Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 5× by 5 distinct cases · …t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
61 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dale Echeverria v. Suzanne Trombino, Individually, etc. (fladistctapp, 2024-03-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Dale Echeverria v. Suzanne Trombino, Individually, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) KOVAR LAW GROUP, PLLC v. JENNIFER JORDAN
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. NORTH SHORE MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a/a/o JOHNNY EDMONDSON
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANUEL V. FEIJOO, M.D., AND MANUEL V. FEIJOO, M.D., P.A., A/A/O ERNESTO MORERA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Capital Health Plan v. Timothy Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC
R.I. · 2016 · confidence medium
For instance, in Florida, “where a party seeks to have the opposing party in a lawsuit pay for attorney’s fees incurred in that same action, the general rule * * * is that independent expert testimony is required.” Sea World of Florida, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Companies, Inc., 28 So.3d 158, 160 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010) (citing Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oliver v. Oliver
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Companies, Inc., 28 So.3d 158, 160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Snow v. Harlan Bakeries, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Florida has a long-standing practice of requiring testimony of expert fee witnesses to establish the reasonableness of attorney's fees. [2] Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987) ("[I]t is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pullen Bros. v. Smith
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Crit-tenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1983); Hyatt Regency Grand Cypress v. Williams, 639 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wometco Enterprises v. Cordoves
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
In City of Tampa v. Fein, 438 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), receded from on other grounds, Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 492 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (en banc), approved, 514 So.2d 351, 352 (Fla. 1987) and Sunny Pines Convalescent Center v. Walters, 422 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) this court held that an order of this nature is not appealable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seitlin & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court has said “it is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney’s fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.” Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seitlin & Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court has said "it is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee." Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla. 1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BIRTH-RELATED N. INJURY COMP. v. Carreras
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
There, too, attorney's fees are not awardable "to cover the time spent by the attorney in establishing the amount of the fee... ." Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. US Sugar Corporation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1987); Regal Wood Prods. v. Baschansci, 603 So.2d 551, 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Solid Waste Authority v. Parker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
While under other statutes containing different language, appellate fees may be denied where the sole issue is the reasonableness of an award of fees, see, e.g., Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1987), (worker’s compensation); In re Estate of Platt, 586 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla.1991), we cannot ignore the very specific language of the statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sonara v. Star Casualty Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
We recognize that in other contexts under other statutes an attorney’s fee award for prosecuting a claim for attorney’s fees may not be compensable, as, for example, in workers’ compensation cases, Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1987) (attorney time spent in determining entitlement to an attorney’s fee compensable, but not attorney time spent establishing the amount of the fee); or estate cases, In re Estate of Platt, 586 So.2d 328, 336 (Fla.1991); or eminent domain cases, Dade County v. Oolite Rock Co., 311 So.2d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dobbs v. Suncoast Acoustics
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1987); Wiseman v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 569 So.2d 508, 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (an attorney is entitled to recover fees for his or her efforts involved in proving entitlement to a bad faith attorney's fee, but not that time expended in establishing the amount of the fee).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MCO Investors, Inc. v. Dansby
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
While we agree with appellant’s contention that testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney’s fee is generally necessary to support the establishment of the fee, Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-3 (Fla.1987), no transcript of the hearing for summary judgment was made, and we find a lack of agreement by the parties concerning the alleged absence of evidence adduced at the hearing or other basis for support of the court’s order awarding fees.
cited Cited "see" Robert M. Cohen v. Katya L. Cohen N/K/A Katya Stubblefield
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351, 352-53 (Fla. 1987). 1 But the general rule has exceptions and one such exception applies here.
discussed Cited "see" Ghannam v. Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987) (“[T]he testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable attorney’s fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee.”); Snow, 932 So.2d at 412 (holding that “the trial court erred in establishing the amount of attorney’s fees” where “there was no testimony from an expert witness on the reasonable amount of the fees”); Robin Roshkind, P.A. v. Machiela, 45 So.3d 480, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“[CJase law throughout this state has adhered to the requirement of an independent expert witne…
discussed Cited "see" Jackson v. Ryan's Family Steak House (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1987) (recognizing JCCs are well qualified to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees by reason of their experience, training and education, when no hearing is required).
cited Cited "see" Tucker v. Fedex
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla.1987).
cited Cited "see" Nash v. AMR Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited "see" Zepeda v. Klein
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1987); Bissmeyer v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 596 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), review denied, 599 So.2d 654 (Fla.1992); Diaz v. SantaFe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Department of Transp. v. Winter Park Golf Club, 687 So.2d 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
cited Cited "see" Sanchez v. Johnson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1987); Trans World Tire Co. v. Hagness, 651 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
cited Cited "see" Orlando Sentinel v. White
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla.1987); Spaulding v. Albertson’s, Inc., 610 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
cited Cited "see" Department of Transportation/Division of Risk Management v. Logan
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1987).
cited Cited "see" State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma
Fla. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1987).
discussed Cited "see" Regal Wood Products v. Baschansci (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1987).
cited Cited "see" Pirretti v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1987); Cincinnati Ins.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sea World of Florida, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Companies
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So.2d 351, 352-53 (Fla.1987); Brake v. Murphy, 736 So.2d 745, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Mark *161 ham v. Markham, 485 So.2d 1299 , 1301 n. 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In re Guardianship of Anderson
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Crittendon Orange Blossom Fruit v Stone, 514 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1987).
CRITTENDEN ORANGE BLOSSOM FRUIT, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Marvin STONE, Respondent.
69476.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 10, 1987.
514 So. 2d 351
Grimes.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 5 cases
Pinpoint authority: #15,787 of 633,719
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (5)

