State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1986). · Go Syfert
State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in the case of multiple discharges of a firearm at multiple victims, there are, by definition, separate violations of each victim's rights”
112 citation events (53 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. State (fladistctapp, 2002-01-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
in the case of multiple discharges of a firearm at multiple victims, there are, by definition, separate violations of each victim's rights
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ELDER v. DIXON
N.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
According to the Florida Supreme Court, “[w]here, during a single criminal episode, there are multiple victims or multiple injuries to a single victim, consecutive sentences are permitted at the discretion of the trial judge.” Miller v. State, 265 So. 3d 457, 458 (Fla. 2018) (citing State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 925-26 (Fla. 2005); State v. Christian, 692 So.2d 889, 890-91 (Fla. 1997); State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robert R. Miller v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Sousa, 903 So. 2d at 925-26 ; State v. Christian, 692 So. 2d 889, 890-91 (Fla. 1997); State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In State v. Ames, 467 So.2d 994 (Fla.1985), where the defendant possessed a gun while breaking into a woman’s house, robbing her in one room and raping her in another, we held that the three offenses occurred during a single episode.” State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1986). 5 In State v. Christian, 692 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1997), during a bar fight, the defendant shot the first victim three times from behind, then shot and wounded the second victim, who had attempted to intervene.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Butner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
However, a trial court has the discretion to impose the sentences consecutively when the offenses are committed contemporaneously, a firearm was discharged, and the defendant “injures multiple victims or causes multiple injuries to one victim.” Valentin v. State, 963 So.2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citations omitted); see also State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 925-26 (Fla. 2005); State v. Christian, 692 So.2d 889, 890-91 (Fla. 1997); State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 1986); Scott v. State, 42 So.3d 923, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leronnie Lee Walton v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
I also would recede from State v. Christian, 692 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1997) (holding that for offenses arising from a single episode, consecutive mandatory minimum sentences are permissible where the violations of the mandatory minimum statutes cause injury to multiple victims, or multiple injuries to one victim), State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1986) (holding that consecutive firearm mandatory minimum sentences are permissible when a single incident involves shootings that are “two separate and distinct offenses involving two separate and distinct victims”), State v. Sousa, 903 S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Our supreme court has held that consecutive mandatory minimum sentences may be imposed under section 775.087(2) for multiple crimes committed during a single criminal episode where there are “separate and distinct offenses involving ... separate and distinct victims.” State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla.1986) (affirming the trial court’s stacking of mandatory minimum sentences on counts of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault committed upon two separate victims); see also Downs v. State, 616 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1993) (affirming the trial court’s stacking of ma…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sousa
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Id. at 1044.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lifred v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The supreme court in Thomas v. State, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1986), again interpreted section 775.087(2), distinguishing Palmer based on the presence in Thomas of "two separate and distinct criminal offenses involving two separate and distinct victims." We find Thomas , construing the precise statute at issue in this appeal, to control.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bonaventure v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla.1986) (upholding the trial court’s consecutive minimum mandatory sentences where the defendant was convicted of using a firearm to commit both attempted murder and aggravated assault because they were separate and distinct offenses committed during the same criminal episode).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haye v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
State v. Boatwright, 559 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla. 1990); LeCroy v. State, 533 So.2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1988); Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120, 1123-1124 (Fla. 1986); State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 1986); State v. Ames, 467 So.2d 994, 995-996 (Fla. 1985); Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1983). [11] In State v. Boatwright, 559 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1990), the supreme court stated: This Court has consistently applied section 775.087(2) as permitting the trial court to impose consecutive three-year mandatory sentences if the acts leading to the convictions are sufficiently separated tempora…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Junco v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
See Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1986); State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044, 1045 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Ronald Williams v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" Goree v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986) (approving stacking of two firearm mandatory minimum terms where defendant shot woman and shot at, but missed, her son." Id. at 891 n. 4.
discussed Cited "see" Cook v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. ( citing State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986)); Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 1997) (stacking permissible where defendant shot and killed two victims during the same episode).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Christian
Fla. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986) (approving stacking of two firearm mandatory minimum terms where defendant shot woman and shot at, but missed, her son). [2] See, e.g., State v. Boatwright, 559 So.2d 210 (Fla.1990) (approving stacking of two capital felony mandatory minimum terms where defendant committed two counts of sexual battery on same child).
cited Cited "see" Young v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986); Hernandez v. State, 556 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
cited Cited "see" Woods v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thomas, supra ; Newton, supra .
cited Cited "see" Cox v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986).
cited Cited "see" Moreland v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986).
cited Cited "see" Jacobs v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986) and Kelly v. State, 552 So.2d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 563 So.2d 632 (Fla.1990).
cited Cited "see" Dion v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla.1986).
cited Cited "see" Junco v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986); State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sprow v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1983) (consecutive sentences permissible where offenses arise from "separate incidents occurring at separate times and places"); see also State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986) (shooting of woman, then of man, then again of same woman does not constitute single criminal episode); Newton v. State, 603 So.2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (shooting at three different police officers during course of hot pursuit does not constitute single criminal episode); Gaynor v. State, 505 So.2d 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (burglaries of two separate homes committed on the …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Segarra v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986) (consecutive mandatory terms appropriate where defendant shot victim four times in her home, followed her outside, paused to fire at the victim's son, and then shot the woman twice more).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Carver v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla.1983), specifically did not prohibit consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for offenses “arising from separate incidents occurring at separate times and places.” Palmer at 4 ; see also, State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla.1986) (consecutive minimum mandatory sentences appropriate for two separate and distinct offenses involving two separate and distinct victims).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Boatwright
Fla. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 487 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1986) (consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences appropriate where defendant shot woman four times in her home, followed her outside, paused to fire at the woman's son, and then shot the woman twice more).
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Tom THOMAS, Respondent.
67423.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 10, 1986.
487 So. 2d 1043

