Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
366 citation events (331 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gary Richard Whitton v. State of Florida (fla, 2026-06-18)
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gary Richard Whitton v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Id. at 983.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Richard Lukehart v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
I, § 9, Fla. Const. We have consistently said “[d]ue process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 5 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael L. King v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve a death penalty defendant’s postconviction claims). -8- II We have consistently said: Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is appropriate if the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. State of Florida & Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. State of Florida & Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
I, § 9, Fla. Const. We have long recognized that “[d]ue process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Joseph Pittman v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Due process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Joseph Pittman v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Due process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jesse Bell v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the opportunity to appear before the court on initial postconviction motions “for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion”). -7- Bell’s motion, finding that each of his claims was procedurally barred and otherwise conclusively refuted by the record.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edward J. Zakrzewski, II v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the circuit court to conduct a hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve a death penalty defendant’s initial postconviction claims).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Michael A. Tanzi v. State of Florida; Michael A. Tanzi v. Secretary, Department of Corrections & Michael A. Tanzi v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
In Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), we held that a trial court must hold a hearing on an initial postconviction motion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duane Eugene Owen v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
In Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), we decided that in proceedings for an initial postconviction motion where the death penalty has been imposed, the trial court must -9- hearing, summarily denied relief on all four claims: (1) that he was denied due process in his first postconviction proceeding because the court failed to stay Owen’s evidentiary hearing or conduct a proper inquiry before allowing Owen to waive his constitutional rights; (2) that Owen obtained newly discovered evidence about his brain damage, declining mental condition, and competency; (3) that Owen’s sever…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Darryl Brian Barwick v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
I, § 9, Fla. Const. “Due process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Darryl Brian Barwick v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
I, § 9, Fla. Const. “Due process requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 982 (Fla. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucious Boyd v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
A. Failure to Hold a Huff Hearing In Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), we held that, in proceedings on an initial postconviction motion in a case where the death penalty has been imposed, the postconviction court must hold a hearing where legal argument can be presented before ruling on the motion.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) & SC14-2106 Thomas Bevel v. State of Florida and Thomas Bevel v. Julie L. Jones, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark James Asay v. State of Florida, SC16-102 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. & SC16-628 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
Further, it is “ ‘[t]he essence of due process ... that fair notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given to interested parties before judgment is rendered.’ ” Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Scull v. State, 569 So.2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Jones also claimed that “[t]o the extent trial counsel did not properly preserve [the] claim, Mr. Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel.” In January 2004, pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), 2 the trial court, presided over by the same judge, conducted a hearing on the amended Rule 3.850 motion to determine which of the claims required an evidentiary hearing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Foster v. State
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that in all capital cases the judge must allow the attorneys an opportunity to be heard on an initial postconviction motion for the purpose of determining whether an evi-dentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holland v. Tucker
S.D. Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring a hearing upon the filing of a post-conviction motion and answer to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed and to hear argument on legal issues). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993). [3] Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). [4] Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343 (Fla. 2001). [5] Boyd v. State, 910 So.2d 167 (Fla.2005). [6] Grim v. State, 841 So.2d 455 (Fla.2003). [7] Below, the trial court specifically instructed the jury on improper doubling.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barwick v. State
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring a hearing in capital postconviction cases to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required with respect to the post-conviction relief claims raised and to permit legal argument by the parties on the matter). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. McNeil
S.D. Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring trial court to hold hearing on post-conviction motion in death penalty cases "to determin[e] whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion”). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franqui v. State
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to be heard on an initial 3.850 motion in a capital case for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. Secretary, DOC
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam) (finding that, due to the severity of punishment at issue in a death penalty case, a circuit judge must hold a hearing on an initial motion for post conviction relief for the purpose of determining whether an evi-dentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Everett v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
After holding a hearing on the motion pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993), the postconvic tion court entered an order denying relief in part and granting an evidentiary hearing on Everett’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conde v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring a hearing in postconviction cases "for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion.”). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Owen v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Worden State 8.850 Collateral Proceedings Owen filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion in the state trial court (the “3.850 court”). 5 On November 5, 1997, the 3.850 court held a hearing, pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 *904 (Fla.1993), to determine which issues required an evidentiary hearing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blanco v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Blanco, 706 So.2d at 9 & n. 8. [7] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring a hearing upon the filing of a postconviction motion and answer to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed and to hear argument on legal issues).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. State
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Jones, 748 So.2d at 1017 n. 3. [4] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993). [5] Mrs. Jones testified for the State during the guilt phase and for the defense during the penalty phase. [6] These issues are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Jones' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during jury selection and the guilt phase; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Jones' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase. [7] These claims are: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that the State i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rutherford v. State
