Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (2025)

Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; civil liability for damages caused during a riot; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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768.28 Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; civil liability for damages caused during a riot; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs.—

(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. Any such action may be brought in the county where the property in litigation is located or, if the affected agency or subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued. However, any such action against a state university board of trustees shall be brought in the county in which that university’s main campus is located or in the county in which the cause of action accrued if the university maintains therein a substantial presence for the transaction of its customary business.

(2) As used in this act, “state agencies or subdivisions” include the executive departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch (including public defenders), and the independent establishments of the state, including state university boards of trustees; counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or municipalities, including the Florida Space Authority.

(3) Except for a municipality and the Florida Space Authority, the affected agency or subdivision may, at its discretion, request the assistance of the Department of Financial Services in the consideration, adjustment, and settlement of any claim under this act.

(4) Subject to the provisions of this section, any state agency or subdivision shall have the right to appeal any award, compromise, settlement, or determination to the court of appropriate jurisdiction.

(5)(a) The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment. Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the sum of $200,000 or any claim or judgment, or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other claims or judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of $300,000. However, a judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid pursuant to this act up to $200,000 or $300,000, as the case may be; and that portion of the judgment that exceeds these amounts may be reported to the Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by further act of the Legislature. Notwithstanding the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided herein, the state or an agency or subdivision thereof may agree, within the limits of insurance coverage provided, to settle a claim made or a judgment rendered against it without further action by the Legislature, but the state or agency or subdivision thereof shall not be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity or to have increased the limits of its liability as a result of its obtaining insurance coverage for tortious acts in excess of the $200,000 or $300,000 waiver provided above. The limitations of liability set forth in this subsection shall apply to the state and its agencies and subdivisions whether or not the state or its agencies or subdivisions possessed sovereign immunity before July 1, 1974.

(b) A municipality has a duty to allow the municipal law enforcement agency to respond appropriately to protect persons and property during a riot or an unlawful assembly based on the availability of adequate equipment to its municipal law enforcement officers and relevant state and federal laws. If the governing body of a municipality or a person authorized by the governing body of the municipality breaches that duty, the municipality is civilly liable for any damages, including damages arising from personal injury, wrongful death, or property damages proximately caused by the municipality’s breach of duty. The sovereign immunity recovery limits in paragraph (a) do not apply to an action under this paragraph.

(6)(a) An action may not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, county, or the Florida Space Authority, presents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing; except that, if:

1. Such claim is for contribution pursuant to s. 768.31, it must be so presented within 6 months after the judgment against the tortfeasor seeking contribution has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review or, if there is no such judgment, within 6 months after the tortfeasor seeking contribution has either discharged the common liability by payment or agreed, while the action is pending against her or him, to discharge the common liability; or

2. Such action is for wrongful death, the claimant must present the claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services within 2 years after the claim accrues.

(b) For purposes of this section, the requirements of notice to the agency and denial of the claim pursuant to paragraph (a) are conditions precedent to maintaining an action but shall not be deemed to be elements of the cause of action and shall not affect the date on which the cause of action accrues.

(c) The claimant shall also provide to the agency the claimant’s date and place of birth and social security number if the claimant is an individual, or a federal identification number if the claimant is not an individual. The claimant shall also state the case style, tribunal, the nature and amount of all adjudicated penalties, fines, fees, victim restitution fund, and other judgments in excess of $200, whether imposed by a civil, criminal, or administrative tribunal, owed by the claimant to the state, its agency, officer or subdivision. If there exists no prior adjudicated unpaid claim in excess of $200, the claimant shall so state.

