State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995). · Go Syfert
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State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder.”
102 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Stevens (fla, 1998-03-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 42 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Stevens (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ashley Nicole Isabel Brito v. Jennifer Salas & Angel Giovanni Rivera v. Jennifer Salas
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
See McCloud v. State, 260 So. 3d 911, 918-19 (Fla. 2018) (explaining that a statute generally should be interpreted to avoid absurdities); State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1995) (“Statutes, as a rule, ‘will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.’ ” (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1986))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramroop v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1374 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Debaun
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Paul, 112 So.3d at 1195 ; State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (“Statutes, as a rule, “will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.’ ” (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Geico General Insurance v. Virtual Imaging Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Since “[statutes, as a rule, ‘will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result,’ ” State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986)), I disagree with Virtual Imaging’s contention that the PIP statute contains two conflicting payment methodologies.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Geico Indemnity Co. v. Virtual Imaging Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Since “[sjtatutes, as a rule, ‘will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result,’ ” State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986)), I disagree with Virtual Imaging’s contention that the PIP statute contains two conflicting payment methodologies.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
We have held that "[s]tatutes, as a rule, `will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.'" State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V.P. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986), “Statutes, as a rule, ‘will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result’ ”). 1996 Amendments In 1996, the legislature again amended the postcommitment detention subsection.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davila v. State
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Further, “[s]tat-utes, as a rule, ‘will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.’ ” State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enterprises
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tillman v. State
Fla. · 2006 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (finding that the goal of granting "law enforcement officers the greatest possible protection ... undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of section[ ] 784.07(3)").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Thus, while unfortunate, the decision in Schriro only reaffirms the importance of Florida's independent consideration of retroactivity under Witt . [21] See, e.g., State v. Klayman, 835 So.2d 248, 254 (Fla.2002) (holding that decision in Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1 (Fla.1999), which held that section 893.135(1)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), was only intended to apply to Schedule I and II drugs, warranted retroactive application); Ferguson v. State, 789 So.2d 306, 309-12 (Fla.2001) (holding that decision in Carter v. State, 706 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1997), which held that a competency hea…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Thus, while unfortunate, the decision in Schriro only reaffirms the importance of Florida's independent consideration of retroactivity under Witt . [14] See, e.g., State v. Klayman, 835 So.2d 248, 254 (Fla.2002) (holding that decision in Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1999), which held that section 893.135(1)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), was only intended to apply to Schedule I and II drugs, warranted retroactive application); Ferguson v. State, 789 So.2d 306, 309-312 (Fla.2001) (holding that decision in Carter v. State, 706 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla.1997), which held that a competency …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bunkley v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
This was clearly a saving construction, akin to State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995), in which we limited the statute authorizing a mandatory minimum sentence for attempted murder of a law enforcement officer to attempted first-degree murder.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Robinson
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. See also State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla.1995) (reviewing under article V, section 3(b)(1) a district court decision holding a statute unconstitutional as applied); Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So.2d 419, 421-23 (Fla.1992) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Joshua, 768 So.2d at 435 ; State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castillo v. Vlaminck De Castillo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995); Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 ; Brown v. Saint City Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 717 So.2d 557, 560 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1998); Phoenix Insurance Company v. McCormick, 542 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gantorius v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
On September 21, 1995, however, the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) held that the law enforcement enhancement provision of sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (1991) applied only to attempted first degree murder of a law enforcement officer, not to attempted second degree murder, which was the offense with which the appellant here was charged.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gantorius v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1374 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d at 1373, n. 1 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hernando County v. Florida Public Service Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newbold v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
