Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). · Go Syfert
Search
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
615 citation events (572 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Sjon Jones v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2025-03-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sjon Jones v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993); see also Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635, 648 (Fla. 2006).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LEANTHONY SMITH v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Based on the circumstances surrounding the strike, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion as to the genuineness of the State’s explanation, and the subsequent grant of the State’s peremptory strike, was erroneous.2 In Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court cautioned against trial judges making arbitrary evaluations and excusal of jurors, especially when the juror is Black, and the jury composition is overwhelmingly not Black.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ray Lamar Johnston v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
It also considered all of the nonstatutory mitigating 4 “A Spencer hearing occurs after the jury has recommended a sentence but before the judge imposes a sentence.” Kormondy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 688 F.3d 1244 , 1271 n.29 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam)). 28 Case: 14-14054 Date Filed: 02/03/2020 Page: 29 of 61 circumstances the defense offered and in its order indicated the weight, if any, it gave each alleged mitigating circumstance.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald Clark, Jr. . Attorney General, State of FL
11th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
In Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993), the Florida Supreme Court held: We contemplated that the following procedure be used in sentencing phase proceedings. ’ First, the trial judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the' State/ an opportunity' to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut informátion in any presentence or medical report;- and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Floyd v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
After holding a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993), the trial court found four statutory aggravating factors (given great or substantial weight), no statutory mitigating factors, and four nonstatutory mitigating factors (given little weight).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re: Paul Glen Everett
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) (providing that, after a jury has recommended a sentence but before the trial court imposes a sentence, the court should hold a hearing to afford all parties an opportunity to be heard, allow the presentation of additional evidence, and allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any pre-sentence or medical report).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pinkney Carter v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) (providing for a hearing after trial, before the judge, at which the parties may present any additional information or evidence pertinent to the appropriate sentence to be imposed and to afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person). 3 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mark A. Twilegar v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
The Spencer [v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993),] hearing was held February 19, 2007.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul Glen Everett v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) (providing that, after a jury has recommended a sentence but before the trial court imposes a sentence, the court should hold a hearing to afford all parties an oppor-tunily to be heard, allow the presentation of additional evidence, and allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any pre-sentence or medical report). 9 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oyola v. State
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Fla.2000) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miguel Oyola v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla. 2000) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert J. Bailey v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
After holding a [hearing in accordance with Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) ], the circuit court sentenced Bailey to death, finding two aggravating circumstances which were given great weight, rejecting the two statutory mental mitigators, and finding a number of other mitigating circumstances which the court found were entitled to little weight.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wheeler v. State
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard, including the defendant in person, and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul H. Evans v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
The court found one statutory 2 See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (requiring trial judges, after receiving the jury’s advisory verdict, to “hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person”). 6 Case: 11-14498 Date Filed: 10/23/2012 Page: 7 of 43 mitigating cir…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnny Shane Kormondy v. Secretary, FLorida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Under Spencer v. State, the purpose of a Spencer hearing is to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person. 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (per curiam). 30 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peterson v. State
Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wade v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Although the indictment charged armed robbery and armed kidnapping, the charges were later amended to delete the "armed" element on these two counts in light of the evidence that a toy gun was used. [2] See Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (requiring a hearing for the presentation of additional evidence to be held after the jury makes a sentence recommendation). [3] The trial court sentenced Wade to sentences of life on the two kidnapping convictions and to fifteen years on the two robbery convictions, with all sentences to run concurrently with the death sentences…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard, including the defendant in person, and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Twilegar v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) C‘[T]he trial judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present addition *188 al evidence; c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person.”). 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hurst v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
Canon 3 B(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides in pertinent part that “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” We have recognized that “there is nothing ‘more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single litigant.’ ” Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051, 1057 (Fla.2003) (quoting Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Israel v. State
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
Israel also claimed that his death sentence was disproportionate. [2] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (explaining the procedure to be used in sentencing phase proceedings, including a hearing at which both sides can present argument and additional evidence). [3] Dr. Krop testified that Israel had been responsive to neuropsychological testing and that he had administered six separate tests.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [2] Although Rodriguez was issued well after the trial here, even under Rodriguez, no constitutional violation occurred. [3] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (trial court should conduct a separate sentencing proceeding in which additional evidence of mitigation not presented to the jury may be received). [4] Moreover, much of defense counsel's testimony regarding this decision seemed to indicate that he was confused as to the report itself.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grim v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard, afford the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence, allow the parties to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report, and afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person). [2] The trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) commission by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony probation; (2) commission by a pe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoskins v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
The trial court found mitigators (14) through (16) based on the hearing held pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard, afford the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence, allow the parties to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report, and afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person). [3] Hoskins asserts that Ms. Harp was the only African-American on the panel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weaver v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] As a result of this disposition, we do not address the State's cross-appeal and the issue of proportionality is rendered moot. [2] See Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) (requiring trial court to conduct separate evidentiary hearing after jury's recommendation to (a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State an opportunity to be heard; (b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; and (c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report). [3] The court rejected t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tompkins v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
