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2011). Bryant argues that section 775.082(10) imposes a mandatory requirement for a judge to enter a written order finding that imposition of a nonstate prison sentence presents a danger to the public, and that failure to comply with the statute even after a rule 3.800(b)(...

...The State argues that resentencing is an entirely new proceeding where the trial court may depart so long as it complies with the statute. To address the issue, we begin by reviewing our decisions concerning departure sentences both prior to and after the enactment of the CPC. We then address the effect of section 775.082(10), before concluding that Shull and Pope v....

...Accordingly, we concluded that as long as the trial court “comports with the principles and criteria prescribed by the Code,” the judge may again impose a departure on remand if the sentence is “supported by valid grounds.” Id. at 93. - 13 -  Section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes Our decision in Bradley James Jackson relied on the language of the CPC, which does not contemplate upward departure sentences, because generally the statutory maximum sentence is the highest possible sentence for any crime. The practice of upward departure sentences was reinstated in 2009, when the Legislature enacted subsection (10) of section 775.082, Florida Statutes, which became effective July 1 of that year....

...the offender to a nonstate prison sanction. However, if the court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. § 775.082(10), Fla....

...equated the failure to provide written reasons with the failure to provide a valid reason. Pope, 561 So. 2d at 556. Further, we recognize that the applicable statutes for imposing either an upward or downward departure sentence require the trial court to enter written findings. See §§ 775.082(10), 921.0025-.0026(2), Fla....

...of resentencing and unjustifiably restricts the statutory discretion of Florida’s circuit court judges, I dissent. Since the trial court here failed to enter the requisite “written findings” supporting imposition of the sentence to a state correctional facility under section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, the district court was correct to reverse for a de novo resentencing at which the trial court could again impose an upward departure sentence if the trial court supported the sentence with the statutorily required written findings....

...There is no sensible reason that a sentencing judge’s error in this context should be beyond remedy. The judicial blunder at issue here should not preclude the sentencing judge on remand from protecting the public from a defendant who “could present[] a danger to the public.” § 775.082(10), Fla....

...tence is reversed on appeal” and determined that “nothing within the CPC precludes the imposition of a downward departure sentence on resentencing following remand.” Id. at 92, 93. Although the sentence in the instant case was imposed under section 775.082(10), which concerns upward—not downward—departure sentences, the silence of the CPC regarding sentencing options on remand is as pertinent here as it was in Bradley James Jackson. -...

...Bobby Clark appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct sentencing error filed in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Because the sentence violates the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA), § 775.082(9), Fla....

...is opinion. Clark must be present for resen-tencing. If the trial court again imposes a split HFO sentence, the incarcerative portion of the HFO sentence must exceed the PRR mandatory minimum sentence. See Johnson, 927 So.2d at 252 (“We reiterate, section 775.082(9)(e) provides that ‘[n]oth-ing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law ....’” (alterations in original))....

PER CURIAM. The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order sentencing Lavoderick K. Reid to thirty-five years incarceration, asserting that because he qualified as a Prison Releasee Reoffender, (“PRR”), pursuant to section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2001), a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory....

...The Florida statute, section 893.13(1)(f), prohibits possession of a controlled substance, among which is cocaine, the offense for which O'Neill was convicted in South Carolina. Violation of this statute in Florida constitutes a felony of the third degree, and is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years (section 775.082(3)(d)) and/or a fine of up to $5,000 (section 775.083(c))....

...I concur in the affirmance of the judgments and sentences of the trial court. I see no reason to certify a question that is answered by the unambiguous language of a statute, in this case, section 775.084(1)(c), Florida Statutes. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(c)3, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] See § 775.082, Fla....

...ee reoffender (PRR). He alleged that he did not qualify for that designation because he did not commit the strong arm robbery, for which he was convicted and sentenced in 1999, within three years of being released from a correctional facility as per section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes....

...obbery, as a prison releasee reoffender. On remand, the trial court clarified that the defendant was to be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. As the State concedes, this means that the defendant's proper sentence is one of fifteen years. See § 775.082(9)(a)2.c, Fla....

...He argues that burglary of an occupied conveyance did not qualify as a PRR qualifying offense because the jury in this case did not find that appellant used or threatened to use force or violence against an individual. We agree. The enumerated offenses under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes, do not include a burglary of an occupied conveyance....

...“[S]tatutory enactments are to be interpreted so as to accomplish rather than defeat their purpose.” Lewis v. Mosley, 204 So. 2d 197, 201 (Fla. 1967) (citing 6 Fla. Jur., Constitutional Law § 14 (1956); Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13 So. 2d 700 (1943)). 957 So. 2d at 629. Section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2006), states in pertinent part: (9)(a)1....

...the intent or purpose that a PRR sentence not serve as the maximum sentence for all crimes arising out of the same criminal episode.” 957 So. 2d at 629. The Court explained: -7-  Paragraph (b) indicates that section 775.082(9) dictates a minimum sentence or sentencing floor, not a statutory maximum....

...at 290. We concluded that this Court has never applied Hale to the PRR statute. The PRR statute specifically states that the legislative intent is to punish those eligible for PRR sentencing to the fullest extent of the law. See § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...(citing Preston v. State, 134 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Robinson v. State, 829 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). However, in -9- Reeves and Cotto, this Court concluded that Hale is inapplicable to cases involving section 775.082(9) because Hale addressed a different statute. Conversely, Young held that a trial court may impose consecutive PRR sentences on a defendant for crimes committed during a single criminal episode. 37 So....

...In his motion, Kirkland alleged that his sentences in counts three through six are illegal because he should not be subjected to PRR sentencing. In support of this allegation, Kirkland claimed that a court cannot impose a PRR sentencing enhancement for offenses not listed in section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...nts from counts three through six. The postconviction court treated Kirkland's motion as a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court recognized that BOLEO is not an enumerated offense under section 775.082(9)(a)(1) but found that Kirkland could still qualify as a PRR under the "catchall" provision if the qualifying offense(s) involved the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o )....

...his vehicle into two police cars carrying four different officers. Based on this information, the court found that the evidence of the use or threat of physical force or violence against the officers was sufficient to qualify Kirkland as a PRR under section 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ) and denied Kirkland's motion....

...d the PRR statute." Id. at 217. In Walker v. State, 965 So.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), this court applied the reasoning set forth in Hearns and held that PRR sentencing is inapplicable to the crime of BOLEO. As BOLEO is not enumerated under section 775.082(9)(a)(1) and, pursuant to Hearns and Walker, does not fall within the "catchall" provision of section 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ), Kirkland's classification as a PRR on counts three through six amounts to an illegal sentence....

...om our record. There is no question that Ms. Wallace was given notice and was eligible to be sentenced as a habitual offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2006). She was also eligible to be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...794.011(5), Florida Statutes (1993), and one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act in violation of section 800.04(2), Florida Statutes (1993). All three offenses are second-degree felonies punishable by a maximum of fifteen years in prison. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...al; 2) the trial court’s initial denial and subsequent granting of his peremptory strike took away from trial counsel’s ability to prepare for trial and thereby deprived him of a fair trial; 3) the trial court erred by sentencing him pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2010); and 4) trial counsel was ineffective in drafting the motion to continue and for failing to argue that the sentence imposed was erroneous....

