The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Section 741.30(6)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2022), provides:
Given the procedural posture, the facts are undisputed. Petitioner is married to Juan Gayle, and the couple shares a three-year-old son. While she was on felony probation for one count of grand theft, Gayle filed an ex parte petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2022). The domestic violence court entered a temporary injunction the same day. Under the terms of the injunction, petitioner was prohibited from having any contact with Gayle or the minor child. Petitioner moved to modify the terms of the injunction, and the court granted petitioner supervised visitation through Family Court Services.
Pursuant to § 741.30(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2022), "[t]he terms of an injunction . . . shall remain in effect until modified or dissolved. Either party may move at any time to modify or dissolve the injunction." "[B]ecause permanent injunctions are open-ended and everlasting, they must be subject to dissolution when the circumstances that justified such an injunction are no longer operative." Trice v. Trice, 267 So.3d 496, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
Jessica Fay appeals the final order dismissing her petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence that she brought against Appellee, Kenneth Carter, under section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2021). The trial court dismissed Fay's petition finding that there was a "lack of jurisdiction in Florida." We reverse.
Dilver contended (both in the trial court and here on appeal) that an injunction for protection against stalking under section 784.0485 is not the same as an injunction for repeat violence or dating violence under section 784.046, or an injunction for domestic violence under section 741.30. Indeed, the State has conceded this point, and has further and commendably conceded that the State did not (and could not) prove Dilver committed aggravated stalking as charged in Count One of the Information, because the State did not (and could not) establish that Dilver engaged in these acts after the issuance of an injunction against repeat violence or dating violence (pursuant to section 784.046) or domestic violence (pursuant to section 741.30), an essential element for aggravated stalking as charged in Count One of the Information.
Section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes, creates "a cause of action for an injunction for protection in cases of repeat violence." A victim of "repeat violence" has standing to seek this type of injunction, meaning the petitioner must aver under oath that the respondent engaged in "two incidents of violence or stalking" directed toward him. Id. (1)(b), (2)(a). One of those incidents must have occurred "within 6 months of the filing of the petition." Id. (1)(b). Unlike for a cause of action for a domestic violence injunction or a dating violence injunction, the statute does not give a repeat-violence petitioner the alternative of showing "reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of another act" of violence in the place of establishing actual acts of "violence" against the petitioner, as that term is defined. Compare id. , with id. (2)(b); and § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. "The trial court must find that two incidents of violence occurred." Russell v. Doughty , 28 So. 3d 169, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
To obtain an injunction for protection against domestic violence, Appellee had to show that she was either a victim of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe that she was in "imminent danger" of becoming a victim of domestic violence. § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021) ; Randolph v. Rich , 58 So. 3d 290, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Section 741.28(2), Florida Statutes defines "domestic violence" as:
It appears that the trial court was trying to shoehorn a custody determination into the generic provision authorizing courts in stalking cases to award "such other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim" of stalking, "including injunctions or directives to law enforcement agencies, as provided in this section." But that statutory language is contained in both sections 784.0485 and 741.30, so the provision in the stalking statute cannot be interpreted as encompassing a child custody determination, particularly where that provision does not reference Chapter 61 or the best interests of the children. If the legislature had intended section 784.0485 to allow for custody determinations, it could have said so, as it did in section 741.30.
Generally, after an injunction has been entered, "either party to the injunction may move to modify or dissolve the injunction at any time." See Hobbs v. Hobbs , 290 So. 3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018) ). A party moving to dissolve the injunction "must 'show changed circumstances.’ " Id. (quoting Alkhoury v. Alkhoury , 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ). To establish a change in circumstances, "the movant must 'demonstrate that the scenario underlying the injunction no longer exists so that continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose.’ " Id. (quoting Alkhoury , 54 So. 3d at 642 ). A trial court considers, when determining whether the injunction continues to serve a valid purpose, "whether the victim 'reasonably maintain[s] a continuing fear of becoming a victim of domestic violence.’ " Id. (alteration in original).
(8) Attorney fees may not be awarded under this section in proceedings for an injunction for protection pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 784.0485, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement or allegation in the petition or that the respondent knowingly made a false statement or allegation in an asserted defense, with regard to a material matter as defined in s. 837.011(3).