(d) For purposes of this section, complete, accurate, and timely compliance with the requirements of paragraph (c) shall occur prior to settlement payment, close of discovery or commencement of trial, whichever is sooner; provided the ability to plead setoff is not precluded by the delay. This setoff shall apply only against that part of the settlement or judgment payable to the claimant, minus claimant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of unpaid adjudicated claims due the state, its agency, officer, or subdivision, may be excused by the court upon a showing by the preponderance of the evidence of the claimant’s lack of knowledge of an adjudicated claim and reasonable inquiry by, or on behalf of, the claimant to obtain the information from public records. Unless the appropriate agency had actual notice of the information required to be disclosed by paragraph (c) in time to assert a setoff, an unexcused failure to disclose shall, upon hearing and order of court, cause the claimant to be liable for double the original undisclosed judgment and, upon further motion, the court shall enter judgment for the agency in that amount. Except as provided otherwise in this subsection, the failure of the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within 6 months after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. For purposes of this subsection, in medical malpractice actions and in wrongful death actions, the failure of the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within 90 days after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions and wrongful death actions is tolled for the period of time taken by the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency to deny the claim. The provisions of this subsection do not apply to such claims as may be asserted by counterclaim pursuant to s. 768.14.

(7) In actions brought pursuant to this section, process shall be served upon the head of the agency concerned and also, except as to a defendant municipality, county, or the Florida Space Authority, upon the Department of Financial Services; and the department or the agency concerned shall have 30 days within which to plead thereto.

(8) No attorney may charge, demand, receive, or collect, for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 percent of any judgment or settlement.

(9)(a) An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. However, such officer, employee, or agent shall be considered an adverse witness in a tort action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function. The exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered as a result of an act, event, or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional officers is by action against the governmental entity, or the head of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee, unless such act or omission was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. The state or its subdivisions are not liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course and scope of her or his employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

(b) As used in this subsection, the term:

1. “Employee” includes any volunteer firefighter.

2. “Officer, employee, or agent” includes, but is not limited to, any health care provider when providing services pursuant to s. 766.1115; any nonprofit independent college or university located and chartered in this state which owns or operates an accredited medical school, and its employees or agents, when providing patient services pursuant to paragraph (10)(f); any public defender or her or his employee or agent, including an assistant public defender or an investigator; and any member of a Child Protection Team, as defined in s. 39.01, or any member of a threat management team, as described in s. 1006.07(7), when carrying out her or his duties as a team member under the control, direction, and supervision of the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions.

(c) For purposes of the waiver of sovereign immunity only, a member of the Florida National Guard is not acting within the scope of state employment when performing duty under the provisions of Title 10 or Title 32 of the United States Code or other applicable federal law; and neither the state nor any individual may be named in any action under this chapter arising from the performance of such federal duty.

(d) The employing agency of a law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10 is not liable for injury, death, or property damage effected or caused by a person fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle if:

1. The pursuit is conducted in a manner that does not involve conduct by the officer which is so reckless or wanting in care as to constitute disregard of human life, human rights, safety, or the property of another;

2. At the time the law enforcement officer initiates the pursuit, the officer reasonably believes that the person fleeing has committed a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08; and

3. The pursuit is conducted by the officer pursuant to a written policy governing high-speed pursuit adopted by the employing agency. The policy must contain specific procedures concerning the proper method to initiate and terminate high-speed pursuit. The law enforcement officer must have received instructional training from the employing agency on the written policy governing high-speed pursuit.

(10)(a) Health care providers or vendors, or any of their employees or agents, that have contractually agreed to act as agents of the Department of Corrections to provide health care services to inmates of the state correctional system shall be considered agents of the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, for the purposes of this section, while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in said contract or by rule. The contracts shall provide for the indemnification of the state by the agent for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter.

(b) This subsection shall not be construed as designating persons providing contracted health care services to inmates as employees or agents of the state for the purposes of chapter 440.

(c) For purposes of this section, regional poison control centers created in accordance with s. 395.1027 and coordinated and supervised under the Division of Children’s Medical Services Prevention and Intervention of the Department of Health, or any of their employees or agents, shall be considered agents of the State of Florida, Department of Health. Any contracts with poison control centers must provide, to the extent permitted by law, for the indemnification of the state by the agency for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter.

(d) For the purposes of this section, operators, dispatchers, and providers of security for rail services and rail facility maintenance providers in the South Florida Rail Corridor, or any of their employees or agents, performing such services under contract with and on behalf of the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority or the Department of Transportation shall be considered agents of the state while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in said contract or by rule.

