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Florida Statute 45.061 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
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The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 45
CIVIL PROCEDURE: GENERAL PROVISIONS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 45.061
45.061 Offers of settlement.
(1) At any time more than 60 days after the service of a summons and complaint on a party but not less than 60 days (or 45 days if it is a counteroffer) before trial, any party may serve upon an adverse party a written offer, which offer shall not be filed with the court and shall be denominated as an offer under this section, to settle a claim for the money, property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer shall remain open for 45 days unless withdrawn sooner by a writing served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted within 45 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions under this section.
(2) If, upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court shall consider all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, including:
(a) Whether, upon specific request by the offeree, the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information which was necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer.
(b) Whether the suit was in the nature of a “test case,” presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.

An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected. For the purposes of this section, the amount of the judgment shall be the total amount of money damages awarded plus the amount of costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer for which recovery is provided by operation of other provisions of Florida law.

(3) In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this section, the court shall award:
(a) The amount of the parties’ costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, and other expenses which relate to the preparation for trial, incurred after the making of the offer of settlement; and
(b) The statutory rate of interest that could have been earned at the prevailing statutory rate on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment.

The amount of any sanction imposed under this section against a plaintiff shall be set off against any award to the plaintiff, and if such sanction is in an amount in excess of the award to the plaintiff, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the amount of the excess.

(4) This section shall not apply to any class action or shareholder derivative suit or to matters relating to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport, eminent domain, or child custody.
(5) Sanctions authorized under this section may be imposed notwithstanding any limitation on recovery of costs or expenses which may be provided by contract or in other provisions of Florida law. This section shall not be construed to waive the limits of sovereign immunity set forth in s. 768.28.
(6) This section does not apply to causes of action that accrue after the effective date of this act.
History.s. 1, ch. 87-249; s. 22, ch. 90-119.

F.S. 45.061 on Google Scholar

F.S. 45.061 on Casetext

Amendments to 45.061


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 45.061
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 45.061.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All
  1. We reject the contention there was a lack of mutuality without further discussion and turn our analysis to whether the parties formed a binding contract. Sakowitz cites section 45.061, Florida Statutes, for the proposition that Florida law favors the acceptance of settlement offers within forty-five days. Thus, the offer was not timely accepted. We conclude this reliance is misplaced. The forty-five day limit applies uniquely to a formal "offer for settlement," and here, the offer was not formally "denominated as an offer under [ section 45.061 ]." § 45.061(1), Fla. Stat. Consequently, the statutory time frame is inapplicable.
    PAGE 28
  2. There is no path from the statutory language of section 768.79 —"net judgment entered"—to the meaning adopted by the majority—a hypothetical judgment equivalent to "what would be included in judgments if the judgments were entered on the date of the settlement offers." Majority op. at 3. The legislature certainly could have enacted a statute with such a meaning. Indeed, the legislature has enacted a statute containing a very similar provision. Section 45.061, Florida Statutes (2020), which applies to offers of settlement for causes of action that accrued on or before the effective date of the statute in 1990, contains a provision defining "the amount of the judgment" as "the total amount of money damages awarded plus the amount of costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer." § 45.061(2)(b), Fla. Stat. So the legislature certainly knows how to clearly exclude post-offer costs and expenses from the definition of the amount of judgment used to determine whether an award is to be made under an offer of judgment statute.
    PAGE 8
  3. Delisle v. Crane Co.

    258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018)   Cited 16 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Our consideration of the constitutionality of the amendment does not end with our determination that the provision was procedural. For this Court to determine that the amendment is unconstitutional, it must also conflict with a rule of this Court. See Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian , 579 So.2d 730, 732–33 (Fla. 1991) ("Where this Court promulgates rules relating to the practice and procedure of all courts and a statute provides a contrary practice or procedure, the statute is unconstitutional to the extent of the conflict.") (citing Sch. Bd. v. Surette, 281 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1973), receded from on other grounds by Sch. Bd. v. Price, 362 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1978) ); see also Leapai v. Milton , 595 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992) (holding that section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), was not unconstitutional to the extent it did not conflict with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and stating that "statutes should be construed to effectuate the express legislative intent and all doubt as to the validity of any statute should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality" (quoting McKibben v. Mallory , 293 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1974) ) ). A procedural rule of this Court may be…
  4. Appellant's argument in favor of Rule 68 fails initially because Rule 68 is not in "direct collision" with the portion of F.S.A. § 45.061 applicable in this case. Rule 68 concerns only interest and offers of judgment, while the Florida statute concerns attorney's fees, offers of judgment and settlement offers. Thus, the circumstances here are similar to those in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 [(citations omitted)] (1980), in which the Court in a diversity action was asked to determine whether the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 in deciding when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations. In the course of holding that Oklahoma law controlled, the Court stated: "'[T]he scope of the Federal Rule [is] not as broad as the losing party urge[s], and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which cover[s] the point in dispute, Erie command[s] the enforcement of state law.'" 446 U.S. 740, 750 [(citations omitted)] (1980) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 [(citations omitted)] (1965)).
    PAGE 6
  5. Palmer v. Palmer