. . . concluded that there was insufficient evidence presented to support an injunction pursuant to section 741.30 . . . Analysis Section 741.30(1)(a) provides that a family or household member may file a petition for protection . . .
. . . of domestic violence is but one way to prove an injunction against domestic violence under section 741.30 . . .
. . . Trice filed a petition for an injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 . . . Trice filed a motion to dissolve the injunction pursuant to section 741.30(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2015 . . . Section 741.30 allows a court to issue an injunction against domestic violence "when it appears to the . . . See § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . See § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; S.C. v. A.D., 67 So.3d 346, 347-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). . . .
. . . the final judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence entered against him under § 741.30 . . . fear that he or she is in "imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence." § 741.30 . . .
. . . However, for the trial court's benefit in subsequent cases, we note that "[s]ection 741.30 'does not . . . Bacchus , 108 So.3d 712, 716 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ); see also § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Under section 741.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), an injunction for protection against domestic violence . . .
. . . Rather, Appellee petitioned for an injunction for protection against domestic violence under section 741.30 . . . Section 741.30 created a cause of action for an injunction for protection against "domestic violence, . . . Notably, section 741.30 does not contain the evidentiary requirements present in section 784.046(4)(a . . . Supreme Court approved family law forms that consistently referred to "domestic violence" and section 741.30 . . .
. . . To obtain an injunction for protection against domestic violence under section 741.30(6)(a), Florida . . .
. . . Section 741.30(4), Florida Statutes (2017), provides that in a cause of action regarding a domestic violence . . . Appeal concluded that the husband had shown good cause sufficient to warrant a continuance under section 741.30 . . . danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.' " Lopez, 922 So.2d at 410 (quoting § 741.30 . . .
. . . Goll is wrong, also, that section 741.30(6)(a)4. required that the child support be continued until the . . . Section 741.30(6)(a)4. provides that: (6)(a) Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court that . . . Id. § 741.30(5)(a). . . . Compare id. § 741.30(5)(a) 1.-3., with id. § 741.30(6)(a) 1.-7. . . . Id. § 741.30(6)(a) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Section 741.30(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2010), authorizes either party to an injunction to file a motion . . . "[C]ourts applying section 741.30(6)(c) have indicated that a motion to modify or dissolve an injunction . . . Because a movant must show a change of circumstances to obtain relief on a motion filed under section 741.30 . . . See Carrozza, 153 So.3d at 340 (concluding that a motion filed under section 741.30(6)(c) was facially . . .
. . . Section 741.30(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), provides for the issuance of an injunction "when it appears . . .
. . . See § 741.30, Fla. Stat. . . . Section 741.30(1)(g), Florida Statutes, prohibits an award of attorney's fees "in any proceeding under . . . Appellant was governed by section 784.046, Florida Statutes, dealing with repeat violence and not section 741.30 . . . correctly notes that section 784.046 does not contain the same prohibition on attorney's fees as section 741.30 . . . The record plainly shows that the parties and the trial court proceeded under section 741.30, and the . . .
. . . the location of my residence unknown for safety reasons pursuant to section 119.071(2)(j)1, section 741.30 . . .
. . . obligation to record domestic violence and stalking proceedings pursuant, respectively, to sections 741.30 . . . INJUNCTION A Petition for Injunction for Protection Against: Domestic Violence filed under section 741.30 . . .
. . . Under section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2017), a trial court may grant an injunction when "the petitioner . . . reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence." § 741.30 . . . Randolph, 58 So.3d at 291 (quoting § 741.30(1)(a) ). . . . Pursuant to section 741.30(6)(b), when determining whether a petitioner has reasonable cause to believe . . . ; (v) and "[w]hether the respondent has destroyed personal property" belonging to the petitioner. § 741.30 . . .
. . . Section 741.30(6), Florida Statutes (2016), provides: (d) A temporary or final judgment on injunction . . . Section 741.30(6)(d)(3) explicitly requires that the trial court have personal jurisdiction over the . . .
. . . The trial court promptly entered a final permanent injunction pursuant' to section 741.30, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . . § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(6)(a), Fla, Stat. (2016). . . . Id. § 741.30(6)(b)(1)-(10). . . . Considering the factors in section 741.30(6)(b), as the court must, Leal had turned violent against Diaz . . .
