Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). · Go Syfert
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Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: PATRICIA DAGAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2019-04-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PATRICIA DAGAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See Hendrix v. State, 224 So. 3d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding that a snapout cannot serve as a written competency order); Gray v. State, 198 So. 3d 780 , 782–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that a snapout cannot serve as a written judgment or sentence); Phillips v. State, 198 So. 3d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), Zaborowski v. State, 126 So. 3d 405 , 407 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), Thar v. State, 8 So. 3d 1204 , 1205 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), and Cochrane v. State, 997 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (Altenbernd, J., concurring) (each noting this court's longstanding discouragement of th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Zaborowski v. State, 126 So.3d 405 , 407 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Thar v. State, 8 So.3d 1204 , 1205 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Cochrane v. State, 997 So.2d 1221, 1223-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (Altenbernd, J., concurring); Woods v. State, 987 So.2d 669, 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Akridge v. Crow, 903 So.2d 346, 350-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Sutton v. State, 838 So.2d 616 , 617 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Heath v. State, 840 So.2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Monroe v. State, 784 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Richardson v. State, 761 So.2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Monroe v. State, 760 So.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gordon v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
After an initial review of the case, this court relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to enter a written order of probation revocation that satisfies Monroe v. State, 760 So.2d 289, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that a "Memo of Sentence" or "snapout" did not constitute a sufficient order of probation revocation), and Donley v. State, 557 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("When a court finds that a probationer has violated his probation, it must enter a formal order setting forth the conditions that it finds were violated.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Braswell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Monroe v. State, 760 So.2d 289, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), this court explained that the use of a memo of sentence or snapout is inadequate to serve as a formal order of revocation.
discussed Cited "see" Hawthorne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See McNeil v. State, 908 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (remanding for the trial court to correct condition numbers on written order to conform to oral pronouncement). 1 However, the court’s attempt to correct the order failed because the Memo of Sentence is inadequate to serve as a revocation order, see Monroe v. State, 760 So.2d 289, 289-90 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), especially when unsigned, see Akridge v. Crow, 903 So.2d 346, 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
cited Cited "see" Lopez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Monroe v. State, 760 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
cited Cited "see" Jelks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Monroe v. State, 760 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Christopher Lucas MONROE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
2D99-3489.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jun 9, 2000.
760 So. 2d 289
Altenbernd.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.

Christopher L. Monroe appeals an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to time served. Although an error in such an order might usually be deemed moot, we conclude that this particular order requires correction.

This is another case in which the order on appeal is a "Memo of Sentence" or "snapout." This is disturbing because this court held as early as 1990 that such an order was an inadequate order of revocation of probation. See Donley v. State, 557 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). This court warned the Tenth Circuit about the continuing use of such orders months before the Tenth Circuit entered this order on August 10, 1999. See Peterson v. State, 730 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We issued yet another opinion, after Peterson and before the Tenth Circuit entered this order, holding Memos of Sentence inadequate to serve as orders of revocation. See Grantham v. State, 735 So.2d 525, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Donley, 557 So.2d 943).

[*290] This Memo of Sentence states that "court found deft violated cond # 4." Condition 4 requires that a probationer not violate the law. In this record, the only violation of condition 4 the affidavit of violation alleges is a home invasion on March 22, 1999. The record contains absolutely no evidence of such a home invasion. Apparently, an affidavit of violation of probation in another case involving Mr. Monroe alleged a different offense as a violation of condition 4. Mr. Monroe is now serving a prison sentence because he violated probation in that case.

It would appear that the trial court entered this order merely to clean up Mr. Monroe's record, while sending him to prison in the other case. Nevertheless, the record incorrectly states that the State proved Mr. Monroe committed a home invasion.

Because the trial court used the Memo of Sentence, there is no order of violation in this case. The record contains no evidence relevant to the grounds for violation alleged in the affidavit. Thus, despite the sentence of time served, we are constrained to reverse this "Memo of Sentence" and remand to the trial court to correct its error.

On remand, if the trial court finds a violation of probation, it shall enter a formal, written order of violation and shall not use a Memo of Sentence as the dispositive document. See Rebollar v. State, 752 So.2d 1287, 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Wagner v. State, 744 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Grantham, 735 So.2d at 526.

Remanded with directions.

GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur.