State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1996). · Go Syfert
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State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“inconsistent verdicts against jointly tried conspirators are not truly inconsistent and we find no compelling reason to except such verdicts from the general rule.”
94 citation events (78 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Florida v. Luis Antonio Perez Franco (fladistctapp, 2026-03-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State of Florida v. Luis Antonio Perez Franco (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
inconsistent verdicts against jointly tried conspirators are not truly inconsistent and we find no compelling reason to except such verdicts from the general rule.
cited Cited as authority (rule) David Lai v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“As a general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida.” State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) David Lai v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“As a general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida.” State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sinclair v. Florida Department of Corrections (2×) also: Cited "see"
S.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) THOMAS v. INCH (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Inconsistent verdicts are allowed because jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007) (quoting State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DAVID KENNETH BOTT v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Inconsistent jury verdicts are legally sustainable because they “can be 2 the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pleasant Grove City v. Terry
Utah · 2020 · confidence medium
It is difficult to understand why we have a detailed trial procedure, where the forum is elaborate and carefully regulated, and then simply give up when the jury confounds us. 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815 . ―[T]he possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs the rationale for allowing verdicts to stand.‖ State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steve Senelus v. Attorney General, State of Florida
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Inconsistent jury verdicts are generally permitted under Florida law “because jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 3 If the state court had denied Senelus’ federal constitutional claim on the merits of that claim, its decision would have been entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Jacoby Turner v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. 1996); see also Brown, 959 So. 2d at 220-21 (holding that a true inconsistent verdict occurred where a defendant was convicted of felony murder along with the lesser included offense of petit theft instead of the charged offense of armed robbery; misdemeanor petit theft conviction meant that the “engaged in the perpetration of a felony” element of felony murder was lacking).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HARVEY L. LINEN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
This exception, referred to as the "true" inconsistent verdict exception, comes into play when verdicts against one defendant on legally interlocking charges are truly inconsistent. . . . [T]rue inconsistent verdicts are "those in which an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count." State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JOSHUA ZELAYA v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
As to that count, the jury checked option A, “Guilty of Aggravated Battery (Deadly Weapon).” The majority correctly points out that our supreme court has determined that “[a]s a general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida.” Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007) (quoting State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) MARCUS JAMAL JERRY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
“As á general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida.” Id. (quoting State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kelley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emory v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996), where the court held that inconsistent verdicts against a single defendant on interlocking charges are not permitted, the court explained that the possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs any rationale for allowing such verdicts to stand.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mantilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218, 220-21 (Fla.2007) (quoting State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996)) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cappalo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Analysis “As a general rule, inconsistent verdicts are permitted in Florida” because “jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dross v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
Md. · 2002 · confidence medium
Yedrysek v. State, 293 Ark. 541 , 739 S.W.2d 672, 673 (1987); People v. Palmer, 24 Cal.4th 856 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13 , 15 P.3d 234, 239 (2001); Marquiz v. People, 726 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Colo.1986); State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996); Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 264 , 297 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280 , 439 N.E.2d 754, 757 (1982); People v. Anderson, 418 Mich. 31 , 340 N.W.2d 634, 636 (1983); Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131 , 8 N.W.2d 849, 856 (1943); State v. Hawkins, 178 N.J.Super. 321 , 428 A.2d 1322, 1323-24 (App.Div.1981)(applying the rule of consistency…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peterson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Section 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (1997), one of the statutes under which appellant was convicted, prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property." Section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting in injury of any person." Appellant argues that the jury's finding of guilt for leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries is inconsistent with a finding of guilt that appellant left an accident resulting in "only in damage to a vehicle." In State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996), t…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cuevas v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Thus, in determining whether legally interlocking charges are involved, we must determine whether it is legally possible to be acquitted of one charge and yet be guilty of the other charged offense or, as stated in State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996), whether "an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count." This seems to limit the application of the legally interlocking charges concept to compound felonies which either involve a specific predicate offense (such as burglary with a battery) or one which involves a predicate offense which may be …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fayson v. State
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
In State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996), this Court explained the principles of law applicable to inconsistent jury verdicts, stating: As a general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fayson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The general rule in Florida is that inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted "because jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant." State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see" Clinton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see" Moody v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732 (Fla. 1996).
cited Cited "see" Everett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla.1996)(citing Gonzalez ).
cited Cited "see" Worthey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731 (Fla.1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Benjamin Curry v. The State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Shere has not pointed to any case law, language within the ‘principal in the first degree’ statute, or anything else to demonstrate his claim that section 777.011 requires his judgment to be revised once his codefendant is convicted of a lesser degree of crime.”); see also State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996) (ruling that the rule of consistency, which applies when conspirators are tried together, is not applicable in Florida except “when verdicts against one defendant on legally interlocking charges are truly inconsistent”); Eaton v. State, 438 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1983…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." KRISTOPHER MICHAEL GOODWIN vs STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Truly inconsistent verdicts are “those in which an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count.” Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. dismissed, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1983)); see also State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Proctor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id. at 893-94 (recognizing that true inconsistent verdicts are the one exception to the rule allowing inconsistent verdicts); see also Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.2007) (recognizing that “the ‘true’ inconsistent verdict exception[] comes into play when verdicts against one defendant on legally interlocking charges are truly inconsistent” and that “true inconsistent *787 verdicts are ‘those in which an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count’ ” (quoting State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996))); Shavers v. Stat…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Conrad v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Brown, 959 So.2d at 220 ; see also State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Flores v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Brown, 959 So.2d at 220 ; see also State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732-33 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Dial v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See State v. Connelly, 748 So.2d 248 (Fla.1999); see also State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731 (Fla.1996).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Gonzalez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731 (Fla.1996)
State of Florida
v.
Cynthia Lynn Powell
86561.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 30, 1996.
674 So. 2d 731
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief — Criminal Appeals, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. Christopher R. DeMetros of the Law Offices of Matthews DeMetros, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent.
Kogan.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published