    206 So. 3d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
    Neither section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, the statute entitled "Offers of Settlement," nor section 768.79, Florida Statutes, the statute regarding offers and demands of judgment in civil actions for damages, applies in dissolution of marriage proceedings.
    PAGE 77
  6. We also note that section 790.33 makes no mention or citation to section 768.28. The supreme court has explained that “[w]hen the Legislature has intended particular statutory causes of action to be subject to the requirements of section 768.28(6), it has made its intent clear by enacting provisions explicitly stating that section 768.28 applies.” See Bifulco v. Patient Bus. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 39 So.3d 1255, 1258 (Fla.2010) (“See, e.g., § 556.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (‘Any liability of the state and its agencies and its subdivisions which arises out of this chapter shall be subject to the provisions of s. 768.28.’); § 45.061( 5), Fla. Stat. (2004) (‘This section shall not be construed to waive the limits of sovereign immunity set forth in s. 768.28.’)”). Thus, even if Appellant's cause of action against Appellee Machen was characterized as being tortious in nature, the fact that section 790.33 makes no mention of section 768.28 supports Appellant's position and our determination that section 768.28 does not apply in this case. See Bifulco, 39 So.3d at 1258 (“Because the Legislature did not refer to section 768.28 or its subsections within chapter 440, and…
  7. Franks v. Bowers

    116 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 2013)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    (2) If neither party requests or agrees to voluntary binding arbitration, the claim shall proceed to trial or to any available legal alternative such as offer of and demand for judgment under s.768.79 or offer of settlement under s. 45.061.
    PAGE 1245
  8. Hallac v. Hallac

    88 So. 3d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 16 times
    Decided prior to Rosen, Aue v. Aue, 685 So.2d 1388, 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), involved a trial court's denial of attorney's fees to the wife because she was “unreasonable” in refusing to accept an offer of settlement from the husband. In reversing,the First District noted “there is no authority for denying attorney's fees in dissolution cases solely for the failure to accept an offer of settlement.” Id. The court noted that “[i]n fact, section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts dissolution proceedings from the offer of settlement statute.” Id.
    PAGE 257
  9. Decided prior to Rosen, Aue v. Aue, 685 So. 2d 1388, 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), involved a trial court's denial of attorney's fees to the wife because she was "unreasonable" in refusing to accept an offer of settlement from the husband. In reversing, the First District noted "there is no authority for denying attorney's fees in dissolution cases solely for the failure to accept an offer of settlement." Id. The court noted that "[i]n fact, section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts dissolution proceedings from the offer of settlement statute." Id.
    PAGE 4
  10. Affirmed. See § 45.061(2), Fla. Stat. (2010); In re Jet 1 Ctr. Inc., 335 B.R. 771, 772 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 2005); Lennar Corp. v. Muskat, 595 So.2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
    PAGE 1186

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    DELISLE, v. CRANE CO., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . Milton , 595 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992) (holding that section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), was not . . .

    EARTHCAM, INC. a v. OXBLUE CORPORATION, a, 658 F. App'x 526 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 45.061 applicable in this case. . . .

    PALMER, n k a v. PALMER,, 206 So.3d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . Neither section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, the statute entitled "Offers of Settlement,” nor section . . .

    BARNES, A. D. v. SUN CHEMICAL CORPORATION,, 164 F. Supp. 3d 994 (W.D. Mich. 2016)

    . . . ) (“The district court was correct in awarding defendant.. .attorney fees” under “Florida Statute § 45.061 . . .

    FLORIDA CARRY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA,, 180 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . .’); § 45.061(5), Fla. . . .

    FRANKS, v. BOWERS, M. D., 116 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 2013)

    . . . alternative such as offer of and demand for judgment under s.768.79 or offer of settlement under s. 45.061 . . .

    HALLAC, v. HALLAC,, 88 So. 3d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

    . . . The court noted that “[i]n fact, section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts dissolution . . .

    TIERRA HOLDINGS, LTD, v. MERCANTILE BANK, a, 78 So. 3d 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

    . . . and replaced it with a new rule which reflected the major components of section 768.79 and section 45.061 . . . Section 45.061, a similar offer-of-judgment statute, was repealed with respect to actions accruing after . . .

