Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases · …when the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
64 citation events (47 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: KATHLEEN WEAVER vs VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2022-10-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) KATHLEEN WEAVER vs VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel
Fla. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the legislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) WILLIAM DAVID FITTS v. BILL FURST, PROPERTY APPRAISER
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) ROBERT MAZUR, KYC SOLUTIONS, INC., PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, LLC, LITTLE, BROWN & COMPANY v. FRANCISCO JAVIER OSPINA BARAYA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) MICHAEL P. GORZYNSKI v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) James Barry Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, etc. (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when the egislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Gretna Racing, LLC. v. Department of Business and Prof. etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
having accepted jurisdiction, we may review the district court's decision for any error.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Mazur v. Ospina Baraya
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the legislature has used a term ... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Mazur v. Ospina Baraya
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
when the legislature has used a term ... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Corrections v. Jermaine D. Jones
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (declining to “imply [a term] where it has been excluded” when the term was used in one section governing the implied warranty 3 for developers but not another implied-warranty section governing contractors); Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that “[j]ust as the legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is evidence that different meanings were intended,” the language of statutes in different chapters can be compared for the same purpose); Ocala Jockey Club, LLC v. Rogers, 9…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Katina Paese v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) IN RE: FINAL REPORT OF THE 20TH STATEWIDE GRAND JURY CASE 8 vs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) KELLY PETERSON MILLIEN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RIVERSIDE HEIGHTS DEVELOPEMENT, LLC v. CITY OF TAMPA AND ULELE, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (declining to "imply [a term] where it ha[d] been excluded" when the term was used in one section but not another).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L. C. v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (declining to "imply [a term] where it has been excluded" when the term was used in one section governing the implied warranty for developers but not another implied-warranty section governing contractors); see also Cason v. Fla. Dep't of Mgmt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JUAN MESEN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (declining to "imply [a term] where it has been excluded" when the term was used in one section governing the implied warranty for developers but not another implied-warranty section governing contractors); see also Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that "[j]ust as the legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is evidence that different meanings were intended," the language of statutes in different chapters can be compared for the same purpose); Ocala Jockey Club, LLC v. Rogers, 98…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) & SC16-589 Nancy Hooker v. Timothy I. Hooker and Timothy I. Hooker v. Nancy Hooker
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 1995) ("Having accepted jurisdiction, we may review the district court’s decision for any error.”); Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982) (”[0]nce this Court has jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all issues appropriately raised in the appellate process, as though the case had originally come to this Court on appeal.”). 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ralph Monroe v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.1995). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Peacock
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Transportation v. Mid-Peninsula Realty Investment Group, LLC (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995). ■In concluding that the section 712.03(5) exception did not apply here, the trial court relied on Dardashti Properties wherein the Fourth District held that this statutory exception did not apply to property held in fee irrespective of whether it was used as a right-of-way. 605 So.2d at 122-23 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) R.A.J. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gabriele v. School Board of Manatee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995). “ ‘The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.’” State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) William Amador v. Town of Palm Beach
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.S. v. C.M.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) (“When the legislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bush v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ferguson v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995), against the party for whom the verdict is directed.” White v. City of Waldo, 659 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Avila v. Miami-Dade County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bortell v. White Mountains Insurance Group, Ltd.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FACULTY SENATE OF FLORIDA INTERN. UNIV. v. Roberts
S.D. Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) (stating that when a legislature has used a term in one section of the statute, but omits it in another section of the same statute, a court cannot imply it where it has been excluded); Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin. of U.S., 637 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1981) (stating that "[t]here is ... a well settled rule of statutory construction that where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute it is presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning and effect"). [38] Thus, this Court must consider…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Roberts
S.D. Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) (stating that when a legislature has used a term in one section of the statute, but omits it in another section of the same statute, a court cannot imply it where it has been excluded); Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin, of U.S., 637 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir.1981) (stating that “[t]here is ... a well settled rule of statutory construction that where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute it is presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning and effect”). 38 Thus, this Court must consid…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rowe v. County of Duval
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) L.G. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) LG v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Munao v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.1995)) (recognizing that when the Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to answer a certified question, it also has jurisdiction to review other alleged errors raised in the appellate court).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sunshine Towing, Inc. v. Fonseca
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ("When the legislature has used a term... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.")).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cyphers
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson County Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) (holding that when the Legislature has used a term in one section of a statute but has omitted *330 it in another section of the same statute, courts will not imply the term where it has been so excluded).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sierra Club v. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bradford
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ("[W]hen the legislature has used a term ... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.")).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarke v. Schimmel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ("When the legislature has used a term... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pasquale v. Florida Elections Com'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (1995), in which our supreme court stated: When the legislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sheffield v. Superior Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995), that her injuries were not permanent.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weiand v. State
Fla. · 1999 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Don King Productions, Inc. v. Chavez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Metropolitan Dade County v. Milton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995); Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146, 152 (Fla), cert. granted on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 294 , 139 L.Ed.2d 226 (1997); see also Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc., 666 So.2d at 900 ; Montes de Oca v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 692 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1997); National Airlines, Inc. v. Division of Employment Sec. of Fla. Dept. of Commerce, 379 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mark Marks, PA
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. City of Jacksonville Beach
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Great Western Bank v. Shoemaker
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) (where legislature uses term in one section of statute but omits same term from other section, court "will not imply it where it has been excluded").
LEISURE RESORTS, INC., Petitioner,
v.
FRANK J. ROONEY, INC., Respondent.
82578.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 27, 1995.
654 So. 2d 911
Wells.
Cited by 61 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 75%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (2)

