v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
[*1050] Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cherry Grant, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
KAHN, LISA D., Associate Judge.
The appellant, Giles Levesque, was charged with second degree murder. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of aggravated battery. He challenges his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of second degree murder. Because the information did not sufficiently allege commission of aggravated battery by causing great bodily harm, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on this theory. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for aggravated battery.
The information charged Levesque with second degree murder by striking or kicking the victim in the head.[1] Second degree murder is a general intent crime while aggravated battery is a specific intent crime. See Howard v. State, 732 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). "A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery: 1. intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement...." § 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Aggravated battery is not a necessary lesser included offense of second degree murder, but it may be a permissive lesser offense depending upon the allegations in the information.[2]See Busby v. State, 766 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA), decision quashed on other grounds by, 765 So.2d 49 (Fla.2000).
The information did not allege that Levesque intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm. It is error to give a jury instruction on a permissive lesser included offense unless the accusatory pleading alleges all the elements of the lesser offense. See K.H. v. State, 763 So.2d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Lawrence v. State, 685 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Andrews v. State, 679 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Watkins v. State, 632 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Accordingly, the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury that Levesque could be found guilty of aggravated battery.
The state argues that Levesque raises this issue for the first time on appeal. At trial, Levesque argued that the evidence was not sufficient to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of aggravated[*1051] battery. Although Levesque's appeal alleges a ground different from the issue argued at the trial level, it is fundamental error for a person to be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. See K.H., 763 So.2d at 1188. Therefore, Levesque may raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See Mateo v. State, 757 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
We therefore reverse Levesque's conviction and sentence for aggravated battery pursuant to section 784.045(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1995). On remand, the state may file a new or amended information, if it so elects.[3]See K.H., 763 So.2d at 1188, n. 1; Mauldin v. State, 696 So.2d 801, 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).[4]
Reversed and remanded.
FARMER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.