Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (22 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cedric Dennard v. State (fladistctapp, 2014-08-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cedric Dennard v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988); Rigueiro v. State, 132 So.3d 853, 854-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gisi v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988); Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So.2d 1361, 1365 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" Lemar Whitfield v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1988); Gartman v. State, 252 So. 3d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); James v. State, 845 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
discussed Cited "see" Walker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988); Walker v. State, 178 So.3d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (table deci sion); Walker v. State, 166 So.3d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (table decision); Walker v. State, 61 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (table decision); Walker v. State, 44 So.3d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table decision); Walker v. State, 11 So.3d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table decision); Walker v. State, 988 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (table decision); Walker v. State, 976 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (table decision); Walker v. State, 861 So.2d 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (table decision); Harri…
discussed Cited "see" Bernal v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988) (holding the trial court could restructure the defendant’s sentences from concurrent to consecutive under Pearce provided the overall length of the defendant’s imprisonment remained the same); Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (same).
cited Cited "see" Jones v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited "see" Craig v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited "see" Sainz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1988); Rubalcaba v. State, 729 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Herring v. State, 411 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see" Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988); Herring v. State, 411 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Bover v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1988); Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So.2d 1361, 1365 (Fla.1984); Herring v. State, 411 So.2d 966, 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(implicitly approved by Florida Supreme Court in Blackshear ).
cited Cited "see" Rubalcaba v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988); Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So.2d 1361, 1365 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" Nathan v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gipson v. State, 616 So.2d 992 (Fla.1993) and Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited "see" Harris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
discussed Cited "see" Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1988) (where original sentence held illegal, court could not, on resentencing, impose sentence longer than sentence originally imposed in absence of intervening event which would justify a greater sentence).
cited Cited "see" Wemett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1988); Beech v. State, 436 So.2d 82, 83-84 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see" Frazier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Stark v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
Suarez v. State, 974 So.2d 451, 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see also Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Kopko v. State, 709 So.2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Gaither v. State, 614 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Alfonso v. State, 561 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); see also Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988); Herring v. State, 411 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sands v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Richardson v. State, 821 So.2d 428, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla.1988); Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see generally James v. State, 868 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (acknowledging that with an "`independent legal basis or identifiable conduct' on the defendant's part," a court may restructure sentences).
cited Cited "see, e.g." James v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Richardson, 821 So.2d at 431 ; see also Blackshear v. State, 531 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1988); Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wemett v. State
Fla. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Blackshear, 531 So.2d at 956 (two concurrent guidelines life sentences were more harsh than the trial court's original imposition of two concurrent sixty-five-year sentences).
Randall Scott BLACKSHEAR, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
71440.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 29, 1988.
531 So. 2d 956
Grimes.
Cited by 40 opinions  |  Published

[*957] Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We agreed to review Blackshear v. State, 513 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), because of apparent conflict with Herring v. State, 411 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Our jurisdiction is predicated on article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

This case involves an application of the principle of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080-81, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), in which the United States Supreme Court said:

Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.

(Footnote omitted.)

With this rationale in mind, we now turn to the instant case. Randall Scott Blackshear pled guilty to charges of armed sexual battery and armed kidnapping and received[*958] two concurrent sixty-five-year sentences. Both crimes were life felonies which were punishable by either life imprisonment or a term of years not exceeding forty years. § 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). On appeal, Blackshear's sentences were reversed and his case remanded for resentencing because the sentencing judge had exceeded the forty-year maximum by twenty-five years. Blackshear v. State, 480 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). At Blackshear's resentencing, the recommended guidelines range was twelve to seventeen years. The trial judge instead departed from the guidelines and imposed two concurrent life sentences. In the case under review, the district court of appeal held that one of the two reasons for departure was invalid. Because the appellate court was unable to conclude that the same sentence would have been given in the absence of the invalid reason, the case was remanded once again for resentencing.

The district court of appeal also concluded that the principle of North Carolina v. Pearce would not preclude a resentencing to two concurrent life sentences. While recognizing that Blackshear was guilty of no new misconduct which would justify a greater sentence than was originally imposed, the court pointed out that because the original sentence was illegal, it could not be reimposed. Thus, the court concluded that when faced with the alternative of resentencing Blackshear to either a term of up to forty years or to life imprisonment, the judge could legally choose to impose the harsher penalty.

Even if we were to accept the contention that the judge would not be precluded from opting for the longer sentence when the only other legal sentence was shorter than the original sentence, it would not apply to the facts of this case because of the existence of the concurrent sentences. In Herring v. State, the defendant was convicted of fifteen counts of second-degree grand theft and received concurrent sentences of ten years on each conviction. The Third District Court of Appeal vacated the sentences because the maximum sentence for each crime was only five years. However, the court stated that the trial judge was at liberty to accomplish his sentencing goal that the defendant be sentenced to ten years by imposing consecutive sentences. The court cautioned that any sentence longer than ten years would have to meet the requirements of North Carolina v. Pearce.

It is evident that the trial judge's sentencing goal for Blackshear was a prison term of sixty-five years. Applying the rationale of Herring, this could be accomplished by imposing consecutive sentences in which the total number of years would not exceed sixty-five. The judicial vindictiveness of which North Carolina v. Pearce was concerned would never come into play.

Thus, we conclude that upon remand the trial judge cannot sentence Blackshear to more than sixty-five years in prison in the absence of an intervening event which would justify a greater sentence.[*] While we approve the remand of this case for resentencing, we quash that portion of the opinion below which states that Blackshear could be resentenced to life imprisonment.

It is so ordered.

EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.

[*] We do not reach the remaining two points raised by Blackshear.