McKnight v. State, 759 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). · Go Syfert
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McKnight v. State, 759 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Maddox v. State (fla, 2000-05-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Further, without expressly receding from Speights, the First District in McKnight in fact corrected a similar error of improper habitualization “because habitual offender sentencing is expressly prohibited for possession of cocaine, and the sentence exceeds the maximum permissible non-habitual offender statute for that offense.” 759 So.2d at 686; see Gregory v. State, 739 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (correcting the same type of unpreserved error although defendant pleaded guilty, because it is serious and patent); Denson, 711 So.2d at 1230 (same); see also Nelson, 719 So.2d at 1232-33 (co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Further, without expressly receding from Speights, the First District in McKnight in fact corrected a similar error of improper habitualization "because habitual offender sentencing is expressly prohibited for possession of cocaine, and the sentence exceeds the maximum permissible non-habitual offender statute for that offense." 759 So.2d at 686; see Gregory v. State, 739 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (correcting the same type of unpreserved error although defendant pleaded guilty, because it is serious and patent); Denson, 711 So.2d at 1230 (same); see also Nelson, 719 So.2d at 1232-33 (correc…
cited Cited "see" Woods v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See McKnight v. State, 759 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); decision approved by State v. McKnight, 764 So.2d 574 (Fla.2000); Hayes v. State, 677 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" State v. McKnight
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See McKnight, 759 So.2d at 686 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Terry McKNIGHT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
97-1845.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct 23, 1998.
759 So. 2d 686
Webster.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Laura Anstead, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Terry McKnight, appellant pro se.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sherri Tolar Rollison and Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WEBSTER, Judge.

In this direct criminal appeal, appellant's appointed counsel initially filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Appellant also filed a brief in proper person. In her Anders brief, counsel noted that appellant had received a 10-year habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine. Following our independent review of the record, we determined that a potential issue existed—whether, notwithstanding failure to object in the trial court, appellant's 10-year habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine constitutes fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal because habitual offender sentencing is expressly prohibited for possession of cocaine, and the sentence exceeds the maximum permissible non-habitual offender sentence for that offense. See § 775.084(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting habitual offender sentencing for violations of section 893.13, Florida Statutes, "relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance"); § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996) (making possession of a controlled substance a third-degree felony). Accordingly, we ordered the parties to brief that issue, pursuant to State v. Causey, 503 So.2d 321 (Fla.1987).

Based upon our recent decision in Nelson v. State, 719 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (general division en banc), we hold that appellant's 10-year habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine constitutes fundamental error, which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's sentence for possession of cocaine and remand for resentencing as to that offense. Also as in Nelson, we certify conflict with Maddox v. State, 708 So.2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). In all other respects, we affirm.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.

MINER, J., and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur.