Cases from cite.case.law:

GLENN v. B R PLASTICS, INC. a I- X,, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1044 (D. Idaho 2018)

. . . reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.' " (quoting 11-56 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 56.13 . . .

H. YOE, III, v. CRESCENT SOCK COMPANY,, 314 F. Supp. 3d 892 (E.D. Tenn. 2018)

. . . (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000) . . .

SENTINEL CAPITAL ORLANDO, LLC, v. CENTENNIAL BANK, FDIC, 676 F. App'x 910 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . the “Participating Bank,” or “Participant,” and the majority interest owner, responsible for loaning 56.13% . . .

SEMCON TECH, LLC, v. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., 660 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2016)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed. 2005)) (“[I]f the motion is brought by a party . . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13, at 56-179 (1996 ed.)). . . .

HANTZ FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, n k a, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1089 (E.D. Mich. 2015)

. . . would be free to disbelieve it.’ ” (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DAS, d b a, 86 F. Supp. 3d 716 (E.D. Mich. 2015)

. . . (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed.2000))) . . .

In WHIRLPOOL CORP. FRONT- LOADING WASHER PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, 45 F. Supp. 3d 706 (N.D. Ohio 2014)

. . . would be free to disbelieve it”) (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

McKINNEY, v. AMERICAN RIVER TRANSP. CO., 954 F. Supp. 2d 799 (S.D. Ill. 2013)

. . . sufficient evidence of each essential element of its prima facie case); Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

DELANO v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES,, 908 F. Supp. 2d 888 (W.D. Tenn. 2012)

. . . (quoting 11 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-162 (3d. ed.2010))) (emphasis . . .

PANAYOTY v. J. ANNUCCI, Jr. A. K. F., 898 F. Supp. 2d 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed. 1999) (discussing burdens of production and . . .

BODEMER v. SWANEL BEVERAGE, INC., 884 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. Ind. 2012)

. . . Practice 3d, § 56.13[1] (where party moves for summary judgment and bears the burden of proof on the . . .

Z. ZINN, v. UNITED STATES, 885 F. Supp. 2d 866 (N.D. Ohio 2012)

. . . 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

SURLES, v. ANDISON,, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012)

. . . 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

TIMBER PRODUCTS INSPECTION, INC. v. COASTAL CONTAINER CORP., 827 F. Supp. 2d 819 (W.D. Mich. 2011)

. . . Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 James William Moore, et al„ Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], . . .

In TFT- LCD FLAT PANEL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

. . . reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.’ ” (quoting 11-56 Moore’s Federal Practice-Civil § 56.13 . . .

ARVEST BANK, v. E. BYRD, L. E., 814 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Tenn. 2011)

. . . (citation omitted); 11 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-162 (3d ed. 2010 . . .

EVANS, v. WALGREEN COMPANY,, 813 F. Supp. 2d 897 (W.D. Tenn. 2011)

. . . (citation omitted); 11 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-162 (3d ed. 2010 . . .

In BROOKE CORPORATION,, 443 B.R. 856 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011)

. . . Stempel, Moore's Federal Practice — Civil, § 56.13[1] (3rd ed. 2010), citing Celotex Corp. v. . . . Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548. . 11 Moore's Federal Practice — Civil, § 56.13[2], citing . . . Id. at § 56.13[4]. . E.g., Lebron v. . . .

E. LEWIN, f b o f b o L. P. v. LIPPER CONVERTIBLES, L. P. LLC, L. P. LLP, L. P. L. P. v. L. P. LLC, L. P. LLP,, 756 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 764 n. 2 (2d Cir.2009); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[4]; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 . . .

In A. BATH, d b a LLC, v. A. d b a LLC,, 442 B.R. 377 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)

. . . See generally 11 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, §§ 56.03[4], 56.13[3] (2006). . . .

TABMAN, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,, 718 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3D, § 2727 at 474 (1998); 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. v. APPLERA CORP., 599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed. 2009) (“[I]f the movant has the burden of persuasion . . .

MULLINS, v. GOODMAN DISTRIBUTION, INC., 694 F. Supp. 2d 782 (S.D. Ohio 2010)

. . . 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

GREEN, a k a Mu v. TUDOR,, 685 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. Mich. 2010)

. . . disbelieve it.’ ” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 James William Moore, Et Al, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

GLOVER, a v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 676 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Mich. 2009)

. . . it.’ ” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting .11 James William Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

ROUSER, v. WHITE,, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

. . . Id., citing 11-56 Moore’s Federal Practice—Civil § 56.13. . . .

E. MONCADA, v. E. PETERS,, 579 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2727 at 474 (1998); 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

In JACOBS, B. v. a k a, 394 B.R. 646 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . MooRE et al., MooRe’s Federal Praotioe ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed.2008) (“[T]he substantive trial burden affects . . .

RENGUETTE, J. R. a v. BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES BROWNS- BURG COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION,, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (S.D. Ind. 2008)

. . . argument precluding summary judgment on the record before the court.” 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

SHAKUR, v. B. SCHRIRO, M., 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008)

. . . powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” 11-56 Moore’s Federal Practice-Civil § 56.13 . . .

ARMOUR, v. G. KNOWLES S. EMI TVT Z EMI V. P. Of LLC, We Do, 512 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2007)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[2], at 56-146 through 56-147 (3d ed.2007); see also Anderson . . .

BRAUNINGER, v. MOTES L. L. C., 260 F. App'x 634 (5th Cir. 2007)

. . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[2], at 146-47 (3d ed.2007); see also Anderson v. . . .

ELLIS, k v. RYCENGA HOMES, INC., 484 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Mich. 2007)

. . . it.’ ” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 James William Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

DRUG MART PHARMACY CORP. v. AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORP., 472 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . See 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed.2000) (citing Williams & Sons Erectors v. S. . . .

L W, INC. v. SHERTECH, INC. W., 471 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-135 (2006) (“[I]f the mov-ant has the burden of persuasion . . .

CLASSIFIED COSMETICS, INC. v. DEL LABORATORIES, INC., 208 F. App'x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-135 (2006). Mr. . . .

v., 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1552 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006)

. . . Moore et. al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed. 2005). . . .

UNITED STATES, v. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006)

. . . Moore et. al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed.2005)). . . .

SAAB CARS USA, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (3d ed.2005). . . .

FEURTADO, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 337 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed.2004). . . .

WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION, v. U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2004)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 56.13(2) (3d ed.1997). 2. . . . See Moore, supra, § 56.13(2). . . .

In J. BALLATO,, 318 B.R. 205 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004)

. . . Moore’s Federal Practice 3d (“Moore’s”), § 56.13[3] at 56-151 (2001). . . . Moore’s §§ 56.11[8] at 56-131; 56.13[4] at 56-153. . . .

WITBECK, v. EMBRY RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, INC., 219 F.R.D. 540 (M.D. Fla. 2004)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶¶ 56.13 & 56.14 (2003). . . .

GRIFFIN, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 287 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . See also 11 James William Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000) . . .

In E. BRESSMAN, B. E. v. E. a a k a a Co. a Co. a a a P. C. a a, 327 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2003)

. . . Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir.1992); 11 Moore, Federal Practice § 56.13[1] p. 56-138. . . .

In E. BRESSMAN, B. E. v. E. a a k a a Co. a Co. a a a P. C. a a, 292 B.R. 229 (3d Cir. 2003)

. . . Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir.1992); 11 Moore, Federal Practice § 56.13[1] p. 56-138. . . .

FRANCO, M. D. v. YALE UNIVERSITY, M. D. M. D. M. D., 238 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D. Conn. 2002)

. . . See 11 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 56.11[1][b], 56.13[2] (3d ed.2002). . . . Id. at § 56.13[2], “Rule 56(e) mandates the entry of summary judgment against the nonmov-ant who fails . . .

In DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENT GROUP, INC. H. C. v., 283 B.R. 87 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, § 56.13[3] at 56-151 (2001) (“Moore’s”). . . . Moore’s §§ 56.11[8] at 56-131; 56.13[4] at 56-153. D. . . . Moore’s §§ 56.11 [8] at 56-131, 56.13[4] at 56-153. In this case, Dr. . . .

ARROYO RODRIGUEZ, v. ECONO SUPERMARKET INC. ABC, 204 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.P.R. 2002)

. . . MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1981) (“The well-settled rule is that cross-motions for . . .

SCOTT, v. MEMORIAL SLOAN- KETTERING CANCER CENTER,, 190 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . Prac.3d § 56.13[4]. . . .

ARNETT, v. T. MYERS,, 281 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2002)

. . . (citing 11 James William Moore et al., MooRe’s FedeRal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed.2000)) ( . . .

In NIKE, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. To, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Or. 2002)

. . . shares were sold between December 27, 2000, and January 18, 2001, at prices ranging from $55.96 to $56.13 . . .

In NEWMAN, v., 304 B.R. 188 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002)

. . . See generally Coquellette, et al. 11 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, §§ 56.13[1], 56.13[3] (1999). . . . Coquellette, et al. 11 Moore’s Federal Practice 3d, §§ 56.13[1] at 56-138 (1999). . . .

COCKREL, v. SHELBY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001)

. . . burden of persuasion on this issue at trial. 11 James William Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

GILBERT IMPORTED HARDWOODS, INC. v. H. HOLLAND, D. A. O. S. P. R., 176 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.W. Va. 2001)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed. 1998) (“If the movant is also the party bearing the . . .

PEER INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC CORP., 161 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.P.R. 2001)

. . . MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1981) (“The well-settled rule is that cross-motions for . . .

DAVIS, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 142 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . See also 11 James William Moore et al„ Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed 2000) (" . . .

LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC CO. INC. v. ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN JUAN OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC CHURCH,, 194 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.P.R. 2001)

. . . Mooee, Moore’s Federal PRACTICE ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1981) (“The well-settled rule is that cross-motions for . . .

In HICKS,, 261 B.R. 306 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . Practice, §§ 56.13-.14 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .

MONTROSE MEDICAL GROUP PARTICIPATING SAVINGS PLAN v. A. BULGER v. A. v., 243 F.3d 773 (3d Cir. 2001)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed.2000), we conclude that MONY and Bulger cannot . . .

LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC CO. INC. v. ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN JUAN OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC CHURCH,, 135 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D.P.R. 2001)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1981) (“The well-settled rule is that cross-motions for . . .

SIMPSON, v. MACON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA Dr. a a a a a a Dr. a Dr. a, 132 F. Supp. 2d 407 (W.D.N.C. 2001)

. . . which the party relies to create a genuine issue of material fact.” 11 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.13 . . .

In DOW CORNING CORPORATION,, 250 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000)

. . . Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; 11 Moore’s Federal Practice, §§ 56.13[3] and 56.30[7] . . .

IOWA RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC. v. WILLIAMS, a, 187 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 1999)

. . . the enforcement of one provision of Iowa’s Campaign Disclosure-Income Tax Check-off Act, Iowa Code § 56.13 . . . Section 56.13(1) of the Iowa Code regulates those independent expenditures. . . . The State seeks to justify section 56.13(1) as serving three alleged compelling state interests. . . . Section 56.13 provides: Independent Expenditures 1. . . . Iowa Code § 56.13(1). The State argues various narrow interpretations of the provision. . . .

In TRANS- END TECHNOLOGY, INC. M. v. D, 228 B.R. 181 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998)

. . . Moore, et al., 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d ed.1992). . . .

HERNDON, E. v. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 28 F. Supp. 2d 379 (W.D. Va. 1998)

. . . reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” 11, Coquillette, et al., Moore’ Federal Practice § 56.13 . . .

ASOCIACION COLOMBIANA EXPORTADORES FLORES, v. UNITED STATES,, 6 F. Supp. 2d 865 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998)

. . . Shareholders A and C, together, effectively owned 56.13 .percent of Santa Helena during the fifth and . . .

v., 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 173 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998)

. . . Shareholders A and C, together, effectively owned 56.13 percent of Santa Helena during the fifth and . . .

In PRYOR, L. MASON, v. PRYOR,, 215 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1997)

. . . Moore, et al., 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d. ed.1992). . . .

E. EVERETT, III, v. UNITED STATES, 980 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1997)

. . . Moore et al„ Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13, at 56-' 171 (2d ed.1994). . . .

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS OF THE UNITED STATES, v. BABBIT,, 949 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13, at 56-171 (2d ed. 1994). . . .

CONOCO INC. Co. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,, 99 F.3d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13, at 56-179 (1996 ed.) . . .

In WAGNER, WAGNER, v. OHIO STUDENT LOAN COMMISSION, L., 200 B.R. 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996)

. . . Moore, et al., 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1992). . . .

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. PARVIZIAN, INC., 944 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13, at 56-171 (2d ed. 1994). . . .

E. STREET CORPORATION, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,, 906 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1995)

. . . Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13, at 56-171 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing effect of cross-motions . . .

v., 102 T.C. 721 (T.C. 1994)

. . . Consequently, it is ripe for summary judgment. 6 Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 56.13, at 56-177 . . . not carry over and support the cross-motion of his adversary. 6 Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, par. 56.13 . . .

HARPER, v. CITY OF CHICAGO HEIGHTS,, 824 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1993)

. . . Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13 (2d ed. 1988). . See, McNeil v. . . .