Reoffender and Required Sentencing Term Pursuant to F.S. 775.082. On February 10, 2017, Alvarez pled guilty to

...5th DCA 2005); Altieri v. State, 835 So.2d 1181, 1183-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Because appellant was sentenced to life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender on the count charging robbery with a firearm, however, he will serve 100 percent of that sentence pursuant to section 775.082(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...SEALS, JAMES H., Associate Judge, Concurring. This case is a prime example of what can go wrong when sentences are decided outside the courtroom by someone other than the presiding judge. The Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, chapter 97-239, Laws of Florida, as codified in section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997) (hereafter called the PRRPA), seeks to punish a certain class of offenders by mandating the maximum sentence normally prescribed for the crime and then requiring the offender to serve every day of that sentence. [1] It is the legislature's expressed intent that these designated offenders "be punished to the fullest extent of the law." § 775.082(8)(d), Fla....

...Schaeffer committed the instant offense at the age of twenty-five in the twenty-fifth month following his release from a Florida prison on December 29, 1995. Thus, Mr. Schaeffer was eligible for punishment pursuant to the PRRPA, because he committed one of the offenses enumerated in section 775.082(8)(a)(1), and he did so "within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections." The events leading to this young man's incarceration for thirty years began at a Burdines Department Store at Countryside Mall in Clearwater on February 1, 1998....

...ossibility of early release. At sentencing the defense attorney attempted to persuade the trial judge to find that "[o]ther extenuating circumstances exist[ed] which preclude[d] the just prosecution" of Mr. Schaeffer as a prison releasee reoffender. § 775.082(8)(d)(1)(d), Fla....

...ere it belongs: with the sentencing judge, subject to his or her reasonable, reviewable exercise of discretion. NOTES [1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act was amended and renumbered by chapter 98-203, Laws of Florida, and now appears at section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1999). [2] Under section 775.082(8)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), the offender is not eligible for "parole, control release, or any form of early release." [3] Section 790.001(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), defines "self-defense spray" as a "device carried solely for...

...[8] The only check on the state attorney's abuse of discretion in these circumstances is the ballot box, which in the case of an unknown defendant in an unknown case is really no check at all. [9] Decisions such as this are often made by supervising attorneys, not the assigned trial attorney. Note that section 775.082(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1997), states that "the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender." Whether that means the elected state attorney or one of his or her deputies is not clearly stated in the statute....

...imprisonment on count three. All counts were to run concurrently, and Wilson was sentenced as a PRR on counts one and two. In his motion, Wilson alleged that burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery does not qualify for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), and as a result, his life sentence on this count is illegal. Specifically, Wilson claimed that burglary of a conveyance is not an enumerated offense *333 under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1). Furthermore, he alleged that the addition of assault or battery does not place burglary of a conveyance in the category of a "forcible felony," which would qualify the offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ), the catch-all provision....

...egal. In its order denying Wilson's claim, the postconviction court simply found that a defendant convicted of any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against another individual qualifies for sentencing as a PRR. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o )....

...th an apparent ability to do so.'" Id. at 53 (quoting § 748.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2007)). Because the PRR catch-all provision specifically encompasses "[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual," § 775.082(9)(a)(1)( o ), the court in Shaw held that "under the statutory elements test, burglary of an occupied conveyance with an assault qualifies as an offense under the catch-all provision." 26 So.3d at 53....

...ther conceded that reversal and remand with directions to strike the PRR designation from this charge is required. At the time of Wilson's offense in 2001, burglary of a conveyance was not a specifically enumerated offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)....

...All the sentences were imposed consecutively to each other. The appellant alleges that his PRR sentence for possession of cocaine (count III) is illegal because that crime is not an enumerated felony that qualifies for PRR sentencing. According to section 775.082(8)(a)l., Florida Statutes (1998), 1 a PRR is a defendant who commits certain enumerated felonies within 3 years after his or her release from prison. Possession of cocaine is not an enumerated felony. The trial court found that the crime qualified under section 775.082(8)(a)l.(o), which allowed a PRR sentence for “any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force against an individual.” The trial court reasoned that the appellant possessed the cocaine at the time he committed the aggr...

...The appellant shall have the right to be present on resentencing. See Lamb v. State, 32 So.3d 117, 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ROBERTS, C.J., BENTON, and KELSEY, JJ., concur. . The PRR statute is now at § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...Chloupek, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sarah B. Mayer, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. STONE, J. We affirm Edwards' conviction and his sentence imposed for armed burglary pursuant to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), known as the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act....

...In that case, the disallowed voir dire questions addressed possible juror bias and ability to render a fair and impartial verdict, not a pre-determination of witness credibility, as Edwards attempted here. Edwards also challenges the constitutionality of section 775.082(8) [1] , Florida Statutes, on grounds of substantive due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and vagueness....

...COHEN, J. Ivan Mobley appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and resisting arrest with violence. [1] The issue before this court is whether a mandatory minimum sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000), must be imposed concurrently with a mandatory minimum sentence under section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000) (the 10-20-LIFE statute), when the mandatory minimum sentences are based on separate and distinct offenses....

...ing of a rule 3.800(b) motion.” Albarracin v. State, 112 So. 3d 574, 574 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). In this case, the trial court had the discretion to sentence appellant anywhere between 40 years in prison and life in prison. See § 775.082(1)(b)1., Fla....

...Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Florida’s juvenile sentencing procedure requires a trial court to conduct an individualized sentencing hearing to determine if life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence for a juvenile convicted of a capital felony. §§ 775.082, 921.1401, Fla....

...tconviction motion in which he asserts that his trial counsel acted ineffectively by failing to advise him that he qualified for a mandatory sentence, in addition to other penalties, pursuant to the prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) statute, section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2012), prior to his rejection of two plea offers....

...And the reason for that is .it’s punitory [sic]. He’s taking up public resource, he needs to pay. He can pay when he gets out of prison at a rate of $50 a month through collections court. A trial court may impose a fine in addition to any penalty prescribed by section 775.082, Florida Statutes., See, § 775.083(1), Fla....

...The appellant argues that he should be resentenced without the PRR designation. He alleges that the State’s document used to support the PRR sentence shows that he was released from prison over three years before the underlying robbery was committed. See § 775.082(9)(a)l, Florida Statutes (a PRR designation requires that the defendant commit or attempt to commit certain enumerated felonies “within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections....”)....

...See §§ 828.12(1), .122(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The circuit court sentenced Reed to an aggregate term of twenty-five years' imprisonment, to be followed by thirty years' probation, because the court found that Reed posed a danger to the public. See § 775.082(10) Fla....

...After careful review and the benefit of oral argument, we hold that the circuit court's findings were inadequate to sentence Reed to a state prison sanction. We thus reverse the sentence with instructions to impose a nonstate prison sanction pursuant to section 775.082(10)....