Daniel De Ciccio and Jamie D. Hoffman of De Ciccio & Broussard, P.A., Orlando, for petitioners.

George J. Adler, Orlando, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We have for review the case of Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 492 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), because of its apparent conflict with Robert & Co. Associates v. Zabawczuk, 200 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1967). Jurisdiction is predicated upon article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

Respondent Stone filed a worker's compensation claim for temporary total disability payments and the payment of medical bills. The deputy commissioner sustained Stone's claim and required petitioners, the employer and carrier, to pay his attorney's fees. In reaching his ruling, the deputy commissioner held three hearings. The first concerned the compensability of the claim; the second was directed toward whether petitioners denied the claim in bad faith; and the third was for the purpose of setting the amount of attorney's fees. The district court of appeal considered the case en banc in order to resolve an intradistrict conflict concerning attorney's fees. In the[*352] course of affirming the order, the court held that the award of attorney's fees should include the time spent by the claimant's attorney in preparing for and prosecuting the claim for attorney's fees.[1] The court also made observations which implied that the recovery of costs in worker's compensation proceedings now included expert witness fees of those testifying as to the amount of attorney's fees despite the fact that in this case no effort was made to recover an expert witness fee for the testifying attorney.

In Zabawczuk, this Court held that the statute permitting the recovery of expert witness fees in worker's compensation proceedings did not include fees for witnesses appearing on behalf of attorneys who were claiming counsel fees payable under the act. The Court said:

While the point is novel, the provision for payment to witnesses testifying "in any proceeding under this chapter" is most reasonably construed, in view of the history of the statute, to proceedings for compensation to claimant rather than proceedings, essentially collateral, for determination of the amount of attorney's fees.

200 So.2d at 804.

More recently, in Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1985), this Court authorized the taxing of expert witness fees for lawyers who testify as experts regarding reasonable attorney's fees in ordinary civil actions. The Court distinguished Zabawczuk, which had been cited as the primary authority to the contrary, by pointing out that the predicate for the decision in that case was the nature of the worker's compensation law which provides a simple, expeditious and inexpensive method of compensating employees who are injured in the workplace.

Nevertheless, in the instant case, the district court concluded that Zabawczuk was no longer relevant in light of the subsequent overhaul of the worker's compensation law in 1979. As the basis for its conclusion, the court said:

It is clear, however, that the present attorney's fees provisions found in section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983), reflect a recognition by the legislature that in specific circumstances — namely, those covered by 440.34(3)(a)-(c) — without the intervention or potential intervention of an attorney acting for the claimant, medical or compensation benefits due the claimant are likely to be delayed or denied to the claimant. See, e.g., Sam Rogers Enterprises v. Williams, 401 So.2d 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We are not persuaded, either by the structure of the Act itself, or our observations with respect to its operation over the past nearly seven years, that the award of attorney's fees to claimant's attorney under the present provisions can be realistically viewed as "collateral" to the purposes of the Act.