[*912] D. Culver Smith, III, of Jones, Foster, Johnston & Stubbs, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

James E. Glass and Linda Dickhaus Agnant of James E. Glass Associates, Miami, for respondent.

R. Earl Welbaum of Welbaum, Zook & Jones, Coral Gables, amicus curiae for The Associated Gen. Contractors of America.

WELLS, Justice.

We have for review the following question certified to be of great public importance:

WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1992), IMPOSE ON A CONTRACTOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR THE INTENDED USE AND PURPOSE WHERE THE CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS SUGGESTS AND SUPPLIES A MANUFACTURED ITEM SUCH AS INDIVIDUAL AIR CONDITIONING UNITS TO A DEVELOPER FOR USE IN A BUILDING PROJECT, WHERE SUCH ITEMS LATER PROVE NOT TO BE FIT FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE SUPPLIED?

Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 624 So.2d 773, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question by holding that a contractor's statutory warranty of fitness does apply to manufactured items such as air-conditioning units supplied by the contractor for use in a building project but that the contractor does not warrant those items for a "specific purpose" under the provisions of section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992). Having accepted jurisdiction, we may review the district court's decision for any error. Lawrence v. Florida East Coast Ry., 346 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 1977). Based on our review, we approve the district court's decision in part and quash it in part.

Leisure Resorts, a developer, retained an architect who in turn retained an engineer to prepare plans and specifications for a 22-story condominium. The engineer designed the condominium so that each unit would contain its own air-conditioning system. In accordance with the design, a condensing unit was placed on the balcony of each condominium. The condensers were stacked one above the other all the way up the east side of the building. This design was less costly than a central air-conditioning system but presented a potential problem which the developer, architect, and engineer recognized early in the construction process. The heated discharged air from one condenser could rise up to the next condenser, causing the higher condenser to overload and automatically shut off.

Carrier, the air-conditioning unit manufacturer originally required in the contract specifications to supply air-conditioning units, declined the job. General Electric, a manufacturer later identified as acceptable in the specifications,[1] would guarantee its units only if certain modifications were made to the condominium design. Leisure Resorts declined to incorporate those modifications into the condominium design.

Frank J. Rooney, Inc. (Rooney) and the air-conditioning subcontractor subsequently suggested, and the architect and engineer approved, the use of Frigiking Tappan units. Tappan represented that the units would operate properly under the specified conditions, but after the building was complete, occupied,[*913] and its operation turned over to its residents, a number of owners encountered problems with the condensers. The architect, engineer, and a representative of the contractor evaluated the condensers, and a dispute developed as to whether the air-conditioning units performed properly in cooling the apartments to an acceptable level. The parties also disagreed as to whether claimed deficiencies in the cooling capacity of the air-conditioning units were a result of the stacked design or a result of defects inherent in each particular air-conditioning unit supplied and installed by the contractor.

Several unit owners brought a class action against Leisure Resorts alleging a variety of construction defects, including failure of the air-conditioning units. Leisure Resorts then filed a third-party complaint against Rooney seeking contribution or indemnity for the defects Rooney allegedly caused. The third-party complaint was severed from the main action in which Leisure Resorts and the owners settled. Leisure Resorts then proceeded against Rooney for indemnity alleging that its liability to the owners was caused by Rooney's breach of contract, breach of warranty, or negligence.

At the close of Leisure Resorts' case, Rooney moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion as to the developer's claims for breach of contract and negligence. The case then proceeded to a jury determination on Leisure Resorts' indemnity claim for breach of the statutory warranties in section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).[2] The court ruled as a matter of law that the contractor impliedly warranted the fitness of the condensers pursuant to section 718.203(2) and instructed the jury as follows:

The issues for your determination on Leisure Resorts' claim against Rooney for indemnity based on breach of warranty are whether the air conditioning equipment supplied by Rooney for the individual condominium apartments was defective within one year after substantial completion of all construction, and if so, whether such defect was a legal cause of loss or damage sustained by Leisure Resorts through no fault of Leisure Resorts.
The equipment was defective if it was not reasonably fit for the specific purpose for which it was supplied.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Leisure Resorts and awarded the developer $250,000 in damages and $133,000 in attorney fees. Rooney appealed.

