Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975). · Go Syfert
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Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases · …ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
103 citation events (50 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Jerry Leon Haliburton v. State of Florida (fla, 2021-06-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1975 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jerry Leon Haliburton v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the - 30 - constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kenneth Darcell Quince v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Figler Family Chiropractic, P.A., a/a/o Linda Manners (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Charter Schools USA, Inc. v. John Doe No. 93 (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Phillips v. State
Fla. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Iacovone
Fla. · 1995 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Rivera v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Rivera v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Kenneth Darcell Quince v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Sketo v. Brown
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Miami Beach v. Steven Kwartin
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Moreover, it is a settled principle of constitutional law that courts should avoid ruling on constitutional issues “if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” State v. Covington, 392 So. 2d 1321 , 1322–23 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEANGELO GEORGE ROBINSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Where a person is arrested 12 pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases have held that the person is in ‘custody’ within the meaning of the speedy trial rule.” Id. at 1284 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. DEBORAH NEFF, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF DOROTHY MILINKOVICH
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See In re Holder, 945 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006); Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miami-Dade County v. Pozos (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Institute, Inc. v. Shield, 49 So. 3d 741, 742 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court held that “[p]rocedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.” (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Calonge
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“Procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.” Id. at 743 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Calonge
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“Procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.” Id. at 743 (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Toby Bogorff, Robert Bogorff, Beth Garcia, Ronald Garcia, Robert Pearce, Barbara Pearce and Timothy Donald Farley, etc. v. Florida Department of Agriculture And Consumer Services and The Florida Commissioner Agriculture
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261, 280 (Fla.2013) (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
It is a “settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 784 So.2d 438, 441 (Fla. 2001) (citing Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raphael v. Shecter
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
It is not material that all the damages resulting from the act shall have been sustained at that time and the running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date.” Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla.1954). 6 . ''[Cjourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” B.C. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1046, 1055 (Fla.2004) (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bland
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See In re Holder, 945 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla.2006) (noting that the court will avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitu-tional grounds); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (adhering to the “settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ds v. Jl
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See In re Holder, 945 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla.2006) (noting that the court will avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (adhering to the "settled principle of constitutional *1105 law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D.S. v. J.L.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See In re Holder, 945 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla.2006) (noting that the court will avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (adhering to the “settled principle of con stitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
The general guide to construction of the procedural rules is set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.010, which states that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." See also Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla.1975) ("Procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.C. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
WEBSTER, POLSTON, and HAWKES, JJ., concur. . ''[C]ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RC v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] "[C]ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975). [2] The trial court states within its order denying the motion to correct disposition that appellant meets criterion (g), identification by physical evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Holder
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.1995) ("[W]e adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional issues."); State v. Covington, 392 So.2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla.1981) ("It is a `settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.'") (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)); Franklin County v. State, 24 Fla. 55 , 3 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Inquiry Concerning A Judge, re Holder
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.1995) (“[W]e adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional issues.”); State v. Covington, 392 So.2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla.1981) (“It is a ‘settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.’ ”) (quoting Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)); Franklin County v. State, 24…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burns v. State
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sullivan v. Sapp
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Comm'n, 475 So.2d 241, 242 (Fla.1985); State v. Covington, 392 So.2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla.1981); Briklod v. State, 365 So.2d 1023, 1027 (Fla.1978); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552-53 (Fla.1975); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla.1974); Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade, 287 So.2d 669, 670-71 (Fla.1973); Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63, 66 (Fla.1973); Williston Highlands Dev.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Boyd
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Cf. State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla.1995) (adhering "to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional *460 issues"); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (warning that "courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Service Metro Corp. v. Bell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975)(courts should avoid reaching a constitutional issue in a case when the decision can be made on other grounds).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. · 1998 · confidence medium
Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 553-54 (Fla.1975). [17] Other district courts that have considered this issue have ruled contrary to the majority opinion. [18] Because the majority opinion stacks one delay upon another in an already overburdened *247 criminal justice system, I respectfully dissent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Stevens
Fla. · 1998 · confidence medium
Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) ("[W]e adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. CACCIAMANI DEVELOPMENT CO.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rather, the rules should be construed in such a manner as to "further justice, not to frustrate it." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla.1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Setzler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
See generally State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995); State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 1995); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kmt v. Dept. of H & R Serv.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm'n, 531 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. 1988); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K.M.T. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm’n, 531 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Fla.1988); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla.1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co.
Fla. · 1986 · confidence medium
"Procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975). "[R]ules of procedure essential to administer justice should never be permitted to become so technical, fossilized and antiquated that they obscure the justice of the cause and lead to results that bring its administration into disrepute." Sundell v. State, 354 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mann v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
Indeed, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure "should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pruitt v. Brock
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Rather, the rules should be construed in such a manner as to "further justice, not to frustrate it." Singletary v. *775 State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tsavaris
Fla. · 1981 · confidence medium
Wooten v. State, 332 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1976); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 *422 (Fla. 1975); Jones v. City of Sarasota, 89 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1956).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Covington
Fla. · 1981 · confidence medium
It is a "settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon *1323 the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975); Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dinsmore v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
In Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 555 (Fla.1975) the supreme court stated: [A]n accused has been “taken into custody” within the meaning of Rule 3.191(a)(1) when the individual has been served with a summons to answer for a crime for which he has been accused of having committed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Florida Nat. Properties, Inc.
Fla. · 1976 · confidence medium
For reasons it does not articulate, the Court chooses not to "adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975); Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1971); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
discussed Cited "see" Rodrick D. Williams v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Singletary v. State , 322 So.2d 551 , 552 (Fla. 1975) (relying on "the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds").
discussed Cited "see" Dufour v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) ("[C]ourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds."); see also Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145 ; Phillips, 984 So.2d at 509 n. 11; Jones, 966 So.2d at 329-30 ; Trotter, 932 So.2d at 1049 n. 5.
discussed Cited "see" Holmes v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (“[Cjourts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.” (citing Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla.1973))).
discussed Cited "see" Trotter v. State
Fla. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 , 552 (Fla. 1975) (stating that "courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds"). 6 Rule 3.203 defines mental retardation as follows: As used in this rule, the term "mental retardation" means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.
cited Cited "see" Sarasota Herald-Tribune v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 (Fla.1975).
Nadene SINGLETARY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee. Lillian EADY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
46175, 46173.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 29, 1975.
322 So. 2d 551
Klein.
Cited by 100 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 4 cases
Pinpoint authority: #31,235 of 633,719
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (3) · Supreme Court of Florida (1)

