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Florida Statute 775.084 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

F.S. 775.084 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XLVI
CRIMES

Chapter 775
GENERAL PENALTIES; REGISTRATION OF CRIMINALS

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F.S. 775.084

775.084 Violent career criminals; habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders; three-time violent felony offenders; definitions; procedure; enhanced penalties or mandatory minimum prison terms.—

(1) As used in this act:

(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(a), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense; or

b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the defendant’s last prior felony or other qualified offense, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later.

3. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.

4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(b) “Habitual violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(b), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted of a felony or an attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony and one or more of such convictions was for:

a. Arson;

b. Sexual battery;

c. Robbery;

d. Kidnapping;

e. Aggravated child abuse;

f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;

g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

h. Murder;

i. Manslaughter;

j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;

k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;

l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

m. Armed burglary;

n. Aggravated battery; or

o. Aggravated stalking.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or

b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.

3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(c) “Three-time violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court must impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(c), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult two or more times of a felony, or an attempt to commit a felony, and two or more of such convictions were for committing, or attempting to commit, any of the following offenses or combination thereof:

a. Arson;

b. Sexual battery;

c. Robbery;

d. Kidnapping;

e. Aggravated child abuse;

f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;

g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

h. Murder;

i. Manslaughter;

j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;

k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;

l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

m. Armed burglary;

n. Aggravated battery;

o. Aggravated stalking;

p. Home invasion/robbery;

q. Carjacking; or

r. An offense which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction if the elements of the offense are substantially similar to the elements of any felony offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs a.-q., or an attempt to commit any such felony offense.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced is one of the felonies enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-q. and was committed:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r.; or

b. Within 5 years after the date of the conviction of the last prior offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., or within 5 years after the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., whichever is later.

3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(d) “Violent career criminal” means a defendant for whom the court must impose imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (4)(d), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult three or more times for an offense in this state or other qualified offense that is:

a. Any forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08;

b. Aggravated stalking, as described in s. 784.048(3) and (4);

c. Aggravated child abuse, as described in s. 827.03(2)(a);

d. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult, as described in s. 825.102(2);

e. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition, as described in s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);

f. Escape, as described in s. 944.40; or

g. A felony violation of chapter 790 involving the use or possession of a firearm.

2. The defendant has been incarcerated in a state prison or a federal prison.

3. The primary felony offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced is a felony enumerated in subparagraph 1. and was committed on or after October 1, 1995, and:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or

b. Within 5 years after the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years after the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.

4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(e) “Qualified offense” means any offense, substantially similar in elements and penalties to an offense in this state, which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction, whether that of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States or any possession or territory thereof, or any foreign jurisdiction, that was punishable under the law of such jurisdiction at the time of its commission by the defendant by death or imprisonment exceeding 1 year.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the placing of a person on probation or community control without an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction.

(3)(a) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:

1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender.

2. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant’s attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.

3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

4. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.

5. For the purpose of identification of a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.

6. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a habitual felony offender sanction or a habitual violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender as provided in this subparagraph.

(b) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a three-time violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:

1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a three-time violent felony offender.

3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

5. For the purpose of identification of a three-time violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.

6. For an offense committed on or after the effective date of this act, if the state attorney pursues a three-time violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a three-time violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section as provided in paragraph (4)(c).

(c) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine whether the defendant is a violent career criminal with respect to a primary offense committed on or after October 1, 1995. The procedure shall be as follows:

1. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant’s attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.

2. All evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

3. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable only as provided in paragraph (d).

4. For the purpose of identification, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.

5. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a violent career criminal sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a violent career criminal as provided in this subparagraph.

(d)1. A person sentenced under paragraph (4)(d) as a violent career criminal has the right of direct appeal, and either the state or the defendant may petition the trial court to vacate an illegal sentence at any time. However, the determination of the trial court to impose or not to impose a violent career criminal sentence is presumed appropriate and no petition or motion for collateral or other postconviction relief may be considered based on an allegation either by the state or the defendant that such sentence is inappropriate, inadequate, or excessive.

2. It is the intent of the Legislature that, with respect to both direct appeal and collateral review of violent career criminal sentences, all claims of error or illegality be raised at the first opportunity and that no claim should be filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence became final, unless it is established that the basis for the claim could not have been ascertained at the time by the exercise of due diligence. Technical violations and mistakes at trials and sentencing proceedings involving violent career criminals that do not affect due process or fundamental fairness are not appealable by either the state or the defendant.