The prosecutor stated that he assumed the call was to prepare the sentencing order because that would not have been unusual for Judge Coe to do. [22] See Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993) (setting forth exact procedure to be used in sentencing phase proceedings, including requirement that after hearing any additional evidence presented by the State or the defendant, the trial court "recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence"); Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 841 (Fla. 1988) (holding that "all written orders imposing a death sentence be prepared prior to the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (requiring trial court to conduct separate evidentiary hearing after jury's recommendation to (a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State an opportunity to be heard; (b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; and (c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report). [2] Stewart first argues that he was entitled to a special jury instruction on the nonstatutory mitigation presented.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blackwelder v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
It is true that "this Court has held that the trial court may not request that parties submit proposed orders and adopt one of the proposals verbatim without a showing that the trial court independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 965 (Fla.2001) (citing Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randolph v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Randolph claims that the communication between Judge Perry's law clerk and the prosecutor amounted to improper ex parte communication which prejudiced his right to a neutral judge. [6] Canon 3 B(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding." Based on this principle, we have repeatedly stated there is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a on…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rimmer v. State
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
When the shooting occurred, he was working at the sister store, located in Davie, Florida. [4] According to the State's firearm expert, the projectile fragment and shell casings found at the scene of the crime matched this firearm. [5] At trial, a fingerprint expert testified that approximately twenty-four prints matched appellant's fingerprints and twenty-one prints matched Parker's. [6] At the hearing held in compliance with Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993), the defense presented a second expert, Michael Walczak, a neuropsychologist, who agreed with Dr. Jacobson's diagnosi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Asay v. Moore
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
Although the trial court's immediate sentencing may have been contrary to the procedural requirements of Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993), this Court decided Spencer five years after Asay's trial and two years after this Court's decision on direct appeal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morton v. State
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993), this Court stated the specific steps a trial court must follow in capital sentencing and we explained our rationale: In Grossman [v. State, 525 So.2d 833 (Fla.1988)], we directed that written orders imposing the death sentence be prepared prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carpenter v. State
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
After receiving sentencing memoranda from the parties and conducting a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla.1993), the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Carpenter to death.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brooks v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
After conducting a hearing pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla.1993), the trial court sentenced Brooks to death on the first-degree murder charge and thirty years in prison as a habitual felony offender on the aggravated battery charge.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Riechmann
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Canon 3B(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding." Based on this principle, this Court has repeatedly stated that there is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single litigant." Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Rose v. State, 601 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla.1992)). *352 …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Third, we conclude that to be consistent with the requirements for the initial sentencing, there should be two separate hearings in accordance with Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla.1993), held that "[t]here is no legal basis for excusing a juror based on the trial judge's arbitrary evaluation of the juror's IQ.
cited Cited as authority (rule) John v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla.1993), the court stated “[t]here is no legal basis for excusing a juror based on the trial judge’s arbitrary evaluation of the juror’s IQ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gordon v. State
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
The State further noted that Gordon and McDonald also received an undisclosed amount of money on each of the four trips they made from Miami to Tampa. [6] Cisneros remains a fugitive, while Shore had the charges against her reduced to accessory after the fact, for which she received probation after agreeing to testify for the State. [7] In Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla.1993), we explained the procedures a trial court must follow in sentencing phase proceedings after receiving the jury's recommendation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. State
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
Capital proceedings are sensitive and emotional proceedings in which the trial judge plays an extremely critical role. 615 So.2d at 690-91 (emphasis added). [2] The trial judge in this case clearly failed to follow the sentencing procedure mandated in Spencer by making his sentencing decision before hearing the parties as to the proper sentence.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rhodes v. State
Fla. · 1994 · confidence medium
Rhodes next claims that contrary to this Court's decision in Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993), he was deprived of an opportunity to be heard personally prior to sentencing.
cited Cited "see" Raymond Bright v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 2.
discussed Cited "see" HARVEY MICHAEL HILL v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635, 648 (Fla. 2006) (recognizing that a defendant in a capital case has the right to “allocate” before the judge prior to sentencing, pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993)), but that any statement to the jury during the sentencing phase must be subject to cross-examination).
discussed Cited "see" Kentrell F. Johnson v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Truehill v. State , 211 So.3d 930 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 3 , 199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017). 2 Spencer v. State , 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 3 The first nine issues were raised in Johnson's initial brief.
discussed Cited "see" Krawczuk v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
11th Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla.1993) (per curiam). 5 Florida has since amended its capital sentencing scheme, and the Florida Supreme Court has held that “in order for the trial court to impose a sentence of death, the jury’s recommended sentence of death must be unanimous.” Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam). 62 Case: 15-15068 Date Filed: 10/18/2017 Page: 63 of 63 declared relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 , 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2003).
cited Cited "see" Dale Glenn Middleton v. State of Florida – Revised Opinion
Fla. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Randy W. Tundidor v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). - 14 - (5) Tundidor was gainfully employed and ran a successful business (minimal weight); (6) Tundidor was a Red Cross volunteer and did volunteer work for his church (very little weight); (7) Tundidor was well-behaved while awaiting trial in jail (slight weight); and (8) Tundidor has maintained positive relationships (minimal weight).
discussed Cited "see" Dale Glenn Middleton v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
cited Cited "see" State v. Mason
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 , 690-691 (Fla.1993) ; Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803 , 813 (Fla.1983).
Leonard SPENCER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
77430.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Mar 18, 1993.
615 So. 2d 688
Per Curiam.
Cited by 534 opinions  |  Published

