Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). · Go Syfert
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Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Elver v. Whidden (flmd, 2020-01-08) · Strongest negative: Catalina Yachts v. Pierce (alaska, 2005-01-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Catalina Yachts v. Pierce (2×)
Alaska · 2005 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886, 887 (Fla.Dist.App.1997) (finding conflict between state offer of judgment statute and federal law where federal statute authorized fee awards for defendants in actions brought in bad faith without expressly limiting them to such actions). [22] See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 , 117 S.Ct. 1800 , 138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997). [23] See State Farm Fire & Cas.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elver v. Whidden
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Florida courts have determined that “because section 1988 allows the award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in a much more limited context than does section 768.79(1), section 1988 preempts section 768.79(1).” Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So. 2d 886, 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City National Bank of Florida v. City of Tampa
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
This court has recognized that in the context of a civil rights action brought pursuant to section 1983, “ ‘[a] prevailing defendant may recover an attorney’s fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.’ ” Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C.
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
In Moran v. City of Lakeland, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that a defendant could not recover attorneys’ fees under § 768.79 even though he had filed an otherwise valid offer of judgment because the underlying civil rights action limited attorneys’ fees to frivolous suits. 694 So.2d 886, 886-87 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited "see" Talbott v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moran, 694 So.2d at 887 .
discussed Cited "see" Chapman v. Laitner
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moran, 694 So.2d at 886 -87 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983))("A prevailing defendant [in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ,] may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.").
cited Cited "see" State v. Golden's Concrete Co.
Colo. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d, 886, 887 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." JES Properties, Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Keesee v. Bank of America, NA, 371 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1376-77 (M.D.Fla.2005)(holding Fla. Stat. § 768.79 did not apply in case arising under Title VII); see also Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886, 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). b.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." St. John v. Coisman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); see also Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that "a federal law preempts a state law where the two conflict") (citing Felder); Hernandez, v. Coopervision, Inc., 691 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("Thus, if it is possible to comply with both federal and state law, there is neither a conflict nor a frustrated purpose.") (citation omitted).
James R. MORAN, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LAKELAND, Appellee.
96-02166.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jun 13, 1997.
694 So. 2d 886
Whatley.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

Robert H. Grizzard, Lakeland, for Appellant.

Mark N. Miller of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellee.

WHATLEY, Judge.

James Moran appeals that part of the order awarding the City of Lakeland attorney's fees pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. We reverse.

Moran filed an action against the City of Lakeland alleging deprivation of his civil rights under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, but Moran declined. The City then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. As a result, the City sought its attorney's fees and costs from the date of the offer through the date summary judgment was entered. The trial court granted the City's motion to tax fees and costs and entered an order accordingly. Moran only challenges that part of the order awarding attorney's fees.

We agree with Moran that the trial court erred in awarding the City attorney's fees. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a federal law preempts a state law where the two conflict. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962).

An offer of judgment filed pursuant to rule 1.442 is governed by section 768.79 as the rule merely incorporates the procedural portion of this statute as a rule of court. Section 768.79(1) provides in pertinent part that a defendant whose offer of judgment is rejected by the plaintiff and who obtains a judgment of no liability may recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees from the plaintiff.

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorizes the award of a reasonable fee to the prevailing party in a civil rights action brought pursuant to section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. "A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,[*887] 429, n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, n. 2, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

Thus, because section 1988 allows the award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in a much more limited context than does section 768.79(1), section 1988 preempts section 768.79(1). See Garan Inc. v. M/V Aivik, 907 F.Supp. 397 (S.D.Fla.1995) (section 769.78 offer of judgment is not applicable in a federal admiralty case because it is a substantive rule in direct conflict with federal maritime law expressly requiring each party to pay their own fees); Petsche v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 607 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (state statute mandating assessment of attorney's fees against insurers of ERISA plan is preempted by ERISA, which provides for discretionary award of said fees); Brooks v. Elliott, 593 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (error to dismiss section 1983 complaint for failure to comply with notice requirement of section 768.28 because federal law preempts imposition of such a requirement).

The City specifically stated at the hearing on its motion for attorney's fees and costs that the motion was filed pursuant to rule 1.442. In light of the preemption of that rule by section 1988 under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in granting the City's motion with regard to attorney's fees.

Accordingly, we reverse the order awarding the City attorney's fees.

PARKER, A.C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur.