The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Although the amended rule borrowed heavily from its federal counterpart (Rule 56) it differs in at least one relevant respect: rule 1.510(a) mandates that the trial court "shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion." (Emphasis added.)We review the district court's summary judgment order de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 71 F.4th 894, 904 (11th Cir. 2023). When conducting our review, we construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep't, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020). Viewing the evidence in that manner, summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).Meanwhile, an off-duty Sumter County Sheriff's Deputy who lived nearby named William Anderson woke up to the sound of a car coming through his yard. (Id., p. 111.) He got out of bed, picked up his identification card and gun, and went outside. (Id.) His brother-in-law Ronnie Robbins, who was at his house, came with him. (Id., p. 113.) Deputy Anderson heard a taser and a deputy trying to control a person who was “actively violently resisting” in the woods. (Id., p. 112.) Robbins heard Deputy Fisher saying to stop resisting and to drop the knife. (Id., p. 104.) Robbins and Deputy Anderson reached Deputy Fisher as Sloan was starting to crawl away after being tased. (Id., p. 56.) Deputy Anderson identified himself, and Deputy Fisher said he needed help. (Id., pp. 56, 113.)The Court has determined the facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, based on the Parties' submissions, including the Stipulation of Agreed Material Facts (Doc. 54). For purposes of summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.On May 3, 2021, Spencer denied Steward's request for a hearing. Id. ¶ 56; (Doc. 28-1 at 12). The denial letter stated there was no further action the union could take on Steward's grievance because the grievance was duplicative of an issue already resolved by Steward's prior litigation. Id. ¶ 78; (Doc. 28-1 at 12). Steward alleges that the union “violated its duty to fairly represent Steward by failing to hold a hearing on [the] grievance letter.” Id. ¶ 64. Steward seeks an order restoring his desired seniority date, enjoining the union from using hiring practices that violate seniority procedures, and awarding monetary damages. Id. at 16-17.The Trustee filed a motion for approval of the settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 on November 14, 2022. See id. at 35-48. Juravin filed an Objection to the Proposed Settlement (“Initial Objection”) on December 2, 2022. Id. at 49-51. After Juravin filed his Initial Objection, he also filed a motion for extension of time so that he could file a “better-substantiated objection.” Id. at 5253. However, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion for extension of time and issued its Order Granting Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 on December 27, 2022, over Juravin's Initial Objection. Id. at 54-57. In that Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that the “Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interest of the estate,” and it stated that the arguments raised by Juravin in his Initial Objection were meritless. Id. at 56. The Bankruptcy Court explained:On a motion for summary judgment, the Court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In addition, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1), the Court may grant summary judgment for the non-moving party “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)(1); see also Gentry v. Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP, 654 F.3d 1247, 1261 (11th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:We cannot say Young's breach of contract claim was erroneously dismissed. A breach of contract claim arises when a defendant fails to make good on a contractual promise. E.g., Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 985 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). But Young does not identify any promise that the Hospital made then failed to keep. Instead, Young's argument is that charging her the ER Visitation Fee breached the Agreement because (1) the Agreement authorized only the imposition of service-related charges, but (2) the ER Visitation Fee "covers overhead, administrative, and operational expenses." The district court rejected both premises. The district court first concluded that the ER Visitation Fee is not the administrative charge that Young made it out it to be. The district court then decided that no matter how one describes the ER Visitation Fee, the Agreement nonetheless authorized the Hospital's imposition of the fee.Evidence presented by the nonmoving party in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and all reasonable factual inferences arising from it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to him or her. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Nonetheless, the nonmoving party still bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. A motion for summary judgment should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.In response to Metrocity's requests to Wright Bros., BOA furnished multiple Comfort Letters and Balance Verification Letters. ¶¶54, 57. These kinds of letters are routinely issued by banks to their clients to provide assurance to third-parties who are considering doing business with the bank's customer. ¶55. Metrocity's sole member, Nathan Saks, received the Letters and relied upon them in deciding to enter into loans and escrow agreements with Wright Bros. ¶¶15, 54, 56, 60. Knowing the average collected balances in, and volume of funds passing through, the Trust Account enabled Metrocity to confirm that the Trust Account was secure and contained the escrow funds previously deposited by Metrocity, which in turn further signified a legitimate aircraft title and escrow operation. ¶58.. . . Schaffer , 429 U.S. 1325, 1330, 97 S.Ct. 14, 50 L.Ed.2d 56 (1976) (Marshall, J., in chambers); see also . . . Schaffer , 429 U.S. 1325, 1330, 97 S.Ct. 14, 50 L.Ed.2d 56 (1976) (Marshall, J., in chambers) (concluding . . .
. . . respondents could not identify the first such legislative subpoena at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 56 . . .
. . . Muller , 296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S.Ct. 183, 80 L.Ed. 158 (1935) ). . . . Trapp , 224 U.S. 665, 667, 32 S.Ct. 565, 56 L.Ed. 941 (1912). . . .
. . . Id ., at 55-56. . . .
. . . Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance are enrolled in a grandfathered plan, while only 56% . . .