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Rutherford's execution is scheduled for January 31, 2006. [2] Rutherford's claims were: (1) access to the files and records pertaining to his case in possession of certain state agencies has been withheld in violation of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution; (2) the existing procedure that the State of Florida utilizes for lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knight v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 , 107 S.Ct. 1821 , 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)." Globe v. State, 877 So.2d 663, 678 (Fla.2004) (quoting Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Fla.2000)). [4] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (requiring hearing on postconviction motion in death penalty case to "determin[e] whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion") [5] In his amended rule 3.850 motion, Muhammad argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on hi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Monlyn v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
He also claimed the following errors: (9) denial of the right to adversarial testing regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator, (10) denial of the right to testify in the penalty phase, (11) unconstitutionality of the death sentence because jury instructions did not define aggravators with the requisite specificity, and (12) denial of the right to adversarial testing during the penalty phase. [3] See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that when a defendant sentenced to death files a postconviction motion, the judge must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the claims req…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Wainwright's motion argued: (1) trial counsel was ineffective regarding the admission of additional DNA evidence; (2) trial counsel was ineffective regarding Wainwright's statements and admissions; (3) trial counsel was ineffective regarding evidence of Wainwright's out of state crimes; (4) trial counsel was ineffective regarding a microphone discovered in Wainwright's cell; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the penalty phase instructions on the aggravators; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's argument at the guilt and …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peterka v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
See id. [3] These issues were that the trial court erred by (1) excusing for cause prospective juror Piccorossi because of his personal opposition to the death penalty; (2) denying Peterka's motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) denying Peterka's motion for judgment of acquittal based upon insufficient evidence of premeditation; (4) admitting hearsay evidence that Peterka had fled Nebraska and was considered "armed and dangerous"; (5) admitting testimony that Russell suspected Peterka of stealing the money order and that Russell intended to let the police handle the matter; (6) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Hamilton's amended motion argued: (1) electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; (2) trial counsel was ineffective regarding venue; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony from Hamilton's family members in support of a motion to suppress; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Hamilton's jury to hear the codefendant's cross-examination of a witness; (5) trial counsel was ineffective regarding Hamilton's jury overhearing testimony meant only for the codefendant's jury; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow co-counsel to conduct t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reed v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094, 1096-97 (Fla. 1994). [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993). [3] Those claims were that his trial counsel failed to object to the State's allegedly race-based use of peremptory challenges; failed to obtain a jury instruction that a felony murder determination is not, in itself, a sufficient aggravator to justify the death penalty; failed to bring a motion before the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence after this Court struck two aggravators on direct appeal; and failed to object to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and CCP jury instruc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] See Armstrong, 642 So.2d at 734 n. 2 (listing direct appeal claims). [2] Armstrong's claims in that motion were as follows: (1) he lacked funding for effective representation; (2) he was denied access to public records; (3) there was a lack of adversarial testing due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, withholding of exculpatory or impeachment material, newly discovered evidence, and improper trial court rulings; (4) newly discovered evidence existed; (5) his trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire; (6) he had an Ake claim regarding mental health; (7) there was cumulat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
In addition, appellant contended that a new sentencing proceeding was needed because the mental health experts failed to raise the possibility that Jones suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome. [2] The amended motion argued the following points: (1) postconviction counsel was ineffective because of the lack of sufficient funding fully to investigate and prepare the postconviction motion; (2) appellant was denied due process and equal protection because records were withheld by state agencies; (3) no adversarial testing occurred at trial due to the cumulative effects of ineffective assistance of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cole v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
The trial court held a hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), after which the trial court summarily denied several of Cole's claims and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.
cited Cited as authority (rule) King v. State
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
On December 21, 2001, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993), at which all parties agreed there was no need for a further evidentiary hearing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Groover v. State
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
Groover argues that this Court's decision in Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993), requires that the parties in a death penalty postconviction case must be permitted to appear before the court to argue the motion and whether an evidentiary hearing is needed.
cited Cited "see" Crosley Alexander Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff, 622 So. 2d at 983.
examined Cited "see" Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
This Court has explained that "[t]he essence of due process *462 is that fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given to interested parties before judgment is rendered." Scull v. State , 569 So.2d 1251 , 1252 (Fla. 1990) ; see Huff v. State , 622 So.2d 982 , 983 (Fla. 1993).
cited Cited "see" Williamson v. Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Perry Alexander Taylor v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (holding that, because of the severity of punishment at issue in a death penalty post-conviction case, the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to appear before the court and be heard on an initial postconviction motion). 2 .
discussed Cited "see" Morris v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (holding that, because of the severity of punishment at issue in a death penalty post-conviction case, the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to appear before the court and be heard on an initial postconviction motion). 2 .
cited Cited "see" Cummings v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Jimenez v. State
Fla. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 439 n. 3. [2] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1993). [3] Jimenez has also filed multiple habeas petitions with both this Court and the federal courts and multiple certiorari petitions with the United States Supreme Court, but all these petitions were denied.
discussed Cited "see" Overton v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 889 . [2] The theory was based on the idea that Nonoxynol is a chemical found in spermicidal condoms, so if the bedding from the MacIvor home tested positive for Nonoxynol, it would support the defense's theory that law enforcement planted Overton's semen on the evidence with the use of a spermicidal condom, which Overton claimed they obtained, from his ex-girlfriend, Lorna Swaby. [3] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [4] Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). [5] Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2…
cited Cited "see" Hannon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited "see" Booker v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. [2] Booker later amended this claim to reflect that only one juror remained on the jury solely because of her race. [3] Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993). [4] In the instant proceedings, the term "mail cover" appears to be used to describe a procedure in which the mail of inmates is monitored by prison staff. [5] Prior to working for the State, Price was employed by the Gainesville Police Department. [6] Further, even if Booker had successfully established that the State had intruded into Booker's attorney-client relationship, he would not be entitled to relief under Weatherford …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Roger HUFF, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
79276.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 1, 1993.
622 So. 2d 982
Per Curiam.
Cited by 314 opinions  |  Published

