775.084
Violent career criminals; habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders; three-time violent felony offenders; definitions; procedure; enhanced penalties or mandatory minimum prison terms.
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775.084 Violent career criminals; habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders; three-time violent felony offenders; definitions; procedure; enhanced penalties or mandatory minimum prison terms.—
(1) As used in this act:
(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(a), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses.
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:
a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense; or
b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the defendant’s last prior felony or other qualified offense, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later.
3. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.
4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.
5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.
(b) “Habitual violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(b), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of a felony or an attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony and one or more of such convictions was for:
a. Arson;
b. Sexual battery;
c. Robbery;
d. Kidnapping;
e. Aggravated child abuse;
f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;
g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;
h. Murder;
i. Manslaughter;
j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;
k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;
l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
m. Armed burglary;
n. Aggravated battery; or
o. Aggravated stalking.
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:
a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or
b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.
3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.
4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.
(c) “Three-time violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court must impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(c), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult two or more times of a felony, or an attempt to commit a felony, and two or more of such convictions were for committing, or attempting to commit, any of the following offenses or combination thereof:
a. Arson;
b. Sexual battery;
c. Robbery;
d. Kidnapping;
e. Aggravated child abuse;
f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;
g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;
h. Murder;
i. Manslaughter;
j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;
k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;
l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
m. Armed burglary;
n. Aggravated battery;
o. Aggravated stalking;
p. Home invasion/robbery;
q. Carjacking; or
r. An offense which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction if the elements of the offense are substantially similar to the elements of any felony offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs a.-q., or an attempt to commit any such felony offense.
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced is one of the felonies enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-q. and was committed:
a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r.; or
b. Within 5 years after the date of the conviction of the last prior offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., or within 5 years after the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., whichever is later.
3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.
4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.
(d) “Violent career criminal” means a defendant for whom the court must impose imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (4)(d), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult three or more times for an offense in this state or other qualified offense that is:
a. Any forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08;
b. Aggravated stalking, as described in s. 784.048(3) and (4);
c. Aggravated child abuse, as described in s. 827.03(2)(a);
d. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult, as described in s. 825.102(2);
e. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition, as described in s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);
f. Escape, as described in s. 944.40; or
g. A felony violation of chapter 790 involving the use or possession of a firearm.
2. The defendant has been incarcerated in a state prison or a federal prison.
3. The primary felony offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced is a felony enumerated in subparagraph 1. and was committed on or after October 1, 1995, and:
a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or
b. Within 5 years after the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years after the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.
4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.
5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.
(e) “Qualified offense” means any offense, substantially similar in elements and penalties to an offense in this state, which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction, whether that of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States or any possession or territory thereof, or any foreign jurisdiction, that was punishable under the law of such jurisdiction at the time of its commission by the defendant by death or imprisonment exceeding 1 year.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the placing of a person on probation or community control without an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction.
(3)(a) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:
1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender.
2. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant’s attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.
3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.
4. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.
5. For the purpose of identification of a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.
6. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a habitual felony offender sanction or a habitual violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender as provided in this subparagraph.
(b) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a three-time violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:
1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a three-time violent felony offender.
2. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant’s attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.
3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.
4. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.
5. For the purpose of identification of a three-time violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.
6. For an offense committed on or after the effective date of this act, if the state attorney pursues a three-time violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a three-time violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section as provided in paragraph (4)(c).
(c) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine whether the defendant is a violent career criminal with respect to a primary offense committed on or after October 1, 1995. The procedure shall be as follows:
1. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant’s attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.
2. All evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.
3. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable only as provided in paragraph (d).
4. For the purpose of identification, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.
5. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a violent career criminal sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a violent career criminal as provided in this subparagraph.
(d)1. A person sentenced under paragraph (4)(d) as a violent career criminal has the right of direct appeal, and either the state or the defendant may petition the trial court to vacate an illegal sentence at any time. However, the determination of the trial court to impose or not to impose a violent career criminal sentence is presumed appropriate and no petition or motion for collateral or other postconviction relief may be considered based on an allegation either by the state or the defendant that such sentence is inappropriate, inadequate, or excessive.