(e) For purposes of this section, a professional firm that provides monitoring and inspection services of the work required for state roadway, bridge, or other transportation facility construction projects, or any employee of a firm performing such services, is considered an agent of the Department of Transportation while acting within the scope of the firm’s contract with the Department of Transportation to ensure that the project is constructed in conformity with the project’s plans, specifications, and contract provisions. This paragraph applies to a professional firm that is in direct contract with the Department of Transportation, as well as any professional firm providing monitoring and inspection services as a consultant to the professional firm that is in direct contract with the Department of Transportation. Any contract with a professional firm must, to the extent permitted by law, provide for the indemnification of the Department of Transportation for any liability, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter to the extent caused by the negligence of the firm or its employees. This paragraph may not be construed as designating persons who provide monitoring and inspection services as employees or agents of the state for purposes of chapter 440. This paragraph is not applicable to the professional firm or its employees if involved in an accident while operating a motor vehicle. This paragraph is not applicable to a firm engaged by the Department of Transportation for the design or construction of a state roadway, bridge, or other transportation facility construction project or to its employees, agents, or subcontractors.

(f) For purposes of this section, any nonprofit independent college or university located and chartered in this state which owns or operates an accredited medical school, or any of its employees or agents, and which has agreed in an affiliation agreement or other contract to provide, or permit its employees or agents to provide, patient services as agents of a teaching hospital, is considered an agent of the teaching hospital while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in the affiliation agreement or other contract. To the extent allowed by law, the contract must provide for the indemnification of the teaching hospital, up to the limits set out in this chapter, by the agent for any liability incurred which was caused by the negligence of the college or university or its employees or agents. The contract must also provide that those limited portions of the college, university, or medical school which are directly providing services pursuant to the contract and which are considered an agent of the teaching hospital for purposes of this section are deemed to be acting on behalf of a public agency as defined in s. 119.011(2).

1. For purposes of this paragraph, the term:

a. “Employee or agent” means an officer, employee, agent, or servant of a nonprofit independent college or university located and chartered in this state which owns or operates an accredited medical school, including, but not limited to, the faculty of the medical school, any health care practitioner or licensee as defined in s. 456.001 for which the college or university is vicariously liable, and the staff or administrators of the medical school.

b. “Patient services” means:

(I) Comprehensive health care services as defined in s. 641.19, including any related administrative service, provided to patients in a teaching hospital;

(II) Training and supervision of interns, residents, and fellows providing patient services in a teaching hospital; or

(III) Training and supervision of medical students in a teaching hospital.

c. “Teaching hospital” means a teaching hospital as defined in s. 408.07 which is owned or operated by the state, a county or municipality, a public health trust, a special taxing district, a governmental entity having health care responsibilities, or a not-for-profit entity that operates such facility as an agent of the state, or a political subdivision of the state, under a lease or other contract.

2. The teaching hospital or the medical school, or its employees or agents, must provide notice to each patient, or the patient’s legal representative, that the college or university that owns or operates the medical school and the employees or agents of that college or university are acting as agents of the teaching hospital and that the exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered as the result of any act or omission of the teaching hospital, the college or university that owns or operates the medical school, or the employees or agents of the college or university, while acting within the scope of duties pursuant to the affiliation agreement or other contract with a teaching hospital, is by commencement of an action pursuant to the provisions of this section. This notice requirement may be met by posting the notice in a place conspicuous to all persons.

3. This paragraph does not designate any employee providing contracted patient services in a teaching hospital as an employee or agent of the state for purposes of chapter 440.

(g) For the purposes of this section, the executive director of the Board of Nursing, when serving as the state administrator of the Nurse Licensure Compact pursuant to s. 464.0095, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the Interstate Commission of Nurse Licensure Compact Administrators, when acting within the scope of their employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, are considered agents of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(h) For purposes of this section, the individual appointed under s. 491.004(8) as the state’s delegate on the Counseling Compact Commission, when serving in that capacity pursuant to s. 491.017, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the commission, when acting within the scope of his or her employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, is considered an agent of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(i) For purposes of this section, the individual appointed under s. 490.004(7) as the state’s commissioner on the Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact Commission, when serving in that capacity pursuant to s. 490.0075, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact Commission, when acting within the scope of his or her employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, is considered an agent of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(j) For purposes of this section, the representative appointed from the Board of Medicine and the representative appointed from the Board of Osteopathic Medicine, when serving as commissioners of the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission pursuant to s. 456.4501, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission, when acting within the scope of their employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, are considered agents of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(k) For purposes of this section, the individuals appointed under s. 468.1135(4) as the state’s delegates on the Audiology and Speech-Language Pathology Interstate Compact Commission, when serving in that capacity pursuant to s. 468.1335, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the commission, when acting within the scope of his or her employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, is considered an agent of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(l) For purposes of this section, the individual appointed under s. 486.023(5) as the state’s delegate on the Physical Therapy Compact Commission, when serving in that capacity pursuant to s. 486.112, and any administrator, officer, executive director, employee, or representative of the Physical Therapy Compact Commission, when acting within the scope of his or her employment, duties, or responsibilities in this state, is considered an agent of the state. The commission shall pay any claims or judgments pursuant to this section and may maintain insurance coverage to pay any such claims or judgments.

(11)(a) Providers or vendors, or any of their employees or agents, that have contractually agreed to act on behalf of the state as agents of the Department of Juvenile Justice to provide services to children in need of services, families in need of services, or juvenile offenders are, solely with respect to such services, agents of the state for purposes of this section while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in the contract or by rule. A contract must provide for the indemnification of the state by the agent for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter.

(b) This subsection does not designate a person who provides contracted services to juvenile offenders as an employee or agent of the state for purposes of chapter 440.

(12)(a) A health care practitioner, as defined in s. 456.001(4), who has contractually agreed to act as an agent of a state university board of trustees to provide medical services to a student athlete for participation in or as a result of intercollegiate athletics, to include team practices, training, and competitions, shall be considered an agent of the respective state university board of trustees, for the purposes of this section, while acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in that contract. The contracts shall provide for the indemnification of the state by the agent for any liabilities incurred up to the limits set out in this chapter.

(b) This subsection shall not be construed as designating persons providing contracted health care services to athletes as employees or agents of a state university board of trustees for the purposes of chapter 440.

(13) Laws allowing the state or its agencies or subdivisions to buy insurance are still in force and effect and are not restricted in any way by the terms of this act.

(14) Every claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section shall be forever barred unless the civil action is commenced by filing a complaint in the court of appropriate jurisdiction within 4 years after such claim accrues; except that an action for contribution must be commenced within the limitations provided in s. 768.31(4), and an action for damages arising from medical malpractice or wrongful death must be commenced within the limitations for such actions in s. 95.11(5).

(15) No action may be brought against the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions by anyone who unlawfully participates in a riot, unlawful assembly, public demonstration, mob violence, or civil disobedience if the claim arises out of such riot, unlawful assembly, public demonstration, mob violence, or civil disobedience. Nothing in this act shall abridge traditional immunities pertaining to statements made in court.

(16)(a) The state and its agencies and subdivisions are authorized to be self-insured, to enter into risk management programs, or to purchase liability insurance for whatever coverage they may choose, or to have any combination thereof, in anticipation of any claim, judgment, and claims bill which they may be liable to pay pursuant to this section. Agencies or subdivisions, and sheriffs, that are subject to homogeneous risks may purchase insurance jointly or may join together as self-insurers to provide other means of protection against tort claims, any charter provisions or laws to the contrary notwithstanding.

(b) Claims files maintained by any risk management program administered by the state, its agencies, and its subdivisions are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident, although portions of the claims files may remain exempt, as otherwise provided by law. Claims files records may be released to other governmental agencies upon written request and demonstration of need; such records held by the receiving agency remain confidential and exempt as provided for in this paragraph.

(c) Portions of meetings and proceedings conducted pursuant to any risk management program administered by the state, its agencies, or its subdivisions, which relate solely to the evaluation of claims filed with the risk management program or which relate solely to offers of compromise of claims filed with the risk management program are exempt from the provisions of s. 286.011 and s. 24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution. Until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident, persons privy to discussions pertinent to the evaluation of a filed claim shall not be subject to subpoena in any administrative or civil proceeding with regard to the content of those discussions.