Billy H. Nolas and Julie D. Naylor, Ocala, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Kellie A. Nielan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

James Roger Huff, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial court's summary denial of his motion to vacate judgment and sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.

In 1980 Huff was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for killing his parents. This Court reversed the convictions and sentences and remanded for a new trial. Huff v. State, 437 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 1983). On retrial Huff was again convicted and sentenced to death on both counts. On appeal, this Court affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. Huff v. State, 495 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1986). On December 2, 1988, Huff filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to rule 3.850. The motion was signed by an attorney employed with the Florida Office of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR), but that attorney was not authorized to practice law in the State of Florida. Filed with the 3.850 motion was a motion to admit the attorney pro hac vice as counsel of record. The trial court entered an order striking[*983] the motion for postconviction relief from the record as being null and void. On appeal, this Court determined that the trial court should have granted the motion to admit the CCR attorney and then should have considered Huff's rule 3.850 motion. Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1990). Accordingly, this Court remanded the cause to the trial court for consideration of the rule 3.850 motion.

On remand, the trial court denied Huff's rule 3.850 motion without hearing. The State submitted a proposed order denying Huff all relief. The record does not reflect when the proposed order was submitted or what prompted the submission. CCR received a copy of the proposed order on Friday, September 6, 1991. The trial court signed the order as submitted on Monday, September 9, 1991, before Huff had the opportunity to raise objections or submit an alternative order.

We confine our review to the issue of whether the circuit court's treatment of Huff's 3.850 motion violated his due process rights. In view of the wide scope of issues raised below[1] and the fact that the death penalty was involved as well as the other circumstances in this case, we agree with Huff that his due process rights were violated. Huff should have been afforded an opportunity to raise objections and make alternative suggestions to the order before the judge signed it. As this Court explained in Rose v. State, 601 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1992), "[t]he other party should not have to bear the risk of factual oversights or inadvertent negative impressions that might easily be corrected by the chance to present counter arguments."