    EMG HOLDINGS, INC. v. AUTUMN PARTNERSHIP, LLP,, 61 So. 3d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

    . . . See § 45.061(2), Fla. Stat. (2010); In re Jet 1 Ctr. . . .

    M. BIFULCO, v. PATIENT BUSINESS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 39 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2010)

    . . . .”); §.45.061(5), Fla. . . .

    PARHAM, L. v. FLORIDA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER, INC. d b a, 35 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

    . . . alternative such as offer of and demand for judgment under s. 768.79 or offer of settlement under s. 45.061 . . .

    RAPHAEL, v. SHECTER,, 18 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

    . . . alternative such as offer of and demand for judgment under s. 768.79 or offer of settlement under s. 45.061 . . . alternative such as offer of and demand for judgment under s. 768.79 or offer of settlement under s. 45.061 . . .

    WHEATLEY, v. MOE S SOUTHWEST GRILL, LLC Fu s H. III, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008)

    . . . . § 45.061 applicable in this case. . . .

    N. MENCHISE, v. AKERMAN SENTERFITT, a I., 532 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2008)

    . . . the defendant made three offers that the plaintiff rejected: a proposal for settlement under section 45.061 . . . We examined section 45.061, which provided that a prevailing defendant who had served either an offer . . . We held that Rule 68 did not preempt section 45.061 because the two provisions were not in “direct collision . . . “Rule 68 concerns only [costs] and offers of judgment, while [section 45.061] concerns attorney’s fees . . . In 1990, the Florida Legislature consolidated sections 768.79 and 45.061 into the current version of . . .

    N. MENCHISE, v. AKERMAN SENTERFITT, a I., 532 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2008)

    . . . the defendant made three offers that the plaintiff rejected: a proposal for settlement under section 45.061 . . . We examined section 45.061, which provided that a prevailing defendant who had served either an offer . . . We held that Rule 68 did not preempt section 45.061 because the two provisions were not in “direct collision . . . “Rule 68 concerns only [costs] and offers of judgment, while [section 45.061] concerns attorney’s fees . . . In 1990, the Florida Legislature consolidated sections 768.79 and 45.061 into the current version of . . .

    MASSEY, v. F. DAVID,, 979 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2008)

    . . . Combs, 608 So.2d 1 (Fla.1992), [Wje found sections 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), and 768.79, Florida . . . mediation by court order, the time periods for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.061 . . . (b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer of settlement or an offer or demand for judgment . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 966 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2007)

    . . . The court should consider rule 1.442 concerning offers of judgment and section 45.061, Florida Statutes . . .

    HART, v. CITY OF GROVELAND,, 919 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

    . . . precluded from recovering costs and attorney fees under rules and statutes such as Rule 1.442 and sections 45.061 . . .

    C. JONES v. DOUBLE D PROPERTIES, INC. Ag, 901 So. 2d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

    . . . and to tax costs pursuant to rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and sections 768.79 and 45.061 . . .

    A. HALL v. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,, 895 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

    . . . LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, by and through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Florida Statutes 768.79, 45.061 . . .

    HAMMELL, v. TAD PROPERTIES, L. L. C. d b a a, 886 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

    . . . proposal for settlement made by appellees pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, and sections 45.061 . . .

    WIGHT, v. WIGHT,, 880 So. 2d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

    . . . 664 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (denying fees for litigating amount of fees sought pursuant to § 45.061 . . .

    FISHER, Jr. v. JOHN CARTER AND ASSOCIATES, INC. a T., 864 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

    . . . Former section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991) (offer of judgment and demand for judgment) and section 45.061 . . . On the contrary, the first district interpreted the thirty-day time limit in section 45.061(2), Florida . . .

    AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TWO YEAR CYCLE, 858 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2003)

    . . . The court should consider rule 1.442 concerning offers of judgment and section 45.061, Florida Statutes . . .

    SARKIS, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 863 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2003)

    . . . In 1986, the Legislature enacted section 768.79, and in 1987, the Legislature enacted section 45.061, . . . In 1988, we requested the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to examine any conflict between sections 45.061 . . . Later, in 1992, we considered the interplay between sections 45.061 and 768.79 in Timmons v. . . . We noted that the Legislature had repealed section 45.061 with respect to causes of action accruing after . . . We stated: In Leapai, this Court upheld the constitutionality of section 45.061 and found that the statute . . .

    W. PEARSON, M. D. v. GABRELCIK,, 838 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

    . . . for settlement made pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, and Florida Statutes sections 45.061 . . .

    D. McMAHAN, f. k. a. v. A. TOTO, D. f. k. a. v. A., 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2002)

    . . . . § 45.061 to settle this case for the amount of $100.00 (One Hundred Dollars) upon a stipulation for . . .

    J. WHITE, v. STEAK AND ALE OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a s,, 816 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2002)

    . . . For example, Section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1997), which applies to causes of action accruing on or . . . Section 45.061 explicitly provides that the judgment obtained is “the total amount of money damages awarded . . . expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer.” § 45.061 . . . Williams court was interpreting section 768.79, the offer of judgment statute, and comparing it to section 45.061 . . . Legislature in 1990 consolidated the two statutes into section 768.79, in essence eliminating section 45.061 . . . made by defendants, in 1990 the Legislature consolidated the offer of judgment statute with section 45.061 . . . section 768.79 to cover both offers of settlement and judgment, and limited the applicability of section 45.061 . . .

    ESTATE OF CORT, v. BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF, 807 So. 2d 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . Combs, 608 So.2d 1 (Fla.1992), [W]e found sections 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), and 768.79, Florida . . .

    BDO SEIDMAN, LLP, f k a BDO a v. BRITISH CAR AUCTIONS, INC. a ADT a, 802 So. 2d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    . . . Milton, 595 So.2d 12 (Fla.1992), ruled on the constitutionality of section 45.061, Florida Statutes ( . . .

    D. McMAHAN, f. k. a. v. A. TOTO, D. f. k. a. v. A., 256 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2001)

    . . . . § 45.061 and, in the alternative, Fla. . . . Stat. § 45.061 to settle this case for the amount of $100.00 (One Hundred Dollars) upon a stipulation . . . Stat. § 45.061, which is no longer effective, contained language indicating that an award of attorney . . . Stat. § 45.061, although it has been repealed for causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990. . . .

    GORTZ, LLP, f k a LLP, LLP, f k a LLP, v. LYTAL, REITER, CLARK, SHARPE, ROCA, FOUNTAIN WILLIAMS, a J. a, 769 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . Satter on June 27, 1996, in the tort action, Lytal Reiter did not move for attorney’s fees under section 45.061 . . .

    AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 773 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2000)

    . . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . .

    CSR PARTNERSHIP, a C. d b a s v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 741 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . that rule 1.442 was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . .

    F. PEREZ, v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. a, 721 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

    . . . For example, Section 45.061, Flor-ida Statutes (1997), which applies to causes of action accruing on . . . Section 45.061 ex plicitly provides that the judgment obtained is “the total amount of money damages . . . expenses reasonably incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer.” § 45.061 . . .

    LAGEMAN, A. D L a v. FRANK H. FURMAN, INC. a H. Jr. a a, 703 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . involves the award of attorney’s fees in favor of Fur-man, pursuant to either section 768.79 or section 45.061 . . .

    CANDYWORLD, INC. a v. GRANITE STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a a, 700 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . Candyworld offered to settle the matter pursuant to section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), but the . . . court, and filed a timely motion for appellate attorney’s fees merely citing sections 627.428, 768.79, 45.061 . . .

    CITY OF DELRAY BEACH, v. KEISER,, 699 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . This much is made abundantly clear to me by subsection (b) of section 44.102, which states: “Sections 45.061 . . .

    McMULLEN OIL COMPANY, INC. v. ISS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE SYSTEM, INC., 698 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . assertion that it was entitled to a fee award under the alternative statutory grounds provided in sections 45.061 . . .

    E. MURPHY v. D. TUCKER,, 689 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . mediation by court order, the time periods for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.061 . . .

    ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. v. NEVILLE,, 687 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . Section 45.061(2), Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (2) If, upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days . . .

    GULLIVER ACADEMY, INC. v. BODEK, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997)

    . . . On June 20, 1991, the plaintiff filed a motion for costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 45.061 . . . On appeal, the First District interpreted section 45.061(2), a statute which was closely related to section . . . 768.79, and reversed, finding that pursuant to section 45.061(2), the thirty-day time limit to file . . . Similarly, section 45.061(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides for this determination “upon a motion . . . The legislature repealed section 45.061 with respect to causes of actions accruing after October 1, 1990 . . .

    LEE COUNTY, a v. F. PIERPONT J., 693 So. 2d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . See, e.g., § 45.061 (offers of settlement); § 73.032 (offers of judgment in eminent domain actions); . . .

    A. MESHER, v. A. COMBS, H. a k a a a, 685 So. 2d 1391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . favor of appellee Suzanne Combs, which was based on a $1,000 offer to settle made pursuant to section 45.061 . . .