2. It is the intent of the Legislature that, with respect to both direct appeal and collateral review of violent career criminal sentences, all claims of error or illegality be raised at the first opportunity and that no claim should be filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence became final, unless it is established that the basis for the claim could not have been ascertained at the time by the exercise of due diligence. Technical violations and mistakes at trials and sentencing proceedings involving violent career criminals that do not affect due process or fundamental fairness are not appealable by either the state or the defendant.
3. It is the intent of the Legislature that no funds, resources, or employees of the state or its political subdivisions be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings based on violent career criminal sentencing, except when such use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.
(4)(a) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual felony offender as follows:
1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.
2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30.
3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10.
(b) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual violent felony offender as follows:
1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 15 years.
2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 10 years.
3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 5 years.
(c)1. The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(b), must sentence the three-time violent felony offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as follows:
a. In the case of a felony punishable by life, to a term of imprisonment for life;
b. In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a term of imprisonment of 30 years;
c. In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a term of imprisonment of 15 years; or
d. In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.
2. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.
(d) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(c), shall sentence the violent career criminal as follows:
1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.
2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 40, with a mandatory minimum term of 30 years’ imprisonment.
3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 15, with a mandatory minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment.
(e) If the court finds, pursuant to paragraph (3)(a) or paragraph (3)(c), that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence a defendant who meets the criteria for sentencing as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal, with respect to an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, sentence shall be imposed without regard to this section.
(f) At any time when it appears to the court that the defendant is eligible for sentencing under this section, the court shall make that determination as provided in paragraph (3)(a), paragraph (3)(b), or paragraph (3)(c).
(g) A sentence imposed under this section shall not be increased after such imposition.
(h) A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002.
(i) The provisions of this section do not apply to capital felonies, and a sentence authorized under this section does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty for a capital felony.
(j) The provisions of s. 947.1405 shall apply to persons sentenced as habitual felony offenders and persons sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders.
(k)1. A defendant sentenced under this section as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal is eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections as provided in s. 944.275(4)(b).
2. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, a defendant sentenced under this section as a violent career criminal is not eligible for any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release granted pursuant to s. 947.149.
3. For an offense committed on or after July 1, 1999, a defendant sentenced under this section as a three-time violent felony offender shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release.
(5) In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.
(6) The purpose of this section is to provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this section, and to this end, a reference to this section constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.
History.—s. 5, ch. 71-136; s. 7, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-116; s. 2, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 6, ch. 88-131; s. 1, ch. 89-280; s. 2, ch. 93-406; s. 2, ch. 95-182; s. 8, ch. 95-195; s. 14, ch. 96-322; s. 44, ch. 96-388; s. 12, ch. 97-78; s. 12, ch. 97-194; s. 11, ch. 98-204; s. 3, ch. 99-188; s. 3, ch. 99-201; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2002-210; s. 2, ch. 2003-23; s. 14, ch. 2008-172; s. 10, ch. 2012-155; s. 39, ch. 2016-105; s. 8, ch. 2019-98.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,453
cases (77 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: Clines v. State
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
State v. Collins (2008)
“Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that a defendant is a habitual felony offender (HFO) or a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and have the court impose an extended term of…”
Burdick v. State (1992)
“After researching relevant session laws from the Laws of Florida (1975), we conclude that the legislature itself never inserted the word in the statute and that the word "shall" either was an editorial error or a misapprehension of actual legislative intent by the editors.”
King v. State (1992)
“Essentially, appellant challenges only the ten-year prison sentence imposed pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), for the third degree felony offense of burglary of a structure, subsections 810.”
State v. Matthews (2004)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989); [8] see also Mills v.”
Barnes v. State (1991)
“Neither case is applicable to an interpretation of § 775.084, Fla. Stat. [7] While several conditions are specified in the statute, there is no requirement that a person had to be convicted of the first felony prior to the commission of the second felony.”
Adams v. State (1979)
“" Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977).”
Eutsey v. State (1980)
“The imposition of an increased sentence pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977), [1] Florida's habitual offender act, *222 is before us on direct appeal because the trial court, in imposing an enhanced sentence, upheld the constitutionality of this act against a…”
State v. Richardson (2005)
“[3] We find no need to address subsection (2) of section 775.084, as argued by the State. The sequential conviction requirement of section 775.”
Hale v. State (1993)
“The statutes which prescribed the sentence for each crime did not provide for minimum mandatory sentences; however, because Daniels was found to be a habitual violent felony offender, the sentences were enhanced by the trial judge under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.…”
Ashley v. State (1993)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989). Ashley unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea on August 29, and was sentenced October 31, 1990, to six years' imprisonment as an habitual felony offender.”
Whitehead v. State (1986)
“We disapprove, however, the district court's holding that the habitual offender statute (section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1985)) is an adequate reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines (Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.”
— 775.084(1) — 41 cases
Barnes v. State (1991)
“Neither case is applicable to an interpretation of § 775.084, Fla. Stat. [7] While several conditions are specified in the statute, there is no requirement that a person had to be convicted of the first felony prior to the commission of the second felony.”
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Hudson v. State (2001)
Woods v. State (1993)
Barber v. State (1990)
— 775.084(1)(B) — 1 case
Cordero v. State (2001)
— 775.084(1)(a) — 225 cases
Barnes v. State (1991)
“Neither case is applicable to an interpretation of § 775.084, Fla. Stat. [7] While several conditions are specified in the statute, there is no requirement that a person had to be convicted of the first felony prior to the commission of the second felony.”
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Jones v. State (1992)
Robinson v. State (1997)
Woods v. State (2002)
— 775.084(1)(a)(1) — 2 cases
Anderson v. State (1994)
Tyson v. State (2012)
— 775.084(1)(a)(2) — 6 cases
Gordon v. State (2001)
Bacon v. State (1993)
State v. Langlois (1997)
Ruiz v. State (2003)
Lewis v. State (2017)
— 775.084(1)(a)(2)(a) — 1 case
Calloway v. State (2005)
— 775.084(1)(a)(2)(b) — 2 cases
Franklin v. State (2004)
Singletary v. State (2016)
— 775.084(1)(a)(3) — 23 cases
Grene v. State (1997)
Denson v. State (1998)
Mills v. State (2002)
Virgil v. State (2004)
Hughes v. State (2003)
— 775.084(1)(a)(4) — 1 case
RJL v. State (2004)
— 775.084(1)(a)(b) — 1 case
State v. Barnes (1992)
— 775.084(1)(b) — 113 cases
Hale v. State (1993)
“The statutes which prescribed the sentence for each crime did not provide for minimum mandatory sentences; however, because Daniels was found to be a habitual violent felony offender, the sentences were enhanced by the trial judge under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.…”
Perkins v. State (1991)
Robinson v. State (1997)
Tillman v. State (1992)
Ross v. State (1992)
— 775.084(1)(b)(1) — 11 cases
Yisrael v. State (2008)
Bover v. State (2001)
White v. State (1996)
Watkins v. State (1993)
State v. Johnson (1993)
— 775.084(1)(b)(1)(b) — 1 case
Alix v. State (2001)
— 775.084(1)(b)(1)(g) — 2 cases
McCoy v. State (2006)
Riser v. State (2005)
— 775.084(1)(b)(1)(m) — 1 case
Franklin v. State (2004)
— 775.084(1)(b)(2) — 3 cases
Reed v. State (2004)
Vickery v. State (1989)
Blackshear v. State (2012)
— 775.084(1)(b)(2)(a) — 1 case
Blackshear v. State (2012)
— 775.084(1)(b)(2)(b) — 3 cases
Yisrael v. State (2008)
Yisrael v. State (2008)
Garcia v. State (2017)
— 775.084(1)(b)(3) — 2 cases
Murray v. State (1993)
RJL v. State (2004)
— 775.084(1)(c) — 47 cases
State v. Thompson (1999)
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Robinson v. State (1997)
State v. Franklin (2003)
Shead v. State (1979)
— 775.084(1)(c)(1) — 1 case
Raford v. State (2001)
— 775.084(1)(c)(1)(a) — 2 cases
Jenkins v. State (2004)
— 775.084(1)(c)(1)(m) — 1 case
Franklin v. State (2004)
— 775.084(1)(d) — 54 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
State v. Hearns (2007)
Grant v. State (2000)
Cala v. State (2003)
State v. Hackley (2012)
— 775.084(1)(d)(1) — 4 cases
State v. Hearns (2007)
Campbell v. State (2006)
Johnson v. State (2003)
— 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a) — 8 cases
Brinson v. State (2008)
Jenkins v. State (2004)
Cribbs v. State (2008)
Butler v. State (2011)
Johnson v. State (2008)
— 775.084(1)(d)(2) — 1 case
Calloway v. State (2005)
— 775.084(1)(d)(3) — 1 case
— 775.084(1)(d)(f) — 1 case
Johnson v. State (2008)
— 775.084(1)(e) — 6 cases
Alix v. State (2001)
Clark v. State (2002)
Hemmy v. State (2001)
— 775.084(2) — 53 cases
Overstreet v. State (1993)
State v. Del Castillo (2004)
Richardson v. State (2004)
Schneider v. State (2001)
State v. Burris (2004)
— 775.084(3) — 90 cases
Whitehead v. State (1986)
“We disapprove, however, the district court's holding that the habitual offender statute (section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1985)) is an adequate reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines (Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.”