. . . hearings on petitions for injunctions for protection against domestic violence and stalking, , See § 741.30 . . .
. . . See §§ 741.28, 741.30, Fla. Stat. . . . .
. . . Section 741.30(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), addresses injunctions for domestic violence and provides . . . Minor Child(ren), both state: The statements made under oath by Petitioner make it appear that section 741.30 . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015); accord Leaphart v. . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), creates a cause of action for an injunction for protection . . . See 741.30(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . Like section 741.30, Fla. Stat., the domestic violence injunction statute, section 784.046, Fla. . . . Chapter 741, Florida Statutes, governs marriage and domestic violence, and section 741.30, Florida Statutes . . . the statute creating a cause of action for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, § 741.30 . . . Baumgartner, 693 So.2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The cause of action created in section 741.30 does . . . imposition of attorney’s fees in a proceeding for injunction against repeat violence under section 741.30 . . .
. . . specifying how the petition is insufficient or conduct a hearing on the petition as provided for in section 741.30 . . .
. . . protection against domestic violence, issued on October 29, 2015, pursuant to Florida Statute section 741.30 . . . Because the order on appeal does not comply with the requirements of section 741.30, Florida Statutes . . . The entry of an ex-parte temporary injunction pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes, requires . . . See § 741.30(5)(c). . . . Nevertheless, section 741.30 “does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions . . .
. . . Jones sought an injunction against her parents to prevent domestic violence, section 741.30, Florida . . .
. . . Section 741.30, • Florida Statutes (2014), provides a cause of action for a domestic violence injunction . . . in pertinent part that “[t]he respondent shall be personally served with a copy of the petition.” § 741.30 . . . and shall include the specific facts and circumstances upon the basis of which relief is sought.” § 741.30 . . . statute states that “[n]othing herein affects a petitioner’s right to promptly amend any petition.” § 741.30 . . . for good cause shown by any party, which shall include a continuance to obtain service of process.” § 741.30 . . .
. . . . § 741.30(1), Fla. . . . petitioner or the respondent may move to modify or dissolve a domestic violence injunction at any time. § 741.30 . . . motion to modify it, seeking to dissolve it based on changed facts, which she had the right to do. § 741.30 . . .
. . . S.L.B., 116 So.3d 617, 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting § 741.30(6)(a)). . . . Section 741.30(5)(c) authorized the court to grant a continuance for good cause and extend the temporary . . .
. . . L.R.P. 12.610(c)(6); § 741.30(10), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . committing felony assault upon her, we would still be constrained to reverse the injunction, See § 741.30 . . . a petitioner does not have to wait for abuse to occur in order to seek an injunction under section 741.30 . . .
. . . To that end, section -741.30(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2012) provides: The sworn petition shall allege . . .
. . . to the trial court issuing a permanent injunction.” 68 So.3d 389, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing § 741.30 . . .
. . . .” § 741.30, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . actually entered an injunction titled as one for protection against domestic violence under section 741.30 . . .
. . . Gonzalez, 734 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), provides that a family or household member may file a . . .
. . . Pursuant to section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), any person who is either the victim of domestic . . . Appellant that the petition sufficiently alleged venue in Sumter County, Florida, pursuant to section 741.30 . . .
. . . . § 741.30(3)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . We express no opinion on the merits of [the] motion.” 816 So.2d at 1247; see § 741.30(6)(c), (10), Fla . . . In its order the trial court also expressed the following concern: F.S. 741.30(6)(c) generally authorizes . . . It is worth acknowledging the court’s concern about the wording of section 741.30(6)(c) which provides . . . As further noted in the same order, however, courts applying section 741.30(6)(c) have indicated that . . . Regardless, the issue of the constitutional validity of section 741.30(6)(c) is not before this court . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012); see Oettmeier v. . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012); see Oettmeier v. . . .
. . . Lopez, 922 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005)). . . .
. . . Parrish of the procedural due process to which she is entitled under section 741.30, Florida Statutes . . . requirements for the issuance of a domestic violence injunction under the procedures set forth in section 741.30 . . . for temporary injunction and remand for reconsideration in accordance with the dictates of section 741.30 . . . Parrish is otherwise sufficient under section 741.30(3), cf. Polanco v. . . . to the level necessary to obtain relief under the statute), or whether a hearing pursuant to section 741.30 . . .