We do not reach the constitutional issue presented, but conclude that (1) the subject statute proscribes only attempted first -degree murder of a law enforcement officer, not, as here, attempted second -degree murder of a police officer, and (2) a conviction for attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer must be reduced to the category 1, necessarily included offense of attempted second-degree murder where, as here, the evidence adduced at trial supports such an conviction—based on the indistinguishable and controlling decision of State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Even more persuasive is the statement that "[t]he penalty for attempted first-degree murder is enhanced when undertaken against a law enforcement officer... ." Id. at 1373-74 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Barnum
Fla. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1374 (Fla. 1995). [15] Also distinguishable is our 2004 Thompson decision concerning the statute governing felony driving while license suspended, in which we held the due process principles of Fiore required relief from a conviction that relied on predicate offenses that the State "did not and could not prove." 887 So.2d at 1266 . [16] See State v. Hayes, 720 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), quashed, 750 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1999); State v. Baxley, 684 So.2d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). [17] See State v. Perry, 716 So.2d 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Holland, 689…
cited Cited "see" Velde v. Velde
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited "see" Joshua v. City of Gainesville
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 656 So.2d 470 (Fla.1995); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" State v. Anderson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995); Carnes v. State, 725 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); United Auto.
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See, s. 51, Ch. 97-261, Laws of Florida, and s. 7, Ch. 98-166, Laws of Florida. 2 See, e.g., State v. Iacovone , 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995) (under standard rules of construction, it is court's primary duty to give effect to legislative intent of a statute; and if literal interpretation leads to an unreasonable result, plainly at variance with purpose of legislation as a whole, court must examine the matter further). 3 Id .
discussed Cited "see" Wiley v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited "see" Steverson v. Singletary
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited "see" State v. Wilson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995)(stating that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991) only apply to attempted first-degree murder).
discussed Cited "see" Brown v. SAINT CITY CHURCH OF GOD (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995); Florida State Racing Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla.1958).
discussed Cited "see" Mathis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1374 (Fla.1995); see also Steverson v. State, 677 So.2d 398, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Iacovone v. State, 639 So.2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), affirmed, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited "see" State v. Brigham
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited "see" Amend. to Fla. Rules of Appellate Proc.
Fla. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995); Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1986) (statutes will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result).
cited Cited "see" Amend. to Fla. Rules of Appellate Proc.
Fla. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995); Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1986) (statutes will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result).
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Final Bill Analysis Economic Impact Statement on CS/HB 819, House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations, dated June 19, 1995. 8 State v. Iacovone, supra; In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990). 9 Cf., s. 119.07 (3)(l), Fla. Stat., which creates an exemption for certain personal information of specified public employees and officers and which provides that an agency that is the custodian of such personal information but is not the employer of the officer or employee shall maintain the confid…
cited Cited "see" State v. Setzler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1995); State v. Mozo, 655 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 1995); Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Iacovone , 660 So. 2d 1371 , 1372 (Fla. 1995); Shell Harbor Group, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco , 487 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). 6 While s. 200.065 (5)(a)2., Fla. Stat., also allows the setting of a millage rate in excess of 110 percent of the rolled-back rate with a 2/3 vote of a board consisting of nine or more members, the St.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thompson v. State
Fla. · 2004 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998) (determining that Court's decision in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), which invalidated the statutory penalties for attempted second- and third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, met all three prongs of Witt and should be applied retroactively) with Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233, 241 , 241 n. 7 (Fla.2000) (concluding that Court's interpretation of the burglary statute did not meet the second or third prongs of the Witt test and could not be applied retroactively).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.1998) (concluding that State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), which held that enhanced penalties for attempted second- and third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer were not authorized by statute, applies retroactively); Bass v. State, 530 So.2d 282 (Fla.1988) (concluding that Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983), which held that consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for use of firearms in crimes arising from a single criminal episode were not authorized by statute, applies retroactively).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dixon v. State
Fla. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 714 So.2d 347 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 452 , 142 L.Ed.2d 405 (1998) (gap of three years between opinion announcing change of law in State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1995), and Stevens announcing retroactive application of Iacovone ); Bass v. State, 530 So.2d 282 (Fla.1988) (gap of five years between opinion announcing change of law in Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983), and Bass announcing retroactive application of Palmer ). [5] If the two-year limit were calculated from the date of the initial decision announcing the change of law …
STATE of Florida, Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
Alan Gilman IACOVONE, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
84215.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 21, 1995.
660 So. 2d 1371
Shaw.
Cited by 75 opinions  |  Published

