Williams v. State, 529 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). · Go Syfert
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Williams v. State, 529 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2016–2018 · …hen a probationer absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once more placed under probationary supervision. at p. 367 ✓
15 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: STATE OF FLORIDA v. DESTINEY LEE BEERY (fladistctapp, 2018-03-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) STATE OF FLORIDA v. DESTINEY LEE BEERY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
hen a probationer absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once more placed under probationary supervision.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
hen a probationer absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once more placed under probationary supervision.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JOEL CANCHOLA v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Because we decide that our case law permits tolling for VOP affidavits alleging absconsion, we need not address Canchola's argument relating to the application of the tolling provision in the 2015 statute. -6- in the case law of "authority for the proposition that probation is automatically tolled during a period when the probationer has absconded"); Williams v. State, 529 So. 2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (recognizing that a probationary period is tolled when a probationer absconds from supervision); Kimball v. State, 890 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (explaining that "when a probation…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hicks
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
As set forth in Williams , “[o]ur supreme court and three of our sister courts have recognized that probation is tolled when a defendant absconds from [probationary] supervision.” Id. at 920-21 (citing Francois v. State, 695 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla. 1997); Kimball v. State, 890 So.2d 495, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Williams v. State, 529 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Ware v. State, 474 So.2d 332, 334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Paul v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Hamilton v. State, 537 So.2d 194, 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Williams v. State, 529 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
cited Cited "see" Hamilton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Williams v. State, 529 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 471 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1985).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Madelyn D. WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
87-12.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug 10, 1988.
529 So. 2d 366
Per Curiam.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John T. Kilcrease, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lauren Hafner Sewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals her revocation of probation and her guidelines departure sentence. We affirm.

Appellant argues that the revocation of her probation was invalid because there was no evidence presented at the revocation hearing to support the reasons for[*367] revocation cited in the order. Although the state agrees, we conclude for the following reasons that we need not reverse or remand for correction of the order of probation.

Appellant was originally charged with violation of probation by an affidavit dated July 8, 1985. Her original term of probation would have expired July 8, 1986. However, on July 12, 1985, appellant absconded from her probationary supervision and did not report her whereabouts again until October 21, 1986. We agree with the first district in Ware v. State, 474 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1986), that when a probationer absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once more placed under probationary supervision. Upon appellant's return to supervision, an amended affidavit for violation of probation was filed on October 27, 1986. That amended affidavit charged appellant with, among other things, an unauthorized change of residence and the commission of an aggravated battery. At the revocation hearing, although the state offered no proof on the first affidavit for violation of probation, there was sufficient evidence to find appellant guilty of the charges contained in the amended affidavit. The resulting order of revocation mistakenly found appellant guilty of the charges contained in the original affidavit for which no proof was offered. Appellant has served the sentence imposed on her as a result of the order of revocation. While we could remand for correction of that order to reflect the violations in fact proved, such would be a useless act inasmuch as appellant has completed her sentence. We are not required to do a useless act. Burney v. State, 402 So.2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Likewise, in sentencing appellant to a departure sentence, it does not appear in the record that the trial judge actually received a sentencing guidelines scoresheet. It does appear that the trial judge was advised as to the proper recommended guidelines sentence and chose to depart. See Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Under the facts of this case, the absence of the scoresheet is irrelevant and results in no prejudice to appellant. Rowe v. State, 496 So.2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). While the trial judge announced at the sentencing hearing proper reasons for imposing a departure sentence[1], a written order of departure containing those reasons was never entered. Since appellant has served her sentence, a remand for the entry of such a written order would also be a useless act. Burney.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, C.J., and SCHEB and LEHAN, JJ., concur.

1 Multiple violations of probation. See Adams v. State, 490 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1986); Nathan v. State, 489 So.2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).