COOK, v. BABBITT,, 819 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993)

. . . necessarily follow that the cross motion should be granted, see 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, pt. 1, para. 56.13 . . .

S. SCHMIDT, v. FARM CREDIT SERVICES, d b a C R Co., 977 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1992)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 at 56-178 (1988 & Supp.1990); 10 C. Wright, A. . . .

UNITED STATES v. EASTERN OF NEW JERSEY, INC., 770 F. Supp. 964 (D.N.J. 1991)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. . . .

In A. NORTH, S. WHITE, v. A. NORTH,, 108 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice, Para. 56.13 (2d ed. 1988). . . .

L. WATERS, v. THORNBURGH,, 888 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.13[1] at 56-175. See Hartman v. C.W. . . .

BAKER OIL TOOLS, INC. v. GEO VANN, INC. BAKER OIL TOOLS, INC. v. TEXAS IRON WORKS, INC., 828 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987)

. . . See also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[1] (1. — 0] (2d ed. 1987) (“The function of the summary judgment . . .

DIAL CORPORATION, a v. MANGHNANI INVESTMENT CORP. a, 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice IMI 56.13 and 56.12 (1986), one who does so still must sustain a dual prong burden . . .

P. F. MANLEY, v. PLASTI- LINE, INC. A, 808 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1987)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 at 56-341 (2d ed. [1986]). . . . .

UPJOHN COMPANY, v. RIAHOM CORPORATION J. P., 650 F. Supp. 485 (D. Del. 1986)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice 11 56.13[3] (2d ed. 1966). B. . . .

WEBER J. v. DELL, R. P., 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986)

. . . . ¶ 56.13, at 56-348 to 349. . . .

MAY, v. EVANSVILLE- VANDERBURGH SCHOOL CORP., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986)

. . . , Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure '§ 2720 (2d ed. 1983); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 . . . .1978); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2720, at pp. 26-27; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, ¶ 56.13 . . .

In BREECE, W. WOODSON, v. TOM BELL LEASING,, 58 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986)

. . . to the opponent of the motion for summary judgment, see 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed. 1982 ¶[ 56.13 . . .

E. BROCK, v. TIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 785 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1986)

. . . Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at pp. 26-27 (2d ed. 1983); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.13 . . .

In ALITHOCHROME CORPORATION, ALITHOCHROME CORPORATION, v. EAST COAST FINISHING SALES CORPORATION,, 53 B.R. 906 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice If 56.13 at 2247. . . .

In Dr. F. RODRIGUEZ, PEREIRA, As Dr. F. v. UNITED STATES, 50 B.R. 576 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice para. 56.13 at 56-341 (2d ed. 1983). . . .

GANS, G. v. MUNDY, F., 762 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1985)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.13[3] at 56-479 (2d ed. 1983). . . .

WHITTENBERG, Mr. P. NAACP, Dr. T. H. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREENVILLE COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA,, 607 F. Supp. 289 (D.S.C. 1985)

. . . 28.16 31.58 25.44 34.12 16.26 21.23 28.10 25.08 23.48 31.56 9.70 75.00 25.55 21.36 28.62 28.72 16.51 56.13 . . .

In FOREST HILLS ASSOCIATES, a LEVY, Co. v. FOREST HILLS ASSOCIATES,, 40 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)

. . . and Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, ¶ 56.13 . . .

In G. OLIVER, J. EGAN, v. G. OLIVER C., 38 B.R. 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984)

. . . Moore, 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, 11 56.13 (1982). . . .

JOYNER, By LOWRY, v. DUMPSON,, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.13, at 56-348 (2d ed. 1982) (upon concluding that there are no genuine . . .

LUBRIZOL INTERNATIONAL, S. A. v. M V STOLT ARGOBAY,, 562 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, ¶ 56.13. . . . .

In WHITE FARM EQUIPMENT COMPANY, J. HANSEN, v. WHITE FARM EQUIPMENT COMPANY, OFFICIAL CREDITORS COMMITTEE OF WHITE FARM EQUIPMENT CO. v. J. HANSEN,, 23 B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13[3] at 2123-26 (2d ed. 1962)). . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 at 2247 (2d ed. 1968)). As stated in Begnaud v. . . .

J. DONOVAN, v. ATHENIAN MARBLE CORPORATION, 535 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Okla. 1982)

. . . judgment as a matter of law upon facts not the subject of a genuine dispute. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 . . .

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)