(d) Minutes of the meetings and proceedings of any risk management program administered by the state, its agencies, or its subdivisions, which relate solely to the evaluation of claims filed with the risk management program or which relate solely to offers of compromise of claims filed with the risk management program are exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until termination of all litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident.

(17) This section, as amended by chapter 81-317, Laws of Florida, shall apply only to causes of actions which accrue on or after October 1, 1981.

(18) No provision of this section, or of any other section of the Florida Statutes, whether read separately or in conjunction with any other provision, shall be construed to waive the immunity of the state or any of its agencies from suit in federal court, as such immunity is guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, unless such waiver is explicitly and definitely stated to be a waiver of the immunity of the state and its agencies from suit in federal court. This subsection shall not be construed to mean that the state has at any time previously waived, by implication, its immunity, or that of any of its agencies, from suit in federal court through any statute in existence prior to June 24, 1984.

(19) Neither the state nor any agency or subdivision of the state waives any defense of sovereign immunity, or increases the limits of its liability, upon entering into a contractual relationship with another agency or subdivision of the state. Such a contract must not contain any provision that requires one party to indemnify or insure the other party for the other party’s negligence or to assume any liability for the other party’s negligence. This does not preclude a party from requiring a nongovernmental entity to provide such indemnification or insurance. The restrictions of this subsection do not prevent a regional water supply authority from indemnifying and assuming the liabilities of its member governments for obligations arising from past acts or omissions at or with property acquired from a member government by the authority and arising from the acts or omissions of the authority in performing activities contemplated by an interlocal agreement. Such indemnification may not be considered to increase or otherwise waive the limits of liability to third-party claimants established by this section.

(20) Every municipality, and any agency thereof, is authorized to undertake to indemnify those employees that are exposed to personal liability pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. ss. 7401 et seq., and all rules and regulations adopted to implement that act, for acts performed within the course and scope of their employment with the municipality or its agency, including but not limited to indemnification pertaining to the holding, transfer, or disposition of allowances allocated to the municipality’s or its agency’s electric generating units, and the monitoring, submission, certification, and compliance with permits, permit applications, records, compliance plans, and reports for those units, when such acts are performed within the course and scope of their employment with the municipality or its agency. The authority to indemnify under this section covers every act by an employee when such act is performed within the course and scope of her or his employment with the municipality or its agency, but does not cover any act of willful misconduct or any intentional or knowing violation of any law by the employee. The authority to indemnify under this section includes, but is not limited to, the authority to pay any fine and provide legal representation in any action.

History.—s. 1, ch. 73-313; s. 1, ch. 74-235; ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 77-86; s. 9, ch. 79-139; s. 1, ch. 79-253; s. 284, ch. 79-400; s. 1, ch. 80-271; ss. 1, 2, ch. 81-317; s. 1, ch. 83-44; s. 1, ch. 83-257; s. 1, ch. 84-29; s. 1, ch. 84-335; s. 21, ch. 86-183; s. 1, ch. 86-184; s. 3, ch. 87-134; s. 2, ch. 88-173; ss. 55, 61, ch. 89-300; s. 92, ch. 89-360; s. 8, ch. 90-192; s. 3, ch. 91-209; s. 112, ch. 92-33; ss. 2, 11, ch. 92-278; s. 1, ch. 93-89; s. 34, ch. 93-129; s. 1, ch. 94-76; s. 2, ch. 94-147; s. 70, ch. 94-209; s. 21, ch. 94-321; s. 428, ch. 96-406; s. 34, ch. 97-93; s. 1809, ch. 97-102; s. 4, ch. 98-402; s. 289, ch. 99-8; s. 9, ch. 2000-155; s. 97, ch. 2002-20; s. 24, ch. 2002-183; s. 2, ch. 2002-401; s. 9, ch. 2003-159; s. 1903, ch. 2003-261; s. 1, ch. 2003-290; s. 67, ch. 2003-416; s. 1, ch. 2006-234; s. 1, ch. 2010-26; s. 1, ch. 2011-113; s. 3, ch. 2011-219; s. 126, ch. 2012-184; s. 12, ch. 2016-139; s. 33, ch. 2017-175; s. 3, ch. 2021-6; s. 1, ch. 2021-147; s. 10, ch. 2022-63; s. 125, ch. 2023-8; s. 3, ch. 2023-18; s. 8, ch. 2023-140; ss. 54, 59, 70, ch. 2024-15; s. 13, ch. 2024-183; s. 1, ch. 2024-271.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,442 cases (278 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, etc. v. State of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2017).