[*552] Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

KLEIN, EDWARD S., Circuit Judge:

The two cases consolidated herein are direct appeals from the County Court of Duval County which held that Fla. Stat. 409.325 is constitutional, and that appellants were not denied a speedy trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Const. Article V, § 3(b)(1).

Although this Court acquires jurisdiction by virtue of the trial court's ruling that Fla. Stat. 409.325 is constitutional, we adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds. Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v.[*553] Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1971); Mounier v. State, 178 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1965). Because of our holding herein that appellants should be forever discharged due to the denial of their right to a speedy trial, we refrain from deciding the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 409.325.

On April 1, 1974, appellant Singletary was served with a summons to appear on May 6, 1974, on the charge of welfare fraud, a violation of Fla. Stat. 409.325. On April 10, 1974, a summons was served upon appellant Eady to appear on May 6, 1974, in the same court as appellant Singletary to respond to the same charges as appellant Singletary.

Both appellants appeared in court on May 6, 1974, but the court on its own motion passed both cases until May 14, 1974, for the appointment of the Public Defender. On May 14, 1974, appellants were adjudged insolvent and the Public Defender was appointed to represent them. Both cases were then continued until May 28, 1974, for the filing of an information. Appellants appeared in court on May 28, 1974, but once again the cases were continued since no information had been filed. On May 30, 1974, the State Attorney filed two informations charging each appellant with violating Fla. Stat. 409.325.

On June 11, 1974, both appellants appeared in court and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges filed in the informations, and the cases were continued until July 8, 1974, for hearing on motions. On July 8, 1974, the appellants appeared in court, the court denied the appellants' motions for statement of particulars, and set the cases for jury trial on August 6, 1974. On August 2, 1974, both appellants filed motions to discharge under the speedy trial rule, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1). On August 6, 1974, the appellants again appeared in court at which time the county judge denied their motions to discharge. The appellants then entered pleas of nolo contendere, preserving the right to appeal the denial of their motions to discharge.

The pertinent provision of Rule 3.191(a)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads as follows:

"... every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall without demand be brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged be a misdemeanor ... The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged." (Emphasis added)

Since the time period commences when the accused is taken into custody, the question presented herein is when were the appellants taken into custody?

While there are a number of cases that have been decided in this State dealing with the question of what amounts to the denial of a speedy trial after arrest, this is the first application of Florida's speedy trial rule to a situation where the accused was served by summons, but was never formally "arrested".

Appellants argue they were taken into custody on April 1st and April 10th, respectively, the date the summonses were served upon them. Alternatively, appellants argue they were taken into custody on May 6th, the date they appeared in court in accordance with the summonses. The State contends that the appellants were not taken into custody until May 14th, the date the Public Defender was appointed to represent the appellants. If the ninety-day time period commenced on May 6th (the date of the appellants' first appearance in court in response to the summonses) or prior thereto, Rule 3.191(a)(1) mandates that the appellants "be forever discharged from the crime."

The purpose of the speedy trial rule is to implement the practice and procedure by which the defendant may seek to[*554] be guaranteed his fundamental right to a speedy trial. The rule was promulgated and its specific time limits established with a view toward expediting the administration of criminal justice. State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1971); Rubiera v. Dade County ex rel. Benitez, 305 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1974).

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), Justice Powell stated:

"... even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility." 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.

Recognizing this Rule 3.191(a)(1) provides:

"A person charged with a crime is entitled to the benefits of this Rule ... whether such person is in custody awaiting trial or is at liberty on bail or recognizance." (Emphasis added)

The failure to appear as commanded by a summons without good cause constitutes an indirect criminal contempt of court, punishable by fine. Fla. Stat. 901.11. It follows that a person served with a summons commanding him to appear in court on a date and time certain stands in a position similar to one at liberty on bail or recognizance.

In U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, declared:

"At least some of these values served by the right to a speedy trial are not unique to any particular stage of the criminal proceeding. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 722, 725-726 (1968); Note, 77 Yale L.J. 767, 780-783 (1968); Comment, 11 Ariz.L.Rev. 770, 774-776 (1969). Undue delay may be as offensive to the right to a speedy trial before as after an indictment or information. The anxiety and concern attendant on public accusation may weigh more heavily upon an individual who has not yet been formally indicted or arrested for, to him, exoneration by a jury of his peers may be only a vague possibility lurking in the distant future. Indeed, the protection underlying the right to a speedy trial may be denied when a citizen is damned by clandestine innuendo and never given the chance promptly to defend himself in a court of law." 404 U.S. at 331, 92 S.Ct. at 468. (Emphasis added)

One served with a summons to answer a criminal charge is no less an accused charged with a crime than one formally placed under arrest by warrant. The anxiety and concern attendant on public accusation commence at that point. The individual's freedom is restricted to the extent that he is required, under threat of arrest for non-compliance, to appear in court on the time and date specified in the summons. Fla. Stat. 901.11. Upon being served with a summons, an accused comes within the jurisdiction of the court.

Fla. Stat. 901.09(2) provides that:

"(2) When the complaint is for a misdemeanor that the magistrate is not empowered to try summarily, he shall issue a summons instead of a warrant if he reasonably believes that the person against whom the complaint was made will appear upon a summons."

Where a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases have held that the person is in "custody" within the meaning of the speedy trial rule. We see no reason why a person served pursuant to Fla. Stat. 901.09(2) with a summons, as contrasted with an arrest pursuant to a warrant, should not likewise be considered as being "in custody" within the meaning of the speedy trial rule. Should such person fail to appear in response to the summons, the provisions of the speedy trial rule relating to Availability for Trial and Exceptional Circumstances[*555] would toll the running of the time period. Rule 3.191(e) and (f). Procedural rules should be given a construction calculated to further justice, not to frustrate it. Eastwood v. Hall, 258 So.2d 269 (Fla.App.2d 1972).

This Court, on December 9, 1974, promulgated the Florida Traffic Rules. 306 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1974). Florida Traffic Rule 6.220 states that:

"Rule 3.191, Rules of Criminal Procedure, shall be applicable to criminal traffic offenses. A person shall be considered `taken into custody' when he is arrested or when a traffic citation or notice to appear is served upon him." (Emphasis added)

Certainly an individual served with a summons to answer criminal charges faces greater anxiety and concern than a person served with a notice to appear in a traffic offense. If a person served with a notice to appear to answer for a traffic offense is deemed to have been "taken into custody", then logic dictates that a person served with a summons to answer for a more serious criminal offense should likewise be deemed to have been "taken into custody".

We reject appellants' alternative argument that the time period in the rule does not commence until the date specified for the accused to appear in court. The anxiety and concern of the accused are not delayed until such time as the accused first appears in court. Since Fla. Stat. 901.09(2) provides that the summons is to be issued by a magistrate, an official of the court, the accused is within the "custody" of the court the moment he receives the summons. From that point onward, his freedoms are restricted.

Based on the position we have taken herein, no words are needed to explain our rejection of appellee's argument that the time period did not commence until the date the appellants were appointed a Public Defender.

In summary, we hold that an accused has been "taken into custody" within the meaning of rule 3.191(a)(1) when the individual has been served with a summons to answer for a crime for which he has been accused of having committed. Since the appellants were not brought to trial within ninety days of their having been taken into custody, their right to a speedy trial has been violated, and they should be discharged.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, C.J., and BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.

OVERTON, J., concurs specially with an opinion, with which ENGLAND, J., concurs.

ROBERTS, J., dissents.

OVERTON, Justice (concurring specially).

I agree with the discharge; however, I do not agree that receiving a summons is "custody" under the terms of Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1).

My construction of our present rule would commence the computation of the speedy trial period involving a summons on the date the defendant submits himself to the court. In this instance, that was on May 6, 1974. Computing ninety days from May 6, 1974, still entitles the appellants to discharge. We should specifically set forth in the rule when the time period begins to run for a criminal action commenced by a summons.

I agree in the result, but not for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion.

ENGLAND, J., concurs.