. . . especially cyberstalking, may not appear intuitively to be an act of violence, for purposes of section 741.30 . . . believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” § 741.30 . . .
. . . Section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2013), “authorizes extending a temporary injunction during a continuance . . . shall be extended if necessary to remain in full force and effect during any period of continuance.’ § 741.30 . . . Dietz, 127 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Section 741.30 ‘does not provide for the issuance of . . .
. . . INJUNCTION A Petition for Injunction for Protection Against: Domestic Violence filed under section 741.30 . . .
. . . See § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.610(c)(4)(B). . . . No specific allegations are required.” § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also Fla. Fam. L. R. . . .
. . . was “no appearance of an immediate and present danger of domestic violence as required pursuant to § 741.30 . . . Relevant for our purposes, section 741.30(3)(a) provides: The sworn petition shall allege the existence . . . (Emphasis added) Further, section 741.30(6)(b) provides: In determining whether a petitioner has reasonable . . . The husband appealed and the Fifth District held that section 741.30 does not contemplate the issuance . . . See § 741.30(5)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . Recently, we addressed an almost identical provision in the domestic violence injunction statute — section 741.30 . . . We reversed the lower court’s ruling, noting that section 741.30 “does not provide for the issuance of . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
. . . Gonzalez, 734 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 741.30(10), Fla. Stat.; Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). AFFIRMED. . . .
. . . . §§ 741.30, 741.28, 784.046, Fla. . . . only requires that a petitioner has been a victim or has a reasonable fear of imminent violence. § 741.30 . . . See generally § 741.30, Fla. . . .
. . . Discussion Section 741.30, Florida Statutes, which governs issuance of domestic violence injunctions, . . . to, parental time with, adoption of, or parental rights and responsibilities for the minor child. § 741.30 . . . However, while section 741.30 authorizes a temporary parenting plan upon the issuance of a domestic violence . . . Therefore, having denied the injunction, Judge Gievers was not authorized under section 741.30 to establish . . . and possession of marital residence after denying husband’s petition for injunction, because section 741.30 . . .
. . . domestic violence injunction requests that his or her address be kept confidential pursuant to section 741.30 . . .
. . . entered against him and subsequently extended at the behest of his estranged wife, pursuant to section 741.30 . . . Section 741.30(1) authorizes injunctions for protection against domestic violence, and provides that . . . temporary injunction ex parte where an immediate and present danger of domestic violence exists. § 741.30 . . . shall be set for a date no later than the date when the temporary injunction ceases to be effective.” § 741.30 . . . shall be extended if necessary to remain in full force and effect during any period of continuance.” § 741.30 . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), confers standing to seek an injunction against domestic . . .
. . . — all matters relating to injunctions for protection against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 . . .
. . . Ambrefe, 993 So.2d 98, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting section 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007))). . . .
. . . Rich, 58 So.3d 290, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting section 741.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and finding . . .
. . . Section 741.30(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2012), sets forth the relief that a trial court may grant upon . . . We acknowledge that section 741.30(6)(a)7., Florida Statutes (2012), allows the trial court to "order . . . In our view, however, the relief contemplated in section 741.30(6)(a)7. does not encompass ordering a . . . Section 741.30(6)(a)7. is intended to allow for relief other than the relief already provided for in . . . (6)(a)5. and 741.30(6)(a)6., section 741.30(6)(a)7. does not encompass such relief. . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See § 741.30(6)(a). Therefore, Mr. . . .
. . . INJUNCTION A Petition for Injunction for Protection Against: Domestic Violence filed under section 741.30 . . . voluntarily dismiss this action. c. _ The evidence presented is insufficient under Florida law (sections 741.30 . . . present danger of domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence; or stalking, as required under section 741.30 . . .
. . . Section 741.30(1), Florida Statutes (2011), creates a cause of action for an injunction for protection . . . Section 741.30(4) states that, upon the filing of the petition, “the court shall set a hearing to be . . . For example, section 741.30(6)(a) authorizes a trial court to award the petitioner the exclusive use . . . See § 741.30, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . The statute creating a cause of action for an injunction for protection against domestic violence, § 741.30 . . . Baumgartner, 693 So.2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (noting that section 741.30(2)(c) “clearly contemplates . . . we reverse the award of fees for the injunction cases, we recognize that the power to amend section 741.30 . . .