Nelson E. Bailey, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Sylvia H. Alonso, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Leonard Spencer appeals his convictions for multiple counts of armed robbery and two counts of first-degree murder and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. While the circumstances of the two robbery-murders for which Spencer was tried are egregious, the manner in which this trial was conducted requires that Spencer's convictions be reversed and a new trial granted. The record, on its face, establishes fundamental unfairness in the conduct of the trial, beginning with the jury selection process and[*689] ending with an ex parte conference between the trial judge and the prosecutor during the sentencing phase of this trial.

In June, 1986, Spencer and a codefendant, Vernon Amos, were involved in two separate robbery-murder incidents. The details of these incidents are set forth in Amos v. State, 612 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1993). Spencer and Amos's first trial, which resulted in convictions and sentences of death, was reversed by this Court and remanded for a new trial because of the restrictions imposed in the jury selection process. Spencer v. State, 545 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1989); Amos v. State, 545 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1989). In October, 1989, the second trial commenced and resulted in a hung jury as to both defendants.

The third trial commenced in November of 1989 with Judge James T. Carlisle presiding. The jury found Spencer guilty on all charges, but could not agree on a verdict as to Amos and his case was set for trial a fourth time. Spencer's trial then proceeded to the penalty phase, at the conclusion of which the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death on both counts of first-degree murder. After a series of motions, Spencer was eventually sentenced to death. It is this third trial that is the subject of this appeal.

During the voir dire phase of this trial, Judge Carlisle questioned one potential juror regarding her ability to sentence a person to death. The juror responded that she could, but later stated that she could not. After some confusion on the juror's part in answering the questions asked by the judge and defense counsel, the judge, without a request by the State, excused the juror. Defense counsel objected to the juror's removal and asked on what basis the judge was excusing her. The judge answered that he removed the juror on the basis of the juror's I.Q. The following colloquy took place:

[Defense Counsel]: What are you doing?
The Court: Excusing her.
[Defense Counsel]: On what basis?
The Court: IQ.
[Defense Counsel]: I object to that. I would like to know what the IQ test is for jury service. I would ask the record to reflect that she is the only black member out of the ten.
... .
[Defense Counsel]: I would ask the court to indicate, for counsel's benefit, so I can make the right inquiries, what kind of IQ standard you are imposing.
The Court: I won't even answer that. Let's go.
Mr. Bailey: You will excuse jurors on that basis; is that right?
The Court: Call the next one.

After questioning several more potential jurors, the trial judge also excused another potential juror on the basis of IQ. Defense counsel again objected to the use of an IQ standard. The trial judge ignored the objection and proceeded with the jury selection and trial.