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and John W. Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for respondent.

[*1044] SHAW, Justice.

We have this cause before us pursuant to the district court's certified question in Thomas v. State, 472 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

In March of 1981 Thomas shot a woman four times in the bedroom of her trailer. While he reloaded his gun, she managed to get outside to her yard. Thomas followed and shot her again. Her son attempted to aid his mother and Thomas fired at him but missed, before shooting the victim two more times. He was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of the woman and of aggravated assault of her son. The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of thirty years for the attempted first-degree murder and five years for the aggravated assault. He ordered consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences for each offense because of possession of a firearm under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1979).

Thomas filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, alleging that the consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were contrary to this Court's holding in Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983). The district court reversed the denial of Thomas's motion, finding the result compelled by Palmer and our recent opinion in Wilson v. State, 467 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1985). The district court certified the following question:

Whether the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced to consecutive three-year mandatory minimum terms pursuant to Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, were "offenses [which arose] from separate incidents occurring at separate times and places" within the meaning of the rule announced in Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983)?

Thomas, 472 So.2d at 1223 (emphasis in original).

The state has petitioned for review, arguing that Palmer and Wilson do not control the factual situation presented here. In Palmer, where the defendant used a revolver to rob thirteen people at the same time, we held that three-year mandatory minimum sentences for firearm possession while committing a felony could not be imposed consecutively for offenses arising from a single criminal episode. In Wilson, where the defendant possessed a gun while kidnapping the one victim and then taking her by car a short distance and sexually assaulting her, we held that the offenses occurred during a single episode. In State v. Ames, 467 So.2d 994 (Fla. 1985), where the defendant possessed a gun while breaking into a woman's house, robbing her in one room and raping her in another, we held that the three offenses occurred during a single episode.

In State v. Enmund, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985), we found that Palmer was not analogous to a situation involving two separate and distinct homicides and held that the legislature intended that the minimum mandatory time to be served before becoming eligible for parole from a conviction of first-degree murder may be imposed either consecutively or concurrently, in the trial court's discretion, for each homicide. We were construing section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1983), rather than section 775.087(2), but the factual situation in the present case is more analogous to Enmund than to Palmer, Wilson, or Ames. Here, as in Enmund, we believe that the legislature intended that the trial court have discretion to impose consecutively or concurrently the mandatory minimum time to be served. In the present case we have two separate and distinct offenses involving two separate and distinct victims.

Thomas argues that because the aggravated assault occurred between the fifth and sixth shots at the attempted murder victim, the incidents were not separate. We agree with the state, however, that the legislature could not have intended that Thomas be punished less severely for continuing the attempted murder outside the victim's trailer than if he had desisted after firing the four shots inside and assaulting the son. We decline to extend Palmer's holding to apply to the present factual sequence[*1045] in view of our conclusion that Thomas committed two separate and distinct offenses.

We answer the certified question in the affirmative and quash the decision under review. We remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and BARKETT, JJ., concur.