56.15
Executions; stay of illegal writs.
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56.15 Executions; stay of illegal writs.—If any execution issues illegally, the judgment debtor may obtain a stay by making and delivering an affidavit to the officer having the execution, stating the illegality and whether any part of the execution is due, with a bond with surety payable to the judgment creditor in double the amount of the execution or the part of which a stay is sought conditioned to pay the execution or part claimed to be illegal and any damages for delay if the affidavit is not well founded. On receipt of such affidavit and bond the officer shall stay proceedings on the execution and return the bond and affidavit to the court from which the execution issued. The court shall pass on the question of illegality as soon as possible. If the execution is adjudged illegal in any part, the court shall stay it as to the part but if it is adjudged legal in whole or in part, the court shall enter judgment against the principal and surety on such bond for the amount of so much of the execution as is adjudged to be legal and execution shall issue thereon.
History.—ss. 2, 3, Feb. 15, 1834; RS 1195; GS 1624; RGS 2828; CGL 4515; s. 11, ch. 67-254; s. 9, ch. 2016-33.
Note.—Former s. 55.37.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1959–2025 · leading case: Settecasi v. Board of Public Instruction
Settecasi v. Board of Public Instruction (1963)
“This burden is upon the movant irrespective of whether he or his opponent would at trial have the burden of proof on the issue concerned, and it rests on the movant whether he is by it required to show the existence or non-existence of facts.”
Fish Carburetor Corp. v. Great American Ins. Co. (1961)
“Appellee failed, however, to cross-assign as error the court's indirect denial of its motion for directed verdict, and we are therefore precluded from considering the propriety of the court's action in this regard. Reversed and remanded for new trial.”
Visingardi v. Tirone (1965)
“NOTES [1] 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15(3), p. 2128. * * * "In determining whether the moving party has satisfied his burden it is helpful to refer to the theory underlying a motion for a directed verdict, for functionally the motion for summary judgment and the motion for…”
Well-Bilt Products, Inc. v. Liechty (1964)
“2165, Section 56.15(8) states: “Discretion plays no real role in the grant of summary judgment: the grant of summary judgment must be proper under the above principles or the grant is subject to reversal.”
Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier (1959)
“, § 56.15(3). As previously pointed out, the defense of waiver would necessarily imply the prior existence of a contract of employment, and attempt to bar recovery by reason of subsequent acts or conduct constituting waiver.”
Berlanti Construction Co. v. Miami Beach Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (1966)
“” (Emphasis added) * «5» * * * 4» We think the appropriate rule is set forth in 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.15(4), (2d ed. 1965), wherein it is stated: * * * * * * “The general and well settled rule is that the court should not resolve a genuine issue of credibility at the…”
Ferrari Financial Services, Inc. v. 170 NE 40 Street, Inc. (2025)
“See § 56.15, Fla. Stat. (2024) (“If any execution issues illegally, the judgment debtor may obtain a stay by making and delivering an affidavit to the officer having the execution, stating the illegality and whether any part of the execution is due, with a bond with surety…”
Smith v. Continental Insurance (1973)
“See 6 Moore, Federal Practice § 56.15 [5]. Reversed and remanded. HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ.”
Time Financial Services, Inc. v. Hilliard Mobile Homes, Inc. (1976)
“No effort was made by appellees to comply with F.S. 56.15. That statute provides that upon receipt by the officer having the execution of the affidavit and bond therein provided for “The officer shall stay proceedings on the execution and return the bond and affidavit to the…”
— 56.15(1) — 1 case
Fish Carburetor Corp. v. Great American Ins. Co. (1961)
“Appellee failed, however, to cross-assign as error the court's indirect denial of its motion for directed verdict, and we are therefore precluded from considering the propriety of the court's action in this regard. Reversed and remanded for new trial.”
— 56.15(3) — 2 cases
Visingardi v. Tirone (1965)
“NOTES [1] 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15(3), p. 2128. * * * "In determining whether the moving party has satisfied his burden it is helpful to refer to the theory underlying a motion for a directed verdict, for functionally the motion for summary judgment and the motion for…”
Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier (1959)
“, § 56.15(3). As previously pointed out, the defense of waiver would necessarily imply the prior existence of a contract of employment, and attempt to bar recovery by reason of subsequent acts or conduct constituting waiver.”
— 56.15(4) — 1 case
Berlanti Construction Co. v. Miami Beach Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (1966)
“” (Emphasis added) * «5» * * * 4» We think the appropriate rule is set forth in 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.15(4), (2d ed. 1965), wherein it is stated: * * * * * * “The general and well settled rule is that the court should not resolve a genuine issue of credibility at the…”
— 56.15(8) — 1 case
Well-Bilt Products, Inc. v. Liechty (1964)
“2165, Section 56.15(8) states: “Discretion plays no real role in the grant of summary judgment: the grant of summary judgment must be proper under the above principles or the grant is subject to reversal.”
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