    C. AUE, v. J. AUE,, 685 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . In fact, section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts dissolution proceedings from the offer . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 682 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1996)

    . . . This rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061 . . .

    KNEALING, v. PULEO J., 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996)

    . . . mediation by court order, the time periods for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.061 . . . (b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer of settlement or an offer or demand for judgment . . . In Leapai and Timmons we found sections 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), and 768.79, Florida Statutes . . . Section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), which concerned offers of settlement and provided for attorney . . . Although the cause of action in this case accrued before that date, section 45.061 was not applicable . . .

    ONG v. MIKE GUIDO PROPERTIES,, 668 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . Milton, 595 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1992), our supreme court addressed a constitutional challenge to section 45.061 . . . Specifically, the court addressed the issue of whether section 45.061 violated the separation of powers . . . In deciding this issue, the court first recognized that the provisions of section 45.061 contained both . . . Section 44.102(5)(b) of the statute provides that: Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer . . . notice that it was relying on section 44.102(5)(b): Moreover, we note that, recognizing that sections 45.061 . . .

    GRAY, v. BRADBURY,, 668 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . Bradbury then moved to tax attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 45.061(2), Florida Statutes, . . . Id.; § 45.061(2), Fla.Stat. . . .

    BOARDMAN PETROLEUM, INC. v. TROPIC TINT OF JUPITER, INC., 668 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . prevailing plaintiff pursuant to sections 376.313(5) (Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act) and 45.061 . . . court found that the Schultzes were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under sections 376.30 and 45.061 . . . We also affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under section 45.061 based upon its finding . . . Under section 45.061 attorney’s fees are automatic if the value of the judgment is 25% greater than the . . . between the time of the offer of settlement and the entry of the final judgment would be recoverable. § 45.061 . . .

    R. COHEN, D. O. R. D. O. P. A. CNA v. S. RICHTER,, 667 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . damages, the defendant unreasonably rejected the plaintiffs offer of settlement made pursuant to section 45.061 . . .

    S. QUILLEN F. v. CURRAN, Co. f k a Co. a, 669 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . trial court determined that Peat Marwick was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 45.061 . . . litigation, was a valid offer to Parker Quillen in accordance with the following portion of section 45.061 . . . the offer, then Peat Mar-wick was rightfully awarded attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 45.061 . . . I would grant rehearing to clarify that the “relief’ contemplated in section 45.061, Florida Statutes . . .

    GILBERT, v. K- MART CORPORATION,, 664 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . Gilbert appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to section 45.061 . . . On June 28, 1989, Appellant filed an offer of settlement pursuant to section 45.061, in which she offered . . . In doing so, the trial court ruled that section 45.061 requires that a motion for fees by the offeror . . . Appellant maintains that because the legislature’s intent behind the enactment of section 45.061 was . . . aspects of section 45.061 remain intact. . . .

    GASPERIN v. REEVES,, 664 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . Reeves made an offer of judgment to the Gasperins pursuant to sections 768.79 and 45.061, Florida Statutes . . .

    SOUTHWINDS FARM, INC. v. H. ALBERTSON,, 664 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . months after commencement of the action, Albertson made an offer of settlement, pursuant to section 45.061 . . . to tax costs as well as attorney’s fees based upon defendants’ rejection of the settlement offer. § 45.061 . . . We observe that the offer of settlement was properly made pursuant to section 45.061. . . .

    PELAEZ, v. W. PERSONS,, 664 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . Persons more than $28,-000.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987). . . . Pursuant to section 45.061, Mr. . . . Persons unsuccessfully moved for attorneys’ fees in this court on a basis other than section 45.061. . . . Persons is not entitled to fees after that point under section 45.061. . . . We note that section 45.061 does not apply to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990. . . .

    MARCUS P. d b a v. S. MILLER, 663 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . The motion stated that it was pursuant to section 45.061, Florida Statutes, but the attached offer of . . .

    TGI FRIDAY S, INC. v. DVORAK,, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995)

    . . . rule of civil procedure, all of which employ different language governing offers of judgment: sections 45.061 . . . Section 45.061 reads as follows: (1) At any time more than 60 days after the service of a summons and . . . The district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees under section 45.061 and Rule . . . In Leapai, this Court upheld the constitutionality of section 45.061 and found that the statute did not . . . Finally, the district court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees under section 45.061 and rule 1.442 . . . the majority’s approval of the district court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of sections 45.061 . . . defendant did not unreasonably reject the plaintiff’s demands for judgment under rule 1.442 and section 45.061 . . .

    BAKER PROTECTIVE SERVICES, v. FP INCORPORATED, 659 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . 2d DCA 1993) (applying the prejudgment interest rule in Phillips to settlement offers under Section 45.061 . . .