492 So.2d at 1110-11.

With all due respect, we cannot see how the 1979 amendments to the worker's compensation law had any effect on the applicability of Zabawczuk. In fact, as acknowledged by the district court, today's worker's compensation law retains and even places renewed emphasis upon the pre-1979 self-executing concept. In Travieso we declined to extend the scope of our ruling to worker's compensation proceedings, and we see no reason why we should change our position.

On the other hand, one of the arguments advanced by Stone has caused us to reconsider the manner in which attorney's fees are set in worker's compensation proceedings. Stone points out that unless they can be compensated, it is often an imposition on attorneys to have to leave their offices for long periods of time in order to testify at worker's compensation proceedings, particularly if substantial travel is involved. Yet, it is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable[*353] attorney's fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee. In Re Estate of Cordiner, 497 So.2d 920 (Fla.2d DCA 1986); Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So.2d 256 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1964).

For much the same reason that we distinguish worker's compensation proceedings from other civil cases with respect to the taxing of the fee of the lawyer who testifies on reasonableness, we now conclude that it should no longer be necessary in every instance to have a hearing only for the purpose of proving the amount of reasonable attorney's fees in worker's compensation proceedings. We hold that the deputy commissioner may, upon consideration of a detailed affidavit of the claimant's attorney concerning the time spent on the case,[2] award a reasonable attorney's fee without the necessity of an affidavit or the testimony of an expert witness concerning the amount of the fee. However, the deputy commissioner shall have the discretion to require a hearing on the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee at which expert testimony would be required, and such a hearing shall be held if requested by any party before the fee is set.

We are convinced that in the ordinary case, deputy commissioners, by reason of their experience, are well qualified to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees without the opinion of an expert on the subject. Such a rule is consistent with the philosophy of the worker's compensation law to provide an expeditious result at a minimum cost. For example, in the case at bar the application of this rule could have avoided the necessity of a third hearing. However, in those cases in which a hearing on the amount of the fee is held, we adhere to the principle of Zabawczuk that no expert witness fee may be taxed for the attorney who testifies on the reasonableness of the fee.

The petitioners also argue that it was error for the deputy commissioner to include in the amount of the attorney's fee award the services rendered by the claimant's attorney in seeking the determination that petitioners denied the claim in bad faith. We agree with the district court of appeal that because the present worker's compensation law places primary responsibility for the claimant's attorney's fees on the claimant, those limited instances in which the claimant may recover attorney's fees represent a substantial benefit to the claimant. § 440.34(3), Fla. Stat. (1985). Therefore, when the claimant's attorney is able to prove that the claim was denied in bad faith, he has obtained a benefit for his client which was not otherwise available. Under these circumstances, the client ought not to be required to absorb the cost of paying his attorney for the services in obtaining this result. Our holding does not extend, however, to cover the time spent by the attorney in establishing the amount of the fee such as that involved in the third hearing in this case.

On the basis expressed herein, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal which affirmed the order of the deputy commissioner.

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.

EHRLICH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.

EHRLICH, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I would approve the well-reasoned decision of the district court of appeal, but I do wholeheartedly agree with the Court's conclusion that hearings are no longer necessary to establish the amount of reasonable attorney's fees in workmen's compensation cases, and that affidavits may be used.

[*354] I would recede from the holding in Robert & Co. Associates v. Zabawczuk, 200 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1967) for the reasons set out in my dissent in Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1985).

1 The court's language can be construed to mean that the time spent by the attorney in establishing the amount of his fee should also be included in the award, but it is clear from the record that the award was predicated only upon the attorney's services rendered through the second hearing.
2 The affidavit may also include any other pertinent factors which are recognized by section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and opposing counsel should be permitted the opportunity to challenge in writing both the reasonableness of the time spent and the applicability of such other factors.