State Farm Fire & Cas. v. De Londono, 511 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). · Go Syfert
State Farm Fire & Cas. v. De Londono, 511 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where the terms of a written instrument are disputed and are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented”
24 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bitz v. Bitz (fladistctapp, 2005-07-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bitz v. Bitz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where the terms of a written instrument are disputed and are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract & Business Cases
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Partylite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan
M.D. Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. dismissed, 519 So.2d 988 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cliff Berry, Inc. v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Zarranz v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 591 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Location 100, Inc., 517 So.2d at 705 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Siever v. BWGaskets, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weisfeld-Ladd v. Estate of Ladd
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding that when a term in a contract is susceptible to more than one construction, it is "proper to submit the question to the jury to be decided as an issue of fact"); Critchlow, 450 So.2d at 1156 (holding that "if a provision is ambiguous, the matter must be submitted to the finder of fact").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Waterbed City, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
“Although the construction of a contract is ordinarily a matter of law, where the terms of a written instrument are disputed and are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented.” State Farm Fire & Cas. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 519 So.2d 988 (Fla.1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. dismissed, 519 So.2d 988 (Fla.1987); Howard v. Howard, 467 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) AMJAD MUNIM, MD, PA v. Azar
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. dismissed, 519 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1987); Howard v. Howard, 467 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) BARCLAYS AM. MORTG. v. Bank of Cent. Fla.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Co. v. De Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Neumann v. Brigman 475 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Critchlow v. Williamson 450 So.2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zarranz v. Coral Gables Hospital, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. de Londono, 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
cited Cited "see" Davis v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
M.D. Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See 511 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
cited Cited "see" Lambert v. Berkley South Condominium Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See De Londono, 511 So.2d at 604 ; Scheller, 462 So.2d at 6 .
cited Cited "see" Lambert v. BERKLEY SO. CONDO. ASS'N, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See De Londono, 511 So.2d at 604 ; Scheller, 462 So.2d at 6 .
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
Ines DE LONDONO, Appellee.
86-152.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jun 9, 1987.
511 So. 2d 604
Daniel S. Pearson, Ferguson and Jorgenson.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 80%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

[*605] Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and Lawrence D. Smith, Miami, for appellant.

Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Edward Perse; Stone & Sostchin, Miami, for appellee.

Before DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

FERGUSON, Judge.

A claim for personal property loss was brought under a homeowner's policy containing an exclusions clause which provided, "We do not cover [content] property regularly rented or held for rental to others... ." The facts show that the insured homeowner leased out the home and furnishings for one year on a one-time basis while out of the country on a business trip. During that period the furnishings were destroyed by fire. An issue arose as to whether the home was regularly rented. That question was submitted to the jury. The insurer brings this appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for the insured contending that construction of the contract presented a question of law which the court should have decided in the insured's favor. We disagree.

Although the construction of a contract is ordinarily a matter of law, where the terms of a written instrument are disputed and are reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented. Quayside Associates, Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Assoc., 419 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The instant policy did not define "regularly rented"; the parties disagreed as to what the term meant; and the trial court was of the view, correctly, that the term was reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. It was, thus, proper to submit the question to the jury to be decided as an issue of fact. Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Affirmed.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, J., concurs.

JORGENSON, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The crucial language of the policy, i.e., "property regularly rented or held for rental to others," is not amenable to multiple constructions. This language is not ambiguous. It is clear that pursuant to this language a oneyear rental of the subject property qualified as "property regularly rented or held for rental to others." The fact that an insurance policy requires analysis to comprehend its scope does not mean it is ambiguous. Hess v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 458 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). There was no reason for the question of coverage to be presented to the jury. In the absence of ambiguity, the question was one of law for the trial court's resolution. See Central Cold Storage, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 452 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 461 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1984).

The trial court erred in permitting the jury to pass on this question since State[*606] Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I would reverse.