Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). · Go Syfert
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Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: PHILIP WALLACE STAUDERMAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2018-10-12) · Strongest negative: Akins v. State (fladistctapp, 2006-03-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
cited Cited "but see" Akins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PHILIP WALLACE STAUDERMAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding, and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender. 'Magic words' are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended." (footnote omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Louis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Saffold v. State, 959 So.2d 1247, 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Zink v. State, 943 So.2d 895, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), rev. denied, 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2004); Fitzpatrick v. State, 884 So.2d 981, 982 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Yates v. State, 823 So.2d 273, 274-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), rev. denied, 842 So.2d 848 (Fla. 2003).
cited Cited "see" Burch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Zink v. State, 943 So.2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2004).
discussed Cited "see" Saffold v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("magic words" are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended when it declared the intent to impose a habitual offender sentence); see also Zink v. State, 943 So.2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lewis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Zink v. State, 943 So.2d 895, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“ ‘Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding, and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender. *1022 “Magic words” are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.’ ”) (quoting Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2004)).
Vincent SCANES, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
4D04-1324.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jun 23, 2004.
876 So. 2d 1238
Stone.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

[*1239] Vincent Scanes, Polk City, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

STONE, J.

We affirm an order summarily denying Scanes' motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Following a jury trial, Scanes was declared a habitual felony offender and sentenced concurrently to thirty years in prison on two second-degree felonies.

Scanes contends that his thirty-year sentences exceed the appropriate statutory maximum for second-degree felonies because the trial court did not orally sentence him "as "a habitual felony offender. Specifically, the court held him to be a habitual felony offender and concurrently sentenced him to the enhanced sentence, but did not state that the thirty-year sentences were imposed on Scanes "as" a habitual felony offender.

The transcript reflects:

.... I declare and find the Defendant to be a habitual felony offender pursuant to Florida Statute 775.084.
The Court herein sentences the Defendant as to Count I and Count II each to thirty years in the Florida State Prison and to run concurrent and not consecutive to each other with credit for time served....

In Evans v. State, 675 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), this court held that the trial court's clarification of sentence two days after oral pronouncement, to reflect the defendant's habitual offender status, was a violation of the defendant's double jeopardy rights and constituted reversible error. There, the oral pronouncement clearly did not reflect the trial court's intention to sentence Evans as a habitual offender, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court's failure to include the habitual sentencing in its oral pronouncement may well have been an oversight. Id.

In Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1266 (Fla.2003), the trial court, three days after sentencing the defendant as a habitual felony offender, imposed a habitual violent felony offender sentence along with a mandatory minimum. There, the supreme court concluded that the later sentence was a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 1269.

Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding,[*1240] and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender.[1] "Magic words" are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended. See O'Neal v. State, 862 So.2d 91, 91-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Yates v. State, 823 So.2d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), rev. denied, 842 So.2d 848 (Fla.2003).

GUNTHER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.

1 We recognize that this court has declared that the only kinds of illegal sentence challenges cognizable under the rule "are those that are illegal because they exceed the maximum ..., those that were unconstitutionally increased after they had been imposed, ... those for which no record, earned jail credit was given," Blakley v. State, 746 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), holding modified by Austin v. State, 756 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and habitual sentencing imposed for an offense not subject to habitualization as a matter of law under any set of factual circumstances. See Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001). We consider the issue raised here to be a claim that the sentence was "unconstitutionally increased" after it was imposed. We also distinguish this claim from those asserting a discrepancy between the oral and written sentence, which must be alleged in a timely motion under rule 3.850. See Gardner v. State, 707 So.2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).