...Because Reed accumulated "22 points or fewer" and animal baiting is a third-degree felony, Reed was presumptively entitled to a sentence that did not include a prison sanction unless the sentencing judge found him to be a danger to the public. See § 775.082(10). At the sentencing hearing, Reed argued that the circuit court could not give him a state prison sentence pursuant to section 775.082(10) because he was not a "danger to the public." But the circuit judge made an oral ruling that Reed was indeed a danger to the public....

...public was unsupported by the record and; (2) the circuit court deprived Reed of his -3- right to a jury trial by finding that Reed was a danger to the public, thus circumventing the statutory maximum sentence in section 775.082(10) and disregarding Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S....

...Therefore, it is necessary and appropriate that the Defendant be sentenced to a State Correctional Facility. Reed now appeals, arguing that: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgments of acquittal; (2) section 775.082(10) violates Apprendi; and (3) the record in this case, as articulated in the Public Danger Order, does not support a finding that Reed is a danger to the public....

...We agree that the Public Danger Order does not adequately establish Reed as a danger to the public. We affirm the denial of Reed's motion for judgments of acquittal without comment. We need not reach Reed's constitutional arguments concerning Apprendi.2 II. ANALYSIS A. The Text of Section 775.082(10) In 2009, the legislature enacted section 775.082(10), which directs that courts must sentence a certain class of felony offenders to a "nonstate prison sanction." Ch. 2009-63, § 1, at 2, Laws of Fla. Although section 775.082(10) does not define "nonstate prison sanction," the phrase is "understood to mean probation, community control, or imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year." Jones v. State, 71 So. 3d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also § 921.00241(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2011) (using the 2 This is not the first time Apprendi concerns have arisen in relation to section 775.082(10)....

...State, 133 So. 3d 557, 558-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Sprott v. State, 99 So. 3d 634, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Jones v. State, 71 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). But see Jones, 71 So. 3d at 176-79 (Thomas, J., concurring in result only) (arguing that section 775.082(10) is unconstitutional under Apprendi). -5- phrase "nonstate prison sanction" to refer to "a term of probation, community control, or community supervision with mandatory participation in a prison diversion program of the Department of Corrections if such program is funded and exists in the judicial circuit in which the offender is sentenced"). Our sister courts of appeal have noted that the purpose of section 775.082(10) is "to keep certain offenders out of the state prison system." Jones, 71 So....

...State, 110 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), dismissed as moot, 137 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 2014) ("[D]ue to an ever- increasing prison population, the cost of prison building and operation, and the downturn in the economy, the Florida Legislature enacted section 775.082(10). This was an effort to stem the tide of prison commitments." (citing Jones, 71 So. 3d at 175 n.4)). Section 775.082(10) reads: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, the court may sentence the offender to a state correctional facility pursuant to this section. Thus, in order to be eligible for the presumptive nonstate prison sanction in section 775.082(10), an offender must satisfy three conditions: (1) the offender must be sentenced for a third-degree felony, (2) the offense must be committed on or after July 1, 2009, and (3) the offender must score "22 points or fewer" as determined by the Criminal Punishment Code's (CPC) scoresheet. -6-  The plain language of section 775.082(10) carves out two subclasses of offenders who cannot qualify for a less severe "nonstate prison sanction," despite otherwise meeting the three aforementioned conditions....

...Section 776.08 then provides a catchall "forcible felony" provision to include "any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." The second subclass of felony offenders precluded from receiving a nonstate prison sanction under section 775.082(10) are those convicted of a third-degree felony in chapter 810, Florida Statutes. Chapter 810 primarily criminalizes various forms of burglary and trespass. If an offender who is eligible for a nonstate prison sanction does not fit into one of these two enumerated subclasses, section 775.082(10) prescribes one more means under which a harsher sentence may be legally imposed: The court may make a written finding that "a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public." B. The Concept of Public Danger Prior to section 775.082(10)'s passage, a court's upward departure based on an offender's danger to the public alone was impermissible....

...1985); Cortez v. State, 497 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Moreover, as the supreme court pointed out in Keys, all criminally punishable conduct is "presumed to be dangerous to the community" to some degree. 500 So. 2d. at 136. The text of section 775.082(10) indicates that the legislature intended to change course....

...2d DCA 1996) (explaining that a legislature is presumed to adopt prior judicial constructions of a reenacted statute, but not if the legislature makes a clear expression to the contrary). When compelled to consider the propriety of an upward departure from a nonstate prison sanction based on section 775.082(10), courts have looked to precisely those factors which they were previously loath to consider—criminal history, victim injury, and propensity for one to commit future crimes. See Porter, 110 So. 3d at 964 (affirming an upward departure based on section 775.082(10) due to victim injury and criminal history); McCloud v. State, 55 So. 3d 643, 645 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (affirming an upward departure based on section 775.082(10), where defendant was a "habitual thief" who "presents a threat to -8- property")....

...not mandate that we ignore Florida's prior case law pertaining to upward departures. As this court recently explained, Florida's former sentencing structure may inform current courts of procedures that may be important in imposing a sentence under section 775.082(10)....

...It makes sense that the legislature's resurrection of a sentencing mechanism may also require the resurrection of certain accompanying legal principles to help manage that mechanism. See Bryant v. State, 148 So. 3d 1251, 1258 (Fla. 2014) (describing section 775.082(10) as a reinstatement of upward departure sentencing, which the CPC had previously eliminated)....

...e v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1068 n.8 (Fla. 1999). We are persuaded that the same principle must apply to findings of public danger under section 775.082(10)....

...son sanction and a danger to the public." Ryerson v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D980, D980 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 20, 2016). Although Reed's treatment of animals is deplorable and certainly should be punished, the circuit court's written findings under section 775.082(10) fail to connect how imposition of a nonstate prison sanction could create a danger to the community....

...The record also demonstrates, however, that the pit bulls could be dangerous to humans when other dogs were in the immediate vicinity. - 10 - nonstate prison sanction would be a greater or lesser deterrent to defendant's unlicensed driving). Case law on section 775.082(10) is not plentiful, but two decisions of our sister courts of appeal offer guidance as to how a sentencing court may properly articulate a nexus between a nonstate prison sanction and public danger. In Porter, the Fourth District upheld a circuit court's upward departure to the sentence of an offender who was otherwise eligible for a nonstate prison sanction under section 775.082(10). 110 So....

...fessional dog raiser and dog fighter," could then present to the public. To suggest otherwise is to propose that every professional dogfighter must serve a state prison sentence, which is clearly in contravention of the diversionary intent behind section 775.082(10). If the legislature intended for section 775.082(10) to function in such a manner, it would have specifically excluded animal baiting from its presumption of nonstate prison sentencing, just as it specifically excluded forcible felonies defined in section 776.08 and third-degree felonies under chapter 810....

...Porter and McCloud (criminal history, victim injury, and propensity to commit future crimes) are not necessarily exhaustive. But they are nevertheless informative to our holding in this case: A court's decision to impose an upward departure under section 775.082(10) must do more than just describe the defendant's criminal conduct....

