Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). · Go Syfert
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Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Regalado Lopez v. Regalado (fladistctapp, 2018-10-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Regalado Lopez v. Regalado
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Section 741.28(2) specifically defines domestic violence as “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.” When considering whether a petitioner has 11 reasonable cause to fear becoming the victim of imminent domestic violence, “the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the histor…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zapiola v. Kordecki
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Where “fear alone is the ‘reasonable cause’ alleged to support the injunction, then not only must the danger feared be imminent but the rationale for the fear must be objectively reasonable as well.” Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. Mitchell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
E.g. id. at 241; Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. Phillips
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
In determining whether the victim’s fear is reasonable, “the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.” Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Gustafson v. Mauek, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Branson v. Rodriguez-Linares
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
In Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the First District reversed a domestic violence injunction where the petitioner’s evidence included proof of “apparently innocuous” telephone calls.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Achurra v. Achurra
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Bresch v. Henderson, 761 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (on motion for reh’g) (supporting the proposition that for a final judgment to be affirmed, the record must demonstrate a sufficient basis for the conclusions of law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sc v. Ad
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Where, as in this case, "fear alone is the `reasonable cause' alleged to support the injunction, then not only must the danger feared be imminent but the rationale for the fear must be objectively reasonable as well." Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.C. v. A.D.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Where, as in this case, “fear alone is the ‘reasonable cause’ alleged to support the injunction, then not only must the danger feared be imminent but the rationale for the fear must be objectively reasonable as well.” Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moriggia v. Moriggia
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In determining whether the victim’s fear is reasonable, “the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.” Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Gustafson v. Maude, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)); see also 741.30(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randolph v. Rich (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In order for the trial court to issue an injunction for protection against domestic violence, the party seeking the injunction must establish that he or she has an objectively reasonable fear that he or she is in “imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Moore v. Hall, 786 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gill v. Gill
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides for the issuance of an injunction in favor of any family or household member, as defined in section 741.28(3), who is a victim of domestic violence or who “has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” Section 741.28(2) defines “domestic violence” as “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical inju…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Jones (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In determining whether the victim’s fear is reasonable, “the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.” Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Gustafson v. Maude, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)); see also § 741.30(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Malchan v. Howard
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Oettmeier v. Oettmeier (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Young v. Smith
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
However, in Giallanza , we held that the statutory definition of "domestic violence" requires some showing of violence or a threat of violence and that general harassment does not suffice. 787 So.2d at 165 (citing Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that harassing phone messages left on answering machine did not give petitioner any objectively reasonable grounds to fear that she was in imminent danger of violence)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Giallanza v. Giallanza
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Id.; Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited "see" Robinson v. Robinson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gustafson v. Mauck , 743 So.2d 614 , 615 -16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (concluding that in the absence of objectively reasonable evidence, a person's subjective belief of imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence is unsubstantiated speculation that does not support the entry of an injunction).
discussed Cited "see" Bacchus v. Bacchus
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that telephone calls to petitioner from former boyfriend failed to justify reasonable fear of imminent danger of becoming victim of domestic violence, despite parties’ history, when calls ceased at petitioner’s request).
discussed Cited "see" Morrell v. Chadick
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that "if fear alone is the `reasonable cause' alleged to support the injunction, then not only must the danger feared be imminent but the rationale for the fear must be objectively reasonable as well" (citing Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999))).
cited Cited "see" Palmerino v. Carter
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing § 741.30(1), Fla. Stat. (1997)).
cited Cited "see" Coleman v. Coleman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing section 741.30(1), Florida Statutes (1997)).
cited Cited "see" Moore v. Hall
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Dennis T. GUSTAFSON, Appellant,
v.
Rebecca MAUCK, Appellee.
98-3267.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct 20, 1999.
743 So. 2d 614
Benton.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #39,033 of 633,719
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (2)

Charles A. McMurry, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Maria Rodriguez, Grant Dearborn, Michael Reiter, and Albert Thorburn of Legal Services of North Florida, Inc., Quincy; Scott T. Manion, Legal Services of North Florida, Inc., Tallahassee; Stacey Pastel Dougan of Greenberg Traurig/Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence Alliance for Battered Women, Miami; Virginia Daire of Florida Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

[*615] ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

BENTON, J.

