Winson v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). · Go Syfert
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Winson v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tuyuana L. Morris, etc. v. Orlando S. Muniz, M.D. (fla, 2018-09-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "see" Tuyuana L. Morris, etc. v. Orlando S. Muniz, M.D. (2×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
Indeed, having an active license is itself a separate statutory requirement for a "medical expert." § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. And although Dr. Thompson mentioned during her deposition in October 2013 that she served as an expert for the Texas Board of Medicine after her retirement from private practice, serving as an expert can hardly be said to be "engag[ing] in the practice of" the profession. § 766.202(6), Fla. Stat.; see Winson v. Norman , 658 So.2d 625 , 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (concluding that the alleged presuit expert who "confined his recent professional activities to acting as a 'lit…
discussed Cited "see" Largie v. Gregorian
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
Correa, 693 So.2d at 621 (quoting Royle v. Florida Hospital-East Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)) (citations omitted); see Winson v. Norman, 658 So.2d 625, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(affirming an order striking an affidavit and dismissing an action after the limitations period had run, where the corroborating opinion was not from a qualified medical expert because "one of the primary thrusts of Florida's statutory medical malpractice scheme is to `weed out' cases which are not, even prima facie, supported by some reliable independent indication of their merits"); see also McPhers…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Christopher Moncrief, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melissa Marie Moncrief v. Charles Edward Kollmer, M.D., and New Smyrna Orthopedics, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See § 766.202(6); see also Winson v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that a physician who “had not been engaged in the actual practice for more than a decade prior and had apparently confined his recent professional activities to acting as a ‘litigation expert’” “was not ‘duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession’” (quoting § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (1993))).
Rita WINSON, Appellant,
v.
Harold G. NORMAN, M.D. and Coral Gables Plastic Surgery Associates — Harold G. Norman, Jr., M.D., P.A., Appellees.
94-1676.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jul 19, 1995.
658 So. 2d 625
Schwartz, C.J., and Hubbart and Nesbitt.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published

[*626] Arnold R. Ginsberg and Lisa L. Fialkow, Miami, for appellant.

George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer and Esther E. Galicia, Coral Gables, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

In this "breast implant" action brought against, among others, the appellant's physician, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the alleged expert who executed the verified written opinion in attempted compliance with the pre-suit screening requirements of sections 766.202(5), 766.203(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993) was not "duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profession," as defined by section 766.202(5). The doctor in question had not been engaged in the actual practice for more than a decade prior and had apparently confined his recent professional activities to acting as a "litigation expert" — on behalf of plaintiffs — in cases such as this one. Since one of the primary thrusts of Florida's statutory medical malpractice scheme is to "weed out" cases which are not, even prima facie, supported by some reliable independent indication of their merits, see, e.g., Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1991); Ragoonanan v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 619 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), it is clear that the affidavit in question was properly stricken and, since the statute of limitations has run, that the action as against the physician was properly dismissed. Cf. Suarez v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 634 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

Affirmed.