. . . Rev. 56 (2014) ; see also Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 Ga. L. . . .
. . . TVA , 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). . . .
. . . See Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56. But other firms may prove less restrained. . . .
. . . TVA , 297 U.S. 288, 346-348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (opinion of Brandeis, J.). . . . Id. , at 347, 56 S.Ct. 466. . . . Id. , at 346, 56 S.Ct. 466. . . . Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1182 (1989). . . .
. . . Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56. We decline to embrace such an uncertain and elastic approach to the text. . . . Rev. 56, 85 (2014) ). . . .
. . . Charlestone Stone Products Co. , 436 U.S. 604, 610, 616, 98 S.Ct. 2002, 56 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). . . . to increase the sexual appeal or attraction of-usu. used with up < titles must be ~ed up to attract 56 . . . Dead, Friendship Wks. 1711 IV. 56 We have had enough of these Christians, and sure there can be no worse . . . to increase the sexual appeal or attraction of-usu. used with up < titles must be ~ed up to attract 56 . . .
. . . Rev. 1, 56-60. . . .
. . . Id. , at 56-57. . . .
. . . See Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo. . . . Oregon , 223 U.S. 118, 149, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912) (same). . . . Stat. 210-211 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, § 4, 12 Stat. 240 (Dakota); Act of Feb. 24, 1863, ch. 56 . . .
. . . United States , 298 U.S. 167, 169-170, 56 S.Ct. 706, 80 L.Ed. 1118 (1936) ("The judge had plenary power . . .
. . . Morales , 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.). . . .
. . . See id ., at 2-56; see also Op. Comp. Gen., B-193573 (Dec. 19, 1979). . . .
. . . New York City Dept. of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 695-701, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). . . . See Brief for Professors of Second Amendment Law et al. as Amici Curiae 10-12; see also App. 51, 56, . . .
. . . 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 . . .
. . . Triplex Safety Glass Co. , 298 U.S. 448, 456-457, 56 S.Ct. 792, 80 L.Ed. 1274 (1936). . . .
. . . Dist., Oct. 11, 2018), App. 56-57; see also Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 Vand. L. . . . Roberts , 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. . . . See ante , at 1404 - 1405, n. 56. . . .
. . . White , 56 N. . . .
. . . Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 56, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Dellmuth v. . . .
. . . Gall , 552 U.S. at 56, 128 S.Ct. 586 ; see United States v. . . . Gall , 552 U.S. at 56, 128 S.Ct. 586. But that fact is not relevant to the issue here. . . .
. . . Proc. 56(c) ). . . .
. . . represents that custody of A.M.T. has so far been resolved only "on an interim basis," Brief for Respondent 56 . . . Brief for Respondent 56, n. 13. . . . Id. , ¶56 (emphasis added) (also considering, among other factors, the infant's physical presence and . . .
. . . See also Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 901 (1943) ; J. . . .
. . . Cuebas y Arredondo , 223 U.S. 376, 390, 32 S.Ct. 277, 56 L.Ed. 476 (1912). . . .
. . . No. 19-56 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . P. 56(c) ; see also Anderson v. . . . before a court, the court examines each motion separately, employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 . . .
. . . Michigan , 547 U.S. 586, 593, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) ). . . .
. . . LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment "if the . . . No. 1] ¶¶ 55-56. The claims are similar but have some differences. . . .
. . . ."); Appellee's Br. 56-57; Appellant's Reply Br. 35-36 ("Both the public interest and the balance of . . .
. . . FDIC , 56 F.3d 1394, 1401 (D.C. Cir.1995). . . . Id . at 1155-56. Parker 's emphasis on bankruptcy court expertise has little salience here. . . . See Parker , 24 F.3d at 1155-56. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . .
. . . I at 155-56. . . . P. 56(a). . . . P. 56(c)(1) (party disputing a fact must provide support for that assertion in the record); Fed. R. . . . P. 56(e) ("If a party ... fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by . . . Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."). . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 848, 854-56, 856 n.4 (W.D. . . .
. . . Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ] for municipal liability . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . Harris , 370 F.3d 945, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hether a statute of limitations for § 1983 actions . . .
. . . Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). . . .
. . . . # 56.) . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . Superior Court , 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. . . .
. . . S1-AR at 56 (2010 PRRB Decision at 10). . . . H-AR at 56-67 (Hillcrest Specialty Hosp. v. Novitas Solutions, Inc. , PRRB 2018-D3 (Nov. 6, 2017)). . . . See S2-Compl. at 56. . . . P. 56(a), (c) ; see Tolan v. . . . Id. at 355-56. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . . To state what should be obvious: An inmate is entitled to the safeguards of Rule 56 just like any other . . .
. . . Id. at col. 5 ll. 52-56. . . .
. . . (quoting Rule of the Court of Federal Claims 56(a) ). . . .
. . . (D.I. 253-56). By trial the parties had narrowed the case to three patents- U.S. . . .
. . . See Notices of Consent to Join (ECF Nos. 39, 44, 54, 56). . . .
. . . the Motion for Reconsideration, Debtor filed her Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 56 . . .
. . . III at 155-56. . . .