...Ryerson, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D980. The court did not do so here. Although we - 12 - are appalled by Reed's treatment of dogs here, we are compelled to reverse based on the directive set forth by the legislature in section 775.082(10). III. CONCLUSION The circuit court erred when it sentenced Reed without making adequate findings that Reed's sentence to a nonstate prison sanction could have presented a danger to the public, as required by section 775.082(10)....

...This too was appealed to this court and affirmed. See Parker v. State, 849 So.2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Parker then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence which was denied. We reverse. Parker argues that the sentence as imposed was illegal in light of section 775.082(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes (Supp....

...dant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows: ... d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years. The state, however, points to a later provision of the same statute, section 775.082(9)(c), which provides: Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s....

...sentence to 66.4 months in prison, with 60 months to be served under the PRRPA and 6.4 months to be served under the CPC, was a legal sentence. See Nettles, 850 So.2d at 492. The majority opinion recognized, in dicta, that the statute (renumbered as 775.082(9)(a).3, Fla....

...State, 761 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and, as we did in Brooks v. State, No. 4D99-1017, ___ So.2d ___, 2000 WL 526040 (Fla. 4th DCA May 3, 2000), certify the conflict. AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. DELL and STONE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 775.082 was subsequently amended and the prison releasee reoffender sentencing scheme is now found at section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...We affirm in all respects. We write to address Rodriguez-Giudieelli’s argument that the trial court reversibly erred when it applied the doctrine of statutory revival and sentenced *948 him to life in prison with parole eligibility-after twenty-five years pursuant to section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...d impose for premeditated murder committed by a juvenile was life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (observing that the only two sentences available under the 2009 version of section 775.082(1) for capital felonies were death or mandatory life without the possibility of parole, and that Roper v....

...1st DCA 2013), Judge Makar provides a well-reasoned resolution to this conflict. Applying the concept of statutory revival discussed in B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987 (Fla.1994), Judge Makar “would hold that the operative sentencing language of the 1993 version of section 775.082(1) is revived and juvenile offenders should be [jsentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years.” 134 So.3d at 1032 ....

...ally, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the same analysis was applied to conclude that a juvenile convicted of felony murder should be sentenced under the 1993 version of section 775.082(1). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err when it applied the doctrine of statutory revival to sentence Rodriguez-Giudicelli pursuant to the 1993 version of section 775.082(1) for a premeditated murder committed when he was a minor....

...As the Fifth District did in Horsley , we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great public importance: *949 WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MILLER V. ALABAMA, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), WHICH INVALIDATED SECTION 775.082(1)’S MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES CONVICTED OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER, OPERATES TO REVIVE THE PRIOR SENTENCE OF LIFE WITH PAROLE ELIGIBILITY AFTER 25 YEARS PREVIOUSLY CONTAINED IN THAT STATUTE? Horsley, 121 So.3d at 1132-33 ....

...Sheppard claims that his conviction for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, which was reclassified as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), based upon the jury’s finding regarding the firearm, is subject to a sentence not to exceed thirty years under section 775.082(3)(b)....

...Finding the sentence legal, the supreme court held that “the trial court has discretion under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum [of thirty years] provided for in section 775.082.” Mendenhall, 48 So.3d at 742. The court reasoned that although the thirty-five-year sentence for a first-degree felony exceeded the thirty-year maximum under section 775.082, such a sentence was mandated by section 775.087(2)(c). Mendenhall, 48 So.3d at 748 (“Section 775.087(2)(e) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.”)....

...was twenty-five years to life. See Mendenhall, 48 So.3d at 742. However, “ ‘once the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty[-]year maximum penalty for a first[-]degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b).’ ” McLeod, 52 So.3d at 786 (quoting Wooden, 42 So.3d at 837 ) (reversing the defendant’s life sentence with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm because the sentence improperly exceeded the statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(b)). The postconviction court incorrectly concluded that the jury’s special verdict exposed Sheppard to an overall maximum sentence of life imprisonment under sections 775.087(2)(a)(3) and 775.082(3)(b). Sheppard’s thirty-five-year sentence im-permissibly exceeds the thirty-year statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(b) and is therefore illegal....

...The HVFO sentences on counts II, IV, and VI exceed the PRRO sentences on those counts and, therefore, are not unlawful. Vargas also asserts that it was error to sentence him to life, as a prison releasee reoffender, for a first-degree felony, punishable by life. The prison releasee reoffender statute, section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that defendants so qualified must be sentenced as follows: a....

...nishable by life." Id.; accord State v. Newmones, 765 So.2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We concur. Subsequent to Brown, the First District certified the question raised in this appeal to the supreme court as one of great public importance, asking: DOES SECTION 775.082(9)(A)3A, FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), WHICH MANDATES A LIFE SENTENCE FOR PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDERS WHO COMMIT "A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY LIFE," APPLY BOTH TO LIFE FELONIES AND FIRST DEGREE FELONIES PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING LIFE? Knight v....

...f the victim. Because Tate was in his thirties when he committed the. charged offenses and his victim was thirteen years old, he should have been charged under section 800,04(5)(c)2., a second-degree felony, which carries a 15-year maximum sentence. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. Instead, Tate was charged and convicted — apparently erroneously — under section 800.04(5)(d), which involves an offender under 18 years of age and is a third-degree felony, carrying a five-year maximum sentence. § 775.082(3)(e), Fla....

...Millsaps and Elizabeth Fletcher Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BENTON, J. Terrill Lee Palmore appeals his sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of early release. On various grounds, he challenges his sentence as unconstitutional insofar as it was imposed under section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). We reject these challenges. He also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him both as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(8) and as a violent career criminal under section 775.084, for the same offense....

...1st DCA) (holding statute not void for vagueness and not violative of equal protection), review granted, 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999). We do, however, certify the same question of great public importance certified in Woods: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? *446 Woods, 740 So.2d at 25....

...violent career criminal." Since he was subject to sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender, however, he was not subject to sentencing as a violent career criminal because section 775.084 does not authorize a sentence longer than the life sentence section 775.082(8)(c) authorizes. While the statute does authorize imposition of "a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law," § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997), it does not authorize imposition of a sentence under another provision that does not result in a greater sentence of incarceration. See Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Because section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the prison releasee reoffender sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration, and because a life term under the habitual felony offender statute is not greater than a l...

...S.P.’s breasts for a few seconds. Both the State and defense 2) “a split sentence . . . of at least twenty-five years’ imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the person’s natural life.” § 775.082(4)(a), Fla....

...3d at 1034. The Third District held that Hale prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences for crimes that arise out of a single criminal episode only where both sentences are enhanced through a sentencing scheme that extends the permissible sentence beyond that prescribed by section 775.082, Florida Statutes.2 However, the Third District concluded that Hale does not prohibit the imposition of consecutive sentences if the statute under which the defendant is sentenced does not extend the maximum permissible sentence delineated by section 775.082....

...oses a mandatory minimum that is in accordance with, and not beyond, the statutory maximum, a PRR sentence is not an enhanced sentence, and a trial court therefore may impose an HFO sentence consecutive to a PRR sentence. Id. at 1034. 2. Section 775.082 delineates the penalties for felonies and misdemeanors unless another sentencing provision applies. -3-  The Third District certified a conflict with the decision of the Fifth District in Williams, 10 So....

...subsection, unless the state attorney determines that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection. § 775.082, Fla....

...We are unwilling to extend Hale to apply to unenhanced sentences. Furthermore, this Court has never applied Hale to the PRR statute. The PRR statute specifically states that the legislative intent is to punish those eligible for PRR sentencing to the fullest extent of the law. See § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...The State concedes that the written judgments improperly imposed the fines and surcharges. We agree. *381 Pursuant to section 775.083(1), a person who has been convicted of an offense other than a capital felony may be sentenced to pay a fíne in addition to any punishment described in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2010). Moreover, when specifically authorized by statute, a person may be sentenced to pay a fíne in lieu of any punishment described in section 775.082....

...The appellant was convicted in March of 2016 of burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery. Because burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute, the offense can only qualify if it falls under section 775.082(9)(a)1.o., Florida Statutes (2015), which states, “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” The Florida Supreme Court has stated that in order for an offense to qualify un...

...3d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“[B]ecause burglary with assault or battery encompasses the alternative of battery, which includes the nonforce option of mere touching, that offense cannot support the PRR enhancement under section 775.082(8)(a)(1)(o).”) ; see also Suffield v....

...MAKAR and JAY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ ∗ Section 775.082(8)(a)1.o. was renumbered in 1998 to 775.082(9)(a)1.o. 2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and M.J....

...Under our current sentencing scheme, not all defendants who are convicted of first-degree murder are eligible for a sentence of death. The trial judge must make additional findings before the death penalty can be imposed. See generally § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2011). Without these findings, a trial court cannot impose a higher sentence than life imprisonment on the basis of the verdict alone. See § 775.082(1), Fla....

...ght of the Hurst and Mosley decisions. But the postconviction court denied the portions of -2- Victorino’s motion in which he argued that he was entitled to be resentenced to life imprisonment based on section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Victorino now appeals the portions of the postconviction court’s order denying in part his successive motion. II. ANALYSIS A. Section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes Victorino concedes we have already ruled in Hurst v. State and Franklin v. State, 209 So. 3d 1241 (Fla. 2016), that section 775.082(2)1 does not require death sentences imposed in violation of Hurst v. Florida to be commuted to life. Nonetheless, Victorino urges us to reconsider our interpretation of section 775.082(2) in light of the fact that his case involves a mass murder and four death sentences. Victorino asserts that under these circumstances a new penalty phase 1. Section 775.082(2) provides: In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously...

...execution is held to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. -3- would be especially time consuming and costly and therefore it would be reasonable for us to construe section 775.082(2) in a way that would require his death sentences to be commuted to life sentences. We find Victorino’s suggestion that we reconsider our interpretation of section 755.082(2) based on the facts of his case unpersuasive and conclude that section 775.082(2) does not entitle Victorino to be resentenced to life imprisonment. B....

...Drukker, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Charmaine M. Millsaps and Elizabeth Fletcher Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant raises various constitutional challenges to section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes, all of which this court has rejected in previous opinions....

...1st DCA), review granted 740 So.2d 529 (Fla.1999). Consistent with those cases, we affirm as to the constitutional challenges, but certify the following as a matter of great public importance: DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Appellant also challenges his sentence on the basis that section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997), does not apply to the offense of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. See section 775.082(8)(a)1.q, Fla....

...We affirm the trial court's summary denial of the claims of ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. However, the appellant's claim challenging the six-year split sentence appears to have merit since the statutory maximum for a third-degree felony is five years. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...Stat (2005). Further, the State has supplied a transcript of petitioner Montero's sentencing hearing, which confirms that this combined record was properly admitted and considered by the trial court in sentencing Montero as a prison-releasee reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...Further, the record includes a transcript of petitioner Corker's sentencing hearing, which confirms that this activities-based public record was properly admitted and considered by the trial court in sentencing Corker as a prison-releasee reoffender. See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

...ed armed robbery as a first-degree felony. We note that attempted robbery with a firearm is a "second degree felony for which the maximum punishment is fifteen years in prison." Pooley v. State, 403 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also §§ 775.082(3)(d), 777.04(4)(c), 812.13(2)(a), Fla....

...2d 728, 730 n.2 (Fla. 1994). However, the trial court properly imposed the twenty-five year mandatory- minimum sentence under section 775.087(2)(a)3., the 10-20-Life Statute, because that provision controls over the fifteen-year maximum outlined in section 775.082(3)(d)....

...Appellant was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), of shooting into an occupied vehicle and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). He again argues that his offense does not qualify under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute. § 775.082(9)(a)l.o., Fla....

...Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant was adjudicated guilty in Case Nos. 00-3083, 00-3084 and 00-3086 of three separate counts of third-degree felony burglary of a structure, in violation of section 810.02(4), Florida Statutes (2000). He was sentenced in all three cases as a prison releasee reoffender under section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000), to concurrent terms of five years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation. These sentences are illegal, because they exceed the statutory maximum provided in section 775.082(9) for the third-degree felony convictions....

...at 2469. Even in a discretionary sentencing scheme, the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion before imposing a life sentence must be informed by consideration of the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances” as articulated in OUTLINED IN SECTIONS 775.082, 921.1401, AND 921.1402 FLORIDA STATUTES (2014), TO JUVENILES CONVICTED OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND SENTENCED TO A NON- MANDATORY SENTENCE OF LIFE IN PRISON BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHAPTER 2014-220, LAWS OF FLORIDA? Landrum, 163 So....

...iew of that sentence at the statutorily mandated period of twenty-five years. See § 921.1402(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). We therefore quash the Second District’s decision and remand this case for resentencing in conformance with sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes, and disapprove Lightsey v....

...life felony because Landrum used a weapon during the crime. § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Because Landrum was convicted of a life felony, she faced punishment for “a term of imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” § 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2004). Like all life imprisonment sentences imposed after 1983, a life imprisonment sentence under section 775.082(3)(a)3....

...criminal record and any statutory sentencing multipliers were taken into account). As provided for in section 921.0024(2), the “permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing.” -6-  high school education on her own? I think it is....

...For those offenders in this category who “did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill,” the subsequent judicial review is available for a sentence of more than fifteen years. Id. at 404 (internal citations omitted). See §§ 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Fla....

...Stat. (2014). None of the Miller factors as now codified in section 921.1401 existed in the sentencing scheme under which Landrum was sentenced, and the sentencing court’s discretion to impose a life sentence was without restriction. See § 775.082(3)(a)3., Fla....

...2014-220, Laws of Florida (2014). This sentencing legislation was “designed to bring Florida’s juvenile sentencing statutes into compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.” Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 39; §§ 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Fla....

...- 23 - juvenile offender’s crime reflects “irreparable corruption.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (internal quotation omitted). Landrum’s life sentence without parole for second-degree murder per section 775.082(3)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2003), violated the Eighth Amendment. The sentencing scheme, which predated Miller and its progeny, did not require the trial court to consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” when exercising its discretion in imposing a life sentence....

