Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). · Go Syfert
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Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Johnson v. State (fla, 2011-04-21)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
While acknowledging that the Fifth District had reached a contrary conclusion in Davis, 968 So.2d at 1052 (holding that a plea agreement stating that defendant would receive 1531 days of credit was not “conclusive evidence” that defendant validly waived any additional' credit), the Third District determined that “a provision in a plea agreement that the defendant is to be awarded credit for time served from a specific date .effectively waives any claim to credit for time served before that date.” Johnson, 974 So.2d at 1152 (citing Hines v. State, 906 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McLeod v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McLeod v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rudicil v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Woody v. State, 993 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)(“We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that a notation on the disposition sheet, next to the award of credit for 154 days, stating ‘-agrees to T/S,’ conclusively refuted Woody’s claim to be entitled to 548 days”)(emphasis in original); Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that written statement in plea agreement that defendant would receive credit for 1531 days time served was not conclusive record evidence that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to additional credit for …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lahens v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In Velasquez , the First District held that a notation of the amount of a jail credit on a written plea agreement “is not sufficient in the absence of evidence ‘that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that right.’ ” Id. at 980 (quoting Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Velasquez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Although the trial court attached the plea agreement, which specifically called for appellant to receive 100 days of credit (which the appellant was awarded), a written notation in the plea agreement as to the amount of credit a defendant will receive is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled.” Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
cited Cited "see" Villar v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
discussed Cited "see" Hines v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Tribble v. State, 948 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Murphy v. State, 930 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Silverstein v. State, 654 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited "see" Hill v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (where written plea agreement stated that jail credit would be 1,531 days, that statement was not conclusive evidence that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would be entitled); Briggs v. State, 929 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (jail credit is mandatory unless record clearly shows that defendant waived his entitlement to such credit); Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (court records must establish defendant's clear intent to waive a portion of his accrued jail time); Silverstein v. State, 65…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Pippins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., McLeod v. State, 58 So.3d 931, 932-33 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hagan v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Davis v. State, 968 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (concluding that written plea agreement that stated “[cjredit for time served as of 7/31/2006 is 1,531 days” was not conclusive evidence that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived entitlement to any additional credit he was owed).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Dwayne K. DAVIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
5D07-2568.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov 30, 2007.
968 So. 2d 1051
Torpy.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published

Dwayne K. Davis, Carrabelle, pro se.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeffrey R. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

TORPY, J.

In this postconviction proceeding, Appellant challenges the lower court's order summarily denying his motion for additional credit for time served in jail prior to his sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant's motion finding that he had waived entitlement to additional jail credit. The trial court attached the written plea agreement in support of this finding. The written plea agreement states "[c]redit for time served as of 7/31/2006 is 1,531 days." We do not view this statement in the plea agreement as conclusive evidence that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled. See Murphy v. State, 930 So.2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (finding waiver of jail credit must be clear and knowing); Silverstein v. State, 654 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding waiver of jail time credit must be specific, voluntary, and clearly shown on the record).

In its response, the State argues that Reed v. State, 810 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), supports the trial court's conclusion. It asserts that Reed stands for the proposition that a stipulation to a specific amount of jail credit contained within a written plea agreement is tantamount to a waiver of any amount above the stipulated sum. We disagree. Reed affirmed the trial court because the motion for jail credit was not sufficient in that it failed to allege the entitlement to the credit was shown in court records. It did so without prejudice to the filing of a legally sufficient motion. In dicta the Second District Court stated:

We note, however, that had Reed's motion been facially sufficient, we would have been compelled to reverse the trial court's order because the attachments to the order do not refute Reed's claim. Without an attached signed plea agreement or the transcript of the plea colloquy showing that Reed had stipulated to the jail credit, the trial court's order and its attachments are insufficient to refute Reed's claim to additional jail credit.
Although we do not decide the issue at this time, we also note that when a claim of this nature is raised, the court records must establish the defendant's clear intent to waive a portion of his or her accrued jail time before we could affirm a defendant's stipulation to credit for less jail time than was actually served. It seems to this court that a defendant should not lose credit for jail time actually served due to a mistake by the defendant, defense counsel, or the State.

[*1053] Reed, 810 So.2d at 1026-27 (emphasis supplied).

We do not interpret this dicta to mean that a waiver can be shown merely by a defendant's stipulation to a certain amount of credit, absent evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional jail credit and voluntarily relinquished that right. In fact, the emphasized portion of the quotation is to the contrary.

Therefore, we reverse the order and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it either grant the motion or attach portions of the record that conclusively refute Appellant's claim.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.