. . . . § 741.30(3)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. :-⅜⅛⅛-⅜-address in domestic ■ violence- notion on petitioner’s request. — §■ 741.30(3)(b), Fla. . . .
. . . .”§ 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . See § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat.; Sheehan v. . . . Id. at 190; see also § 741.30(6)(b), Fla. . . . See § 741.30(6)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . §] 741.30 or [Fla. . . .
. . . Section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2011), authorizes either party to a domestic violence injunction to . . . Rule 1.610(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, like section 741.30, authorizes the modification . . .
. . . an injunction for protection against domestic violence without minor children, pursuant to section 741.30 . . .
. . . appeals the trial court’s issuance of a domestic violence injunction against her pursuant to section 741.30 . . . Section 741.30(6) authorizes the court to issue an injunction when a person shows that he or she has . . .
. . . In order to have standing to seek such an injunction, section 741.30(l)(e), Florida Statutes, requires . . . Thus, a party filing a petition under section 741.30 must prove “that the parties are residing, or have . . . present before a court may enter an injunction for protection against domestic violence under section 741.30 . . . Accordingly, Mascia did not establish that he had standing to seek an injunction under section 741.30 . . .
. . . . § ] 741.30 or [Fla. . . .
. . . Under section 741.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), any person “who is either a victim of domestic violence . . . Pope, 901 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (noting the due process requirements of section 741.30 and . . .
. . . To the extent that Romerhaus claims that the notification requirements of section 741.30(8)(c)(5), Florida . . .
. . . violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30 . . .
. . . . § 741.30(l)(a) & (3), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . . § 741.30(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). Mr. . . . Achurra, the petitioner, had the initial burden to prove entitlement to relief. § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2010) permits family or household members to seek an injunction . . .
. . . violence is reversed, and the case is remanded for a full eviden-tiary hearing in accordance with section 741.30 . . .
. . . trial court entered the injunction without conducting a full evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 741.30 . . . See § 741.30, Fla. . . . Lewis, 689 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Section 741.30[ ] anticipates a “full hearing” prior . . .
. . . "In the context of domestic and repeat violence, section 741.30(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes (2009), . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that a family or household member may file a . . .
. . . . § 741.30(3)(b), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). . . . Therefore, the question we must address is whether, under section 741.30(6)(a), the Mother’s behavior . . .
. . . injunctions were entered ex parte in late June 2010, pursuant to Florida’s domestic violence statute, section 741.30 . . . Parrish correctly notes that the language of section 741.30 does not specifically provide for a parent . . . Section 741.30 clearly contemplates that children are among those who may invoke the statute’s protection . . . Section 741.30(l)(e) provides that the statutory injunction “may be sought by family or household members . . . Section 741.30(5)(a) permits a court to issue such an injunction if “an immediate and present danger . . .
. . . Ambrefe, 993 So.2d 98, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007)). . . . Maude, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)); see also 741.30(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Jones v. . . .
. . . Additionally, appellant argues that the permanent injunction entered pursuant to section 741.30, Florida . . . statute as amended provides for an injunction to “remain in effect until modified or dissolved.” § 741.30 . . .
. . . Although section 741.30(10), Florida Statutes, provides that either party may move for modification or . . .
. . . .” § 741.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Moore v. . . . a petitioner does not have to wait for abuse to occur in order to seek an injunction under section 741.30 . . .
. . . Any “family or household members” may seek a domestic violence injunction as provided by section 741.30 . . .
. . . Section 741.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides for the issuance of an injunction in favor of . . . Mauck, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)); see also § 741.30(6)(b). . . . See § 741.30(l)(i) (providing that “[t]he court is prohibited from issuing mutual orders of protection . . .
. . . subject matter, it appears from a review of the record that the injunction was entered under section 741.30 . . .
. . . subject matter, it appears from a review of the record that the injunction was entered under section 741.30 . . .
. . . establish, that the appellant and the appellee resided in the same household as required by section 741.30 . . .