Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). · Go Syfert
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Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“here a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the double jeopardy clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.”
26 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Martin v. State (del, 2023-11-07)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Martin v. State
Del. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
here a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the double jeopardy clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peter Felix Armstrong v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
I, § 9, Fla. Const.; Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Palmer v. State, 182 So. 2d 625 , 626–27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kopson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)(1), a court may correct an illegal sentence “at any time.” With regard to expired sentences, this Court has stated: “[WJhere a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.” Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (emphasis added) (reversing and remanding for prison sentence to be vacated where the trial court mistakenly thought offenses were misdemeanors and senten…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jimenez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Cf Ellis v. State, 913 So.2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Willingham v. State, 833 So.2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)); Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown
Tenn. Crim. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Ct. App. 2004); Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ortiz (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
The law is clear that “where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence.” Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Willingham v. State, 833 So.2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Palmer v. State, 182 So.2d 625, 626-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cruz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pate v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See Maybin, 884 So.2d at 1175 ; Willingham v. State, 833 So.2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); I.B. v. State, 771 So.2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Rivera, 862 So.2d at 56 (adding a probation term inadvertently omitted during pronouncement of the sentence was not simply a "clarification," but an amended sentence, deviating from the original one and increasing it in violation of double jeopardy protection); Williams v. State, 801 So.2d 284, 286 (Fla. *615 4th DCA 2001) (holding that where the sentencing court did not pronounce a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willingham v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
We agree. "[W]here a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence." Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hodges v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Palmer v. State, 182 So.2d 625, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966).
discussed Cited "see" ODELL ERIC BROWN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that “where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction”).
cited Cited "see" MICHAEL A. MITCHELL v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (motion to correct an illegal sentence which has been served is moot).
cited Cited "see" Anderson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State , 749 So.2d 545 , 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing Palmer v. State , 182 So.2d 625 , 626 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) ).
cited Cited "see" Isaac L. Anderson Jr. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing Palmer v. State, 182 So. 2d 625 , 626 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)).
discussed Cited "see" Maybin v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 546 .
cited Cited "see" IB v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
cited Cited "see" I.B. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sneed v. State, 749 So.2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ronald SNEED, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
98-2111.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jan 5, 2000.
749 So. 2d 545
Warner.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ettie Feistmann, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

WARNER, C.J.

A jury found appellant guilty of attempted possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Immediately after the verdict, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of both offenses, and thinking both charges were misdemeanors sentenced the appellant to time served with[*546] the agreement of the state.[1] The next day the trial court vacated the judgment and sentence and subsequently held a hearing, because the court and the state were wrong in their conclusion that attempted possession of cocaine was a misdemeanor. In fact, it was a felony. At the second sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to 140.4 months in prison. Appellant claims that imposition of the second sentence constituted double jeopardy. We agree and reverse.

Although the appellant did not raise a double jeopardy challenge at the trial level to his resentencing, a violation of double jeopardy principles is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Acosta v. State, 489 So.2d 63, 63 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(citing State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1986)). In the instant case, the court adjudicated the appellant and sentenced him to time served. Thus, by the time the court realized its mistake, appellant's sentence had already been served. Moreover, where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased sentence. See Palmer v. State, 182 So.2d 625, 626-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); cf. United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir.1996). In Palmer, this court quoted with approval from 8 R.C.L., Criminal Laws, § 247 that:

"Where a judgment has been fully satisfied by the defendant, the trial court has no power to amend it by increasing the punishment after the term at which the judgment was rendered, or even during the same term. The ends of justice will not be served by permitting the state, after the sentence of the law has been discharged, to open the case for any purpose and least of all to insert an additional penalty. To permit this would be like punishing the delinquent the second time for the same offense."

182 So.2d at 626 (emphasis added). In a footnote we also noted that an invalid sentence that has been served will not be set aside, because the question has become moot. See id. at 626 n. 2.

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the second sentence and to discharge the defendant from custody on that charge. He, of course, remains in custody on his other judgment and sentence.

DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.

1 The record reflects that appellant had also been convicted of another crime for which he was already serving a fifteen year sentence.