. . . Dissenting Op. at 1155-56. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . App'x 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dukagjini , 326 F.3d at 56 ). . . .
. . . Pereira , 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson , 592 F.3d at 755-56 ). . . .
. . . Schriver, 255 F.3d at 56. . . . Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). . . .
. . . Thus, even factoring in overtime, the per diems accounted for around 40-56% of Stone's total weekly income . . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . for Rule 12(c) and provided no substantive analysis of the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 . . . explicitly relied upon in the complaint," the "motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 . . . Conversion of a motion under Rule 12 to one for summary judgment requires that "the procedures of Rule 56 . . . the Pleadings both as "pursuant to Rule 12(c) because it attached factual materials" and "as a Rule 56 . . .
. . . Carson, 802 F.3d 752, 755-56, 758 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom. Hunter v. . . . Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 655-56, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam). Id. Lytle v. . . .
. . . Craft , 436 U.S. 1, 8-9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (implying that a "claim for damages [that . . . Valley Auth. , 297 U.S. 288, 348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[T]he . . . Dep't's Br. at 56. . . . Dep't's Br. at 55-56. Federalist 68 cannot be read fairly to support this interpretation. . . .
. . . Id. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955. . . .
. . . Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ; see also Carswell v. . . . Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). . . . Br. at 56. i. . . . K Mart Corp. , 894 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1990) ; see also Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. . . . Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) ; Hardeman v. . . .
. . . Hill , 890 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 844, 202 L. . . .
. . . determines a defendant's criminal history score based on his or her prior convictions," id. at 155-56 . . . Amendment 802 at 155-56. . . .
. . . Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). . . .
. . . P. 56(a) ). . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . . P. 56(a) ; see Nick's Garage, 875 F.3d at 113-114. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . P. 56(a) ). Hays v. HCA Holdings, Inc. , 838 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harris Cty. v. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). Thomas v. Tregre , 913 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. . . .
. . . Ekhator , 17 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1994) (uncertainty whether sentencing judge "was aware" of authority . . .
. . . Dupont , 565 F.3d 56, 64-66 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding so that the district court could resolve factual . . .
. . . P. 56(a) ; Strickland , 692 F.3d at 1154. . . . Clairson Indus., L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007) ). . . . Dep't of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). . . .
. . . Id. col. 6. ll. 32-56. . . . Appellant's Br. 56. . . . Placebo for Weight Loss in Obese Patients with Depressive Symptoms, 10 Obesity Res. 1049-56 (2002), J.A . . .
. . . Columbia , 831 F.3d at 56-57. Id. at 59. Id. at 57. Id. (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Walton , 56 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1995) ; United States v. . . . in committing" a "conspiracy to distribute cocaine" constituted "aiding and abetting" under § 4B1.1. 56 . . .
. . . P. 56(a). A. . . .
. . . See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 5:56 (15th ed. 2018) ("Breach of contract claims arising out of a . . . a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) or a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 . . .
. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). . . .
. . . See id. at 655-56 & n.9. . . . See Pizzuto I , 202 P.3d at 655-56. The court concluded that the trial court did not err. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . P. 56 ). . . . P. 56(a) (providing that a party may move for partial summary judgment); Biel v. St. . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . . Blackstone, Commentaries *55-56). . . .
. . . P. 56(a) ; see Celotex Corp. v. . . . P. 56(c)(1)(A). . . .
. . . Hr'g Tr, p. 56 at 14-25; p. 57 at 1-14. . . . Among the cases construing the Brunner standard most generously is In re Bene , 474 B.R. 56 (Bankr. . . . Hr'g Tr. p. 56 at 14-25; p. 57 at 1-14. . . . 2004) (analyzing income-based repayment in the good faith context)); see also In re Bene , 474 B.R. 56 . . .
. . . The Amended Proof of Claim was filed 56 days after the filing of the original Proof of Claim, and 42 . . .
. . . The Rule 56(d) Issue A. . . . Rule 56(d) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides that, unless local court rules or a case-specific . . . Appellate courts review decisions on Rule 56(d) motions for abuse of discretion. Sterk v. . . . Before the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(d) was 56(f). . . . (f) remain applicable, but we describe them using the current designation of 56(d). . . .
. . . Id. at 1155-56. . . .
. . . IRS , 56 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1995). . . .
. . . District Court outlined the legal standards for both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 . . . Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). . . .
. . . P. 56(a). . . .
. . . Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41, 56, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) ). . . .
. . . Cory & Assocs., Inc. , 341 F.3d 644, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2003) ; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. . . .
. . . Norden Sys., Inc. , 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998). . . . Columbia Univ. , 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that, under Title IX, the claims of an accused . . . Danzer , 151 F.3d at 56 ; see note 47, ante . App. 1378. Id. at 1376. Id . at 1377. . . . Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that § 1983 liability cannot be premised on "respondeat superior . . .
. . . Dissent Op. 355-56. . . .
. . . See id . at 155-56. . . .
. . . Irex Corp. , 909 F.3d 151, 155-56 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). . . . P. 56(c) ). . . .
. . . P. 56, on his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago and several of its police officers . . . P. 56(a). . . .