Zambuto v. State (1982)
King v. State (1996)
State v. Rucker (1993)
MacK v. State (2002)
— 775.084(3)(a) — 51 cases
State v. McMahon (2012)
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
State v. Collins (2008)
“Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that a defendant is a habitual felony offender (HFO) or a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and have the court impose an extended term of…”
Moore v. State (2000)
Sampson v. State (2002)
— 775.084(3)(a)(1) — 1 case
— 775.084(3)(a)(2) — 2 cases
Chavez v. State (1997)
Mackey v. State (2004)
— 775.084(3)(a)(3) — 2 cases
Cameron v. State (2002)
Cameron v. State (2002)
— 775.084(3)(a)(4) — 2 cases
Yisrael v. State (2008)
Yisrael v. State (2008)
— 775.084(3)(a)(6) — 5 cases
State v. Stephenson (2008)
State v. McMahon (2012)
Fitzpatrick v. State (2004)
White v. State (2011)
— 775.084(3)(b) — 57 cases
Massey v. State (1992)
Judge v. State (1992)
Massey v. State (1991)
Snead v. State (1993)
Ashley v. State (1993)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989). Ashley unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea on August 29, and was sentenced October 31, 1990, to six years' imprisonment as an habitual felony offender.”
— 775.084(3)(b)(2) — 1 case
Vann v. State (2007)
— 775.084(3)(b)(s) — 1 case
Loriga v. State (1999)
— 775.084(3)(c) — 15 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Zambuto v. State (1982)
State v. Harris (1978)
State v. Rodriguez (1991)
Adams v. State (1979)
“" Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977).”
— 775.084(3)(c)(1) — 1 case
— 775.084(3)(c)(5) — 1 case
Pope v. State (2004)
— 775.084(3)(d) — 60 cases
Eutsey v. State (1980)
“The imposition of an increased sentence pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977), [1] Florida's habitual offender act, *222 is before us on direct appeal because the trial court, in imposing an enhanced sentence, upheld the constitutionality of this act against a…”
Scott v. State (1984)
Adams v. State (1979)
“" Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977).”
Rowland v. State (1991)
Weston v. State (1984)
— 775.084(3)(e) — 3 cases
Johnson v. State (1991)
Louis v. State (1994)
Wencel v. State (2000)
— 775.084(3)(e)(5) — 1 case
Williams v. State (2001)
— 775.084(4) — 56 cases
Burdick v. State (1992)
“After researching relevant session laws from the Laws of Florida (1975), we conclude that the legislature itself never inserted the word in the statute and that the word "shall" either was an editorial error or a misapprehension of actual legislative intent by the editors.”
Reeves v. State (2007)
Brown v. State (1998)
Hill v. State (1995)
Burdick v. State (1991)
— 775.084(4)(1995) — 1 case
Hudson v. State (1996)
— 775.084(4)(6) — 1 case
Green v. State (1990)
— 775.084(4)(A) — 1 case
Williams v. State (2014)
— 775.084(4)(B) — 1 case
Barnes v. State (2002)
— 775.084(4)(C) — 1 case
Geohagen v. State (1994)
— 775.084(4)(a) — 228 cases
Burdick v. State (1992)
“After researching relevant session laws from the Laws of Florida (1975), we conclude that the legislature itself never inserted the word in the statute and that the word "shall" either was an editorial error or a misapprehension of actual legislative intent by the editors.”
State v. Brown (1988)
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
State v. Matthews (2004)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989); [8] see also Mills v.”
State v. Hudson (1997)
— 775.084(4)(a)(1) — 30 cases
Burdick v. State (1992)
“After researching relevant session laws from the Laws of Florida (1975), we conclude that the legislature itself never inserted the word in the statute and that the word "shall" either was an editorial error or a misapprehension of actual legislative intent by the editors.”