3. It is the intent of the Legislature that no funds, resources, or employees of the state or its political subdivisions be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings based on violent career criminal sentencing, except when such use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.

(4)(a) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual felony offender as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10.

(b) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual violent felony offender as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 15 years.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 10 years.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 5 years.

(c)1. The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(b), must sentence the three-time violent felony offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as follows:

a. In the case of a felony punishable by life, to a term of imprisonment for life;

b. In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a term of imprisonment of 30 years;

c. In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a term of imprisonment of 15 years; or

d. In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.

2. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.

(d) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(c), shall sentence the violent career criminal as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 40, with a mandatory minimum term of 30 years’ imprisonment.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 15, with a mandatory minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment.

(e) If the court finds, pursuant to paragraph (3)(a) or paragraph (3)(c), that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence a defendant who meets the criteria for sentencing as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal, with respect to an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, sentence shall be imposed without regard to this section.

(f) At any time when it appears to the court that the defendant is eligible for sentencing under this section, the court shall make that determination as provided in paragraph (3)(a), paragraph (3)(b), or paragraph (3)(c).

(g) A sentence imposed under this section shall not be increased after such imposition.

(h) A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002.

(i) The provisions of this section do not apply to capital felonies, and a sentence authorized under this section does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty for a capital felony.

(j) The provisions of s. 947.1405 shall apply to persons sentenced as habitual felony offenders and persons sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders.

(k)1. A defendant sentenced under this section as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal is eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections as provided in s. 944.275(4)(b).

2. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, a defendant sentenced under this section as a violent career criminal is not eligible for any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release granted pursuant to s. 947.149.

3. For an offense committed on or after July 1, 1999, a defendant sentenced under this section as a three-time violent felony offender shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release.

(5) In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.

(6) The purpose of this section is to provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this section, and to this end, a reference to this section constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.

History.—s. 5, ch. 71-136; s. 7, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-116; s. 2, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 6, ch. 88-131; s. 1, ch. 89-280; s. 2, ch. 93-406; s. 2, ch. 95-182; s. 8, ch. 95-195; s. 14, ch. 96-322; s. 44, ch. 96-388; s. 12, ch. 97-78; s. 12, ch. 97-194; s. 11, ch. 98-204; s. 3, ch. 99-188; s. 3, ch. 99-201; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2002-210; s. 2, ch. 2003-23; s. 14, ch. 2008-172; s. 10, ch. 2012-155; s. 39, ch. 2016-105; s. 8, ch. 2019-98.

F.S. 775.084 on Google Scholar

F.S. 775.084 on Casetext

Amendments to 775.084

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 775.084

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 775.084.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court