We have for review a decision passing upon the following question from the First District Court of Appeal certified to be of great public importance:

DOES THE "RULE OF CONSISTENCY" EXCEPTION, AS IT RELATES TO A JURY VERDICT IN A SINGLE CASE AND TRIAL WHERE ALL BUT ONE OF THE CO-CONSPIRATORS ARE ACQUITTED, REMAIN VIABLE IN FLORIDA FOLLOWING THE DECISIONS IN UNITED STATES v. POWELL, 469 U.S. 57 [105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461] (1984) AND UNITED STATES v. ANDREWS, 850 F.2d 1557 (11TH CIR. 1988), CERT. DENIED, 488 U.S. 1032 [109 S.Ct. 842, 102 L.Ed.2d 974] (1989), THE LATTER OF WHICH OVERRULED FEDERAL CASE LAW UPON WHICH THE FLORIDA EXCEPTION WAS ORIGINALLY BASED?

State v. Powell, 659 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3 (b)(4), Fla. Const.

For the reasons explained herein, we quash the decision under review and hold that an acquittal of all jointly tried accused conspirators but one does not require the acquittal of the remaining conspirator.

By amended information, the State charged Cynthia Powell and her boyfriend, Michael Cross, with conspiracy to commit murder. The State alleged that Cross and Powell did agree, conspire, combine or confederate with each other to commit murder. At their joint trial, the jury acquitted Cross and convicted Powell.

Relying on the rule of consistency, Powell moved to arrest judgment. Under the rule of consistency, when all named accused conspirators are tried together and no unidentified conspirators are alleged and all but one of the conspirators are acquitted, the verdict against the remaining conspirator will not be allowed to stand. Pearce v. State, 330 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert.denied, 341 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1976).

The trial court granted the motion. The First District Court of Appeal, which had previously adopted the rule of consistency inPearce, affirmed the trial court and certified the above question.

As a general rule, inconsistent jury verdicts are permitted in Florida. Eaton v. State, 438 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1983); Goodwin v.State, 157 Fla. 751, 26 So.2d 898 (1946); *Page 733 Gonzalez v. State,440 So.2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1983). Inconsistent verdicts are allowed because jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See Eaton, 438 So.2d at 823. Moreover, defendants have adequate procedural and constitutional protections to ensure that their convictions are not erroneous, whereas the State does not have the benefit of any reciprocal protections. Cf. Potts v. State, 430 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1982) (relied on similar reasoning to hold that defendant tried separately from co-conspirator is not entitled to raise conviction of co-conspirator for a lesser offense as a bar to defendant's conviction for a greater offense).

This Court has recognized only one exception to the general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts. This exception, referred to as the "true" inconsistent verdict exception, comes into play when verdicts against one defendant on legally interlocking charges are truly inconsistent. As Justice Anstead explained when writing for the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Gonzalez, true inconsistent verdicts are "those in which an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count." 440 So.2d at 515. For example, this Court has required consistent verdicts when

the underlying felony was a part of the crime charged — without the underlying felony the charge could not stand. The jury is, in all cases, required to return consistent verdicts as to the guilt of an individual on interlocking charges.

Eaton, 438 So.2d at 823; see Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979) (verdict of guilty as to felony-murder set aside where jury failed to find defendant guilty of the underlying felony); Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1981) (defendant could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during a commission of felony where the jury failed to find the defendant guilty of any felony). An exception to the general rule is warranted when the verdicts against a single defendant are truly inconsistent because the possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs the rationale for allowing verdicts to stand.

Inconsistent verdicts against jointly tried conspirators are not truly inconsistent and we find no compelling reason to except such verdicts from the general rule. Cf. Eaton, 438 So.2d 822 (refusing to recognize exception where, after joint trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempting to escape, while trigger-man was convicted of second-degree murder and aiding in defendant's attempt to escape). Even the federal court that created the rule of consistency has since rejected it.

In 1961, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the rule of consistency in conspiracy cases. Herman v. United States,289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961). Although the Herman court gave little justification for a rule requiring consistent verdicts where conspirators are tried together, a few Florida courts, including the First District Court of Appeal in Pearce, adopted the exception. Filer v. State, 285 So.2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973);Pearce v. State, 330 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Cravero v.State, 334 So.2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 342 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1977); Sparkman v. State, 528 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). However, more recently both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals overruled the Herman decision. United States v.Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 1032, 109 S.Ct. 842, 102 L.Ed.2d 974 (1989) (relying on UnitedStates v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)); United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). Other federal circuit courts likewise have refused to recognize the rule of consistency. United States v. Bucuvalas,909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia,882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989); United States v. Valles-Valencia,823 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1987).

We see no reason to recognize an exception to the general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts when that exception is based on federal precedent that has been overruled, particularly when that exception is inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. Accordingly, we quash the decision under *Page 734 review, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.