    STOUFFER HOTEL CO. v. TEACHERS INSURANCE,, 944 F. Supp. 874 (M.D. Fla. 1995)

    . . . The defendants’ requests prompt an inquiry into the meaning and history of Section 45.061, Florida Statutes . . .

    PULEO J. v. KNEALING,, 654 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . (b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an offer of settlement or an offer or demand for judgment . . .

    BASS, v. STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a E., 649 So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . Bass also filed a motion for appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to Sections 627.428, 45.061, and 768.79 . . .

    G. HENSON, v. M. HASLAM,, 644 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Appellee cross-appeals the court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees under section 45.061, Florida . . . Under section 45.061, there is a statutory rebuttable presumption that where there is a verdict for the . . .

    WRIGHT, v. T. CARUANA,, 640 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Both former Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and Florida Statutes Section 45.061 govern offers of judgment . . . See § 45.061(1), Fla. Stat. (1991); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.442(b) (version effective January 1, 1990). . . . Therefore, neither former Rule 1.442 nor § 45.061 applies to this case. . . . conclusion here is not altered by Florida Statutes Section 44.102(5)(b), (1991), which provides: Sections 45.061 . . .

    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. S. MALMBERG,, 639 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1994)

    . . . 20, 1991, State Farm served the Malmbergs with an offer to settle for $100,-001 pursuant to sections 45.061 . . . The Malmbergs relied on section 45.061(2), which says that the rejection of an offer by the plaintiff . . . In Timmons, this Court held that section 45.061 applied to defendants’ verdicts. . . . We adhere to the Timmons rule that allows section 45.061 to be applied to verdicts for the defendant. . . . Section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1991), is solely controlling in this case. . . .

    DVORAK, v. TGI FRIDAY S, INC. a d b a TGI s,, 639 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . She served three different offers of judgment, one under section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987), one . . . We reverse the denial of attorney’s fees under section 768.79, but affirm denial under section 45.061 . . . Although the supreme court in Lea-pai decided only the constitutionality of section 45.061, it follows . . . section 768.79 and pointed out that the unreasonable rejection language, while appearing in section 45.061 . . . Section 45.061(2) provided that a court “may” award attorney’s fees if the court determines that an offer . . .

    DIAL CORPORATION, v. ADDONISIO,, 634 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Appellant appeals a denial of attorney’s fees under Section 45.061(2), Florida Statutes (1993). . . . Thereupon, the order appealed is affirmed. § 45.061(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). Affirmed. . . .

    AITKEN v. GAJADHA, M., 636 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Affirmed as to the denial of the award under section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1989). .WARNER, KLEIN . . .

    SCHMIDT, F. J. F. Jr. v. B. FORTNER, S. F., 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for offer-of-judgment attorney’s fees under sections 45.061 . . . judgment in the amount of $500,000 under rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and sections 45.061 . . . Plaintiffs’ demand for judgment was made under both sections 45.061 and 768.79. . . . The finding that plaintiffs were not entitled to fees as a sanction under section 45.061(2) did not, . . . Section 45.061(2) then provided as follows: "If, upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days after the . . .

    BUCHANAN v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 629 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . Allstate served offers of judgment on the Buchanans in the amount of $10,000, pursuant to Sections 45.061 . . . We nevertheless conclude that Allstate is entitled to an attorney-fee award under section 45.061. . . . As stated in Leapai, the operative events that trigger the provisions of section 45.061 are the making . . . In that case the court noted that “the petitioner could have filed simultaneously under section 45.061 . . . Allstate’s motion for same pursuant to section 45.061. . . .

    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. EGAN P., 626 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . verdict, State Farm filed its motion to tax costs and for attorney’s fees pursuant to sections 768.79 and 45.061 . . . We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s finding that section 45.061, Florida Statutes is unconstitutional . . .

    NORDYNE, INC. v. FLORIDA MOBILE HOME SUPPLY, INC., 625 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . cross appeal, FMHS argues that it is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to sections 44.102, 45.061 . . . They referred to sections 45.061 and 768.79, and to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. . . . rule — they were all served less than sixty days before trial, thereby failing to comply with section 45.061 . . . To the extent that section 44.102(5)(b) purports to amend both section 45.061 and section 768.79, it . . . Moreover, we note that, recognizing that sections 45.061 and 768.79 contained conflicting terms, and . . .

    PIPPIN, S. v. LATOSYNSKI, LATOSYNSKI, v. PIPPIN, S., 622 So. 2d 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . jury verdict, Latosynski moved to have sanctions imposed against Pippin and Davis pursuant to sections 45.061 . . . The trial court denied the motion for sanctions, finding only section 45.061 and rule 1.442 applicable . . .

