Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
99 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: David Lai v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2024-11-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Lai v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
See Brown, 959 So. 2d at 221 (holding that the defendant could not be convicted of felony murder where the jury acquitted the defendant of the underlying felony); Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. 1981) (defendant could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during a commission of felony where the jury failed to find the defendant guilty of any felony); Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 , 4 1161 (Fla. 1979) (verdict of guilty as to felony murder set aside where jury failed to find defendant guilty of the underlying felony); see also Morris v. State, 349 So. 3d 491 , 493 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Lai v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
See Brown, 959 So. 2d at 221 (holding that the defendant could not be convicted of felony murder where the jury acquitted the defendant of the underlying felony); Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. 1981) (defendant could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during a commission of felony where the jury failed to find the defendant guilty of any felony); Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 , 4 1161 (Fla. 1979) (verdict of guilty as to felony murder set aside where jury failed to find defendant guilty of the underlying felony); see also Morris v. State, 349 So. 3d 491 , 493 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cappalo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
For example, the verdicts are im-permissibly inconsistent where a defendant is convicted of felony murder but convicted of only a misdemeanor rather than the underlying felony, see Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158, 1161 (Fla.1979), or where a defendant is convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony but convicted of only a misdemeanor rather than the underlying felony, see Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954, 956 (Fla.1981). 1 Such cases involve an offense that as a matter of law cannot be committed unless another underlying offense has also been committed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fayson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954, 956 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sales v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954, 956 (Fla.1981).
cited Cited "see" THOMAS v. INCH
N.D. Fla. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 221 (citing Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981)).
discussed Cited "see" Steve Senelus v. Attorney General, State of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Redondo, 403 So. 2d at 956 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Brown
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981); Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla.1979).
cited Cited "see" State v. Perez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Collins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
Inasmuch as (a) the defendant’s acquittal as to the underlying felony of robbery precludes a conviction on any degree of felony murder based on that crime, Gurganus v. State, 451 So.2d 817 (Fla.1984); Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla.1979); Noel v. State, 705 So.2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Pray v. State, 571 So.2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); see generally Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981), quashing Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and (b) the appellant, who was merely a passenger in a vehicle involved in the fatal traffic accident, could not be guilty of non-fel…
cited Cited "see" Lusk v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), rev'd on other grounds 403 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1981) (citing Greene v. City of Gulfport, 103 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1958).
cited Cited "see" Morris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1981); Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979); Ayrado v. State, 431 So.2d 320 (Fla.3d DCA 1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jamal Wodford v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
As we stated in Turner v. State, 301 So. 3d 1017 , 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), “a true inconsistent verdict requires more than just factual or logical inconsistency.” Instead, in a “true” inconsistent verdict “an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count.” Id. at 1019 (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see, e.g., Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. 1981) (reversing a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the defendant was convicted of only simple batter…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mantilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Gibbs v. State, 698 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.1997) (stating “[w]e do not find that the quantity requirement of trafficking possession is a separate element which allows dual prosecution of both trafficking possession and simple possession arising out of the same [illegal substance]”) 4 ; Robinson v. State, 901 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), citing Gibbs, 698 So.2d at 1206 and observing “Our supreme court has held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both trafficking possession of cocaine and simple possession of the ‘same’ cocaine.”); see also Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Smiley v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Cuevas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla.1979); see also Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McGee v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981)(defendant could not be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where the jury failed to find the defendant guilty of any felony). *24 The "true inconsistent verdict" exception does not apply in the instant case.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hicks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1981) (lesser included offense conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony reversed because jury acquitted defendant of the greater offense of aggravated battery). [2] We need not resolve these problems in this case, however, as the issue is not presented here in any form by any of the defendants; such questions must be left for another day with only a red flag warning as to the possible dangers involved for the state in charging greater and lesser included offenses in a single indictment or information.
Ricardo REDONDO, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
59032.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 23, 1981.
403 So. 2d 954
Boyd.
Cited by 75 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: #49,579 of 633,719
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Florida (1)

[*955] Peter Kutner, Law Office of Henry R. Carr, Miami, for petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., James H. Greason and Theda R. James, Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before the Court on petition for certiorari to review the decision in Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). We find express and direct conflict with Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979), and therefore have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Petitioner was charged by a two-count information with aggravated battery and the unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in the commission of a felony. The case was tried before a jury. On the aggravated battery charge, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery. On the firearm charge, the jury found petitioner guilty as charged of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

The trial court initially entered judgment on both convictions, but later granted a motion for arrest of judgment on the firearm charge on the ground that it was inconsistent with the jury's acquittal of petitioner on the underlying felony charge.

On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment of conviction of simple battery due to an error the trial court made in instructing the jury. The case was ordered remanded for a new trial on a charge of simple battery, since a re-trial of the aggravated battery accusation was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The state cross-appealed the trial court's order in arrest of judgment on the firearm charge. The district court reversed the order, reasoning that although technically inconsistent with the jury's verdict on the underlying felony charge, the guilty verdict for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was within the power of the jury to return. Although holding that the trial court erred, the appellate court declined to simply reinstate the judgment, since the same error in jury instructions that called for a new trial on the battery accusation also required one on the firearm possession charge. The court remanded for a new trial for the misdemeanor of simple battery and the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

In Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979), the appellants were charged with third-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. Patricia Mahaun was found guilty by the jury of third-degree felony murder and child abuse by culpable negligence, a lesser included misdemeanor of the felony of aggravated child abuse. We concluded that by returning the verdict of guilty of the misdemeanor the jury had acquitted her of the felony of aggravated child abuse. We held that since the felony of aggravated child abuse was an essential[*956] element of the felony murder, Mrs. Mahaun could not be convicted on the latter charge.

In the present case the jury in effect acquitted petitioner of the felonies of aggravated battery and attempted aggravated battery when it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery, a misdemeanor. The existence of a felony or an attempted felony is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. § 790.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1977).[1] Therefore, petitioner may not be convicted of that crime. A conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must stand or fall in conjunction with the underlying felony. Ferrell v. State, 358 So.2d 843 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 366 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1979).

That portion of the district court decision that reversed the trial court's order in arrest of judgment is quashed. We remand the case to the district court with directions to reinstate the trial court's order and to remand for a new trial on the charge of simple battery.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.

SUNDBERG, C.J., and ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.

1 Whoever, while committing or attempting to commit any felony or while under indictment, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any firearm or carries a concealed firearm is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, and s. 775.084.