Mesa v. State (1994)
Franke v. State (2008)
Sanders v. State (2005)
Burdick v. State (1991)
— 775.084(4)(a)(2) — 15 cases
Sanders v. State (2005)
Smith v. Wainwright (1987)
Rowe v. State (2003)
Braggs v. State (1994)
Small v. State (1983)
— 775.084(4)(a)(3) — 23 cases
State v. Rodriguez (1991)
Hoefert v. State (1987)
Sanders v. State (2005)
Townsend v. State (1992)
Rodriguez v. State (2000)
— 775.084(4)(a)(b)(c) — 1 case
Moorer v. State (1993)
— 775.084(4)(a)(l) — 8 cases
Smart v. State (2013)
Poppell v. State (1987)
Dolansky v. State (2007)
State v. Rinkins (1994)
Moye v. State (1996)
— 775.084(4)(b) — 179 cases
Ashley v. State (1993)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989). Ashley unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea on August 29, and was sentenced October 31, 1990, to six years' imprisonment as an habitual felony offender.”
Donald v. State (1990)
Hale v. State (1993)
“The statutes which prescribed the sentence for each crime did not provide for minimum mandatory sentences; however, because Daniels was found to be a habitual violent felony offender, the sentences were enhanced by the trial judge under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (Supp.…”
Lamont v. State (1992)
Burdick v. State (1991)
— 775.084(4)(b)(1) — 15 cases
Johnson v. State (1990)
Lamont v. State (1992)
White v. State (1993)
State v. Washington (1992)
State v. Hudson (1997)
— 775.084(4)(b)(2) — 12 cases
Fuston v. State (2000)
Sims v. State (1992)
Kendrick v. State (2002)
Ruffin v. State (2002)
Woods v. State (1992)
— 775.084(4)(b)(3) — 9 cases
White v. State (1993)
Kiedrowski v. State (2004)
Johnson v. State (1991)
Johnson v. State (1991)
Gunn v. State (1994)
— 775.084(4)(b)(l) — 8 cases
Randolph v. State (2001)
Moye v. State (1996)
Copeland v. State (2013)
Lockwood v. State (1984)
Leaty v. State (1991)
— 775.084(4)(c) — 60 cases
King v. State (1992)
“Essentially, appellant challenges only the ten-year prison sentence imposed pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), for the third degree felony offense of burglary of a structure, subsections 810.”
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
King v. State (1996)
State v. Matthews (2004)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989); [8] see also Mills v.”
State v. Thompson (1999)
— 775.084(4)(c)(1) — 4 cases
Butler v. State (2019)
Butler v. State (2019)
— 775.084(4)(c)(2) — 1 case
State v. Meyers (1998)
— 775.084(4)(d) — 27 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Pryor v. State (2010)
Major v. State (2002)
Mel R. Williams v. State (2018)
Johnson v. State (2000)
— 775.084(4)(d)(1) — 1 case
Pope v. State (2004)
— 775.084(4)(d)(3) — 1 case
Johnson v. State (2008)
— 775.084(4)(e) — 100 cases
State v. Matthews (2004)
“See § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1989); [8] see also Mills v.”
Burdick v. State (1992)
“After researching relevant session laws from the Laws of Florida (1975), we conclude that the legislature itself never inserted the word in the statute and that the word "shall" either was an editorial error or a misapprehension of actual legislative intent by the editors.”
Roberts v. State (1990)
Simmons v. State (1992)
— 775.084(4)(f) — 3 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
State v. McMahon (2012)
Clines v. State (2004)
— 775.084(4)(g) — 9 cases
Horn v. State (2001)
Jenkins v. State (2000)
Kenon v. State (2001)
McKnight v. State (2000)
Love v. State (2002)
— 775.084(4)(h) — 18 cases
State v. Collins (2008)
“Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that a defendant is a habitual felony offender (HFO) or a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and have the court impose an extended term of…”
Champagne v. State (2019)
Pankhurst v. State (2001)
Cooper v. State (2005)
Pryor v. State (2010)
— 775.084(4)(j) — 5 cases
State v. Thompson (1999)
Sanchez v. State (2000)
Adams v. State (1999)
Kijewski v. State (2000)
Barrs v. State of Florida (2004)
— 775.084(4)(k) — 5 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Mastay v. McDonough (2006)
Timothy Hampton v. State (2017)
Smith v. State (2013)
— 775.084(5) — 87 cases
State v. Richardson (2005)
“[3] We find no need to address subsection (2) of section 775.084, as argued by the State. The sequential conviction requirement of section 775.”