After the conclusion of the trial and penalty phase proceedings before the jury, Spencer filed a motion for a new trial. A single hearing date was then scheduled for that motion and the sentencing proceeding before Judge Carlisle. When the scheduled time for the hearing to begin had passed, and neither Judge Carlisle nor the state attorney had appeared in the courtroom, defense counsel entered the judge's chambers. Defense counsel found Judge Carlisle, the state attorney, and the state attorney's assistant proofreading an order sentencing Spencer to death. When the court convened moments later, defense counsel noted for the record the situation he had encountered and asked the judge to address it. The judge explained that he had been having a conversation with the prosecutor concerning this Court's decision in Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 841 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1354, 103 L.Ed.2d 822 (1989), in which we ordered the establishment of a procedural rule requiring "that all written orders imposing a death sentence be prepared prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence for filing concurrent with the pronouncement."

Defense counsel voiced his concern that the judge had drafted an order expressing his reasons and conclusions for imposing[*690] the death penalty prior to Spencer's counsel having an opportunity to be heard. Defense counsel then moved to recuse Judge Carlisle. The judge denied the motion. In doing so, he admitted that there was indeed a draft of a sentencing order and that defense counsel had not been given notice of the process employed by the prosecutor and the judge. Judge Carlisle then denied the motion for a new trial and stated that the draft in question would not be the order entered in sentencing Spencer. The judge additionally explained that what defense counsel had encountered in the judge's chambers was something other than what it appeared to be.

Several days later, defense counsel filed a second and formal motion for the recusal of Judge Carlisle. Defense counsel also filed a motion calling for Judge Carlisle to withdraw his ruling on the motion for a new trial so that the motion could be determined on its merits by the judge assigned to the case. Judge Carlisle granted the motion for recusal but did not rule on the motion to withdraw his ruling denying a new trial.

After Judge Carlisle recused himself, a substitute judge was assigned. Spencer filed a motion offering as an additional ground for a new trial that, in capital cases, a substitute judge who did not preside over the guilt and penalty phases of the trial may not impose a death sentence. The substitute judge denied the motion and also denied Spencer's motion to set aside Judge Carlisle's denial of the motion for new trial.

The substitute judge then imposed the death sentence, finding the following aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) one of the murders was committed while Spencer was engaged in an armed robbery; (3) one of the murders was committed during the flight from the first murder and while committing a robbery; (4) the first murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; (5) the second murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and (6) the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. The sentencing judge found that no mitigating circumstances were present and sentenced Spencer to death.

Spencer contests his convictions and sentence primarily on the basis that the ex parte communications between the prosecutor and the judge were the culmination of a pattern of judicial bias. Spencer argues that this pattern of judicial bias started during the jury selection process when Judge Carlisle improperly injected himself into the selection process by excusing sua sponte several jurors for allegedly having low IQ's. Spencer contends that the cumulative effect of Judge Carlisle's actions violated Spencer's right to due process. The State, on the other hand, argues that the Judge's conduct in this trial was not improper and that the conference between the judge and the prosecution was intended only to properly apply Grossman.

With regard to the trial judge's excusal of jurors during voir dire based on their IQ, we find clear error. There is no legal basis for excusing a juror based on the trial judge's arbitrary evaluation of the juror's IQ. The fact that the juror was confused is no basis for excusing her in this manner. This type of sua sponte action by the trial judge also has other ramifications in this instance since the juror in question was the only black juror on the jury panel at the time she was excused. The record establishes that the jury selection process was so tainted that Spencer's convictions must be reversed and this cause retried once again.

Next, we find it important to address the ex parte communications between the trial judge and the state attorney. In Grossman, we directed that written orders imposing the death sentence be prepared prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence. However, we did not perceive that our decision would be used in such a way that the trial judge would formulate his decision prior to giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. We contemplated that the following procedure be used in sentencing phase proceedings. First, the[*691] trial judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for imposing the death sentence. Third, the trial judge should set a hearing to impose the sentence and contemporaneously file the sentencing order. Such a process was clearly not followed during these proceedings.

It is the circuit judge who has the principal responsibility for determining whether a death sentence should be imposed. Capital proceedings are sensitive and emotional proceedings in which the trial judge plays an extremely critical role. This Court has stated that there is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single litigant." Rose v. State, 601 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992). This statement was made in recognition of the purpose of canon 3A(4), Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.

While we do not find that the trial judge's conduct was intended to deny Spencer a fair trial, we do find that reversible error occurred in both the jury selection and sentencing portions of these proceedings. We conclude that fundamental fairness requires that Spencer receive a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand this case for a new trial before a new judge.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.