Lee Cnty. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). · Go Syfert
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Lee Cnty. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“statutory construction is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels' legal arguments, not by way of 'expert opinion.”
8 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Gyongyosi v. Miller (fladistctapp, 2012-02-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Gyongyosi v. Miller
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
statutory construction is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels' legal arguments, not by way of 'expert opinion.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Strickland v. Timco Aviation Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Cf. In re Estate of Williams, 771 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Lee County v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So.2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); T.J.R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hann v. Balogh (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Construction of language in a deed “is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels’ legal arguments, not by way of ‘expert opinion.’ ” See Lee County v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So.2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (discussing expert opinion about statutory construction).
cited Cited "see" Brophy v. Condon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lee County v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So.2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
cited Cited "see" In Re Estate of Williams
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lee County v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So.2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." HSBC Bank USA v. Buset
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Lee Cty. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating that “[e]xpert testimony is not admissible concerning a question of law” because the resolution of legal issues “is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels’ legal arguments, not by way of ‘expert opinion’”). 5 (2) The note was a negotiable instrument under Florida law. (a) In General The trial court concluded that the note was non-negotiable for three different reasons.
LEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant,
v.
BARNETT BANKS, INC., Appellee.
96-01360.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 20, 1997.
711 So. 2d 34
Blue.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 64%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

James G. Yaeger, Lee County Attorney, and John J. Renner, Assistant County Attorney, Fort Myers, for Appellant.

Michael J. Ciccarone of Goldberg, Goldstein & Buckley, P.A., Fort Myers; and Robert L. Donald of Law Office of R.L. Donald, Fort Myers, for Appellee.

BLUE, Judge.

Lee County appeals the award of attorney's fees and costs in this eminent domain case. The primary issue in this case was recently decided in favor of the appellant. See Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So.2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Accordingly, we reverse.

We also reverse the $400 expert witness fee award. Barnett Bank called Mr. Hume to testify as an expert witness on the question of attorney's fees. Mr. Hume's testimony consisted only of his opinion as to the legal interpretation of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). We reverse the award, not because Mr. Hume was wrong, see Pierpont, but because his testimony was not a proper subject for expert testimony. Expert testimony is not admissible concerning a question of law. Statutory construction is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels' legal arguments, not by way of "expert opinion." See Edward J. Seibert v. Bayport Beach and Tennis Club Ass'n, Inc., 573 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla.1991); Devin v. City of Hollywood, 351 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).

Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney's fees and the expert witness fee, and remand for an award of attorney's fees in accordance with Pierpont.

ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

UPON CONSIDERATION, we deny the Appellee's motion for rehearing and clarification, but grant its motion to certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:

WHETHER THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY'S GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE OF VALUE CAN BE CONSIDERED AN "OFFER" FOR THE CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1994)?

[*35] Rehearing and clarification denied; question certified.

ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.