...3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and Starks v. - 24 - State, 128 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. We remand for resentencing in accordance with sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statues (2014). It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., concurs in result. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED,...

...3d at 964. Rockmore raises the same arguments in this Court. To resolve them, it is necessary to explain Florida’s robbery statute and the abandonment of property defense that several of our district courts have held precludes its application. 1. Section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2008), provides that a person who commits an enumerated offense, including robbery, within three years after being released from a state correctional facility or other designated correctional facility, may b...

...Purdy, Public Defender, and Kathryn Rollison Radtke, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Petitioner 3. Rockmore’s life sentence was the result of his classification as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2009). This statute requires that for an enumerated felony such as robbery with a firearm that is punishable by life, the defendant must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life. § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2009). If Rockmore had been convicted of either of the two lesser-included offenses of petit theft or resisting a merchant, the PRR statute would not have applied. § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla....

...(listing the enumerated offenses for which an offender may be sentenced as a PRR). If Rockmore had instead been charged with and convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the PRR statute would have mandated a sentence of only five-years’ imprisonment. See § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat....

constitutionality of section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2016). Riordan argues that, even if section 775.082(10) was

71 So. 3d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ). Section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: If

...r in 1993. Based on the trial court case number, apparently the 1991 Florida Statutes are applicable. Under the 1991 statutes, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder is eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years. § 775.082(1), Fla....

...n, and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison followed by fifteen years' probation on that count. Although Parks challenged this fourth sentence, we conclude that it is legal because it is within the statutory maximum for a first-degree felony. § 775.082(3)(b). -2- sentences became final....

...In a rule 3.800(a) 2 McDuffie committed his life felony prior to July 1, 1995. We note that defendants who commit life felonies after July 1, 1995, may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life or for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. See § 775.082(3)(a)(3), Fla....

... Parks correctly challenged his three sentences in a motion filed under rule 3.800(a) because fifteen years' imprisonment followed by life probation exceeds the statutory maximum of thirty years' imprisonment for his first-degree felony convictions. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

...Gallegos qualified for habitual felony offender (HFO) sentences. *1238 See § 775.084(4)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2008). In case number 08-15691, the trial court sentenced him as an HFO on both third-degree felony charges, increasing each sentence from five years' incarceration to ten, concurrent. See § 775.082(3)(d) (stating that third-degree felonies are typically punishable by up to five years in prison)....

...speed which is a second-degree felony. See § 316.1935(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] Felon in possession of a firearm is actually a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years in prison or more depending upon possible enhancements. See §§ 775.082(3)(c), 790.23(3), Fla....

...Martinez asserts that his conviction for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, which was reclassified as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), is subject to a sentence not to exceed thirty years under section 775.082(3)....

...s to life. See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740, 742 (Fla.2010). However, “ ‘once the trial court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, it could not exceed the thirty-year maximum penalty for a first[-]degree felony under section 775.082(3)(b).’” McLeod v....

...State, 42 So.3d 837, 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)) (reversing the defendant’s life sentence with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm because the sentence improperly exceeded the statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(b)). Because the court imposed a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term, Martinez’s life sentence impermissibly exceeds the thirty-year statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(b) and is therefore illegal....

...Jessie Montgomery appeals his judgment and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). The trial court sentenced Montgomery to twenty-five years in prison, followed by sex offender probation for the remainder of his life. See § 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II), Fla. Stat. (2008). Both the orally pronounced sentence and the written sentence provide that Montgomery's sentence is a minimum mandatory sentence "if required" by statute. We affirm Montgomery's judgment and sentence but write to clarify that section 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II) does not require a minimum mandatory sentence. Montgomery was sentenced pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a), which provides: (3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows: ....

...(2008) (providing that a defendant "is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149," prior to serving the minimum sentence). See also § 775.082(9)(b) ("A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release....

...for any form of discretionary early release, except pardon or executive clemency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to serving the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment."). Moreover, if there is any ambiguity in the language of section 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II), we must construe it in favor of the defendant....

...Rashid challenged this sentence as illegal in a motion to correct sentencing error filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), and the state conceded in its response to that motion that the PRR designation was illegal on that count because section 775.082(9)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2003), does not include possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon as an offense for which the court may impose PRR sentencing....

...Baxter's seventeen-year sentence on the charge of possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense [1] appears to exceed the maximum penalty allowed by law for this charge. The offense is a second degree felony. See § 790.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). As such, the penalty should not exceed fifteen years. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...punishable by life. The use of a firearm should have enhanced the kidnapping offense to a life felony. § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990); Price v. State, 838 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Corbitt v. State, 697 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), provided that a life felony committed on or after October 1, 1983, could be punished either by life in prison or by a term of years not exceeding forty years....

...Section 794.0115(2)(e) requires that an individual found to be a dangerous sexual felony offender “be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.” 2 Section 794.0115(6) further provides: (6) Notwithstanding s. 775.082(3), chapter 958, any other law, or any interpretation or construction thereof, a person subject to sentencing under this section must be sentenced to the mandatory term of imprisonment provided under this section. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s....

...775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence imposed must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section. (Emphasis added). Here, Wilkerson was convicted under section 800.04(4)(b), a second-degree felony, generally punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2012). Section 794.0115(6) provides that when, as here, the mandatory minimum under section 794.0015 (twenty-five years) exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under section 775.082 (fifteen years), the mandatory minimum must be imposed....

...in which to file comments with the Court. [2] It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. *275 APPENDIX *276 NOTES [1] In chapter 2009-63, section 1, Laws of Florida, the Legislature amended section 775.082, Florida Statutes, to include a new subsection (10), which affects the sentence computation as follows: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third-degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...tence in Florida for premeditated murder committed by a juvenile was life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Washington v. State, 103 So.3d 917, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (observing that only two sentences available under 2009 version of section 775.082(1) for capital felonies were death or mandatory life without possibility of parole, and that Roper v....

...James did not object to the State’s opening statements or Ivy’s testimony. After trial, the jury deliberated for a few hours until ultimately finding James guilty of attempted murder. Because James qualified as a prison release reoffender, the trial court imposed the required life sentence under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2025). This timely appeal followed. ANALYSIS James challenges the trial court’s admission of the still frame from a video showing James at the crime scene hours before Ivy was shot....

...us molestation count: a life sentence or a 325.5-month sentence. As section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2019), provides: The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. … If the [LPS] under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. If the total sentence points are greater than or equal to 363, the court may sentence the offender to life imprisonment. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...3d 1243, 1246, 1248–49 (Fla. 2021) (“[U]nder section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence where there are multiple convictions subject to sentencing on a single scoresheet,” and “if the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum penalty in section 775.082, the LPS is both the minimum sentence and the maximum penalty for that offense.”). Rigueiro v....

...statutory maximum sentence on the three lewd and lascivious molestation counts. See § 800.04(5)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2019) (listing lewd and lascivious molestation on a victim less than twelve years of age by an offender less than eighteen years of age as a second-degree felony); § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat....