    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. S. MALMBERG,, 623 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . Thus section 45.061 appears to be solely controlling in this case. . . . (emphasis added). § 45.061(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .” § 45.061(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . . § 45.061(6), Fla.Stat. (1991); Timmons v. . . . Combs, 608 So.2d 1 (Fla.1992). . § 45.061(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

    BRODOSE v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 622 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . However, the court did err in awarding attorney’s fees to the school board under either section 45.061 . . . Similarly, although section 45.061 has been repealed as to causes of action accruing after October 1, . . . First, the provision repealing section 45.061 as to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990, . . . Second, although Timmons overruled this court’s interpretation of the application of section 45.061, . . . Timmons cannot be applied to this case because the law to be applied when considering section 45.061 . . .

    STEWART SELECT CARS, INC. v. MOORE, 619 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . Appellants assert that they filed a written offer of judgment “pursuant to sections 45.061 and 768.79 . . .

    BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, PINELLAS COUNTY, v. TOM F. SAWYER,, 620 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1993)

    . . . and costs against convicted defendant represented by public defender or court appointed attorney); § 45.061 . . .

    GLATTHORN, v. UNITED STATES, 818 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1993)

    . . . 1988, before any discovery had been taken, GLATTHORN filed an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Section 45.061 . . . Section 45.061 provides, in pertinent part: (1) [A]ny party may serve upon an adverse party a written . . .

    W. PERSONS, v. PELAEZ,, 613 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . After this action was instituted, Persons tendered an offer of judgment pursuant to section 45.061, Florida . . . Thus, according to section 45.061(2), such an offer “shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected . . .

    METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. JONES BOATYARD, INC., 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1993)

    . . . Edwards the Second District Court of Appeal held that an offer of settlement, under section 45.061, was . . . We approved this interpretation of section 45.061 in our decision in Leapai v. . . . Therefore, the approach we announced in Leapai, regarding offers of settlement under section 45.061, . . . As to the second argument, the petitioner could have filed simultaneously under section 45.061 had it . . . Additionally, we do not find any direct conflict between section 45.061 and section 768.79 that would . . .

    BANYAN CORPORATION, a V. v. SCHUCKLAT REALTY, INC. a, 611 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Smith also appealed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and court costs to SRI under sections 45.061 . . .

    ROYAL CARIBBEAN CORPORATION, S. A. P. R. v. MODESTO,, 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . [t]o the extent that procedural aspects of new rule 1.442 are inconsistent with sections 768.79 and 45.061 . . .

    WILSON INSURANCE SERVICES d b a J. v. WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,, 608 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . that section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), requires a judgment in plaintiffs favor, but section 45.061 . . .

    JOHNSTON v. KLOSTER CRUISE LIMITED d b a, 604 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Defendant based its offer of settlement/judgment on rule 1.442 and section 45.061, Florida Statutes ( . . . court has yet to pass on the issue whether defendant’s offer complied with the requirements of section 45.061 . . . It is now apparent that section 45.061 is not unconstitutional as an unwarranted interference with the . . . trial court for a determination in the first instance as to the formalities of compliance with section 45.061 . . .

    O NEIL, v. WAL- MART STORES, INC., 602 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . 'This is the appeal of a final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees to a defendant under section 45.061, . . . Prior to trial, Wal-Mart made an offer of judgment under section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987) in the . . . The second issue on appeal concerns whether section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987) permits an award . . . Section 45.061(2) requires the court to determine whether “an offer was rejected unreasonably” prior . . . and section 45.061 was preserved only for causes of action accruing before October 1, 1990. . . .

    In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 604 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . The court should consider Rrule 1.442⅛ F-Ia.R.Civ.P, concerning offers of judgment and section 45.061 . . .

    TIMMONS, v. S. COMBS,, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . Timmons then sought costs and attorney’s fees under section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1989), for Combs . . . First District Court of Appeal affirmed on the premise that a defendant may not recover under section 45.061 . . . Section 45.061, which applies to most court actions, is worded somewhat differently. . . . The court below construed section 45.061 in the same manner as the courts have interpreted section 768.79 . . . Section 45.061 does not specify in whose favor the judgment must be entered. . . .

    VIVAL, INC. a d b a v. SYRACUSE PLASTICS OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC., 604 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . sanctions to Valdez because of Syracuse’s rejection of an offer of judgment made pursuant to section 45.061 . . .

    F. SAWYER, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, PINELLAS COUNTY,, 596 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . See, e.g„ §§ 27.56(1)(a); 45.061(3)(a); 253.03(13); 373.129(6); 489.132(3) 631.54(5); 895.05(7); 895.07 . . .