[*1372] Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law and Kimberly D. Nolen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Karen Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review Iacovone v. State, 639 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the district court declared sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991), invalid as applied to Alan Iacovone. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Alan Iacovone and Lori Cuervo began dating in 1985. They moved in together and had three children before the relationship deteriorated and Cuervo moved out with the children in 1991. Iacovone threatened Cuervo on several occasions and on Christmas morning, 1991, entered her apartment and argued with her and her father. After struggling with the father, Iacovone ran from the apartment and began beating on Cuervo's car with a hammer. When Deputy Hogsten approached, Iacovone ran to his own car and attempted to flee, striking the officer with the car.

Iacovone was convicted of attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to sections 784.07 and 775.0825, Florida Statutes (1991). The district court reversed the conviction, ruling that the statutes violate equal protection by punishing attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer more harshly than the completed act. The State appeals.

Murder of a law enforcement officer is punishable as follows:

 First-degree murder ............ death or life without parole
 Second-degree murder ........... imprisonment not exceeding
 30 years, with a 25 year
 mandatory minimum term
 Third-degree murder ............ imprisonment not exceeding
 15 years, with a 15 year
 mandatory minimum term

See §§ 775.082, 775.0823, 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1991).

Section 784.07 addresses attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and makes the crime a life felony:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section, any person who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duty or who is convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer when the motivation for such attempt was related, all or in part, to the lawful duties of the officer, shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.0825.

§ 784.07(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).

Section 775.0825 in turn provides for a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment:

Any person convicted of attempted murder of a law enforcement officer as provided in s. 784.07(3) shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole. Such sentence shall[*1373] not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001 [sentencing guidelines].

§ 775.0825, Fla. Stat. (1991).

It is the State's position that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply to all three degrees of murder and result in the following across-the-board penalty scheme:

 Attempted first-degree murder ........... Life or less than 40 years
 imprisonment, with a 25 year
 mandatory minimum term
 Attempted second-degree murder .......... Life or less than 40 years
 imprisonment, with a 25 year
 mandatory minimum term
 Attempted third-degree murder ........... Life or less than 40 years
 imprisonment, with a 25 year
 mandatory minimum term

The discrepancy recognized by the district court is apparent in this scheme in that the penalty for attempted third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., life or forty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum) is vastly greater than the penalty for completed third-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., fifteen years with a fifteen year mandatory minimum). Further, the penalty for attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., life or forty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum) is significantly greater than the penalty for completed second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer (i.e., thirty years with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum).

The State argues that, although a "sentencing disparity" exists, this reading of the statutes does not violate equal protection because the State is afforded wide discretion when classifying crimes. The State urges that the legislature's intent to deter "lethal attacks" against law enforcement officers provides a reasonable basis for the sentencing classification notwithstanding the above-mentioned anomaly.

We find standard rules of statutory construction dispositive of this case without reaching the constitutional issue.[1]See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975) ("[W]e adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds.").

Under standard rules of construction, "it is our primary duty to give effect to the legislative intent; and if a literal interpretation leads to an unreasonable result, plainly at variance with the purpose of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further." Radio Tel. Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Tel. Co., 170 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1964). Statutes, as a rule, "will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result." Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1986).

The legislature unquestionably intends to give law enforcement officers the greatest possible protection. See, e.g., Ch. 89-100, § 2(1), Laws of Fla. (enacting section 775.0823) ("[L]aw enforcement ... officers are constantly exposed to great risk of personal injury and death, and consequently are entitled to the greatest protection which can be provided through the laws of this state."). This goal undoubtedly played a role in the enacting of sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825.

We fail to see how this goal is furthered by applying sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 to all degrees of murder. If the purpose of the statutes is to discourage lethal attacks against law enforcement officers, as the State contends, then the penalty for the completed crime should be greater, not less, than the penalty for the attempt. Otherwise, a criminal who attempts to murder a law enforcement officer would have a substantial incentive to complete the act in order to avoid exposure to the harsher penalty. The State's interpretation thus would seem to encourage, not discourage, lethal attacks. This is an irrational result.

When the statutes are limited to first-degree murder, they result in a sensible scheme. The penalty for attempted first-degree[*1374] murder is enhanced when undertaken against a law enforcement officer, and the penalty for the completed act of first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer is greater than the penalty for the attempt. This is a logical arrangement that reasonably advances the legislature's goal of providing law enforcement officers with the greatest protection possible under state laws.

We hold that sections 784.07(3) and 775.0825 apply only to first-degree murder. We affirm the decision of the district court of appeal.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.

1 Were we to address the constitutional issue, the penalty scheme proposed by the State would face formidable due process hurdles. See, e.g., State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1986) ("[T]he guarantee of due process requires that the means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained... .").