Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). · Go Syfert
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Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
6 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Duer v. Moore (fladistctapp, 2000-05-22)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duer v. Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
In denying his administrative appeal, DOC referred to allegations in the information in Case No. CR96-3353 "that your offenses occurred on or between January 1, 1995 and November 8, 1995" and asserted: "As you are convicted of committing a crime on or after October 1, 1995, you fall under the 85% time frame." We reject DOC's suggestion that the information should be interpreted as charging a single, "continuing assault." Cf. Puffinberger v. State, 581 So.2d 897, 900 (Fla.1991) (finding the "offense ... continued after the ... effective date of the permitted guideline ranges"); Jenkins v. State…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilder v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Finally, as this court stated in Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), evidence of prior, similar conduct is admissible to prove the existence, formation or organization of a conspiracy. [1] On this record, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence of Bell's participation in a conspiracy with Wilder to traffick in stolen goods, if not overwhelming, is abundantly sufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy by a *547 preponderance of the evidence without consideration of any hearsay statements made by Bell.
cited Cited "see" Brown v. Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Aaron W. JENKINS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
AT-210.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan 30, 1984.
444 So. 2d 1108
Larry G. Smith.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published

Lloyd L. Vipperman, Jr., Gainesville, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Andrew Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

LARRY G. SMITH, Judge.

Appellant's contention that his double jeopardy rights were infringed, or that he was prejudiced in the defense of the conspiracy charge for which he was tried by reason of a material variance between the information and bill of particulars and the proof at the trial, have been considered and found to be without merit. We also disagree with appellant's contention that the changes in the substantive statute, Section 944.47, Florida Statutes, amended effective July 1, 1982, could not be applied to the conspiracy charge against him, and therefore affirm.

A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars specifying the exact day upon which a crime occurred if the exact date is not known. State v. McGregor, 409 So.2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Moreover, as appellant concedes, there was only one conspiracy here. Epps v. State, 354 So.2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). However, it is abundantly clear that acts constituting the conspiracy occurred both before and after the effective date of the statutory amendment to Section 944.47, which increased the penalty for introduction of contraband into a state penal institution from a third degree felony to a second degree felony, thereby causing the conspiracy to commit that crime to become a felony, rather[*1109] than a simple misdemeanor. Cases decided under the RICO statute, Section 943.462, Florida Statutes (1979), hold that that statute, applying to a course of ongoing criminal activities, much as a conspiracy does, may be applied to criminal activities occurring before the effective date of that act, and thus not offend constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, as long as at least one act occurred after the effective date of the statute. Carlson v. State, 405 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1981); State v. Whiddon, 384 So.2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1980). By analogy to the reasoning applied in the RICO cases, since acts in the conspiracy here clearly occurred after the effective date of the statutory amendment, the mere fact that the conspiracy commenced before the effective date of the amendment does not render the application of the amended law to appellant's crime an impermissible retroactive application of the law.

Furthermore, evidence of prior, similar criminal conduct is admissible to prove the existence, formation or organization of a conspiracy charged. U.S. v. Torres, 519 F.2d 723 (2nd Cir.1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 457, 46 L.Ed.2d 392 (1975); 20 A.L.R.Fed. § 4(c), Conspiracy — "Prior Similar Conduct."

AFFIRMED.

WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.