In its opinion, the district court set forth a detailed analysis of section 718.203.[3]Leisure Resorts, 624 So.2d at 776-777. Based on this analysis, the court concluded that manufactured items for which there would be a manufacturer's warranty do not fall within the language "materials supplied" as set forth in section 713.203(2) or "all other improvements and materials" as used in section 718.203(2)(b). Consequently, the court determined that, unlike the developer's warranty which expressly covers personal property[*914] supplied and warranted by the manufacturer, the contractor's warranty did not extend to personal property such as air-conditioning condensers.

With respect to this point, we do not approve the district court's decision. Rather, we assume that the legislature intended the plain and obvious meaning of the words used in the statute. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984); United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Tuggle, 216 So.2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). Specifically, we conclude that manufactured items constitute "materials" as that term is used in section 718.203(2). Accordingly, the contractor gives a statutory warranty of fitness when supplying manufactured items such as the air-conditioning condensers which are the subject of this case.

We do approve the district court's conclusion that the contractor's warranties and developer's warranties differ in scope. The district court noted a material distinction between the developer's warranty mandated by section 718.203(1) and the contractor's warranty mandated by section 718.203(2). The developer's implied warranty is a "warranty of fitness or merchantability for the purposes or uses intended" whereas the contractor's implied warranty is a "warranty of fitness as to the work performed or material supplied." When the legislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded. See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1949); accord Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation, 408 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Furthermore, the recognition of two distinct warranties comports with the idea that purposes or uses intended are matters more within the control of the developer who has control of the design of the building, while competency of work performed and quality of the materials supplied in constructing condominium buildings based upon the plans and specifications encompassed within the building contract are matters within the control of the contractor. To be in compliance with the section 718.203(2) implied warranty of fitness then, the contractor must provide work and materials which conform with the generally accepted standards of workmanship and performance of similar work and materials meeting the requirements specified in the contract. See David v. B & J Holding Corp., 349 So.2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

The trial court thus erred in instructing the jury that a defect in the equipment could be found, and the contractor's warranty was thereby violated, if the equipment was not reasonably fit for the specific purpose for which it was supplied. The trial court's instruction had the effect of including in the contractor's warranty the design of the condominium buildings.

Having determined that the statutory warranty is applicable to the contractor in respect to the air conditioning units, it follows that a directed verdict for the contractor as to the breach of implied warranty claim would be proper only if there was no evidence upon which a jury could find that the equipment was defective. Accordingly, we reject the district court's conclusion that a directed verdict for the contractor with regard to the contractor's statutory warranty was appropriate. Here, the engineer's testimony regarding his study of the malfunctioning units created a jury issue as to whether the air-conditioning units conformed with generally accepted standards of performance of air-conditioning units complying with the specifications of the contract.[4] That issue should be resolved by a jury instructed as to the contractor's warranty in accord with this opinion.

[*915] Accordingly, we quash the district court's decision to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion and remand to the Fourth District so that it may consider the remaining issues raised by Rooney which it declined to address after finding the warranty issue dispositive. If the district court determines the remaining issues are not dispositive of the case, it must remand for a new trial in which the trial court can provide a proper jury instruction with respect to the contractor's statutory warranty.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, J., recused.

1 Leisure Resorts changed the contract specifications for air-conditioning units during its negotiations with Rooney. Rather than Carrier units as originally specified, the contract as amended called for General Electric, Carrier, or their equal as approved by the engineer.
2 The trial court interpreted the 1979 version of section 718.203, but as the district court noted, the relevant portions of that statute contain the same language as section 718.203, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
3 Section 718.203 reads in pertinent part:

(1) The developer shall be deemed to have granted the purchaser of each unit an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability for the purposes or uses intended as follows:

... .

(b) As to the personal property that is transferred with, or appurtenant to, each unit, a warranty which is for the same period as that provided by the manufacturer of the personal property, commencing with the date of closing of the purchase or the date of possession of the unit, whichever is earlier.

... .

(d) As to all other personal property for the use of the unit owners, a warranty which shall be the same as that provided by the manufacturer of the personal property.

... .

(2) The contractor, and all subcontractors and suppliers, grant to the developer and to the purchaser of each unit implied warranties of fitness as to the work performed or materials supplied by them as follows:

(a) For a period of 3 years from the date of completion of construction of a building or improvement, a warranty as to the roof and structural components of the building or improvement and mechanical and plumbing elements serving a building or improvement, except mechanical elements serving only one unit.

(b) For a period of 1 year after completion of all construction, a warranty as to all other improvements and materials.

4 The engineer testified that, after conducting various tests on the units

we determined that there was a sufficient amount of recirculation around the condensing units to affect their performance. We also found that the capacity of the units under several different conditions, the conditions that were installed and all the conditions that were officially set units to test in the best possible conditions, the units did not meet the capacity that was specified on the contract drawings.... [T]he main conclusion is that the units were not performing, did not have the capacity sufficient to satisfy the contract documents even under the best conditions.