...n of the 20-year mandatory mínimums pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)2. See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008) ("If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to [the 10/20/life statute] exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed.”). Without the 20-year mandatory mínimums, the maximum sentence for each of these counts would have been 5 years. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...sentence and remand for resentencing. Before trial, the State filed notices asserting that Williams qualified as both a habitual felony offender (HFO) under section 775.084(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)....

...It also states that Williams is “adjudicated a Habitual Felony Offender and has been *455 sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of Section 775.084(4)(A), Florida Statutes.” It further provides that Williams is “sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender F.S. 775.082(8); Count 1: min/man 15 yrs.” Hence, both the oral pronouncement and the written sentence appear to impose a sentence on Williams of fifteen years in prison as both an HFO and a PRR, followed by five years’ probation as an HFO....

...The supreme court observed that, under the PRR [statute], “ ‘[n]oth-ing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to [the HFO statute] or any other provision.’” Id. at 658 (citing § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997), now § 775.082(9)(c)) (emphasis supplied)....

...incarceration period of the HFO sentence exceeds the PRR sentence. Id. at 658-59. The sentences in Grant involved equal periods of incarceration under the HFO and PRR. Grant’s reasoning is equally applicable to a true split sentence. We reiterate, section 775.082(9)(c) provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law....” Thus, if the incarceration portion of an HFO sentence does not exceed the PRR sentence, the sentences violate the PRR....

...(c) A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...by expert testimony. 1“A person who knowingly or willfully abuses a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree and constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.”); § 775.082(3)(a)3, Fla....

...WARNER, J. Appellant, Andrako Bradley, appeals his sentence to five years in prison following his no contest plea. Because the trial court failed to make written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public, pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2010), we reverse and remand for resentencing. The state charged appellant with felony battery in violation of section 784.03(2). It alleged the commission of a battery by appellant together with the commission of a previous battery by him 2005. Felony battery is a third degree felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...It is undisputed that appellant’s criminal scoresheet at the time of sentencing, including the violation of probation, totaled 12.8 points. After sentencing, appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), arguing that his sentence violated section 775.082(10), which requires the court to sentence an offender to a nonstate prison sentence when the offender has not committed a forcible felony and whose sentencing points are 22 or fewer....

...The trial court did not rule on this issue within the time permitted by the rule, thus requiring us to review the issue through this appeal. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B). We review the legality of appellant’s sentence de novo. Flowers v. State, 899 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Section 775.082(10) sets forth the following rule regarding sentencing for offenders scoring less than 22 points: If a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...involve the use or threat of physical violence is insufficient to categorize felony battery under section 784.03(2) as a forcible felony. The conclusion that appellant was not convicted of a forcible felony and scored fewer than 22 points implicates the sentencing restriction in section 775.082(10). The statute requires the court to impose a nonstate prison sanction unless it makes written findings that such a sentence poses a danger to the public. In Bryant v. State, 148 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 2014), the court held that under section 775.082(1)), Florida Statutes, a sentence in excess of a nonstate prison sentence constitutes an upward departure sentence....

...at 3 556. Here, the court provided no written reasons showing that a nonstate prison sentence poses a danger to the public. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence appellant to a nonstate prison sentence, consistent with section 775.082(10) and Bryant. Reversed and remanded for resentencing. CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....

...Assistant Attorney General (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee Florida Department of Corrections. Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Appellant Jeffrey Blackshare appeals the trial court’s denial of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. He claims section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (2025), is self-executing and that the Florida Department of Corrections must release him immediately upon eligibility....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *139 PER CURIAM. Robert F. Medina appeals his sentence for burglary of a dwelling, which the trial court entered pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the Act), section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Second, Medina argues that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling is not a qualifying offense under the Act. Medina points out that the Act lists "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling" as a qualifying offense. § 775.082(8)(a)1.q., Fla....

...with such order, willfully to flee in an attempt to elude the officer, and a person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. (2) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agen...

...signia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. 3  Case: 14-14329 Date Filed: 01/12/2016 Page: 4 of 4 longer ACCA-qualifying offenses and cannot form the basis for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA....

781(c)(2) (providing that a defendant convicted of a § 775.082(1)(b)1. offense “shall not be eligible for” a

entered an open plea of guilty. Pursuant to section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, Appellant scored a nonstate

...post-conviction motion. Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded. POLEN, GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Home invasion robbery is a first degree felony, § 812.135(2), Fla. Stat. (2001), punishable by up to thirty years in prison, § 775.082(3)(b), Fla....

....? Do you understand that?" Defendant replied, "Yes sir." [3] Burglary of an occupied dwelling, without assault or battery, and without the offender being or becoming armed, is a second degree felony, § 810.02(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001), punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). [4] Robbery without a weapon is a second degree felony, § 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001); the attempt of such an offense is a third degree felony, § 777.04(4)(d)1, Fla. Stat. (2001), punishable by up to five years in prison, § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...ounces that conviction will not result in imprisonment or an adjudication of guilt. Resisting an officer without violence is a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year. See § 843.02, Fla. Stat.; § 775.082(4)(a), Fla....

...We affirm the sentence because we agree, although for different reasons, that tolling occurred. 1 In 2002, case number 2002-377CF, Franklin pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine, a third degree felony with a maximum allowable penalty of five years in prison. See § 89S.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002); § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...On appeal, Barlow contends the trial court committed fundamental error in imposing this sentence. There is no dispute as to whether the sentence was within statutory limits. Indeed, convicted of ten second-degree felonies, each with a fifteen-year maximum, see § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...lling, aggravated assault, and two counts of armed robbery. At sentencing, the court found that Jackson had committed these crimes within three years of being released from prison and that he therefore qualified for sentencing under the PRR Act. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kaitlin Weiss, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. * The PRR Act allows the State to seek enhanced sentences for those who commit certain felonies within three years of release from prison. See § 775.082(9), Fla....

...Carlos Green was sentenced to concurrent sentences as a habitual felony offender and as a prison releasee reoffender following his conviction for manslaughter. We reject Green's challenges to his conviction. We also reject his constitutional challenges to his sentence and to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...criminal history and scored 22 points on her Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet, making the minimum permissible sentence “any nonstate prison sanction.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(25).1 Petitioner was not facing 1 For offenses committed on or after July 1, 2009, section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes, would require the court to impose a nonstate prison sanction in this any mandatory, minimum sentence....

PER CURIAM. Billy Tom Kalogeras appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion alleging that the trial court improperly sentenced him on his conviction for false imprisonment as a Prison Releas-ee Reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)l, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...nd carjacking without a firearm, Appellant was found guilty of the lesser crimes of battery, false imprisonment, and theft. The trial court sentenced Appellant on the false imprisonment conviction to five years’ incarceration as a PRR, pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)l....

...Defendants so designated face mandatory minimum sentences. The PRR statute applies *890 to a defendant who commits or attempts to commit any of the enumerated felonies in the statute, or any felony involving “the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” § 775.082(9)(a)l.o. 1 A person sentenced as a PRR is not entitled to any form of early release and must serve one hundred percent of the court-imposed sentence. § 775.082(9)(b)....