Bover v. State (2001)
State v. Collins (2008)
“Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, sets out the requirements the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that a defendant is a habitual felony offender (HFO) or a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) and have the court impose an extended term of…”
Richardson v. State (2004)
Rhodes v. State (1997)
— 775.084(6) — 2 cases
Clines v. State (2005)
“That statute, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes four categories of recidivists whose sentences may be enhanced.”
Salters v. State (2000)
— 775.084(7)(b) — 1 case
Smith v. State (1995)
— 775.084(8) — 1 case
Brown v. State (1984)
— 775.084(a) — 2 cases
Bynes v. State (2003)
Reynolds v. State (1996)
— 775.084(a)(1) — 1 case
Cooper v. State (1993)
— 775.084(b) — 3 cases
Anthony v. State (2000)
Ponton v. State (2011)
Sanders Jr. v. State (2019)
— 775.084(b)(1) — 1 case
Johnson v. Singletary (1995)
— 775.084(c) — 7 cases
Salters v. State (2000)
Salters v. State (1999)
Rallo v. State (1999)
Bover v. State (1999)
O'NEILL v. State (1995)
— 775.084(d) — 1 case
Rodriguez v. Moore (2003)
— 775.084(d)(1) — 1 case
Chacon v. State (2006)
— 775.084(d)(1)(a) — 1 case
— 775.084(e) — 1 case
O'Neill v. State (1996)
— 775.084(i)(a) — 1 case
Turner v. State (2009)
— 775.084(l)(a) — 144 cases
Alcorn v. State (2013)
Dougherty v. State (2010)
Cox v. State (2017)
— 775.084(l)(a)(2) — 4 cases
Barnes v. State (1994)
Anderson v. State (1986)
Robinson v. State (1998)
Martinez v. State (1992)
— 775.084(l)(a)(2)(b) — 4 cases
Lynch v. State (2004)
Johnson v. State (2000)
Butler v. State (2017)
Cunningham v. State (2013)
— 775.084(l)(a)(3) — 22 cases
Vickers v. State (2004)
Jefferson v. State (1995)
Love v. State (2001)
Gadsen v. State (2003)
— 775.084(l)(a)(4) — 1 case
R.J.L. v. State (2004)
— 775.084(l)(a)(l) — 2 cases
Thomas v. State (1994)
Johnson v. State (2000)
— 775.084(l)(b) — 66 cases
State v. Harris (2014)
State v. Anders (2009)
Bynes v. State (2003)
Ponton v. State (2011)
Jacobs v. State (2014)
— 775.084(l)(b)(2) — 3 cases
Bozarth v. State (2001)
Mills v. State (2003)
Bunion v. State (1994)
— 775.084(l)(b)(2)(b) — 2 cases
Johnson v. State (2000)
Bozarth v. State (2001)
— 775.084(l)(b)(3) — 1 case
R.J.L. v. State (2004)
— 775.084(l)(b)(4) — 1 case
Arnold v. State (1992)
— 775.084(l)(b)(l) — 5 cases
Bozarth v. State (2001)
Abner v. State (1990)
Robinson v. State (1996)
Alvarado v. State (2009)
Bonaventure v. State (1994)
— 775.084(l)(b)(l)(g) — 1 case
Donaldson v. State (2010)
— 775.084(l)(c) — 21 cases
Ubilla v. State (2009)
Webb v. State (2000)
Robinson v. State (1996)
State v. Harris (2014)
Sosa v. State (2005)
— 775.084(l)(d) — 18 cases
Dixon v. State (2010)
Bynes v. State (2003)
Bynes v. State (2012)
Zink v. State (2007)
Sustakoski v. State (2008)
— 775.084(l)(d)(3) — 1 case
Simmons v. State (2016)
— 775.084(l)(d)(a) — 1 case
CURI v. State (2010)
— 775.084(l)(d)(l)(a) — 2 cases
Zink v. State (2007)
Fisher v. State (2014)
— 775.084(l)(e) — 8 cases
Villegas-Alen v. State (2000)
Cotto v. State (2012)
Hankins v. State (2010)
Rucker v. State (1993)
Johnson v. State (2014)
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.