The State argues that Rose is inapposite to this case because Huff's attorney received a copy of the proposed order. In Rose, the proposed order was sent to Rose's former counsel and his new counsel was never served a copy nor given notice of receipt of the order by the court. Id. at 1182 & n. 5. Consequently, Rose was never given an opportunity to review the order or to object to its contents before the court signed the order denying all relief. This Court reversed the order denying Rose's motion for relief. Id. at 1184.

Even though the factual circumstances of the instant case are somewhat different from those in Rose, we find that the same due process concerns expressed in Rose are also present in this case. Rose was denied due process of law because his counsel was never served a copy of the proposed order; thereby depriving Rose of the opportunity to review the order and to object to its contents. In the instant case, CCR received a copy of the proposed order on Friday before the court signed it on Monday. This did not afford Huff a sufficient opportunity to review the order, much less to object to its contents. In fact, according to CCR's presentation at oral argument, Huff's attorneys were in the process of preparing a response to the proposed order when they received the court's signed order. At oral argument, CCR also noted that Huff's attorneys had previously requested a status conference regarding the motion for postconviction relief, but that the court did not grant the conference. "The essence of due process is that fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given to interested parties before judgment is rendered." Scull v. State, 569 So.2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990). We find that Huff was denied due process of law because the court did not give him a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

Because of the severity of punishment at issue in a death penalty postconviction case, we have determined that henceforth the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to appear before the court and be heard on an initial 3.850 motion. This does not mean that the judge must conduct an evidentiary hearing in all death penalty postconviction cases. Instead, the hearing before the judge is for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion. If this procedure had been followed in the instant case, this Court might not be faced with the issue of whether Huff's due process rights were violated.

[*984] Unlike Rose, we do not find that the facts in this case support an assumption that the trial court and the State engaged in an improper ex parte communication regarding the order. Huff's motion for rehearing contains the following quote from the cover letter that accompanied the order submitted by the State to the judge: "A copy is being furnished this same day to CCR, with the encouragement that counsel for the Defendant submit his or her own proposed Order to the Court, expressing, no doubt, a contrary resolution." This quotation gives a strong indication that the State submitted the order on its own initiative and without an ex parte request from the court, as was the case in Rose. However, even if the State submitted the order on its own initiative, the court's wholesale adoption of the unsolicited order, without an opportunity for Huff's counsel to object to its contents, leaves the impression that Huff's arguments were not considered. Moreover, the State's cover letter anticipated that Huff would be given an opportunity to participate in the decision-making by the judge. The effect on the appearance of the impartiality of the tribunal is precisely the "insidious result" that this Court condemned in Rose. 601 So.2d at 1183.

The State further argues that Huff has only addressed the procedural improprieties and has not presented any specific objections to the contents of the order and thus has not demonstrated that reversal on this issue would serve any purpose. In effect, the State seems to argue that Huff's claim puts form over substance. We do not agree. When a procedural error reaches the level of a due process violation, it becomes a matter of substance. Huff's motion for rehearing, which was denied by the trial court, objected to the flawed procedure rather than to the contents of the order. This motion is very similar to the motion for rehearing filed with the trial court in Rose, where this Court limited review to the procedural errors. In Rose, we noted that the overriding concern is "the appearance of the impartiality of the tribunal", rather than actual prejudice. Id. While we do not address the merits of Huff's claims, we do note that he has raised specific objections to the contents of the order before this Court and that the motion for rehearing that he submitted to the trial court incorporates by reference the specific claims contained in his 3.850 motion and supporting memoranda.

Huff also alleges that the judge neither received nor reviewed the record of Huff's trial before denying the motion for postconviction relief.[2] The record refutes that claim. The order denying Huff's motion for postconviction relief specifically states that the court reviewed Huff's motion and memorandum and supplemental discussion in support of the motion, the State's responses, and "all of the records" before denying the motion.

For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order denying Huff's motion for postconviction relief and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

1 Huff's petition for postconviction relief was 81 Pages in length. Upon remand to the circuit court by this Court, Huff also filed a 50-Page supplemental memorandum.
2 The circuit judge who entered the order under review was not the judge who presided over Huff's trial or originally dismissed his 3.850 motion.