Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 766.202 (2025)

Definitions; ss. 766.201-766.212.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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766.202 Definitions; ss. 766.201-766.212.—As used in ss. 766.201-766.212, the term:

(1) “Claimant” means any person who has a cause of action for damages based on personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical negligence.

(2) “Collateral sources” means any payments made to the claimant, or made on his or her behalf, by or pursuant to:

(a) The United States Social Security Act; any federal, state, or local income disability act; or any other public programs providing medical expenses, disability payments, or other similar benefits, except as prohibited by federal law.

(b) Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by him or her or provided by others.

(c) Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services.

(d) Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.

(3) “Economic damages” means financial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including, but not limited to, past and future medical expenses and 80 percent of wage loss and loss of earning capacity to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act.

(4) “Health care provider” means any hospital or ambulatory surgical center as defined and licensed under chapter 395; a birth center licensed under chapter 383; any person licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, chapter 462, chapter 463, part I of chapter 464, chapter 466, chapter 467, part XIV of chapter 468, or chapter 486; a health maintenance organization certificated under part I of chapter 641; a blood bank; a plasma center; an industrial clinic; a renal dialysis facility; or a professional association partnership, corporation, joint venture, or other association for professional activity by health care providers.

(5) “Investigation” means that an attorney has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a written opinion from said expert.

(6) “Medical expert” means a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care professional degree from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.

(7) “Medical negligence” means medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract.

(8) “Noneconomic damages” means nonfinancial losses that would not have occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is entitled to recover such damages under general law, including the Wrongful Death Act.

(9) “Periodic payment” means provision for the structuring of future economic damages payments, in whole or in part, over a period of time, as follows:

(a) A specific finding of the dollar amount of periodic payments which will compensate for these future damages after offset for collateral sources shall be made. The total dollar amount of the periodic payments shall equal the dollar amount of all such future damages before any reduction to present value.

(b) The defendant shall be required to post a bond or security or otherwise to assure full payment of these damages awarded. A bond is not adequate unless it is written by a company authorized to do business in this state and is rated A+ by Best’s. If the defendant is unable to adequately assure full payment of the damages, all damages, reduced to present value, shall be paid to the claimant in a lump sum. No bond may be canceled or be subject to cancellation unless at least 60 days’ advance written notice is filed with the court and the claimant. Upon termination of periodic payments, the security, or so much as remains, shall be returned to the defendant.

(c) The provision for payment of future damages by periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amounts of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made.

History.—s. 49, ch. 88-1; s. 1153, ch. 97-102; s. 58, ch. 2003-416; s. 3, ch. 2011-195; s. 125, ch. 2018-24.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 103 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: Tuyuana L. Morris, etc. v. Orlando S. Muniz, M.D., 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).

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Tuyuana L. Morris, etc. v. Orlando S. Muniz, M.D., 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018). · cites it 63× “See § 766.202, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). This is especially important because the Legislature “ ‘is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version of that law’ and “the legislature is presumed to have - 20 - adopted prior judicial constructions…”

Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). · cites it 30× “Relevant to the instant action, section 766.202(4) requires the claimant's attorney to consult with and obtain an opinion from a medical expert.”

Est. of Michelle Evette McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). · cites it 8× “” § 766.202(8), Fla. Stat. (2005) (incorporated in § 766.”

Apostolico v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 871 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). · cites it 11× “[7] Because the trial court did not use the correct legal principles in determining that Nurse Headley was not a qualified medical expert, as defined by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (2002), the order dismissing Apostolico's wrongful death medical malpractice action must…”

Hesterly v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2007). · cites it 12× “Count III: Medical Malpractice as to Defendant Royal Caribbean In its Motion to Dismiss, Royal Caribbean argues that it is not a medical care provider and thus cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged medical malpractice of its shipboard doctors.”

Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 8× “Byrne’s qualifications under section 766.202, Florida Statutes (2009), which defines “medical expert” in subsection (6) and cross-references the requirements of section 766.”

Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996). · cites it 4× “The effect of the order of dismissal was to permanently bar the plaintiffs' claim since the statutory limitations period for filing claims had then expired. [1] The Third District affirmed the order of dismissal by a two-to-one vote, and reasoned as follows: It is the plaintiffs…”

Yocom v. Wuesthoff Health Sys., Inc., 880 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). · cites it 6× “See § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); Apostolico v.”

Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). · cites it 5× “§ 766.202(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). Requiring a written expert opinion as part of the presuit investigation assures the defendant that the claim was preceded by a reasonable investigation; "that there is justification for the Plaintiffs' claim, i.”

The Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC, etc. v. Denise Townes, etc., 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018). · cites it 2× “4 It is undisputed that the National Deaf Academy is not a health care provider, as defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2008).”

St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000). · cites it 3× “" § 766.202(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). See also Bombalier v.”

Fitchner v. LifeSouth Cmty. Blood Centers, Inc., 88 So. 3d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). · cites it 3× “In support of its motion, Life-South relied on the 2003 amendment to section 766.202(4) Florida Statutes, which added blood banks to the class of potential defendants who are entitled to the procedural safeguards afforded by the statute.”

Show all 103 citing cases →

— 766.202(1) — 7 cases

St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000). “" § 766.202(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). See also Bombalier v.”

Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological, 40 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Univ. of Miami v. Wilson, 948 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Pavolini v. Bird, 769 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

Franzen v. Mogler, 744 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

— 766.202(2) — 3 cases

Chester v. Doig, 842 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2003).

Barlow v. North Okaloosa Med. Ctr., 877 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2004).

Doig v. Chester, 776 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

— 766.202(2)(a) — 1 case

Barlow v. North Okaloosa Med. Ctr., 809 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

— 766.202(3) — 7 cases

Barlow v. North Okaloosa Med. Ctr., 877 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2004).

Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc. v. Afonso, 4 So. 3d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000). “" § 766.202(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). See also Bombalier v.”

Chester v. Doig, 842 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2003).

Estrada v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

— 766.202(4) — 25 cases

Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1996). “The effect of the order of dismissal was to permanently bar the plaintiffs' claim since the statutory limitations period for filing claims had then expired. [1] The Third District affirmed the order of dismissal by a two-to-one vote, and reasoned as follows: It is the plaintiffs…”

The Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC, etc. v. Denise Townes, etc., 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018). “4 It is undisputed that the National Deaf Academy is not a health care provider, as defined in section 766.202(4), Florida Statutes (2008).”

Fitchner v. LifeSouth Cmty. Blood Centers, Inc., 88 So. 3d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “In support of its motion, Life-South relied on the 2003 amendment to section 766.202(4) Florida Statutes, which added blood banks to the class of potential defendants who are entitled to the procedural safeguards afforded by the statute.”

Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Admin. Hearings, 29 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 2010).

Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, Pa, 915 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

— 766.202(5) — 24 cases

Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). “Relevant to the instant action, section 766.202(4) requires the claimant's attorney to consult with and obtain an opinion from a medical expert.”

Apostolico v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 871 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “[7] Because the trial court did not use the correct legal principles in determining that Nurse Headley was not a qualified medical expert, as defined by section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (2002), the order dismissing Apostolico's wrongful death medical malpractice action must…”

Tuyuana L. Morris, etc. v. Orlando S. Muniz, M.D., 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018). “See § 766.202, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). This is especially important because the Legislature “ ‘is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version of that law’ and “the legislature is presumed to have - 20 - adopted prior judicial constructions…”

Faber v. Wrobel, 673 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

Yocom v. Wuesthoff Health Sys., Inc., 880 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “See § 766.202(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); Apostolico v.”

— 766.202(6) — 33 cases

Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “Byrne’s qualifications under section 766.202, Florida Statutes (2009), which defines “medical expert” in subsection (6) and cross-references the requirements of section 766.”

Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). “§ 766.202(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). Requiring a written expert opinion as part of the presuit investigation assures the defendant that the claim was preceded by a reasonable investigation; "that there is justification for the Plaintiffs' claim, i.”

Oken v. Williams, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

— 766.202(7) — 6 cases

Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).

South Miami Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 38 So. 3d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Chester v. Doig, 842 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2003).

Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 585 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Pilgrim, 107 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

— 766.202(8) — 5 cases

Est. of Michelle Evette McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). “” § 766.202(8), Fla. Stat. (2005) (incorporated in § 766.”

M.D. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

Pizzarelli v. Rollins, 704 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

Tallahassee Mem. Reg. Med. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 766.202(8)(b) — 2 cases

Tallahassee Mem. Reg. Med. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kinsey, 655 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 766.202(8)(c) — 1 case

St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

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