11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

Brunson v. State
No. 4D22-2668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023)
Affirmed. See State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 991-92 (Fla. 2008); § 775.084(4)(a), (4)(b), (4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993).
Matos v. State
No. 4D22-775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023)
(g) For commercial sexual activity in which any child younger than 18 years of age . . . is involved commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a) 6., s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
PAGE 3
Pryor v. State
No. 2D22-563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2023)
As a result, we conclude that the State reaches too far. As the State would have it, any "adjudication[] of delinquency for felonies committed as a juvenile" would be a predicate conviction for VCC sentencing. § 790.235(2). We read section 790.235(2) differently. The State's parsing of the statute impermissibly excises the antecedent, qualifying portion of the sentence. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Schs., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) ("Basic to our examination of statutes, and an important aspect of our analysis here, is the 'elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.' "(quoting Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006))). Namely, "[f]or purposes of [section 790.235], the previous felony convictions necessary to meet the [VCC] criteria under [section] 775.084( 1)(d)" may also include "adjudications of delinquency for felonies committed as a juvenile." § 790.235(2) (emphasis added). Thus, not just any adjudication…
Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't. of Corr.
8:20-cv-927-WFJ-SPF (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2023)
1 more...
As noted above, the trial court found that Mr. Evans qualified as a habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 9, pp. 12-13.) As a result, he was subject to a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of fifty-five years. (Id., p. 4; see also Fla. Stat. §§ 775.084, 893.13.) The court ultimately sentenced Mr. Evans to concurrent terms of ten years' imprisonment for aggravated assault, twenty-five years' imprisonment for fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer, five years' imprisonment for possession of cocaine, and time served for driving while license suspended or revoked. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 10.) Accordingly, Mr. Evans's sentences fell “within the limits imposed by statute,” which weighs against finding that they violated the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009).
PAGE 16
N.H. v. State
No. 5D23-795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2023)
A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
PAGE 7
Upshur v. State
No. 2D22-2520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2023)
Mr. Upshur was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's failure to request supplemental briefing after Powers issued. At the time of Mr. Upshur's appeal, the argument raised in Powers was before this court in Archer v. State, 332 So.3d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Mr. Archer was also convicted of DUI manslaughter and sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a four-year minimum mandatory term. Id. at 25. While his direct appeal was pending, Mr. Archer filed a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion asserting that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a term of fifteen years' prison without the period of probation required by section 316.193(5). Id. The trial court denied Mr. Archer's motion, reasoning that because section 316.193(3) provides that a person convicted of DUI manslaughter shall be punished as provided in sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084 and does not reference section 316.193(5), "punishment is not governed by section 316.193's DUI sentencing requirements." Id. This court disagreed.
PAGE 5
Ray v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
3:16-cv-1112-TJC-JBT (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023)
Motion for summary judgment
Motion to dismiss
6 more...
The trial court resentenced Petitioner on count four at the direction of the First District Court of Appeal's order granting Petitioner's Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence, finding that section 775.084(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes, prohibits habitualization for a felony “relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance,” and as a third degree felony, count four was punishable by a maximum sentence of five years. See Ray v. State, 177 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
PAGE 22
Kleckley v. Florida
No. 19-62972-CIV-ALTMAN (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2023)
Claim 11 is a (slightly) different story. That's because Kleckley now explains why he believes his “habitual felony offender” sentence violated the Due Process Clause. See Rule 59(e) Motion at 10 (“The Petitioner case is different the law is clear that Florida Statutes 775.084(1)(a)(3), (1999), does not permit habitualization for a felony ‘relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.'” (quoting Harris v. State, 695 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (errors in original))). Unfortunately, Kleckley's argument turns exclusively on his textual interpretation of Florida law (and on his belief about what the Florida Legislature intended when it adopted that law). In other words, his argument remains thoroughly (and improperly) grounded in state law. See Kleckley II, 2022 WL 11607203, at *8 (“[O]ur Circuit's district courts uniformly refuse to review a state court's imposition of a habitual-felony-offender sentence.”).
PAGE 16
Pierre v. State
No. 3D21-2139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2023)
See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (increasing the statutory maximum sentence for a third-degree felony committed by a habitual violent felony offender from five years to "a term of years not exceeding 10, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 5 years.")
PAGE 3
Key v. State
No. 4D22-1495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2023)
We have recognized that counsel can be deemed ineffective for misadvising a defendant as to the potential range of penalties he will face at trial, including his exposure based on lesser-included offenses, when he is weighing whether to accept a plea offer. Louima v. State, 247 So.3d 564, 566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); see also Vars v. State, 50 So.3d 1202, 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (counsel has a duty to determine whether the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing even if the state has not yet filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced sentencing). Here, it is undisputed that counsel told Key he was likely to be convicted of aggravated battery if he proceeded to trial and misadvised him that he could be sentenced to a maximum of 15 years for that offense. Counsel failed to realize that Key qualified as an HFO and therefore could be sentenced up to 30 years for aggravated battery. See § 775.084(4)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2015).
PAGE 2
Cases from cite.case.law:
GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 766 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Gonzalez was sentenced as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084(4), Florida Statutes . . . third degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
WARD, DOC v. STATE, 273 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
VITO, v. STATE, 270 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . offender subject to a thirty-year maximum sentence for robbery without a weapon, see §§ 812.13(2)(c), 775.084 . . .
SANCHEZ, Sr. v. STATE, 270 So. 3d 515 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . offense commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . restore, it is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
CUTHBERTSON, v. STATE, 272 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(d), (3)(c)(5), Fla. Stat. (2014) ; Johnson v. . . .
CHAMPAGNE a k a DOC v. STATE, 269 So. 3d 629 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. . . . felony offender (HFO) enhancement, Busbee, 187 So.3d at 1269-71, and therefore not subject to the CPC, § 775.084 . . .
SAPP, v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 935 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 775.084(4)(a)1., Fla. Stat. . . . habitual felony offender convicted "of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life." § 775.084 . . .
HASTIE, v. STATE, 267 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . . § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
E. BYNES, v. STATE, 267 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . a sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, pursuant to section 775.084 . . . At that time, section 775.084(1)(d)3.b. provided, in pertinent part: "Violent career criminal" means . . .
L. LINEN, DOC v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 874 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
BUTLER, Jr. v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 684 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See §§ 775.084(4)(c)(1), 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997) ; Davis v. . . .
EDWARDS, v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 849 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ) 4. commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
EDWARD, v. STATE, 271 So. 3d 125 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 775.084(3)(b) (providing: "The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph . . . qualified him to be sentenced in the instant case as a habitual violent felony offender under section 775.084 . . . that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony," as required under section 775.084 . . .
SANDERS, Jr. v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 682 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . The trial court sentenced Sanders as an habitual violent felony offender, pursuant to section 775.084 . . . appropriate predicate crime for habitual violent felony offender status under the version of section 775.084 . . .
FUNDERBURK, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 980 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
STATE v. ESPINOZA,, 264 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . period, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
SOL, v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 749 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . felony offender and has been sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084 . . . Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, states that a "habitual felony offender" is "a defendant for whom . . . the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment." § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. . . . Section 775.084 also states that the trial "court must sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender . . . .. unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public ." § 775.084 . . .
GUILLEN, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 910 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . provision commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
STATE v. LEWARS,, 259 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 775.084(1)(a)2.b., (b)2.b., (c)2.b., (d)2.b., Fla. . . .
M. G. v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 1094 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . However, this section does not apply to any offense listed in s. 775.084(1)(b)1. . . . Subsection 775.084(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2017), provides for an extended term of imprisonment for . . . in section 943.0583(3) applies only if the petitioner was convicted of an offense listed in section 775.084 . . . We hold that this language unambiguously refers to the list of offenses set forth in section 775.084( . . . However, the requirement of a conviction in section 775.084(1)(b)1. is relevant only to determining whether . . .
STAUDERMAN, DOC v. STATE, 261 So. 3d 649 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(a), (3)(a), (4)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
IN RE AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- REGULAR- CYCLE REPORT., 265 So. 3d 494 (Fla. 2018)