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Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, etc. v. State of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 106× “ANALYSIS Standards of Review Searcy Denney’s challenge to the fee limitation in the claims bill enacted in chapter 2012-249, Laws of Florida, is primarily based on contentions that the fee limitation is unconstitutional and that the district court misinterpreted the provisions…”

Am. Home Assur. v. NAT. RR CORP., 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005). · cites it 70× “The second question asks whether, given that the Kissimmee Utility Authority, a municipal agency, contractually agreed to indemnify a private party, the agreement is controlled by the restrictions on waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997).…”

Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). · cites it 48× “It is our task today to determine the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from the enactment of chapter 73-313, as amended by chapter 74-235, Laws of Florida, section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). [1] The issue reaches us by writ of certiorari from two…”

Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012). · cites it 54× “Each defendant asserted immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2005). At issue in this case is Keck’s claim of individual immunity pursuant to section 768.”

Maggio v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & Emp. SEC., 899 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2005). · cites it 47× “Section 768.28 is titled, "Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; *1078 exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs.”

Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009). · cites it 30× “When addressing the issue of governmental liability under Florida law, we have repeatedly recognized that a duty analysis [13] is conceptually distinct from any later inquiry regarding whether the governmental entity remains sovereignly immune from suit notwithstanding the…”

Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 42× “In Commercial Carrier we addressed the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). We recognized the broadness of the legislative waiver [6] and rejected various arguments designed to restrict its scope: (1) that the waiver…”

Keck v. Eminisor, 46 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 149× “Each of the defendants also invoked section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and asserted some level of immunity from tort liability.”

Eric Green v. Calvin Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 31× “The district court noted that section 768.28, enacted in 1973, applies to “[e]very claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section .”

Trianon Park Condo. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 21× “The district court certified the following question: Whether under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), as construed in Commercial Carrier Corp.”

Eiras v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2017). · cites it 21× “” Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (9)(a). Thus: in order for a plaintiff to succeed in piercing the statutory immunity defense, he must make a good faith allegation in the complaint that the public office official either acted outside the scope of his employment or in bad faith.”

& SC13-1874 Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc. & Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc., 175 So. 3d 724 (Fla. 2015). · cites it 32× “The trial court denied UCFAA’s motion for summary judgment, which had argued that UCFAA is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2008). Id.”

Show all 1,442 citing cases →

— 768.28(1) — 144 cases

Am. Home Assur. v. NAT. RR CORP., 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005). “The second question asks whether, given that the Kissimmee Utility Authority, a municipal agency, contractually agreed to indemnify a private party, the agreement is controlled by the restrictions on waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997).…”

Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, etc. v. State of Florida, 209 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2017). “ANALYSIS Standards of Review Searcy Denney’s challenge to the fee limitation in the claims bill enacted in chapter 2012-249, Laws of Florida, is primarily based on contentions that the fee limitation is unconstitutional and that the district court misinterpreted the provisions…”

Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). “It is our task today to determine the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity resulting from the enactment of chapter 73-313, as amended by chapter 74-235, Laws of Florida, section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). [1] The issue reaches us by writ of certiorari from two…”

Pollock v. Florida Dept. of High. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).

Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009). “When addressing the issue of governmental liability under Florida law, we have repeatedly recognized that a duty analysis [13] is conceptually distinct from any later inquiry regarding whether the governmental entity remains sovereignly immune from suit notwithstanding the…”

— 768.28(10) — 13 cases

Avallone v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs Citrus Cty., 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986).

Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).

Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985). “In Commercial Carrier we addressed the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975). We recognized the broadness of the legislative waiver [6] and rejected various arguments designed to restrict its scope: (1) that the waiver…”

Ingraham Ex Rel. Ingraham v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984).

— 768.28(10)(a) — 8 cases

Florida Dept. of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2007).

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Crews v. Florida Pub. Employers Council 79, 113 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Abril v. Dep't of Corr., 884 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Mingo v. Ara Health Servs., Inc., 638 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

— 768.28(10)(e) — 3 cases

Posen Constr., Inc. v. Lee Cnty., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

Hntb Corp. v. Caitlin Milstead, Etc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).

Johnson Bros. Corp. v. WSP USA, Inc. (M.D. Fla. 2024).

— 768.28(10)(f) — 1 case

Bean v. Univ. of Miami, 252 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

— 768.28(11) — 13 cases

Pub. Health Trust v. Menendez, 584 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1991).

Vargas v. Glades Gen. Hosp., 566 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

Whitney v. Marion Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 416 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

Menendez v. Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cty., 566 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

Twigg v. Hosp. Dist. of Hardee Cnty., Fla., 731 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. Fla. 1990).

— 768.28(11)(a) — 2 cases

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Dahl v. Eckerd Fam. Youth Alternatives, Inc., 843 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

— 768.28(12) — 17 cases

Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2002).

Platt Ex Rel. Platt v. Dept. of Health & Rehab., 659 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Beard v. Hambrick, 396 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1981).

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 436 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

— 768.28(13) — 13 cases

Nat'l Auto Serv. Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2002).

Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000).

Gabriel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 515 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Gerard v. Dept. of Transp., 472 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985).

— 768.28(14) — 20 cases

Eric Green v. Calvin Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 2016). “The district court noted that section 768.28, enacted in 1973, applies to “[e]very claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section .”

Green v. Cottrell, 172 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Doe ex rel. Doe's Mother v. Sinrod, 90 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Calhoun v. Nienhuis, 110 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

Halveland v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 219 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

— 768.28(14)(a) — 1 case

Florida Mun. Liab. Self Insurers Prog. v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

— 768.28(15) — 1 case

United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Phillips, 740 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

— 768.28(15)(a) — 4 cases

Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000).

Comesanas v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 700 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

Zeichner v. City of Lauderhill, 732 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amato, 667 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

— 768.28(16) — 7 cases

Thomas A. Schopler, D.D.S. v. Rupert Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990).

Magula v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 742 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990).

Connor v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (M.D. Fla. 2001).

Tennant v. Florida, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

Orange Ridge, Inc. v. State of Fla., 696 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Fla. 1988).

— 768.28(16)(b) — 2 cases

Wagner v. Orange Cnty., 960 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

City of Homestead v. McDonough (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

— 768.28(17) — 3 cases

Nana's Petroleum, Inc. v. Clark (In Re Nana's Petroleum, Inc.), 234 B.R. 838 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 1999).

Tennant v. Florida, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

Horn v. State, Dep't of Transp., 665 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

— 768.28(18) — 7 cases

Fla. Dept. of Nat. Resources v. Garcia, 753 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2000).

Posen Constr., Inc. v. Lee Cnty., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

Brown v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Saintcy v. Florida Dep't of Revenue Child Support Prog. (S.D. Fla. 2024).

— 768.28(19) — 1 case

— 768.28(2) — 52 cases

Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012). “Each defendant asserted immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2005). At issue in this case is Keck’s claim of individual immunity pursuant to section 768.”

& SC13-1874 Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc. & Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc., 175 So. 3d 724 (Fla. 2015). “The trial court denied UCFAA’s motion for summary judgment, which had argued that UCFAA is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2008). Id.”

Keck v. Eminisor, 46 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “Each of the defendants also invoked section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and asserted some level of immunity from tort liability.”

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

— 768.28(3) — 2 cases

Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1983).

Turner v. Gallagher, 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

— 768.28(5) — 178 cases

Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).

— 768.28(5)(1999) — 1 case

City of Pompano Beach v. Stefanko, 791 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

— 768.28(5)(a) — 8 cases

Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc., & Univ. of Florida Bd. of Trs. (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc., & Univ. of Florida Bd. of Trs. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

McCrimmon v. Centurion of Florida, LLC (M.D. Fla. 2022).

Curry v. Jenkins (M.D. Fla. 2023).

— 768.28(5)(b) — 1 case

Dream Defenders v. Desantis (N.D. Fla. 2021).

— 768.28(6) — 206 cases

Maggio v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & Emp. SEC., 899 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2005). “Section 768.28 is titled, "Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions; recovery limits; limitation on attorney fees; statute of limitations; *1078 exclusions; indemnification; risk management programs.”

Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1983).

Bifulco v. Patient Bus. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 39 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2010).

Rumler v. Dep't of Corr., Florida, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2008).

— 768.28(6)(A) — 2 cases

Debose v. Univ. of South Florida, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2016).

White v. Fl. Hwy. Patrol, Div. of Fl. Dept. of Hwy., 928 F. Supp. 1153 (M.D. Fla. 1996).

— 768.28(6)(a) — 143 cases

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 2009).

Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999).

Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Reyes, 688 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1996).

— 768.28(6)(b) — 26 cases

Florida Med. Ctr. v. DEPT. OF HRS, 511 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

McSwain v. Dussia, 499 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

VonDrasek v. City of St. Petersburg, 777 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

Nelson v. Hillsborough Cnty., Florida, 189 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Ross v. Jim Adams Ford, Inc., 871 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

— 768.28(6)(c) — 5 cases

Williams v. Henderson, 687 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Aitcheson v. Florida Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Vehs., 117 So. 3d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Howarth v. City of New Port Richey (M.D. Fla. 2019).

Jordan M. Anderson v. the Sch. Bd. of Escambia Cnty. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).

King v. Lee Cnty. (M.D. Fla. 2025).

— 768.28(6)(d) — 10 cases

Rumler v. Dep't of Corr., Florida, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2008).

Ross v. Jim Adams Ford, Inc., 871 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

VonDrasek v. City of St. Petersburg, 777 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

Williams v. Henderson, 687 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

McCoy v. Pinellas Cnty., 920 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

— 768.28(7) — 30 cases

Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Acanda, 71 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2011).

Turner v. Gallagher, 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

Cole v. Dep't of Corr., 840 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 889 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1983).

— 768.28(8) — 18 cases

Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. State, 194 So. 3d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Ingraham Ex Rel. Ingraham v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984).

Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. v. Esposito, 991 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

DeAlmeida v. Graham, 524 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).

— 768.28(9) — 126 cases

Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982).

Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Pozos, 242 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

Holmes Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1995).

Dist. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cty. v. Talmadge, 381 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1980).

— 768.28(9)(a) — 338 cases

Eiras v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2017). “” Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (9)(a). Thus: in order for a plaintiff to succeed in piercing the statutory immunity defense, he must make a good faith allegation in the complaint that the public office official either acted outside the scope of his employment or in bad faith.”

Keck v. Eminisor, 46 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “Each of the defendants also invoked section 768.28, Florida Statutes, and asserted some level of immunity from tort liability.”

Casado v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 340 F. Supp. 3d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2018).

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

— 768.28(9)(b) — 2 cases

Bean v. Univ. of Miami, 252 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

Bates v. Sahasranaman, 522 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 768.28(9)(b)(2) — 2 cases

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Kellianne Naso, as Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Allan Dwoskin v. Ronald Hall, G4s Secure Solutions (usa) Inc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

— 768.28(9)(c) — 1 case

Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

— 768.28(9)(d) — 2 cases

David L. Ross v. City of Jacksonville, 274 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

City of Tampa v. Foottit, Foottit (Fla. 2d DCA 2024).

— 768.28(9)(d)(1) — 1 case

David L. Ross v. City of Jacksonville, 274 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

— 768.28(9)(d)(2) — 1 case

David L. Ross v. City of Jacksonville, 274 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

— 768.28(ll)(a) — 1 case

Peak v. Outward Bound, Inc., 57 So. 3d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.