On motion for rehearing, we withdraw our prior opinion in this case and substitute the following as the opinion of the court. We reverse a permanent injunction against domestic violence entered against Dennis Gustafson at the behest of Rebecca Mauck.

Not quite two years after the expiration of an earlier injunction against domestic violence, Mr. Gustafson began placing telephone calls to Ms. Mauck that led to new proceedings and to entry of the injunction now under review. The earlier injunction is not at issue here.

In July of 1993, Mr. Gustafson and Ms. Mauck ended some seven years of cohabitation. While there was no evidence that physical violence ever marred the relationship, the end of their time together became contentious. A one-year injunction against domestic violence was entered against Mr. Gustafson on January 31, 1994.

Beginning in January of 1997, at first at intervals of two to three months, then more frequently, Mr. Gustafson left tape recorded messages requesting that Ms. Mauck call him. The parties did not actually speak again until November of 1997, according to Ms. Mauck. Then, in response to a telephone message Mr. Gustafson had left, requesting that she send him a recipe, she called him up and gave him the recipe over the telephone. She did not ask him to stop calling her or leaving messages for her.

Although they did not speak again after that, Mr. Gustafson placed three more telephone calls to Ms. Mauck. Once he left a message requesting that she forward mail. In his final call, he left a message offering her photographs he had taken of her family. At her request, Ms. Mauck's stepfather went to see Mr. Gustafson in an effort to retrieve the photographs and to ask him not to call again.

The message concerning the photographs was left for Ms. Mauck at her home on July 21, 1998. Concerned that Mr. Gustafson knew her whereabouts, she felt that the telephone calls, although apparently innocuous, were intended to frighten her, and that she was in danger of imminent violence, no doubt recalling the acrimony of some years before and threats Mr. Gustafson made then. Accordingly, she filed a petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence, which was granted on August 19, 1998.

Section 741.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), confers standing to seek an injunction against domestic violence on any person who has actually been the victim of domestic violence or who on some other basis has reasonable cause to believe that he or she faces impending danger from such violence. Entry of an injunction under section 741.30(1) has collateral consequences under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic violence injunctions. See, e.g., Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J.Super. 600, 713 A.2d 565 (App.Div. 1998) (domestic violence injunction precluding career in law enforcement).

On October 1, 1997, the legislature amended section 741.30(1)(a) to provide that a person must have reasonable cause to believe that he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence in order to be entitled to an injunction, see Ch. 97-155, § 5 at 2971, Laws of Fla. (1997), codified at § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), tightening the previous requirement to prove reasonable fear of violence only at some indeterminate time in the future. See generally Cleary v. Cleary, 711 So.2d 1302, 1302 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

The statutory standard is an objective one. For the period after the initial injunction expired, Ms. Mauck relies on the telephone calls to prove that Mr. Gustafson poses a danger to her. While we do not doubt appellee's sincerity—and with all due respect to the trial court's findings—[*616] we cannot agree that Mr. Gustafson's telephone calls considered in conjunction with the history of the relationship before the initial injunction was entered gave Ms. Mauck objectively reasonable grounds to fear that she was in imminent danger of violence at Mr. Gustafson's hands. After all, as far as the record shows, neither party had done the other physical violence at any time during their relationship, which began more than a decade ago.

Ms. Mauck's motion for rehearing affords us the opportunity to express our complete agreement with the proposition that "Rebecca was not required to wait for sexual or physical abuse to occur in order to seek relief under the statute." Appellee's Motion for Rehearing at 7 (Aug. 20, 1999) (emphasis in original). We also fully agree that

in trying to ascertain whether and to what extent an abuser poses a threat to the victim's safety, courts must consider his [or her] behavior within the context of the relationship and its history. See Lovcik v. Ellingson, 569 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D.1997) (holding past abusive behavior is relevant in determining whether domestic violence is imminent).

Id. at 4. See also Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 713 A.2d 390 (1998); Kanaszka, 713 A.2d at 568. We deem it significant here, however, that the parties ceased living together more than five years before the injunction was entered and that there was no evidence that Mr. Gustafson made any effort to contact Ms. Mauck after her stepfather asked him not to.

In deciding the present case, we express no view on any other set of facts and note that the courts are open to Ms. Mauck in the event circumstances change in any material way.

Reversed.

ALLEN and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.