...“forcible felony,” as defined in section 776.08, Florida Statutes (2000), for purposes of the violent career criminal (VCC) statute, section 775.084(l)(d), Florida Statutes. Just as false imprisonment is not one of the enumerated felonies under section 775.082(9)(a)l., battery of a law enforcement officer is not specifically enumerated as a “forcible felony” in section 776.08....

...Hunter appeals a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment imposed as a prison releasee reoffender for burglary of a dwelling. The dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the offense. We affirm. Mr. Hunter raises several constitutional challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...However, we have previously upheld the constitutionality of the Act on these grounds. See Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). At trial, Mr. Hunter's counsel argued that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not a qualifying offense under the Act. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q) (1997)....

...Such a finding shall be based upon whether the person actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. The court may find that multiple defendants killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. § 775.082(1)(b), Fla....

...certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 133 S. CT. 2151 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM? AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED. EVAN...

...Stark, however, filed a rule 3.800(a) motion asserting that the orally pronounced sentences were illegal under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA) because the incarcerative portions of the concurrent HFO sentences did not exceed the PRR terms. See § 775.082(9)(c), Fla....

...The written sentences were erroneous because they did not comport with the orally pronounced sentences, and they were illegal because, without the omitted HFO sentencing enhancements, the thirty-year terms exceeded the maximum permissible sentences for second-degree felonies. [1] See § 775.082(3)(c) (stating that the maximum sentence for a second-degree felony is fifteen years' imprisonment); Williams v....

...s. "If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence `pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law' the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence." State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345, 354 (Fla.2000) (quoting § 775.082(9)(c))....

...Gregory Lewis Jordan appeals the denial of his motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), alleging that the sentences he received as a result of a negotiated plea were illegal because they exceeded the maximum sentences allowed under section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...In 2009, Jordan filed a rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence alleging that the sentences he received for Counts I, II, and III are illegal because they exceed the statutory maximums allowed at the time. The trial court erred in denying Jordan's motion. Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that a person may be punished as follows: for a life felony, "by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years"; for a second degree felony, "by a term of impris...

...After revoking Jeffers’ probation, the trial court sentenced him to a split sentence of 115.5 months’ incarceration followed by 64.5 months’ probation, which totals fifteen years-the maximum sentence permissible for a second-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla....

...clarification and write to explain our affirmance. In this case, Eubanks was convicted of armed burglary of a dwelling, a first degree felony. [2] The prison releasee reoffender statute specifically lists armed burglary as a qualifying offense. See § 775.082(9)(a)1.p., Fla. Stat. (1999). "Occupied" versus "unoccupied" makes no difference, if an armed burglary is involved. If the crime is simply a burglary, then whether or not the dwelling is occupied or unoccupied does matter, because the language of section 775.082(9)(a)1.q., Florida Statutes, in place at the time Eubanks committed his offense, specified as a qualifying crime "burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling." See State v....

...5th DCA 2001), approved on other grounds, 838 So.2d 557 (Fla.2003). To the extent Bradshaw is in conflict with Stabile and this opinion, we certify that a conflict exists. Motion for Rehearing, Clarification and Certification GRANTED. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla....

...ld be imposed if the child were committed for the offense.” § 985.435(5), Fla. Stat. (2012); see also A.W. v. State, 787 So.2d 149, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). A first-degree misdemeanor is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year. § 775.082(4)(a), Fla....

...That error was committed below is conclusively established, without more, by section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2009), which provides: The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1,1998. See also § 775.082(8)(d), Fla....

...ariwise, when the guidelines are not to be applied that they are specifically excluded from consideration. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing that a sentence imposed under this statute is not subject to the Criminal Punishment Code); § 775.082(8)(d), Fla....

punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. In his commission of aggravated

...e. The trial judge considered the case of White v. State, 666 So.2d 895 (Fla.1996), which concerned the Habitual Felony Offender ("HFO") statute [3] , and ruled that DUI Manslaughter is a qualifying offense, and sentenced Mr. Souza accordingly. *954 Section 775.082(9)(a), the definitional section of the PRR Act, describes a prison releasee reoffender as follows: (9)(a) 1....

...his subsection, unless the state attorney determines that extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender, including whether the victim recommends that the offender not be sentenced as provided in this subsection. 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla....

...ification according to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, is manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....

...islature intended to include it within the ambit of the PRR Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence rendered by the trial court. AFFIRMED. SAWAYA, CJ., and PETERSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(c)3, Florida Statutes (2002). [2] § 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Santiago was charged with, and convicted of, burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). The State followed the procedure required to have Santiago declared a prison releasee *1028 reoffender, pursuant to section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...qualifying offense for purposes of the prison releasee reoffender statute. We agree. The prison releasee reoffender ("PRR") statute establishes enhanced and mandatory sentences under certain defined circumstances and for certain enumerated felonies. Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes defines "prison releasee reoffender": 1....

...n for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state. (Emphasis supplied). The State acknowledges that the crime of burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery is not a specifically enumerated offense under section 775.082(9)(a). However, the State contends that it is a qualifying offense under the so-called "catchall" provision, section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...ire proof of the use or threat of use of physical force or violence. In other words, because this statutory offense can be established by proof of a mere touching, [4] the offense cannot qualify as a predicate offense under the catchall provision of section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...NOTES [1] Under section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the defense of self-defense is not available to a person who is "attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony...." [2] This is the exact same language found in section 775.082(9)(a)1....

...rth below, he should have been sentenced to a nonstate prison sentence based upon his score of 14.1 points. The trial court denied the motion without any analysis or record attachments. The appellant bases his illegal sentence claim on the fact that section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2009), which took effect just prior to the appellant's arrest, states that anyone who commits a crime: on or after July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in s....

...However, the defendant's sentences for kidnapping under counts five, seven, nine, eleven, and thirteen were incorrectly classified as first degree felonies. Kidnapping with a weapon is classified as a life felony. See § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Therefore, we remand for resentencing under Section 775.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...We reject the State’s contention that Johnson’s contemporaneous convictions for other violent felonies insulate Johnson’s death sentences from Ring and Hurst v. Florida. See Hurst, 202 So.3d at 53 n. 7. However, we also reject Johnson’s argument that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2015), requires that we remand Johnson’s case to the trial court for imposition of a life sentence....

...The State requested that Dean be sentenced as a PRR on both counts, however,' the State did not introduce any evidence to support a finding that Dean committed the crimes in this case within three years of being released from a state correctional facility, See § 775.082(9)(a), Fla....

Id. ; see, e.g. , § 775.082(3)(c) (explaining that a juvenile convicted of

...sideration of Appellant’s subsequent, pending charges played no part in the twelve-year sentence imposed. See § 790.23(l)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing that a convicted felon who possesses a firearm commits a felony of the second degree); § 775.082(3)(d), Fla....

...ne crimes and to determine the range of punishment applicable to such crimes. See Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla.2000). Section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: (3) Burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s....