Ventura v. State, 741 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). · Go Syfert
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Ventura v. State, 741 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he opportunity to address the court must be allowed even if the case involves a mandatory sentence.”
15 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Davenport v. State (fladistctapp, 2001-02-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Davenport v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he opportunity to address the court must be allowed even if the case involves a mandatory sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sjon Jones v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
See Davenport v. State, 787 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing for a new sentencing hearing where the trial court refused to allow the appellant the opportunity to present evidence and argument during his sentencing hearing); Ventura v. State, 741 So. 2d 1187, 1188-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (reversing for a new sentencing hearing where the judge denied the defendant’s request for the opportunity to speak).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Ray Smith v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Davenport v. State, 787 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Ventura v. State, 741 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); see also Colette v. State, 881 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“Because the trial court refused to ‘entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence’ . . . , we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”) (quoting Petrucelli v. State, 855 So. 2d 150, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HARVEY MICHAEL HILL v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ventura v. State, 741 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hodierne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
And contrary to the State’s contention, it is not the legality of Hodierne’s sentence that is at issue; rather, it is due process and “[r]especting the right of the defendant to address the court [which] ‘maximizes] the perceived equity of the process.’ ” Ventura v. State, 741 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (third alteration in original) (quoting Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-5.17 cmt. at 208 (3d ed. 1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dean v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Ventura v. State, 741 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chillingworth v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Under the rule, the defendant was entitled to make a statement to the court," Ventura v. State, 741 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), as well as present matters in mitigation.
discussed Cited "see" Ryan v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ventura v. State, 741 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Barry v. State, 330 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Fla. R.Crim.
Ernesto VENTURA, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
98-2061.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sep 22, 1999.
741 So. 2d 1187
Schwartz, C.J., and Cope and Shevin.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

[*1188] Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Consuelo Maingot, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and SHEVIN, JJ.

COPE, J.

Defendant-appellant Ernesto Ventura appeals the sentence imposed after he failed to comply with certain provisions of his plea agreement. We reverse.

In July 1997 defendant entered into a substantial assistance plea under which, if he failed to appear for sentencing, he would be subject to a 60-year habitual offender sentence. Defendant was represented by privately-retained counsel, George Garcia. Defendant did not appear and a capias warrant was issued for his arrest. Defendant was subsequently arrested and a sentencing hearing was held in June 1998.

At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Garcia stated only that he had not been in contact with defendant since the July 1997 hearing on the substantial assistance agreement. Mr. Garcia did not offer any statement or evidence on behalf of defendant. Defendant then told the court that he had retained new counsel Sy Gaer, to attend the hearing and speak on his behalf. Because Mr. Gaer had not filed an appearance on behalf of defendant and was not present in the courtroom, the trial court refused to postpone the proceedings and imposed sentence. The court said it would make no difference in any event because the court interpreted the substantial assistance agreement to call for a 60-year sentence, regardless of the circumstances. Defendant asked the court for the opportunity to speak. The court refused that request as well. Defendant was sentenced to the 60-year habitual offender sentence and has appealed. We now reverse.

First, when defendant informed the trial court that he had retained new counsel, the court should have recessed the sentencing hearing to verify the retention and, if true, allowed new counsel to appear and be heard.

[*1189] Second, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(b), before imposing sentence the trial court is required to "entertain submissions and evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence." Under the rule, defendant was entitled to make a statement to the court. See Culbertson v. State, 306 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). As we view the matter, the opportunity to address the court must be allowed even if the case involves a mandatory sentence. Respecting the right of the defendant to address the court "maximiz[es] the perceived equity of the process...." American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-5.17 commentary at 208 (3d ed.1994). Where the court refuses to hear a statement by the defendant, the case must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. See Davis v. State, 642 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Hargis v. State, 451 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

On remand the parties should address the question whether the relevant part of the substantial assistance agreement in this case called for a mandatory 60-year term as a habitual offender, or whether the substantial assistance agreement gave the court discretion over the length of sentence. As summarized in the transcript, a failure to appear for sentencing would make the defendant "subject to" such a 60-year habitual offender sentence. The question is whether "subject to" allows the court discretion over sentence length.

Reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.