    GILMAN YACHT SALES, INC. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO,, 600 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . fees and costs based on Gilman’s alleged unreasonable refusal of a settle ment offer under section 45.061 . . . court erred in finding that Gilman unnecessarily refused to settle with Kaufman, pursuant to section 45.061 . . .

    COLLECTION CHEVROLET, INC. v. VALUE RENT- A- CAR, INC., 595 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . On April 29,1988, Collection tendered an $8,350 offer of judgment to Value pursuant to section 45.061 . . . In the present proceeding, Collection moved for sanctions under 45.061(2), (3), Florida Statutes (1987 . . . The trial judge denied the motion on the sole ground that section 45.061 was unconstitutional. . . . Milton, 595 So.2d 12 (Fla.1992) we conclude that section 45.061 is valid and enforceable. . . .

    LENNAR CORPORATION, v. MUSKAT,, 595 So. 2d 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . made, and the plaintiff-appellee, Miriam Muskat, rejected an offer of settlement pursuant to section 45.061 . . . which the amount of the settlement offer was determined, Lennar moved for sanctions under sections 45.061 . . . Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 595 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), we hold both that section 45.061 is constitutional . . . The cause is remanded solely for the purpose of determining the amount to be assessed under section 45.061 . . . (2). . 45.061 Offers of settlement— ****** (b) An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected . . .

    G. LEAPAI, v. MILTON,, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . Leapai, 562 So.2d 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), in which that court held section 45.061, Florida Statutes . . . SECTION 45.061 CONSTITUTED THE ADOPTION OF A RULE OF PROCEDURE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(a . . . SECTION 45.061 WHERE THE OFFER OF SETTLEMENT WAS MADE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE BUT . . . In answering the first question, the district court of appeal declared section 45.061 unconstitutional . . . We conclude that the procedural aspects of section 45.061 encroach upon the authority of the supreme . . .

    ZARRANZ, v. CORAL GABLES HOSPITAL, INC., 591 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . Zar-ranz pursuant to Section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987). . . . of settlement has been rejected is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 45.061 . . . Co., 581 So.2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (defendant can recover fees under § 45.061 only where a judgment . . .

    GROSS v. ALBERTSON S, INC. a, 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . is an appeal from a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees to a victorious defendant under section 45.061 . . . Pertinent parts of Section 45.061, Florida Statutes provide as follows: (1) At any time more than 60 . . . Appellants challenge the constitutionality of section 45.061, citing Milton v. . . . judgment obtained by the plaintiff”, there is no comparable requirement in section 45.061. . . . The legislature concluded that it would be covered by the existing version of section 45.061. . . .

    MILLER, v. WALLACE,, 591 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . The appellee cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for sanctions, pursuant to section 45.061 . . .

    WINN DIXIE STORES, INC. v. ELBERT a k a,, 590 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . In addition, defendant also extended an offer of settlement to plaintiff pursuant to section 45.061, . . . Section 45.061, Florida Statutes, provides in part: An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably . . .

    PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. GREAT DANE TRAILERS OF FLORIDA, INC., 50 Fla. Supp. 2d 136 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991)

    . . . Prior to trial, on March 28, 1990, CAVALIER, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 45.061, filed an Offer . . . CAVALIER specifically relied on Florida Statutes sections 45.061 and 768.79. . . . ruled CAVALIER and GREAT DANE were not entitled to attorneys’ fees under Florida Statutes sections 45.061 . . . A recent case construing Florida Statute 45.061 governing offers of settlement and the award of attorneys . . . Richardson also held section 45.061 to be substantive law and therefore retrospective [sic] application . . .

    TARPON SPRINGS ARCADE LIMITED, f k a v. CITY OF TARPON SPRINGS,, 582 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . this appeal is whether the trial judge properly denied appellant attorney’s fees pursuant to section 45.061 . . . This court has previously held section 45.061 to be constitutional. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. . . . holding that the circumstances of this case constituted a “test-case” within the contemplation of section 45.061 . . .

    SHARP COMMUNITY AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC. a v. SHARP, Jr., 582 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . In making this award as to Richardson’s individual claims, the court relied on section 45.061 and rule . . . See section 45.061(2), Fla.Stat. While dicta in Makar v. . . . Like section 45.061, rule 1.442 (1988) does not apply if a judgment is not rendered in favor of the party . . . Since the appellee did not establish the necessary predicate to invoke either section 45.061 or rule . . . Richardson also argues that section 45.061, Florida Statutes unconstitutionally infringes upon the Florida . . .