. . . If sentences are imposed under section 775.084, or section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes, and the Criminal . . . Criminal Punishment Code must be filed in addition to any sentencing documents filed under section 775.084 . . . committed , or is reported to have committed. an offense, other than those offenses listed in section 775.084 . . . committed , or was reported to have committed, an offense, other than those offenses listed in section 775.084 . . . committed , or is reported to have committed, an offense, other than those offenses listed in section 775.084 . . .
KEY, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under section 775.084 . . . State , 217 So.3d 160, 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (explaining that section 775.084 did not provide for enhanced . . .
MCMILLAN, v. STATE, 254 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 775.084(4)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1997), provides that the court may sentence an HVFO up to . . . offender requires that the offender "shall not be eligible for release for 15 years," under section 775.084 . . . was convicted of a life felony, received a habitual offender sentence, when the version of section 775.084 . . . Instead, section 775.084(4)(b)(1), Florida Statute (2018), clearly provides, with no discretion , that . . . See § 775.084(4)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (1997); Stanley v. . . .
BAUGH, v. STATE, 253 So. 3d 761 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . its previously-filed notices to classify Baugh as both a PRR and an HFO under sections 775.082(9) and 775.084 . . . the court committed fundamental error by depriving him of his rights to confrontation under section 775.084 . . . Section 775.084(3)(a) provides that in a proceeding to "determine if the defendant is a habitual felony . . .
STODDARD, DOC v. STATE, 253 So. 3d 759 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Unlike the violent career criminal and habitual offender sentencing enhancements in section 775.084, . . .
UNITED STATES v. URBINA- FUENTES,, 900 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2018)

. . . Burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
TAMBRIZ- RAMIREZ, v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2018)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
AGLIO, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 571 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . threat, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 249 So. 3d 721 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Under section 775.084, a trial court "shall sentence the violent career criminal ... . . . ." § 775.084(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . State, 912 So.2d 550, 553 (Fla. 2005) (citing § 775.084(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002) ). . . . ." § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . And given the statute, 775.084 requires me to sentence you, Mr. . . .
GRAVES, v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Third, section 775.084 addresses, among other things, the procedure for, and consequences of, adjudication . . . the first degree as described in s. 782.04(1), a sentence pursuant to s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . the third degree as described in s. 782.04(4), a sentence pursuant to s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . the third degree as described in s. 782.04(4), a sentence pursuant to s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . in s. 782.07 during the commission of a crime, a sentence pursuant to s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
MEEKS, v. STATE, 247 So. 3d 700 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable ... as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
LINDEMUTH, v. STATE, 247 So. 3d 635 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . custody and commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
MORRIS, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 514 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . carjacking is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
GILMAN, v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 983 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Gilman also agreed to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084 of the Florida . . . The trial court designated Gilman a habitual felony offender under section 775.084 by relying upon Gilman's . . . argued that case number F87-38796 could not be used as a predicate for habitualization under section 775.084 . . . subsequent offense for which he is to be sentenced was committed during such probationary period. § 775.084 . . .
HOWARD, v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 962 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Pursuant to section 775.084(1)(e), Florida Statues, a qualifying offense is: any offense, substantially . . . crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which is a qualifying felony for HVFO purposes. § 775.084 . . .
WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 244 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . The circuit court sentenced Williams as a habitual felony offender, see § 775.084, to thirty years' imprisonment . . .
MCNAIR, v. STATE, 244 So. 3d 379 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(c)1.g., Fla. . . .
ELLIOT, v. STATE, 243 So. 3d 418 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . , the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084 . . .
ANGUILLE, v. STATE, 243 So. 3d 410 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . another commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
ATMORE, v. STATE, 242 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 . . . See § 775.084(4)(a)(3), Fla. . . .
MUSSON, v. STATE, 242 So. 3d 512 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
MARSHALL III, v. STATE, 241 So. 3d 969 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . court sentenced him to thirty-three years in prison as a habitual violent offender pursuant to section 775.084 . . . See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. . . .
HUBBARD, Jr. v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 177 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Under section 775.084(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2013), a defendant is subject to enhanced HFO sentencing . . . State, 927 So.2d 1048, 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (" Section 775.084(1)(a)(3)... precludes sentencing a . . .
FRANCISCO, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 884 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . shall be known as "trafficking in cocaine," punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . be known as "trafficking in illegal drugs," punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
STATE v. CARRIER B., 240 So. 3d 852 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . animal commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
HUMPHREY, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 718 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . 3.800(a) because he does not dispute that his prior convictions qualified him as a VCC under section 775.084 . . .
PARRONDO, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 777 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . offender commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . offender commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . offender commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
DOYLE, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 95 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . sent commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
I. L. a v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 81 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . : Burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
CINTRON, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 882 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . be known as "trafficking in illegal drugs," punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
CANIDATE, v. STATE, 238 So. 3d 412 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . property, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
GUTIERREZ, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 144 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 775.084(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1994), which provision existed prior to the unconstitutional . . .
GARCIA, v. STATE, 237 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . Garcia points to section 775.084(1)(b)(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . Id. § 775.084(1)(b) (emphasis added). . . . Id. § 775.084(1)(b)(1)(g).) . . . See § 775.084(2), Fla. Stat. . . . This part of section 775.084 has since been amended. . . .
WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 232 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2017)

. . . under this section that is “less than the sentence that could be imposed under section 775.082, section 775.084 . . . imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . to this section, are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . .
NEWBHARD, v. STATE, 237 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
BURKS, v. STATE, 237 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . . to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082 , s. 775.084 . . .
CUMMINGS, v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2015); Alexander v. . . .
JONES, v. STATE, 246 So. 3d 1200 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) ; State v. . . .
IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 231 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2017)

. . . is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
ALVAREZ, v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . February 1, 2017, the State filed a Notice of State’s Intention to Seek Enhanced Penalty Pursuant to F.S. 775.084 . . .
GILMAN, v. STATE, 232 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Gilman also agreed to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084 of the Florida . . . The trial court designated Gilman a habitual felony offender under section 775.084 by relying upon Gil-man . . . argued that case number F87-38796 could not be used as a predicate for habitualization under section 775.084 . . . See § 775.084(l)(a)2., (2), Fla. . . . subsequent offense for which he is to be sentenced was committed during such probationary period. § 775.084 . . .
ROBINSON a k a v. STATE, 233 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(l)(a), Fla. . . .
R. MCGRIFF, v. STATE, 229 So. 3d 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
STATE v. MILLER,, 227 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2017)

. . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree, •punishable as provided in s. '775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
CLARK, DOC v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 775.084(4)(a)(l) provides that a trial court “may sentence the habitual felony offender ... . . .
UNITED STATES v. VAIL- BAILON,, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 775.084(l)(d), and Florida’s prisoner-releasee-reoffender statute, Fla. Stat. § 775.082. . . . . . § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a) (defining the term “violent career criminal” to include a defendant who has been . . .
ANTHONY, v. STATE, 224 So. 3d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988); Johnson v. . . .
PARENTI, v. STATE, 225 So. 3d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .
COLE, v. STATE, 225 So. 3d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(b)l„ Fla. Stat. (1989). . . .
BUTLER, DOC v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(l)(a)(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 224 So. 3d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . 414, 414-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“A defendant’s knowing waiver of the procedural rights accorded by § 775.084 . . .
GOODMAN, v. STATE, 229 So. 3d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if: (I . . . homicide is: (b) A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
JONES, v. STATE, 225 So. 3d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . mandatory life sentences cannot be enhanced by designating him as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084 . . . Capital crimes cannot be enhanced under the plain language of section 775.084(4)(a)1. Parrimon v. . . .
E. LEWIS, v. STATE, 223 So. 3d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); State v. Matthews, 891 So.2d 479 (Fla. 2004); Robbins v. . . .
NORTH, v. STATE, 221 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084 . . .
COX, v. STATE, 221 So. 3d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . that “he qualifies as a habitual felony offender pursuant to the statutory requirements set forth in 775.084 . . . offender designation) was illegal because his prior convictions were not sequential as required by section 775.084 . . . of these prior predicate felonies and that he qualified as a habitual felony offender under section 775.084 . . . In doing so, Cox knowingly and voluntarily waived the procedural requirements of section 775.084 and, . . . Stat. (1997). .In 1997, section 775.084(5), Florida Statutes (1997) provided: In order to be counted . . .
J. ACEVEDO, v. STATE, 218 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 2017)

. . . lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . of age commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . of age commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . conduct commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . . conduct commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
STATE v. SPENCER,, 216 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 2017)

. . . manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
WOODS, v. STATE, 214 So. 3d 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . escalating pattern of criminal behavior without violating the Sixth Amendment or Blakely), see also § 775.084 . . .
HAMPTON, v. STATE, 217 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(k)l., Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
FLANDERS, v. STATE, 217 So. 3d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . murder because that charge was a life felony and the habitual violent felony offender statute, section 775.084 . . . convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under section 775.084 . . . The Legislature amended section 775.084 to include life felonies effective for crimes committed on or . . .
ROBINSON, v. STATE, 215 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . associated with the province of the judge in sentencing, as in the case of habitual offenders, section 775.084 . . .
E. MCNAIR, v. STATE, 212 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . qualifying offense for the purpose of sentencing him as a three-time violent felony offender under section 775.084 . . .
TAMBRIZ- RAMIREZ, v. STATE, 213 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ,, 677 F. App'x 575 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . injury commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084 . . .
UNITED STATES v. FRITTS,, 841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
G. DURKEE, v. STATE, 203 So. 3d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(b), (4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . case is factually distinguishable from Clines, where the Florida Supreme Court held that “subsection 775.084 . . . See § 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2014). Appellant does not allege he fails to qualify as an HFO. . . .
UNITED STATES v. SEABROOKS,, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable ... as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
K. SINGLETARY, v. STATE, 202 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 775.084(1)(a)(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); Johnson v. State, 60 So.3d 1045 (Fla.2011); Hughes v. . . .
McAFFEE, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993); Duncan v. Moore, 754 So.2d 708 (Fla.2000); Deason v. Fla. . . .
SIMMONS, Jr. v. STATE, 205 So. 3d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 775.084(l)(d)(3), 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
J. A. W. v. STATE, 210 So. 3d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . sent commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
GELIN, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . adult commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or 's. 775.084 . . .
SMITH, v. STATE, 204 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2016)

. . . jurisdiction commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
PITTS, v. STATE, 202 So. 3d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084 . . .
SALVO, v. STATE, 199 So. 3d 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . State, 912 So.2d 550, 560 (Fla.2005) (“[O]nly one recidivist category in section 775.084 may be applied . . .
REDDING, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), 775.084(4)(a)(2), 810.02(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008); State v. . . .
ZEIGLER, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . subsection commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .
UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ- MONTES,, 831 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2016)

. . . imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 . . .

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

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